

EDR in block mode stops IcedID cold

microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/09/edr-in-block-mode-stops-icedid-cold/

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We are happy to announce the general availability of endpoint detection and response (EDR) in block mode in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. EDR in block mode turns EDR detections into real-time blocking of malicious behaviors, malware, and artifacts. It uses Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's industry-leading visibility and detection capabilities and Microsoft Defender Antivirus's built-in blocking function to provide an additional layer of post-breach protection in cases where the primary antivirus misses a threat.

EDR in block mode extends the behavioral blocking and containment capabilities in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, thwarting attack chains that could allow attackers to gain a foothold on a device and, consequently, a network. For each malicious behavior or malware blocked, EDR in block raises an alert in Microsoft Defender Security Center, enabling security teams to perform additional investigation and hunting and comprehensively resolve attacks.

Since being available for [public preview](#) in August, EDR in block mode has helped customers to stop a wide range of threats, especially in cases where Microsoft Defender Antivirus isn't the primary antivirus. Below we describe an IcedID campaign, one of many attacks foiled by EDR in block mode. In this incident, the organization's non-Microsoft antivirus solution missed the malware, but Microsoft Defender for Endpoint picked up the malicious behavior. EDR in block mode kicked in and protected the device from a series of malicious activities that include evasive attacker techniques like process hollowing and steganography that lead to the deployment of the info-stealing IcedID malware.




Figure 1. IcedID attack chain stopped by EDR in block mode

How EDR in block mode stopped an IcedID attack

On October 13, attackers launched a new campaign to distribute the IcedID malware. IcedID is a banking trojan that remains in memory, monitors traffic to banking domains and financial websites, and steals sensitive financial information. It has also been observed to modify site content to redirect traffic to malicious sites for the same purpose.

As in many past IcedID campaigns, this attack started with an email carrying a malicious attachment, in this case, a password-protected archive file. The emails used the fake reply technique and contained the password to the archive file.




Figure 2. Spear-phishing email used in the IcedID campaign

The archive file contained a document with malicious obfuscated macro code. When enabled, the malicious macro connects to a remote site to attempt to download the IcedID loader, which would in turn download and run the main IcedID malware.




Figure 3. Document with malicious macro

In customer environments protected by Microsoft for Defender Endpoint with Microsoft Defender Antivirus as the primary antivirus, the attack was blocked. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint uses Anti-malware Scan Interface (AMSI) and specialized machine learning classifiers on the client and in the cloud to detect malicious macro behavior.

In one environment that wasn't using Microsoft Defender Antivirus, the primary antivirus solution missed the campaign, so when the user opened the document and enabled the macro, the malicious code started connecting to the command-and-control (C2) server. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's EDR capabilities, however, detected the malicious macro behavior.

EDR in block mode, which was enabled on the environment, kicked in and instantly blocked the malicious document, preventing a chain of evasive attacker activities that could have led to the IcedID malware being installed.

An active 'PowDow' malware was blocked

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Defender Security Center interface. At the top, there is a risk level indicator showing 'Medium' with a red bar. Below this, the 'ALERT STORY' section is visible, with a 'Collapse all' link on the right. The alert details are as follows:

- [1004] winlogon.exe**
 - Process id: 1004
 - Creation time: Oct 23, 2020, 9:05:05 PM
 - Image file path: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe
 - Image file SHA1: 68648430e41da124215c8e36bcd85ca0c1714304
 - Image file creati...: Oct 9, 2020, 8:44:02 PM
 - Execution details: Token elevation: Default, Integrity level: System
 - Signer: Microsoft Windows
 - VirusTotal ratio: 0/71
 - User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
 - PE metadata: winlogon.exe
- [8120] userinit.exe**
- [960] explorer.exe**
- [9240] WINWORD.EXE /n "C:\Users\... \Desktop\010.20.doc" /o ""**
 - Process id: 9240
 - Creation time: Oct 23, 2020, 11:06:09 PM
 - Image file path: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office16\WINWORD.EXE
 - Image file SHA1: bfd578328154d755e79ebd2bd9ca3e1a5901224c
 - Image file creati...: Sep 17, 2020, 7:06:28 PM
 - Execution details: Token elevation: Default, Integrity level: High
 - Signer: Microsoft Corporation
 - VirusTotal ratio: 0/72
 - User: [Redacted]
 - PE metadata: WINWORD.EXE
 - Referenced in co...: 010.20.doc

At the bottom of the alert, a red banner states: **An active 'PowDow' malware was blocked**. To the right of this banner, there are status indicators: a red square for 'Medium', a blue circle for 'New', and a green circle for 'Blocked'.

