

# New SVCReady malware loads from Word doc properties – Detection & Response

<https://socinvestigation.com/new-svcready-malware-loads-from-word-doc-properties-detection-response/>

June 10, 2022

IOC


By

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An unknown malware loader named SVCReady has been discovered in phishing attacks, featuring an unusual way of loading the malware from Word documents onto compromised machines.

More specifically, it uses VBA macro code to execute a shellcode stored in the properties of a document that arrives on the target as an email attachment.

According to a new report by HP, the malware has been under deployment since April 2022, with the developers releasing several updates in May 2022. This indicates that it is currently under heavy development, likely still at an early stage.

However, it already supports information exfiltration, persistence, anti-analysis features, and encrypted C2 communications.


**Also Read: [Symbiote malware infects all running processes on Linux systems](#)**

### **SVCReady starts with an email**

The infection chain begins with a phishing email carrying a malicious .doc attachment. However, contrary to the standard practice of using PowerShell or MSHTA via malicious macros to download payloads from remote locations, this campaign uses VBA to run shellcode hiding in the file properties.

**Also Read: [Black Basta Ransomware operators leverage QBot for lateral movements](#)**

As shown below, this shellcode is stored in the properties of the Word document, which is extracted and executed by the macros.



### **Shellcode hidden in document properties (HP)**

By splitting the macros from the malicious shell code, the threat actors attempt to bypass security software that may normally detect it.

“Next the shellcode, which is located in the document properties, is loaded into a variable. Different shellcode is loaded depending on if the architecture of the system is 32 bit or 64 bit,” explains [HP’s report](#).

The appropriate shell code is loaded into memory from where it will use the Windows API function “Virtual Protect” to acquire executable access rights.

Next, the SetTimer API passes the address of the shellcode and executes it. This action results in a DLL (malware payload) dropping into the %TEMP% directory. A copy of “rundll32.exe”, a legitimate Windows binary, is also placed in the same directory under a different name and is eventually abused to run SVCReady.

**Also Read: [New ‘DogWalk’ Windows zero-day gets free unofficial patches – Detection & Response](#)**

## Detection Queries

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### Microsoft Defender

```
DeviceProcessEvents | where (((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith @"\\WINWORD.exe") or (FolderPath endswith @"\\WINWORD.exe") or (ProcessCommandLine contains "WINWORD.exe")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains @"\AppData\Local\Temp") and (ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\[\w\.\.]+\d11|\\[\w\.\.]+\d.exe'))
```

### CrowdStrike

```
((ParentBaseFileName="*\\WINWORD.exe") OR (ImageFileName="*\\WINWORD.exe") OR (CommandHistory="*WINWORD.exe*") OR (CommandLine="*WINWORD.exe*")) AND ((CommandHistory="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp*") OR (CommandLine="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp*")) AND (regex field=CommandHistory '['\\\\\\\\[\\w\\\\.]+\\\\.dll|\\\\\\\\[\\w\\\\.]+\\\\.exe']" OR regex field=CommandLine '['\\\\\\\\[\\w\\\\.]+\\\\.dll|\\\\\\\\[\\w\\\\.]+\\\\.exe']")
```

### Elastic Query

```
((process.parent.executable:*\\WINWORD.exe OR process.executable:*\\WINWORD.exe OR process.command_line:*WINWORD.exe*) AND process.command_line:*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp* AND (process.command_line:/\\[\\w\\.]+\\.dll|\\[\\w\\.]+\\.exe/))
```

### CarbonBlack

```
((parent_name:*\\WINWORD.exe OR process_name:*\\WINWORD.exe OR process_cmdline:*WINWORD.exe*) AND process_cmdline:*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp* AND (process_cmdline:/\\[\\w\\.]+\\.dll|\\[\\w\\.]+\\.exe/))
```

## Fireeye Helix

```
(metaclass:\windows` (pprocess:`*\WINWORD.exe` OR process:`*\WINWORD.exe` OR args:\WINWORD.exe`) args:\AppData\Local\Temp` args:/['\\\\[\\w\\.]+\\.dll|\\\\[\\w\\.]+\\.exe']/)
```

## Google Chronicle

```
(principal.process.file.full_path = /**\WINWORD\.exe/ or target.process.file.full_path = /**\WINWORD\.exe/ or target.process.command_line = /**\WINWORD\.exe.*/) and target.process.command_line = /**\AppData\\Local\\Temp.*/ and target.process.command_line = /\\[\\w\\.]+\\.dll|\\[\\w\\.]+\\.exe/
```

## MS Sentinel

```
SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4688 | where (((ParentProcessName endswith @"\WINWORD.exe") or (NewProcessName endswith @"\WINWORD.exe") or (CommandLine contains 'WINWORD.exe')) and (CommandLine contains @"\AppData\Local\Temp') and (CommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\[\\w\\.]+\\.dll" or CommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\[\\w\\.]+\\.exe"))
```

## Splunk

```
(source="WinEventLog:*" AND ((ParentImage="*\\WINWORD.exe") OR (Image="*\\WINWORD.exe") OR (CommandLine="*WINWORD.exe*")) AND (CommandLine="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp*") | rex field=CommandLine "\\(?P<payload>[\\w\\.]+\\.dll)|\\(?P<renamed_file>[\\w\\.]+\\.exe)"
```

