

# MAR-10265965-1.v1 – North Korean Trojan: BISTROMATH

 [us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-045a](https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-045a)

## Notification

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## Summary

### Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Defense (DoD). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS, FBI, and DoD identified Trojan malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as BISTROMATH. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit <https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra>.

DHS, FBI, and DoD are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Use should flag activity associated with the malware and report the activity to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) or the FBI (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.

This report looks at multiple versions of a full-featured RAT implant executable and multiple versions of the CAgent11 GUI implant controller/build. The RAT performs simple XOR network encoding and are capable of many features including conducting system surveys, file upload/download, process execution, and monitoring the microphone, clipboard, and the screen. The GUI controllers allow interaction with the implant as well as the option to customize options. The implants are loaded with a trojanized executable containing a fake bitmap which decodes into shellcode.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see [MAR-101265965-1.v1.stix](#).

### Submitted Files (5)

04d70bb249206a006f83db39bbe49ff6e520ea329e5fbb9c758d426b1c8dec30 (96071956D4890AEBEA14ECD8015617...)

1ea6b3e99bbb67719c56ad07f5a12501855068a4a866f92db8dcdefaffa48a39 (688890DDBF532A4DE7C83A58E6AA59...)

618a67048d0a9217317c1d1790ad5f6b044eaa58a433bd46ec2fb9f9ff563dc6 (0AE8A7B6B4D70C0884095629FC02C1...)

738ba44188a93de6b5ca7e0bf0a77f66f77a0dda2b2e9ef4b91b1c8257da790 (C51416635E529183CA5337FADE8275...)

b6811b42023524e691b517d19d0321f890f91f35ebdbdf1c12cbb92cda5b6de32 (26520499A3FC627D335E34586E99DE...)

### Additional Files (2)

133820ebac6e005737d5bb97a5db549490a9f210f4e95098bc9b0a7748f52d1f (a21171923ec09b9569f2baad496c9e...)

43193c4efa8689ff6de3fb18e30607bb941b43abb21e8cee0cfd664c6f4ad97c (83833f8dbdd6ecf3a1212f5d1fc3d9...)

### IPs (1)

159.100.250.231

## Findings

**1ea6b3e99bbb67719c56ad07f5a12501855068a4a866f92db8dcdefaffa48a39**

### Tags

backdooremotetrojan

### Details

<b>Name</b>	688890DDBF532A4DE7C83A58E6AA594F
<b>Name</b>	ss.exe
<b>Size</b>	1102926 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	688890ddbf532a4de7c83a58e6aa594f
<b>SHA1</b>	d8f6a7f32c929ce9458691447ff1cf6d180588c8
<b>SHA256</b>	1ea6b3e99bbb67719c56ad07f5a12501855068a4a866f92db8dcdefaffa48a39
<b>SHA512</b>	8484bea6adf27c2323632c3e94f91eb313e341622b5696b0d24105be1f24fa356f5fce8f691e2d309fd24f7d8bb41fd7b682c29193128

---

**ssdeep** 24576:kgWxnOH3vvS+7nD03glQ1J6cS2lvyip5HkRpB7T4IRMh3y:kgWZMvSKnY3DJLSoORT7ThAC

---

**Entropy** 7.951069

Antivirus

<b>Ahnlab</b>	Trojan/Win32.Bmdoor
<b>Antiy</b>	Trojan[Backdoor]/Win32.Androm
<b>Avira</b>	TR/Injector.ukfuc
<b>BitDefender</b>	Trojan.GenericKD.41987827
<b>ClamAV</b>	Win.Trojan.Agent-7376538-0
<b>Cyren</b>	W32/Trojan.IZTF-2035
<b>ESET</b>	a variant of Win32/Injector.DQTY trojan
<b>Emsisoft</b>	Trojan.GenericKD.41987827 (B)
<b>Ikarus</b>	Trojan.Win32.Injector
<b>K7</b>	Riskware ( 0040eff71 )
<b>McAfee</b>	Trojan-Injector.c
<b>Microsoft Security Essentials</b>	Trojan:Win32/Agentesla!MTB
<b>NANOAV</b>	Trojan.Win32.Androm.ghyuau
<b>Sophos</b>	Troj/Inject-ETF
<b>Symantec</b>	Backdoor.Tidserv
<b>Systweak</b>	trojan.injector
<b>TACHYON</b>	Backdoor/W32.Androm.1102926
<b>TrendMicro</b>	TROJ_FR.7170E263
<b>TrendMicro House Call</b>	TROJ_FR.7170E263
<b>VirusBlokAda</b>	Backdoor.Androm
<b>Zillya!</b>	Backdoor.Androm.Win32.44606

