Ghidra Tutorial - Using Entropy To Locate a Cobalt Strike Decryption Function

embee-research.ghost.io/ghidra-entropy-analysis-locating-decryption-functions/

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Using <u>Ghidra</u> to analyse malware can be a difficult and daunting task. This task is often complicated through the use of <u>encryption</u> and the general complexity of using Ghidra for the first time.

In this blog, I will demonstrate a simple workflow that you can use to speed up this process.

By using the entropy view within Ghidra, you can quickly hone in on functions related to encryption, and use this to identify areas that you can analyse in a debugger or develop into Yara rules.

In this short blog, I will be using the sample 480c5f297ec7d30d21449ab950f6dd3cdfeb78c591b5e3450c2d6027f8be2e72

Link to File Here

Initial Analysis

The initial file I'll be using is a 64-bit dll file that was initially marked as cobalt strike.

Detect It Easy v3.01					- 🗆 X
File name					
C:\Users\Lenny\Desktop	o\malware\Cobalt\480c5f297ec7d30d	21449ab950f6dd3d	dfeb78c591b5e3450c2d6027f	f8be2e72	
File type	Entry point		Base address		MIME
PE64 -	00000018001c33c >	Disasm	00000018000000	Memory map	Hash
PE	Export Import	Resources	.NET TLS	Overlay	Strings
Sections	TimeDateStamp Sir	zeOfImage	Resources		Entropy
0005 >	2021-08-03 05:45:38	0004e000	Manifest	Version	
Scan	Endianness	Mode	Architecture	Туре	Hex
Detect It Easy(DiE)	- LE	64	AMD64	DLL	
compiler	Microsoft Visual C	C/C++(2012 upda	te 4)[-]	S	
linker	Microsoft Li	inker(11.0)[DLL64		S ?	
					Options
Signatures			Deep scan		About
	100%	> Lo	g 237 msec	Scan	Exit

During initial analysis, I typically view use the entropy view of <u>Detect-it-easy</u> to identify if there are any large areas of high entropy, which typically indicates encrypted content. These areas are something that I tend to hone in on in my next step of analysis.

In this case, there are no indications of high entropy or packing.



Since there are no significant sections of high-entropy, I will instead use <u>Ghidra</u> to hone in further.

The lack of large high-entropy areas suggests that there are no embedded payloads. However, there may be smaller areas of high entropy that contain configuration data (c2's, url's) or otherwise useful information.

We can try and use Ghidra to determine this further.

Cobalt Strike Analysis With Ghidra

After loading the file inside of Ghidra, a screen like this is presented. This is a lot of information and generally a difficult place to start.



There are lots of things you can do from here, but for the purpose of this blog I will be honing in on Entropy, and using the entropy to identify decryption functions that can be used in a Yara rule.

To achieve this, a few steps need to be taken

- Enable the entropy view
- Locate any areas of High-entropy (typically indicated by red blobs)
- Use the "most recent label" to locate the beginning of high-entropy areas
- Observe any cross-references to the start of the high-entropy area (This shows any function that is acting on the entropy, typically this will be a decryption method)
- If a decryption method is found, look for unique instructions that can be used in a <u>Yara</u> rule.
- Additionally Use a debugger (like <u>x64dbg</u>) to analyse the decryption function.

Enabling the Entropy View in Ghidra

Enabling the entropy view is simple. You can use the top-right box to enable a dropdown menu that contains the "Show Entropy" setting.



With the entropy view enabled, a small window shows up that enables you to view entropy within the file.

High Entropy Areas are indicated by Red blobs. The red blobs can be clicked to jump straight to the high-entropy section.

