

# New in Ransomware: Seth-Locker, Babuk Locker, Maoloa, TeslaCrypt, and CobraLocker

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## Ransomware

In this entry, we give an overview of new ransomware discoveries. This includes a new ransomware family dubbed Seth-Locker, and developments in the variants Babuk Locker, Maoloa, TeslaCrypt, and CobraLocker.

By: Raphael Centeno, Monte de Jesus, Don Ovid Ladores, Junestherry Salvador, Nikko Tamana, Llalum Victoria February 05, 2021 Read time: ( words)

Ransomware is in constant state of development — this is true not only of ransomware families that are big-game hunters or ransomware families that have a targeted approach in their campaigns, but also for new ones.

In this entry, we look into a new ransomware family dubbed Seth-Locker, which was discovered while at large and is still under development. We also enumerate developments in Babuk Locker, Maoloa, and a possible TeslaCrypt variant. Lastly, we note the appearance of a CobraLocker variant that is at large and uses a popular game as a disguise to attract the attention of unwitting victims.

## New ransomware Seth-Locker

We discovered a new ransomware named Seth-Locker at large. An interesting feature of this new ransomware is its inclusion a few backdoor routines in its malicious files, together with its ransom routine. These backdoor routines that have been observed so far are the following:

- open\_link for reading content from the command-and-control (C&C) server
- down\_exec for downloading and execute a file
- shell to run a command line shell command
- locker to run the ransomware routine
- kill to terminate a process or itself

Once executed, the ransomware follows the typical routine of encrypting files and appending them with the suffix .seth, before dropping a ransom note.

As its code contains several rookie mistakes and oversights, we surmise that it is still under development. For example, malware commands are easily visible and repetitions of file extensions to be checked are in its code. Additionally, another tell-tale sign that it is still under development is that it lacks sophistication in hiding its routines and techniques. In the future, however, it would be possible to encounter an improved version of this ransomware.

## Developments in Babuk Locker

Babuk Locker is also a new ransomware family and the first enterprise ransomware discovered in 2021. It initially identified itself as Vasa Locker in December 2020. Babuk Locker is proving to be a fast-evolving and active ransomware. Early into 2021, it had already attacked several companies, utilizing the strategy of threatening to expose stolen information.

Even as a new ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), its operations follow the methods of known targeted ransomware attacks. Its initial access likely involves compromised user accounts, exploitation of vulnerabilities, or malspam. Threat actors then move laterally to make an inventory of the victim's network and important files since they exfiltrate data as part of their double extortion method. Afterward, they finally proceed to deploying their ransomware payload. In addition, they eventually post the exfiltrated data on a blog or a Tor site that they operate.

Babuk Locker utilizes a ChaCha8 stream cipher for encryption and Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) for key generation, making the recovery of files without gaining access to the private key highly unlikely. Chuong Dong's blog gives further details on how this malware operates.

What's notable about Babuk Locker is the progression of its attacks and its threat actors' use of a Tor site to communicate with their victims. The oldest and first sample that we observed involved sending a typical ransom email to their target. Meanwhile, the second variant of the ransomware that we encountered used a Tor site, which showed a screenshot of the data that the threat actors had stolen from their target. Based on this development, we can see how the group behind Babuk Locker is making their extortion methods more personalized and aggressive.

Certain aspects of Babuk Locker have similarities with other known ransomware. In particular, the ransom note is striking as it matches that used by DarkSide. This is evidenced in Figure 1, which suggests that these two ransomware families could be linked together. With regard to techniques, Babuk Locker also seems to have taken a page out of older ransomware like Conti, Ryuk, and Ragnar Locker. For example, like these older malware, it terminates processes and services that are related to applications, back-up software, endpoint security, and servers. Given how effective these known ransomware are, it is no surprise that Babuk Locker has mimicked some of their techniques.

```
|----- [ Hello, ██████████ ] ----->
      ****BY BABUK LOCKER****

what happend?
-----
Your computers and servers are encrypted, backups are deleted from your network and copied. We use strong encryption algorithms, so you cannot decrypt your data. But you can restore everything by purchasing a special program from us - a universal decoder. This program will restore your entire network. Follow our instructions below and you will recover all your data. If you continue to ignore this for a long time, we will start reporting the hack to mainstream media and posting your data to the dark web.

what guarantees?
-----
We value our reputation. If we do not do our work and liabilities, nobody will pay us. This is not in our interests. All our decryption software is perfectly tested and will decrypt your data. We will also provide support in case of problems. We guarantee to decrypt one file for free. Go to the site and contact us.

what information compromised?
-----
We copied more than 50 gb from your internal network, here are some proofs, for additional confirmations, please chat with us. In cases of ignoring us, the information will be released to the public.

How to contact us?
-----
Using TOR Browser ( https://www.torproject.org/download/ ):
http://██████████e2p4wu4iq.onion/login.php?██████████

!!! DANGER !!!
DO NOT MODIFY or try to RECOVER any files yourself. We WILL NOT be able to RESTORE them.
!!! DANGER !!!
```

