

Lil' skimmer, the Magecart impersonator

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A very common practice among criminals consists of mimicking legitimate infrastructure when registering new domain names. This is very true for Magecart threat actors who love to impersonate Google, jQuery and many other popular brands.

In this post we look at a skimmer recently disclosed by security researchers that has been around for over a year but managed to keep a low profile. In addition to naming several of their domains after Google, the threat actor is also naming their domains after the websites they have compromised.

Often, identifying additional infrastructure on the same network is a relatively simple exercise. But in this case it is more complex because the hosting servers are comprised of a large number of domains names, many of which are also malicious but not skimming related. Hiding in the noise is another common trait for threat actors.

Keeping it simple

This skimmer was publicly mentioned by Eric Brandel in early June 2021 and unlike Magecart JavaScript code, this one is very straightforward. Jordan Herman had also previously [spotted this skimmer](#) and referred to it as [Lil' Skim](#). Based on an [urlscan.io crawl](#), it appears the earliest instance is from at least March 2020, via [googie\[.\]host](#).

Newish Google themed digital skimming/[#magecart](#) domains

googie-analitycs.site
googie-analytics.online
googie-analytics.website
googletagsmanager.website

Example on [@urlscanio](#)

//googie-analytics.online/js/analytics.js<https://t.co/wJMx4qP1z3>

Very simple/clean code: pic.twitter.com/L6QuU6ImJR

— Eric Brandel (@AffableKraut) [June 1, 2021](#)

A dense network hiding more skimmer domains

A quick review of the [Autonomous System](#) (AS198610 Beget) where those skimmer domains are found shows a significant number of malicious hosts tied to phishing kits, Windows payloads, and Android malware just to name a few. Two IP addresses in particular, 87.236.16[.]107 and 87.236.16[.]10, are host to additional skimmer domains belonging to Lil' Skim.

Custom domains by compromised store

And then we discovered a number of skimmer domains that were named after compromised stores. This in itself is not a new practice and is often seen with phishing sites. The threat actor simply replaced the top level domain name with .site, .website or .pw to create hosts that load the skimmer code and receive stolen credit card data.




Figure 3: Legitimate website and copycat domain hosting a skimmer

Standard skimmer domains

googletagsmanager[.]website
googie-analitycs[.]site
googie-analytics[.]online
googie-analytics[.]website
cdnattn[.]site
facebookmanagers[.]pw
googletagmanager[.]space
googie[.]website
googleapis[.]website
googie[.]host
tidio[.]fun
jquery[.]fun
cloudfiare[.]site

Skimmer domains impersonating compromised sites

perfecttux[.]site
gorillawhips[.]site
bebedepotplus[.]site
postguard[.]website
dirsalonfurniture[.]site
dogdug[.]website
bebedepotplus[.]website
perfecttux[.]website

Skimmer IPs

Known victim sites