E Listing: cobalt_430.bit	18001c324 77 96 18001c324 77 96 18001c324 77 96 18001c329 49 0f af d9 18001c324 77 18 0c 01 00 00 18001c334 48 8b f3 18001c337 74 05 18001c339 8b 4f 24	UMF JA LAB_18001c326 MOV IMUL TEST MOV JZ MOV	param_4,XXX LAB_18001c2bc RBX,R14 RBX,param_4 dword ptr [RDI + 0x14 RSI,RBX LAB_18001c33e param_1,dword ptr [R]	xREF[1]: This is the entrop hone in on entro secti	18001c2: by view by usin ons	ت ایا دد (j) A. Young the	can red	<pre> Due to the second se</pre>	compile: entry longlong entr longlong IVa uint uVar2; ulong *puVar ulonglong uV FILE *pFVar7 undefined uV FILE *pFVar7
Eisting: cobalt_480.	ulonglong uint undefined8 ulonglong undefined undefined undefined undefined	<pre>RAX:8 ECX:4 RDX:8 R8:8 Stack[0x28]: Stack[0x30]: Stack[0x30]: Stack[0x40]:</pre>	<return> param_1 param_2 param_3 param_4 1 param_5 1 param_6 1 param_7 1 param_8</return>					20 21 22 23 24 25	underined uv short *_MaxC ulonglong *u short *unaff ulonglong un uint uVarll; short *unaff undefined8 i

Locating A Decryption Function With Ghidra

I tend to start with the largest red blob first. Clicking on the larger red blob shows the following view.

Initially this is just a blob of encrypted bytes. More information can be extracted by jumping to the beginning of the blob area.

🖽 Listing: col					h 🛍 🍾	= 1	📩 📕 -	×C
	1800374df	c ??	B6h				- II	
	1800374e0 b	1 ??						
	1800374e1 6	7??						
	1800374e2 0	a ??						
	1800374e3 0	c ??						
	1800374e4 b	a ??						
	1800374e5 6	a ??					- 5	
	1800374e6 0	3??						
	1800374e7 0	2?						
	1800374e8 a	7 ??	A7h					10
	1800374e9 7	d ??						11
	1800374ea 1	8 ??						12
	1800374eb 1	0 ??						13
	1800374ec a	c ??	ACh					14
\rightarrow	1800374ed 7							15
	1800374ee 1	1 ??						10
	1800374ef 1	e ??	1Eh					1
	1800374f0 9	d ??					- 15	18
	1800374f1 5	3 ??					- 18	19
	1800374f2 2	e ??					112	
	1800374f3 3	4 ??						
	1800374f4 9	6 ??						22
	1800374f5 5	e ??					- 18	23
	1800374f6 2	7 ??						24
	1800374f7 3	a ??						25
	1800374f8 8	b ??						
	1800374f9 4	9 ??					12	
	1800374fa 3	c ??						
								\square
🔚 Listing: c	obalt_480.bin × 🛛 🚓 f	Function Graph ×						

To locate the start of the encrypted blob, we can use the "Go To Previous Label" button, making sure to set the arrow direction to "UP".

Graph	Navigat	ion Se	earch	Select	Tools	Window	ı Help					CodeBr	owser: proje	ect:/col	balt_480.k	oin
• 8• 8•	Б 1	6 1	I D	υL	FΥ	в -	(a (a)	n @	1	S 🗉 🛅 🤇	C ₆	🕞 🎞 🤶	- 🖬 🖪 🖁		b	
🖬 📴	<u>≥</u> ×	🔚 Lis		balt_48	0.bin											- - 1
					1800 1900 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800	0374df 0374e1 0374e1 034e2 0374e3 0374e3 0374e4 0374e5 0374e6 0374e7 0374e7	00 b1 67 0a 0c 6a 03 02		22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22	B6h B1h 67h OAh OCh BAh 6Ah 03h 02h	j					
		^			101	use th	y the ne "La	abel" l	or the outton	with a	direc	ction c	ve war of "UP"	it to		
	-2				Т	his w	rill jur	np to	the st	art of th	e en	icrypte	ed blob	-		
<u> </u>	• X				180 180 180	0374f2 : 0374f3 : 0374f4 : 0374f5 :	2e 34 96 5e		?? ?? ?? ??	2Eh 34h 96h 5Eh	- 4 ^					

This will move the screen to the beginning of the encrypted blob, in this case the beginning was found at DAT_1800373a0. We can also see that this location is referenced 8 times by the function FUN_180027a80.

In most cases, this is a very strong indicator that FUN_180027a80 is the function responsible for decrypting the blob.