---

```
|----- [ welcome to Dark ] ----->

what happend?
-----
Your computers and servers are encrypted, backups are deleted. We use strong encryption algorithms, so you cannot decrypt your data. But you can restore everything by purchasing a special program from us - universal decryptor. This program will restore all your network. Follow our instructions below and you will recover all your data.

Data leak
-----
First of all we have uploaded more then 100 GB data.

Example of data:
- Accounting data
- Executive data
- Sales data
- Customer support data
- Marketing data
- Quality data
- And more other...

Your personal leak page: http://██████████xcftmqa.onion/blog/article/id/6/██████████
The data is preloaded and will be automatically published if you do not pay. After publication, your data will be available for at least 6 months on our tor cdn servers.

we are ready:
- To provide you the evidence of stolen data
- To give you universal decrypting tool for all encrypted files.
- To delete all the stolen data.

what guarantees?
-----
We value our reputation. If we do not do our work and liabilities, nobody will pay us. This is not in our interests. All our decryption software is perfectly tested and will decrypt your data. We will also provide support in case of problems. We guarantee to decrypt one file for free. Go to the site and contact us.

How to get access on website?
-----
Using a TOR browser:
1) Download and install TOR browser from this site: https://torproject.org/
2) open our website: http://██████████cuhtk2.onion/██████████
```

Figure 1. A Babuk ransom note (top) compared with a DarkSide ransom note (bottom)

Babuk Locker's leak site offers more clues. For example, we observed how the leak site has been modified recently to announce that Babuk has now been rebranded to "Babyk." The site also claims that the group behind the variant is not malicious, and that they aim to expose security issues in organizations.




Figure 2. The leak site shows both the rebranding

### About Us

#### What is BABUK?

Non malicious, specialized software, created with purpose to show the security issues inside the corporate networks.

Babuk uses its own implementation of SHA256 hashing, ChaCha8 encryption, and Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key generation and exchange algorithm to protect its keys and encrypt files

What issues are we talking about and why we are not a criminals?

In our understanding - we are some kind of a cyberpunks, we randomly test corporate networks security and in case of penetration, we ask money, and publish the information about threats and vulnerabilities we found, in our blog if company doesn't want to pay.

For example, imagine the situation: villains intruding the building company's network (huge developer who specializes on sport objects), those villains doesn't care about money, they are crazy fanatics from terroristic organization, they get the blueprints and schematics... just think what going to be further..

Our audit is not the worst thing can happen to your company, but think twice, pay by money, of maybe the people lives..

### Our Rules

#### Payment Rules:

- We will give Bitcoin wallet to a client directly in chat. (please request BTC wallet once you ready for payment)
- Client should send at first 1 bitcoin on our wallet, just for verification purposes. After we will confirm this transaction, client can send the whole amount.
- After the 1st confirm on blockchain would be received, we will initiate process of providing you with all that was claimed

#### HOW-to-USE DECRYPTOR

- Before install it on any server or host, you should turn off Anti-virus software and windows defender, also better switch off internet connection.
- Than you have to RUN program "As Administrator", after decryption will be finished you will get the message.so wait for it.
- You have to copy and paste Decryption tool on each Locked server or host and execute it there.

from "Babuk" ransomware to "Babyk" and details about the malware.

Interestingly, the leak site also lists entities that are excluded from the group's scope of interest. This list was present before the modification and is the first time that we have observed a ransomware variant showing this kind of discretion.

