

SANS ISC: InfoSec Handlers Diary Blog - SANS Internet Storm Center SANS Site Network Current Site SANS Internet Storm Center Other SANS Sites Help Graduate Degree Programs Security Training Security Certification Security Awareness Training Penetration Testing Industrial Control Systems Cyber Defense Foundations DFIR Software Security Government OnSite Training InfoSec Handlers Diary Blog

 isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28448

Qakbot infection with Cobalt Strike and VNC activity.

Published: 2022-03-16

Last Updated: 2022-03-16 05:27:22 UTC

by [Brad Duncan](#) (Version: 1)

[0 comment\(s\)](#)


Introduction

On Monday 2022-03-14, I infected a vulnerable Windows host with Qakbot (Qbot) malware. Approximately 17 hours later, the infected host generated traffic for Cobalt Strike and VNC (Virtual Network Computing) activity. Like Cobalt Strike, VNC provides remote access to an infected host.

DLL files used for Qakbot infections have tags in the code that identify the malware sample's distribution channel. In this case, the distribution tag was obama166.


Today's diary provides a quick review of the infection activity.

2022-03-14 (MONDAY) - QAKBOT (OBAMA166 DISTRIBUTION)




Shown above: Flow chart for Qakbot infection activity on Monday 2022-03-14.


Images From the Infection




Shown above: Example of email for obama166 distribution Qakbot on Monday 2022-03-14.



Shown above: Downloading a zip archive from link in an email.



Shown above: Excel spreadsheet extracted from downloaded zip archive.




Shown above: DLL files downloaded for Qakbot infection.

(http.request or tls.handshake.type eq 1) and !(ssdp)

Time	Dst	port	Host	Info
2022-03-14 19:44:32	149.255.62.22	80	eaglio.org	GET /apm/3/s2Fmok83x.zip
2022-03-14 19:44:32	149.255.62.22	443	eaglio.org	Client Hello
2022-03-14 19:45:16	52.109.12.21	443	nexus.officeap...	Client Hello
2022-03-14 19:45:16	52.109.12.18	443	nexusrules.off...	Client Hello
2022-03-14 19:45:19	101.99.95.190	80	101.99.95.190	GET /6537991.dat
2022-03-14 19:45:21	146.70.81.64	80	146.70.81.64	GET /6537991.dat
2022-03-14 19:45:23	190.14.37.12	80	190.14.37.12	GET /6537991.dat
2022-03-14 19:48:11	52.109.12.21	443	nexus.officeap...	Client Hello
2022-03-14 19:48:18	52.168.112.66	443	v10.events.dat...	Client Hello
2022-03-14 19:50:11	52.183.220.149	443	settings-win.d...	Client Hello
2022-03-14 19:53:02	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 19:53:06	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 19:53:07	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 19:53:29	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 19:57:48	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:03:08	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello

Annotations: **URL FOR ZIP** (points to the first row), **QAKBOT DLLs** (points to the three rows with .dat files), **QAKBOT C2** (points to the Client Hello rows from 201.170.181.247).

Shown above: Traffic from the infection filtered in Wireshark.




Shown above: New Qakbot DLL saved to the infected Windows host shortly after the initial infection.

(http.request or tls.handshake.type eq 1 or (tcp.port eq 65400 and tcp.flags eq 0x0002)) and !(ssdp)


Time	Dst	port	Host	Info
2022-03-14 20:47:47	131.253.33.200	443	www.bing.com	Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:48:11	52.109.12.23	443	nexus.officeapp...	Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:50:12	52.183.220.149	443	settings-win.da...	Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:50:50	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:56:10	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:56:14	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:57:11	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:57:11	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:57:53	13.69.109.130	443	v10.events.data...	Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:58:15	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:58:18	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:58:20	72.247.207.22	443	www.openssl.org	Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:58:31	23.111.114.52	65400		56494 → 65400 [SYN]
2022-03-14 20:59:19	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 20:59:21	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello
2022-03-14 21:00:23	201.170.181.247	443		Client Hello

Annotation: **QAKBOT TCP C2 TRAFFIC** (points to the SYN packet on port 65400).

Shown above: More traffic from the Qakbot infection filtered in Wireshark.



Shown above: TCP traffic over port 65400 associated with this Qakbot infection.



Shown above: Data binary saved to disk at C:\u\ from the Qakbot infection.