Figure 4. Microsoft Defender Security Center alert for the blocked IcedID malware

The attack that could have been

This IcedID campaign shows why blocking malicious behavior and attacks in real time, especially in the earlier stages of the attack, is critical in preventing the full impact of threats. After gaining access to a device, attackers bring in sophisticated tools and utilize advanced

techniques to operate stealthily on a system.

For example, if the IcedID macro isn't blocked from running, it downloads a DLL file disguised as a CAB file from `hxxp://h4dv4c1w[.]com/ryfu/bary[.]php?l=konu13[.]cab`. This DLL file is saved as `[random].txt` and is executed using `regsvr32.exe`. The DLL then downloads `jazzcity.top`, an encrypted PNG file that contains malware code. This technique of hiding malicious code in image files, called steganography, is used by attackers to evade detection.

When decrypted, the PNG file creates an `msiexec.exe` process and uses process hollowing, a stealthy cross-process injection technique, to inject malicious code. The hollowed-out `msiexec.exe` process then creates the file `joavript.dll`, which is the decrypted IcedID malware.

Suspicious behavior by Microsoft Word was observed

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Defender Security Center interface. At the top, there is a risk level indicator set to 'Medium' and a user profile icon. Below this, the 'ALERT STORY' section displays a process tree. The tree starts with 'ntoskrnl.exe' (PID 4), which spawned 'smss.exe' (PID 696), which in turn spawned 'smss.exe' (PID 936, PID 000000ec 00000084), which spawned 'winlogon.exe' (PID 1004), which spawned 'userinit.exe' (PID 8120), which spawned 'explorer.exe' (PID 960), which finally spawned 'WINWORD.EXE' (PID 9240). The 'WINWORD.EXE' process is highlighted, and its details are shown in a side panel. The details include: Process id: 9240; Creation time: Oct 23, 2020, 11:06:09 PM; Image file path: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office16\WINWORD.EXE; Image file SHA1: bfd578328154d755e79ebd2bd9ca3e1a5901224c; Image file creati...: Sep 17, 2020, 7:06:28 PM; Execution details: Token elevation: Default, Integrity level: High; Signer: Microsoft Corporation; VirusTotal ratio: 0/69. Below the details, there is a section for 'User' (showing a user icon), 'PE metadata' (showing 'WINWORD.EXE'), and 'Referenced in co...' (showing '010.20.doc'). A red alert banner below the details reads 'Suspicious behavior by Microsoft Word was observed' with a risk level of 'Medium' and status 'New'. Below the process tree, another alert banner reads ''Icedid' malware was detected' with a risk level of 'Medium' and status 'New'. The interface also includes an 'Expand all' link in the top right corner.

Figure 5. Microsoft Defender Security Center alert for the detection of IcedID malware

Once in memory, the IcedID malware acts as the middleman between the browser and the banking site. It does this by creating a self-signed certificate and by hooking the browser to accept this certificate. This allows IcedID to monitor HTTPS traffic to online banking sites and manipulate and steal information.

EDR in block mode: Transforming EDR visibility into real-time blocking

With endpoint and detection response (EDR) in block mode, now generally available, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint provides another layer of post-breach protection when attacks manage to slip past the primary antivirus solution. An extension of the behavioral blocking and containment capabilities, EDR in block mode stops attacks cold when it detects malicious behavior, malware implant, and other artifacts. It stops and blocks malicious behavior in real-time, even if a threat has started running, helping ensure that attacks are not allowed to proceed and achieve their endgame.

EDR in block mode can be enabled thru the advanced settings in Microsoft Defender Security Center. Organizations that have not enabled this feature will also get security recommendation to do so via the threat and vulnerability management feature. To learn more, read the [EDR in block mode documentation](#).




Figure 6. Enable EDR in block mode in advanced features in Microsoft Defender Security Center

EDR in block mode is part of the comprehensive endpoint protection provided by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, which delivers preventative protection, post-breach detection, automated investigation, and response. [Learn how you can secure your organization with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](#).

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