# We do not audit

## next categories of organizations



### Hospitals

except private plastic surgery clinics, private dental clinics



### Non-Profit

Any non-profitable charitable foundation (except the foundations who help LGBT and BLM)



### Schools

except the major universities



### Small Business

Companies with annual revenue less than 4 mln\$ (info about revenue we take from zoominfo)

Show leaks info

[About Us](#) / [Our Rules](#)

Figure 3. The list of organizations exempted from Babuk's attacks as posted on their leak site

Based on its code, the latest sample that we saw is already the third version of Babuk, which involves a more personalized ransom note that directly addresses the victim organization by name. It is likely that we will see more of this malware in the future, given the level of activity that we have described.

```
704a0fa7de1956 ▶ ↓FRO ----- a32 PE.00408950 |Hiew 7.20 <c>SEN
.00408950: 55          push     ebp
.00408951: 8BEC       mov     ebp,esp
.00408953: 81EC800000 sub     esp,00000080 ;'  '
.00408959: A1B0A14000 mov     eax,[0040A1B0]
.0040895E: 33C5      xor     eax,ebp
.00408960: 8945FC     mov     [ebp+041],eax
.00408963: 68D0214000 push    0004021D0 ;'babuk_v3'
.00408968: 6A00      push    0
.0040896A: 6801001F00 push    0001F0001 ;'  '
.0040896F: FF15C8B04000 call    OpenMutexA ;KERNEL32
.00408975: 894588     mov     [ebp+178],eax
.00408978: 837D8800   cmp     d,[ebp+178],0
.0040897C: 7514      jne     .00408992 ----> <2>
.0040897E: 68DC214000 push    0004021DC ;'babuk_v3'
.00408983: 6A00      push    0
.00408985: 6A00      push    0
```

Figure 4. The Babuk Locker code

showing that this sample is from the third version of Babuk

Possible TeslaCrypt disabling system security

The variant described here arrives through a spam email, which downloads a malicious binary that we detected as the ransomware TeslaCrypt. While Babuk is new, TeslaCrypt is an older ransomware family. Notably, TeslaCrypt's key was released in 2016 so it should now be considered a defunct ransomware; however, a new variant seems to have emerged (detected as Ransom.MSIL.TESLACRYPT.THABGBA). At present, we do not have enough information to say why the ransomware has made a reappearance. Additionally, we are not ruling out the possibility that the sample is simply a copycat version of TeslaCrypt.



Whatever the case might be, a notable feature of this malware is how it downgrades its victim's security. The malware initially disables Windows Defender before terminating a very long list of around 300 other services such as debuggers and security-related applications. Authors of this variant seem to be aiming to narrow down the availability of a recovery method for their victim's system.

For a ransomware variant, we very rarely see this many security-related processes and applications being closed in a campaign.

Operation	Info
new process	"net.exe" start FDResPub /y
new process	"net.exe" stop MSSQLSSQL_2008 /y
new process	"net.exe" stop EhttpSrv /y
new process	"net.exe" stop MMS /y
set registry value	key: HKU\S-1-5-21-1220815037-938734135-970455290-1001_CLASSES\Local Settings\MuiCache\46\52C64B7E value: LanguageList data: en-US, en
new process	"net.exe" stop MSSQLSQLEXPRESS /y
new process	"net.exe" start upnphost /y
new process	C:\Windows\system32\net1 stop bedbg /y
new process	"net.exe" stop avpsus /y
new process	"net.exe" stop McAfeeDLPAgentService /y
new process	"net.exe" stop mfewc /y
new process	"net.exe" stop BMR Boot Service /y
new process	C:\Windows\system32\net1 start Dnscache /y
new process	"net.exe" stop NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service /y
new process	"net.exe" stop DefWatch /y
new process	"net.exe" start SSDPSRV /y
new process	"net.exe" stop YooBackup /y
new process	"net.exe" stop YooIT /y
new process	"net.exe" stop zhudongfangyu /y
new process	"net.exe" stop stc_raw_agent /y
new process	"net.exe" stop VSNAPVSS /y
set registry value	key: HKU\S-1-5-21-1220815037-938734135-970455290-1001_CLASSES\Local Settings\MuiCache\46\52C64B7E value: LanguageList data: en-US, en
new process	"net.exe" stop VeeamTransportSvc /y
new process	"net.exe" stop VeeamDeploymentService /y
new process	"net.exe" stop VeeamNFSSvc /y
new process	"net.exe" stop veeam /y

Figure 5. A screenshot showing a partial list of security-related applications terminated by the ransomware Developments for Maoloa

The Maoloa ransomware was first seen in 2019. It is also one of the malware used in an attack on [hospitals](#) in Romania in July 2019. Maoloa has also been linked to the older [GlobeImposter](#) ransomware.