(http.request or tls.handshake.type eq 1) and !(ssdp)

Time	Dst	port	Host	Info
2022-03-15 12:27:52	13.89.178.26	443	v10.events.data...	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:28:01	103.87.95.131	2222		Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:35:24	52.185.211.133	443	settings-win.da...	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:37:36	86.98.27.253	443		Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:38:35	86.98.27.253	443		Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:43:55	86.98.27.253	443		Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:44:00	86.98.27.253	443		Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:44:59	86.98.27.253	443		Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:45:01	86.98.27.253	443		Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:45:03	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:45:05	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:45:31	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:45:59	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:46:03	86.98.27.253	443		Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:46:33	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:47:02	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:47:36	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:48:09	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:48:45	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:49:12	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:49:40	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:49:43	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:49:44	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:49:46	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:49:49	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:49:51	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:49:54	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:49:56	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:49:59	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello
2022-03-15 12:50:02	190.123.44.113	4444	runfs.icu	Client Hello

COBALT STRIKE TRAFFIC STARTS


Shown above: Cobalt Strike activity started about 17 hours after the initial Qakbot infection.

ip.addr eq 45.153.241.142 and tcp.flags eq 0x0002


Time	Src	port	Dst	port	Info
2022-03-15 12:44:03	10.3.14.103	57211	45.153.241.142	443	57211 → 443 [SYN]
2022-03-15 12:44:03	10.3.14.103	57212	45.153.241.142	443	57212 → 443 [SYN]
2022-03-15 12:53:42	10.3.14.103	57260	45.153.241.142	443	57260 → 443 [SYN]

START OF TCP STREAMS FOR VNC TRAFFIC

Shown above: TCP SYN segments for VNC traffic caused by this Qakbot infection.



Shown above: First TCP stream for the VNC activity.



Shown above: Second TCP stream for the VNC activity.

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture window titled "tcp.stream eq 809". The main pane displays a list of packets with columns for Time, Src, port, Dst, port, and Info. The selected packet (2022-03-15 12:53:42) shows a TCP segment of a reassembled PD. Below the packet list, the "Follow TCP Stream" pane shows the raw data of the stream, which is highlighted in red. A large text overlay in the center of the stream data reads "THIRD TCP STREAM FOR VNC TRAFFIC". The stream data is a mix of ASCII characters and some non-printable bytes. At the bottom of the stream pane, it says "7,430 client pkts, 8 server pkts, 14 turns." and "Entire conversation (10MB)".

Shown above: Third TCP stream for the VNC activity (10 MB of data).

The image shows the Security Onion Alerts interface. The browser address bar shows a URL with a query string: "https://.../#/alerts?q=%2a&t=2022%2F03%2F13%2003%3A14%3A19%20A...". The interface displays two alerts:


- Alert 1: 2022-03-15 12:44:03.383 +00:00 ETPRO MALWARE VNCStartServer USR Variant CnC Beacon
- Alert 2: 2022-03-15 12:44:03.380 +00:00 ETPRO MALWARE VNCStartServer BOT Variant CnC Beacon

The details pane for the selected alert shows the following information:

- @timestamp: 2022-03-15T12:44:03.380Z
- destination.geo.continent_name: Europe
- destination.geo.country_iso_code: DE
- destination.geo.country_name: Germany
- destination.geo.ip: 45.153.241.142
- destination.geo.location.lat: 51.2993
- destination.geo.location.lon: 9.491
- destination.geo.timezone: Europe/Berlin
- destination.ip: 45.153.241.142
- destination.port: 443

At the bottom of the interface, it says "Version: 2.3.100 © 2022 Security Onion Solutions, LLC Terms and Conditions".

Shown above: ETPRO alerts in Security Onion for the VNC traffic from this infection.



