


# JPCERT Coordination Center official Blog

---

 [blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2021/01/Lazarus\\_tools.html](https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2021/01/Lazarus_tools.html)



朝長 秀誠 (Shusei Tomonaga)

January 20, 2021

## Commonly Known Tools Used by Lazarus

---

### Lazarus

- Email

It is widely known that attackers use Windows commands and tools that are commonly known and used after intruding their target network. Lazarus attack group, a.k.a. Hidden Cobra, also uses such tools to collect information and spread the infection. This blog post describes the tools they use.

### **Lateral movement**

---

These three tools are used for lateral movement. AdFind collects the information of clients and users from Active Directory. It has been observed that other attack groups also used the tool [1]. SMBMap is used to have their malware infect other hosts. (Also check out our previous [blog post](#) on Lazarus.) It has also been observed that Responder-Windows was used to collect information in the network.

Name	Description	Reference
AdFind	Command line tool to collect information from Active Directory	<a href="http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/">http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/</a>
SMBMap	Tool to list accessible shared SMB resources and access those files	<a href="https://github.com/ShawnDEvans/smbmap">https://github.com/ShawnDEvans/smbmap</a>
Responder-Windows	Tool to lead clients with spoof LLMNR, NBT-NS, and WPAD	<a href="https://github.com/lgandx/Responder-Windows">https://github.com/lgandx/Responder-Windows</a>

## Stealing sensitive data

These three tools are used for information theft. Tools for such a purpose are used only in certain cases because malware itself usually has similar functions. Tools for collecting account information from browsers and email clients are particularly used. Attackers often archive collected files in RAR before exfiltration, and so does Lazarus attack group using WinRAR. As we mentioned in our previous blog post, the malware can archive files in zlib and send them. It means that files are not always sent in RAR.

Name	Description	Reference
XenArmor Email Password Recovery Pro	Tool to extract credentials from email clients and services	<a href="https://xenarmor.com/email-password-recovery-pro-software/">https://xenarmor.com/email-password-recovery-pro-software/</a>
XenArmor Browser Password Recovery Pro	Tool to extract credentials from web browsers	<a href="https://xenarmor.com/browser-password-recovery-pro-software/">https://xenarmor.com/browser-password-recovery-pro-software/</a>
WinRAR	RAR archiver	<a href="https://www.rarlab.com/">https://www.rarlab.com/</a>

## Other tools

These following tools are used for other purposes. Attackers sometimes create backdoors in the infected network using RDP, TeamViewer, VNC, and other applications. It is confirmed that Lazarus has used VNC and a common Microsoft tool ProcDump before. ProcDump is

sometimes used when attackers attempt to extract user credentials from the LSASS process dump. Windows' counterpart of common Linux tools such as tcpdump and wget are also used.

Name	Description	Reference
TightVNC Viewer	VNC client	<a href="https://www.tightvnc.com/download.php">https://www.tightvnc.com/download.php</a>
ProcDump	Common Microsoft's tool to get process memory dump	<a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump</a>
tcpdump	Packet capturing tool	<a href="https://www.tcpdump.org/">https://www.tcpdump.org/</a>
wget	Downloader	

## In closing

---

This blog post described tools used by Lazarus group. Although their malware contains many functions as we already covered in other blog posts, they still supplement it with tools which are widely available and commonly known. It should be noted that anti-virus software may not detect such tools.

The hash values of the tools covered in this blog post are listed in Appendix A.

Shusei Tomonaga  
(Translated by Takumi Nakano)

## Reference

---

[1]\_Cybereason: Dropping Anchor: From a TrickBot Infection to the Discovery of the Anchor Malware

<https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware>

## Appendix A: Hash value

---

Be careful when using these hash values as IoC. The list contains tools that are commonly used for non-malicious purposes.

AdFind

- CFD201EDE3EBC0DEB0031983B2BDA9FC54E24D244063ED323B0E421A535CFF92
- B1102ED4BCA6DAE6F2F498ADE2F73F76AF527FA803F0E0B46E100D4CF5150682
- CFD201EDE3EBC0DEB0031983B2BDA9FC54E24D244063ED323B0E421A535CFF92

SMBMap

- 65DDF061178AD68E85A2426CAF9CB85DC9ACC2E00564B8BCB645C8B515200B67
- da4ad44e8185e561354d29c153c0804c11798f26915274f678db0a51c42fe656

#### Responder-Windows

- 7DCCC776C464A593036C597706016B2C8355D09F9539B28E13A3C4FFCDA13DE3
- 47D121087C05568FE90A25EF921F9E35D40BC6BEC969E33E75337FC9B580F0E8