A newer sample that we encountered (detected as [Ransom.Win32.MAOLOA.THAAHBA](#)) was packaged inside a 7-Zip SFX file. This variant also used the legitimate tools certutil.exe and Autoit script. All of these additions are evasion tactics that we have not observed in previous variants. The older Maoloa variants that we encountered used a bare, unpackaged, binary.

Time	PID	Process Path	Operation	Info
17:12:05:873		C:\Users\Desktop\...	create file	C:\Users\AppData\Local\Temp\7ZipSfx.000\srhi.com
17:12:05:888		C:\Users\Desktop\...	modify file	C:\Users\AppData\Local\Temp\7ZipSfx.000\srhi.com
17:12:05:998		C:\Users\Desktop\...	create file	C:\Users\AppData\Local\Temp\7ZipSfx.000\cee.com
17:12:05:998		C:\Users\Desktop\...	modify file	C:\Users\AppData\Local\Temp\7ZipSfx.000\cee.com
17:12:05:998		C:\Users\Desktop\...	create file	C:\Users\AppData\Local\Temp\7ZipSfx.000\ner.com
17:12:05:998		C:\Users\Desktop\...	modify file	C:\Users\AppData\Local\Temp\7ZipSfx.000\ner.com
17:12:06:123		C:\Users\Desktop\...	create file	C:\Users\AppData\Local\Temp\7ZipSfx.000\txh.com
17:12:06:123		C:\Users\Desktop\...	modify file	C:\Users\AppData\Local\Temp\7ZipSfx.000\txh.com

Figure 6. Execution of

the SFX file where the Maoloa ransomware is packaged

Once executed, the self-extracting archive carrying the Maoloa ransomware payload will drop four files as seen in Figure 6.

Among these files is the Maoloa ransomware which, once decrypted, will proceed with its encryption routine and dropping of ransom notes. Similar to [past variants](#), this Maoloa sample's appended extension is ".Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz" despite belonging to the Maoloa ransomware family and not GlobeImposter's.

Process Path	Operation	Info
C:\Users\... AppData\...	create file	D:\
C:\Users\... AppData\...	modify file	C:\
C:\Users\... AppData\...	change file attr	Z:\
C:\Users\... AppData\...	modify file	C:\\$Recycle.Bin\C4D1664EF40CE18F8D41
C:\Users\... AppData\...	rename file	C:\autoexec.bat.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	modify file	C:\autoexec.bat.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	change file attr	C:\Documents and Settings
C:\Users\... AppData\...	modify file	Z:\
C:\Users\... AppData\...	rename file	C:\Email and Password List.htm.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	modify file	C:\Email and Password List.htm.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	rename file	C:\Email and Password List.js.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	modify file	C:\Email and Password List.js.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	rename file	C:\Email and Password List.txt.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	modify file	C:\Email and Password List.txt.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	rename file	C:\Email and Password List.vbs.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	modify file	C:\Email and Password List.vbs.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	change file attr(3)	C:\IO.SYS
C:\Users\... AppData\...	change file attr	C:\IPH.PH
C:\Users\... AppData\...	rename file	C:\IPH.PH.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	modify file	C:\IPH.PH.Globeimposter-Alpha865qqz
C:\Users\... AppData\...	change file attr(3)	C:\MSDOS.SYS
C:\Users\... AppData\...	change file attr	C:\MSOCache
C:\Users\... AppData\...	change file attr	C:\Recovery
C:\Users\... AppData\...	change file attr	C:\System Volume Information
C:\Users\... AppData\...	create file	C:\HOW TO BACK YOUR FILES.txt
C:\Users\... AppData\...	modify file	C:\HOW TO BACK YOUR FILES.txt

Figure 7. Dropping of Maoloa encryption and

ransom note components showing Globeimposter file extensions  
CobraLocker disguised as Among Us

Finally, part of our notable discoveries is a CobraLocker variant (detected as [Ransom.MSIL.COBRALOCKER.B](#)) that was found at large and that uses the popular game Among Us as a disguise to lure users. The file name used by this ransomware is “AmongUsHorrorEdition.”