## Indicators of Compromise

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```
501D971E548139153C64037D07B4E3FEA2C1735A37774531C88CFA95BA660EC3  
99DF2CC2535C82B84BA23384DF290D7506242532123D8414C1CFC61967072C28  
C6C080A63DD038D11CD6E724D2DE31108CABE7B6E38F674FE8189696886582AF  
D270E1CA349DAA668E0807BE65ECA75CC739008A39E283F922A8728C22663417  
6C9FD23D88239D819E0B494E589B665C4E7921ED9B9DD0BBBD1610D71230BCF81  
F47514C680135C7D4285F2284D5621245463F55A901C38F171DCE445695AC533  
9F7124303F1C957F7E02F275F3501CBAA6E0645A6D78B50617A97761DC611CFF  
4C1DD6A893F86A150E003118148C655044D06E8300678CF6BF3CC3107B91B66C  
FCB325D21D1100269731553015D6D0F85143DAE2BFA6CBAF49AC6DA29F1F732E  
939863285773B17623F0F027FAAE8B994BF5FC1AFB182C63A026431C71CD3885  
65A650DD353EA767EF68CF4627436977E6D55102D699B2E8B8DE491DA5C0A5EB  
134D0B10BAC1404FA1DA83C96C08E0882500819DAAD5F49E9E83C92F2A624B3E  
F2FADD7A8B88DA62228DAB8981638B5C9F5512A57A0441B57C2B3A29B0A96012  
0D55564A2BED4FF06BC8B1DAAB98E2032C39536DAA31878E16FED29BC987A4D1
```

A8EED171FDCB2A872865620FC2234E0B07201D927ABCB65344846F6D4A7B75F5  
C24266CC16D65F0B8D72BB7DF80A6B2FFE343429A764AFB9FB0A9C20D53AB9AF  
50FBE350CC660361B919F5E464DA6D6170F35EF497327AE5DEFC7805E76D5568  
C362D9EEFAFB44D4116B4DFABD5945E974C8A010221705E021490EFBF34BC3A3  
68617985E8AB455316C18172723FBD2748DE58008714C4CB3F7C6F19D326F135  
65E551F7093299A9A20EAF536197C19ABBDD51B95B9570EDAC4950D7C951AD92  
D8AEC5539973927EB07A23BA4DE3780D28C2DD2D6DBBC697562A44B30CD3B03F  
CA61DE1E2442C16C280EB7264D6B7F79EC92CDC10D1C202EFB028DA5F242F83A  
74652EAE27C9F5A5C397EACC76DAF768B3E601F106E8539C7D855712AB185E40  
0224B906741F248D8BCEDAFAEF423B58FFB1B4577EC06711293F7065B12AE71788  
FDABB1F5B7691F03B2D89FEB8B0D4E3FD036F9B4E718269CAD8741C7E4D14072  
FD799D99F7E84436F8AF16D94EE7B2F1D08CA3CEE746E1CF9B36E2139D676E4C  
4A2E76B57DE10C687716A1D7A295910CC5C0D04F5D10D4F4C53AE1BDE45A251C  
9122092980BC0ED9C9B008C5456CC18656C41798585B8819F1D6F2620CAC3CF3  
391D134B792FB660426F183755AD00DBD737F521CFF1F9A12D402CD714D34645  
B67120F25963D36560CBB86B35E864F608536ABEF7C3377F46997D65BAD13CAA  
5170461322CB1A79ABB84FEED75B7F871B6F1594562E7724C45D7BB98F97C86B  
4B8627B5896A0656E801A95B16068F84660F1460A247E712651E0945EB4309CB  
95E328A549247F900DA5747F7E2057DEF121D2EDA82CFD7E926A6955C797D317  
AFA40C3157F2704ABA4838A7308B53A4853176AF86982CE2999AA4DF3AC7BB9C  
00FD57B32A3DF737C274D2184663DE4EDC22A4E003419C1B10B262E66995EE23  
5B7FBEC223DEB714DC7A4037348936A27D86B061CB2120213D5A69849CC9B588  
FA6F5695AC2530B486FDD6FE8096AAAF65081BC092AB874545628C61E1403919  
C86A477579188305132DAB40700D06FFF9E26B5CE627233FB9D20DA1DFC74B47  
748352146AB86EA1A32DFED0B0D5FAC0EFC52728BCCD79476B74FB73517EFB21

## DLLs

08e427c92010a8a282c894cf5a77a874e09c08e283a66f1905c131871cc4d273  
16851d915aaddf29fa2069b79d50fe3a81ecaafd28cde5b77cb531fe5a4e6742  
1d3217d7818e05db29f7c4437d41ea20f75978f67bc2b4419225542b190432fb  
235720bec0797367013cbdc1fe9bbdde1c5d325235920a1a3e9499485fb72dba  
39c955c9e906075c11948edd79ffc6d6fcc5b5e3ac336231f52c3b03e718371e  
5e932751c4dea799d69e1b4f02291dc6b06200dd4562b7ae1b6ac96693165cea  
d3e69a33913507c80742a2d7a59c889efe7aa8f52beef8d172764e049e03ead5  
f690f484c1883571a8bbf19313025a1264d3e10f570380f7aca3cc92135e1d2e

## Domains

muelgadr[.]top  
wikidreamers[.]com  
galmerts[.]art  
marualosa[.]top  
kikipi[.]art  
kokoroklo[.]su

Source: <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-svcready-malware-loads-from-word-doc-properties/>

| [SVCReady: A New Loader Gets Ready.](#)

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