🖽 Listing: cob	alt_480.bin			
	18003739b c2	??		
	18003739c 54	??	54h	
	18003739d 4d	??		Cross references
	18003739e aa	??	AAh	
	18003739f cc	??	CCh	
				<pre>XREF[8]: FUN_180027a80:1800286d5(*), FUN_180027a80:1800286dc(*), FUN_180027a80:18002874e(*),</pre>
				FUN_180027a80:180028755(*), FUN_180027a80:1800287c7(*), FUN_180027a80:1800287ce(*), FUN_180027a80:18002840(*),
→	1800373>0 f7		F7b	FUN_180027a80:180028847(*)
	1800373a1 da	??	DAb	
	1800373a2 ec	??		
	1800373a3 41	??	41h	the first the state of the stat
	1800373a4 fc	??	FCh	Using go to previous label, the beginning
	1800373a5 d7			of the encrypted blob has been identified.
	1800373a6 e5			
	1800373a7 4f			This blob is referenced 8 times by
	1800373a8 e1			
	1800373a9 c0			FUN_10002/880.
	1800373aa fe			
	1800373ab 5d			
	1800373ac ea			
	1800373ad cd			

Clicking on any of the references takes us to the responsible function.



Scrolling down slightly reveals a significant number of bitwise operators such as XOR $^{\wedge}$ and SHR >>.

This is generally a strong indicator of an encryption/decryption function.



At this point, we can have high confidence that the decryption method has been identified.

There are a few interesting things that can be done here.

- Ask ChatGPT to identify the type of Encryption/Decryption Used
- Try to extract bytes that can be used in a Yara rule
- Use a debugger to obtain the decoded results.

Using ChatGPT to Identify an Encryption Function

To identify the type of decryption/encryption used, I copied out the entire decompiled function as asked ChatGPT if it could identify it.

To do this, I asked Can you identify the type of encryption or decryption used in this ghidra decompiled code? and then pasted in the entire function.

	+ ⁺ GPT-4	
E	Can you identify the type of encryption or decryption used in this ghidra decompiled code?	C
,	undefined8 FUN_180027a80(byte *param_1,int param_2,int param_3,uint *param_4)	
	{ uint uVar1; undefined8.uVar2:	
	Tougraphed that the energy of an type was AEC. I nere anally depit know on	augh chaut

ChatGPT suggested that the encryption type was AES. I personally don't know enough about AES to confirm this, but it's a useful suggestion and probably correct.

At this point you could try to identify the decryption key and write a script to decode the encoded data using an AES library.

The decompiled code you've shared is part of the key expansion process for the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm. The key indicators include:	ዕፊዋ	
1. The various key lengths checked: 0×10 (128 bits), 0×18 (192 bits), and 0×20 (256 bits) are standard AES key sizes.		
2. The use of S-box lookups in the code (referenced by the addresses like `&DAT_180036fa0` ,		
`&DAT_1800373a0` , etc.).		
3. The cyclic shifting and substitution operations.		
4. The function `FUN_18002a060` likely computes the AES key schedule's round constants or		
involves some AES-specific transformation (like the SubWord operation followed by an		
Rcon addition).		
5. The generation and expansion of keys, as seen by the loop structures and bitwise		
operations.		
The code performs key expansion to generate round keys from the initial key, which will be		
used in the encryption of decryption process of AES.		

Extracting Encryption Bytes For a Yara Rule

With the encryption function identified, you can try to find bytecodes that can be turned into a Yara rule.

This works best when the malware uses its own unique encryption/decryption function. It may not be the best here (since the AES usage may not be unique on its own), but it's something that can work for a lot of malware.

(Here's an example where it worked well for IcedID)

To create a Yara rule, you want to look for blobs that contain at least 2 math/bitwise operators. (XOR, SHR, SHL etc). From there you can extract bytecodes that can be used for Yara rules.



Extracting Decoded Content With a Debugger

With knowledge of the decryption function and location of encrypted content, you can use a debugger to set breakpoints and extract information of interest.

To do this, you can either set a software breakpoint on the encryption/decryption function. Then jump to the end of the function and find the register or location containing decrypted content.

OR

With knowledge of where the encrypted content is located, you can set a hardware breakpoint on the location and receive an alert when it is acted on.

Both of these methods will achieve the same result. This is something I may write about in another blog post.

Conclusion

In this post, we have used Ghidra to identify an encryption function present inside a Cobalt strike sample. We have identified an area of high entropy and also identified that the encryption used might be AES.

This information can be leveraged further to identify the decrypted contents via debugger, or to develop a Yara rule based on bytecodes present in the encryption.