Figure 8. The file name of CobraLocker that disguises itself as a version of Among Us

If executed, it will run an image in line with the “horror” aspect of the file and will display the text “Do you want to play?” It will then run typical malicious activities, such as terminating cmd.exe, regedit.exe, and Process Hacker, as well as adding registries for persistence.

How to secure against ransomware?

As shown by these ransomware families, threat actors will continue to hone their malware to ensure the success of their campaigns, be it by placing heavier pressure on their victims to comply to their demands or simply better disguising their malicious activities to evade detection.

- Ransomware of the present is undergoing rapid changes that need to be observed and prepared for. Here are measures that users and organizations can use to protect themselves from ransomware:
- Create an effective back-up strategy by following the [3-2-1 rule](#).
- Adopt strong passwords throughout the network.
- Consider network segmentation to separate important processes and systems from the wider access network.
- Increase both your awareness and the awareness of the members of your organization on how ransomware spreads (i.e., through spammed emails and attachments)
- Monitor and audit network traffic for any suspicious behaviors or anomalies.

Trend Micro solutions

Trend Micro solutions such as the [Smart Protection Suite](#) and [Trend Micro™ Worry-Free™ Business Security Services](#) solutions, which have [behavior monitoring](#) capabilities, can protect users and businesses from these types of threats by detecting malicious files, scripts, and messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs. Our [XGen™ security](#) provides a cross-generational blend of threat defense techniques against a full range of threats for [data centers](#), [cloud environments](#), [networks](#), and [endpoints](#). It infuses high-fidelity [machine learning](#) (ML) with other detection technologies and global threat intelligence for comprehensive protection from advanced malware.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Detection name	SHA-256
<u>Ransom.MSIL.COBRALOCKER.AA</u>	88d55af8d84c1909e9ccf962e59f71dacf158eb9fd671920a23b7390103bd58f
<u>Ransom.MSIL.COBRALOCKER.AA</u>	ec621d94c847976baa8b3ead1bb98c2a0951432ba21181f09fb1c55dcddd98c3
<u>Ransom.MSIL.COBRALOCKER.B</u>	ba28a0615626a40254c4e4167e0b3f8bc82bdd83f42b225605c34268c38ef0b5
<u>Trojan.MSIL.COBRALOCKER.A</u>	bdcc8754a9f75c2fe1f909af669ac59f25d635139f3634f525e4189db604e3f0
<u>Trojan.MSIL.COBRALOCKER.A</u>	ff53667fe3745601d6d04668cd854813f650087be2872876de71d412b70eb0cd
<u>Ransom.MSIL.TESLACRYPT.THABGBA</u>	dcd725c415cebc7df170edf49af18d6f86e76ef75185737de5959405f4aecc56
<u>Ransom.Win32.BABUK.YEBA-THAAEBA</u>	704a0fa7de19564bc743fb68aa0652e38bf86e8ab694bc079b15f945c85f4320
<u>Ransom.Win32.BABUK.YEBA-THAAEBA</u>	8140004ff3cf4923c928708505754497e48d26d822a95d63bd2ed54e14f19766
<u>Ransom.Win32.BABUK.YEBA-THAAEBA</u>	afcf265a1dcd9eab5aab270d48aa561e4ddeb71c05e32c857d3b809bb64c0430
<u>Ransom.Win32.BABUK.YNBA-THABGBA</u>	3dda3ee9164d6815a18a2c23651a53c35d52e3a5ad375001ec824cf532c202e6
<u>Ransom.Win32.BABUK.YNBA-THABGBA</u>	c5167053129bd4a5542cfef9e739b0443e22e184cb4c0b57c049b448f030cf15
<u>Ransom.Win32.MAOLOA.THAAHBA</u>	94be0c4af61e979ad2064544708807fcdfc4b63115ed885ed0067ece04630a7b
<u>Ransom.Win64.SETHLOCKER.THABEBAA</u>	58c852525bf3bea185db34a79c2c5640c02f8291cddbde8dd7c0a9d4682f4b2c
<u>Trojan.W97M.TESLACRYPT.THABGBA</u>	c7e40628fb6beb52d9d73a3b3afd1dca5d2335713593b698637e1a47b42bfc71