Shown above: Registry update made by the Qakbot infection.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Link from email for zip download:

[http://eaglio\[.\]org/apm/3/s2Fmok83x.zip](http://eaglio[.]org/apm/3/s2Fmok83x.zip)

Traffic generated by Excel macro for Qakbot DLL files:

- [http://101.99.95\[.\]190/6537991.dat](http://101.99.95[.]190/6537991.dat)
- [http://146.70.81\[.\]64/6537991.dat](http://146.70.81[.]64/6537991.dat)
- [http://190.14.37\[.\]112/6537991.dat](http://190.14.37[.]112/6537991.dat)

Qakbot C2 traffic:

- 201.170.181[.]247 port 443 - HTTPS traffic
- port 443 - www.openssl[.]org - HTTPS traffic (connectivity check)
- 23.111.114[.]52 port 65400 - TCP traffic
- 76.169.147[.]192 port 32103 - HTTPS traffic
- 103.87.95[.]131 port 2222 - HTTPS traffic
- 86.98.27[.]253 port 443 - HTTPS traffic
- various IP addresses over various ports - attempted TCP connections

Cobalt Strike traffic:

[190.123.44\[.\]113](http://190.123.44[.]113) port 4444 - runfs[.]jicu - HTTPS traffic

VNC module traffic:

45.153.241[.]142 port 443 - encoded/encrypted traffic and beacon channels

Rule hits on VNC module traffic:

- ETPRO MALWARE VNCStartServer USR Variant CnC Beacon
- ETPRO MALWARE VNCStartServer BOT Variant CnC Beacon

Malware retrieved from the infected Windows client:

SHA256 hash: ba80720c42704e8e1a73e60906f6f289ba763365c8f6b16ccf47aac8a687b83e

- File size: 92,828 bytes
- File location: hxxp://eaglio[.]org/apm/3/s2Fmok83x.zip
- File name: ClaimDetails-1699343128-Mar-14.zip

SHA256 hash: 5a6157eefc8d0b1089a5bfdee351379b27baff4c40b432fd22e0cbe1f6102fab

- File size: 120,410 bytes
- File name: ClaimDetails-1699343128-Mar-14.xlsb

SHA256 hash:

47fe3cbab19b43579e3312d90f7a8c7021c84e228e7c8ef97d39a1a7a261ea01

- File size: 408,576 bytes
- File location: hxxp://101.99.95[.]190/6537991.dat
- File location: C:\Biloa\Dopaters1.ocx
- File type: PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
- Run method: regsvr32.exe *[filename]*

SHA256 hash:

8751f8aedc65a10826071515b4b7896a8800152b8e3bcbbe9e8a64970deb9b49

- File size: 408,576 bytes
- File location: hxxp://146.70.81[.]64/6537991.dat
- File location: C:\Biloa\Dopaters2.ocx
- File type: PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
- Run method: regsvr32.exe *[filename]*

SHA256 hash: 7312353bab71ecefec6888bb804afd71f67178ded4ce41960924d3d6f7400320

- File size: 408,576 bytes
- File location: hxxp://190.14.37[.]12/6537991.dat
- File location: C:\Biloa\Dopaters3.ocx
- File type: PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

- Run method: regsvr32.exe [filename]

SHA256 hash: 7264fc1e81ff854b769f8e19ced247fb95210a58ddd5edce4a6275ddc38e5298

- File size: 920,064 bytes
- File location: C:\Users\
[username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Hezuky\bbsdipimaxckk.dll
- File type: PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
- Run method: regsvr32.exe [filename]

Note: No binaries for Cobalt Strike or the VNC activity were found on the infected Windows host.

Final words

This infection shows some changes in Qakbot.

Earlier this year, Qakbot samples created a scheduled task that pointed to an additional registry update with base64 code used to re-create the Qakbot binary after a reboot. I no longer see that with recent Qakbot samples.

Also, this infection didn't stay persistent after logging out or doing a reboot. Normally, Qakbot keeps the active DLL in memory. If a victim logs out or reboots, Qakbot saves the in-memory DLL to disk and creates a registry update at **HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run**. After rebooting and/or logging back in, this registry update loads the DLL, then Qakbot deletes the registry update and erases the DLL that had been saved to disk.

In this case, a Qakbot DLL was already saved to disk long before I tried logging out/rebooting. Furthermore, the infection did not persist after I logged out.

There's also a data binary stored at a **C:\u** directory created by Qakbot. From a forensic point of view, things are noticeably different with recent Qakbot infections. Not drastically different, but the changes are noticeable.

A pcap of the infection traffic along with malware (Excel file and DLL) from an infected host can be found [here](#).

Brad Duncan

brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net

Keywords: [VNC](#) [Qbot](#) [Qakbot](#) [malspam](#) [CobaltStrike](#) [Cobalt Strike](#)

[0 comment\(s\)](#)

Join us at SANS! [Attend with Brad Duncan in starting](#)



[Top of page](#)

x

[Diary Archives](#)