

NewBot Loader. By: Jason Reaves and Joshua Platt | by Jason Reaves | Walmart Global Tech Blog | Mar, 2024

 medium.com/walmartglobaltech/newbot-loader-81e2ba11c793

Jason Reaves

March 12, 2024

```
: AssemblyVersion("1.0.0.0")
: Debuggable(DebuggableAttribute.DebuggingModes.Default)
: AssemblyCompany("")
: AssemblyConfiguration("")
: AssemblyCopyright("Copyright © 2024")
: AssemblyDescription("")
: AssemblyFileVersion("1.0.0.0")
: AssemblyProduct("NewBot.Loader.Infrastructure")
: AssemblyTitle("NewBot.Loader.Infrastructure")
: AssemblyTrademark("")
: CompilationRelaxations(8)
: RuntimeCompatibility(WrapNonExceptionThrows = true)]
: ComVisible(false)]
: Guid("43FA7D66-6D96-4693-8C41-EC79AFB113A5")]
```

By: Jason Reaves and Joshua Platt

Another day another new loader. During our research lately, we have discovered several new malware loaders that appear to be targeting corporate and enterprise environments.

This one calls itself NewBot Loader:

The loader is slightly obfuscated but some strings can still be seen giving a bit of insight into the capabilities.

```
<CloseShell>b__0<OpenShell>b__0<GetShell>b__0<GetInstalledEdr>b__0<GetBytes>b__0<Inject>b__0<Exec
```

The rest of the strings are loaded as single bytes:

We can recover them pretty easily though by hexlifying the entire binary and doing a regex:

```
>>> t = re.findall(r''[a2,01]2520.{8}20..'', d)>>> tt = [(x[-2:], x) for x in t]>>> tt =
[(chr(int(x[0],16)), x[1]) for x in tt]>>> tt[0]('\x00', '12520000000002000')>>> out = "">>> for
val in tt:... if val[1][0] == '1':... out += '\n'... out += val[0]...>>>
out'\n\x00\nOpening new shell...\ncmd.exe\n/k\n[\n] - \nInfo\nError\n[\n] - \nError\n[\n] -
\n{0}:{1}\nClient {0} connecting to {1}...\nUnable to perform handshake.\nClient {0} connected to
{1}...\nUnable to connect listener: \n{0} received.\nSending {0} callback...\nDisconnecting
{0}...\nDisconnected {0}...\nUnable to extract key from encoded
payload.\nSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\nNewBot.Loader\nNewBot.Loader\nU
```

Decoded strings are appended to end of this blog, the config is mostly based on random data and a generated GUID but finding the calls to this involve going through the control flow obfuscation that is common in .NET involving overloaded class methods. We are going to briefly walk through a few relevant code blocks below:

To find where this gets used we start with the below code following the built string 'Loader started...':

The first call Xoshiro sets up the registry key persistence via a run key. Next a new object is created which is also where our config is setup inside the Partner function, this object is then passed to Intx which just sets the internal Fixups variable to the new object:

This gets later used and what is passed in is the C2 host and port that is also decoded from the strings:

There is also a lot of strings related to AV, EDR and analyst tools which appear to mostly come from OSINT code[1]. These strings are loaded into a string array named Hierarchy:

Later these names are retrieved in another piece of code. The manual function called just returns the previous array. Next, a few directory locations are loaded:

The loaded directories are:

```
C:\Program Files (x86)C:\Program FilesC:\ProgramData
```

The loader will then look for any sub folder containing the strings:

Decoded strings allude to encoded payload extraction. The extraction routine reads in the first 16 bytes to acquire a key that will be utilized in the decoding routine. Unfortunately, we were unable to retrieve a payload at the time of our writing.

```
using (MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream(older, 0, older.Length)) { byte[]
array = new byte[16]; int num = memoryStream.Read(array, 0, 16); bool flag = num < 16;
if (flag) { throw new Exception(string.Concat(new string[] { "Unable to extract
key from encoded payload." })); }
```

Decoded strings

References

1: <https://github.com/PwnDexter/SharpEDRChecker>