#### XenArmor Email Password Recovery Pro

85703EFD4BA5B691D6B052402C2E5DEC95F4CEC5E8EA31351AF8523864FFC096

#### XenArmor Browser Password Recovery Pro

4B7DE800CCAEDDEE8A0EDD63D4273A20844B20A35969C32AD1AC645E7B0398220

#### Winrar

- CF0121CD61990FD3F436BDA2B2AFF035A2621797D12FD02190EE0F9B2B52A75D
- EA139458B4E88736A3D48E81569178FD5C11156990B6A90E2D35F41B1AD9BAC1

#### TightVNC Viewer

- A7AD23EE318852F76884B1B1F332AD5A8B592D0F55310C8F2CE1A97AD7C9DB15
- 30B234E74F9ABE72EEFDE585C39300C3FC745B7E6D0410B0B068C270C16C5C39

#### Tcpdump

- 2CD844C7A4F3C51CB7216E9AD31D82569212F7EB3E077C9A448C1A0C28BE971B
- 1E0480E0E81D5AF360518DFF65923B31EA21621F5DA0ED82A7D80F50798B6059

#### Procdump

- 5D1660A53AAF824739D82F703ED580004980D377BDC2834F1041D512E4305D07
- F4C8369E4DE1F12CC5A71EB5586B38FC78A9D8DB2B189B8C25EF17A572D4D6B7

#### Wget

- C0E27B7F6698327FF63B03FCCC0E45EFF1DC69A571C1C3F6C934EF7273B1562F
- CF02B7614FEA863672CCBED7701E5B5A8FAD8ED1D0FAA2F9EA03B9CC9BA2A3BA
- 
- Email

#### Author



朝長 秀誠 (Shusei Tomonaga)

Since December 2012, he has been engaged in malware analysis and forensics investigation, and is especially involved in analyzing incidents of targeted attacks. Prior to joining JPCERT/CC, he was engaged in security monitoring and analysis operations at a

foreign-affiliated IT vendor. He presented at CODE BLUE, BsidesLV, BlackHat USA Arsenal, Botconf, PacSec and FIRST Conference. JSAC organizer.

Was this page helpful?

0 people found this content helpful.


If you wish to make comments or ask questions, please use this form.

This form is for comments and inquiries. For any questions regarding specific commercial products, please contact the vendor.


please change the setting of your browser to set JavaScript valid. Thank you!

## Related articles

---




Trends of Reported Phishing Sites and Compromised Domains in 2021



Attack Exploiting XSS Vulnerability in E-commerce Websites



PHP Malware Used in Lucky Visitor Scam



Attacks Embedding XMRig on Compromised Servers

```

v7 = mal_check_count(http_strc->URL);
(*(void (*)(int, int, int, int))o_InternetCrackr1A[0])(http_strc->URL, v7,
if ( v6 == 1 )
{
  wsprintfA(
    &v0,
    "Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=%s\r\n",
    (const char *)http_strc->http_bonday_str);
  if ( !v20 || !v21 )
  {
    if ( v20 )
    {
      wsprintfA(
        &v32,
        "--%s\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"%s\"\r\n\r\n",
        (const char *)http_strc->http_name1,
        (const char *)http_strc->http_body_text);
    }
    else
    {
      wsprintfA(
        &v32,
        "--%s\r\n"
        "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"%s\"; filename=\"%s\"\r\n"
        "Content-Type: image/png\r\n"
        "\r\n",
        (const char *)http_strc->http_bonday_str,
        (const char *)http_strc->http_name,
        (const char *)http_strc->http_filename);
    }
  }
  else
  {
    wsprintfA(
      &v32,
      "--%s\r\n"
      "\r\n"
      "%s\r\n"
      "--%s\r\n"
      "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"%s\"; filename=\"%s\"\r\n"
      "Content-Type: image/png\r\n"
      "\r\n",
      (const char *)http_strc->http_bonday_str,
      (const char *)http_strc->http_name1,
      (const char *)http_strc->http_body_text,
      (const char *)http_strc->http_bonday_str,
      (const char *)http_strc->http_name,
      (const char *)http_strc->http_filename);
  }
  wsprintfA(&v33, "\r\n--%s--\r\n", (const char *)http_strc->http_bonday_str);
  v27 = mal_check_count((int)&v32);
  v28 = mal_check_count((int)&v33);
}

```

Lazarus Attack Activities Targeting Japan (VSingle/ValeforBeta)

- [Back](#)
- [Top](#)
- [Next](#)