YARA Rules

```
rule CryptographyFunction
{
  meta:
    author = "CISA trusted 3rd party"
    incident = "10271944.r1.v1"
    date = "2019-12-25"
    category = "Hidden_Cobra"
    family = "HOTCROISSANT"
  strings:
    $ALGO_crypto_1 = { 8A [1-5] 32 [1-4] 32 [1-4] 32 [1-4] 88 [1-5] 8A [1-4] 32 [1-4] 22 [1-4] 8B [1-5] 8D [3-7] 33 [1-4] 81 [3-7] C1 [1-5] C1 [3-7] 33 [1-4] 22 [1-4] C1 [1-5] 33 [1-4] 32 [1-4] 8B [1-4] 83 [1-5] C1 [1-5] 33 [1-4] C1 [1-5] C1 }
  condition:
    uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and any of them
}
```

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 2008-01-17 10:34:19-05:00

**Import Hash** 68d3c5fd0c41042f190fa12a4eebfe1b

PE Sections

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
-----	------	----------	---------

---

0b8ab9af886c4161371944bd46af685d	header	1024	2.484025
0cc984b88cda683bad52d886fbadf22d	.text	77824	6.585222
d7200a9095f81e46d89eb2175a7d16ba	.rdata	21504	4.940483
56eae295cdc645a889cc51643c19ca1c	.data	5632	3.200450
31d4e62663767a64bd72b957df2bed2e	.rsrc	1536	4.029623
c7a9818fe1b1f64be18f67db25dbed6d	.reloc	7680	4.982554

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.

Relationships

1ea6b3e99b...	Connected_To	159.100.250.231
1ea6b3e99b...	Contains	43193c4efa8689ff6de3fb18e30607bb941b43abb21e8cee0cfd664c6f4ad97c

Description

The samples use a PlanetCPP.com 'RichEdit example' executable to obfuscate calling a decryption function which decrypts an embedded 'fake' configuration and shellcode. When the malicious function is called, it deobfuscates API pointers, loads the full file into memory, calculates an offset, decodes the image, which becomes configuration options and shellcode and then executes the shellcode.

The embedded shellcode has many selectable options.

```

-----Begin Shellcode Options-----
- option00: Embedded vs Downloaded payload
  0 -> payload embedded within own file at offset (option27 + option28 + option22)
  1 -> Download payload from url <option30> to %temp%\<option31>\RGID3D88.tmp

- option01: True -> check for vm artifacts:
  registry checks:
    VMWARE Scsi device
    VBOX Scsi device
    QEMU Scsi device
    SOFTWARE\Vmware,Inc.\Vmware_Tools
    HARDWARE\Description\System\SystemBiosVersion == "VBOX"
    HARDWARE\Description\System\SystemBiosVersion == "QEMU"
    HARDWARE\Description\System\SystemBiosVersion == "BOCHS"
    HARDWARE\Description\System\VideoBiosVersion == "VIRTUALBOX"
    HARDWARE\Description\System\SystemBiosDate == 06/23/99
    SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox_Guest_Additions
    HARDWARE\ACPI\SDT\VBOX_
    HARDWARE\ACPI\FADT\VBOX_
    HARDWARE\ACPI\RSMT\VBOX_
    SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VBBoxGuest
    SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VBBoxMouse
    SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VBBoxService
    SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VBBoxSF
    SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VBBoxVideo
  file checks:
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmmouse.sys
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmhgfs.sys
    \\.\HGFS
    \\.\vmci
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\VBBoxMouse.sys
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\VBBoxGuest.sys
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\VBBoxSF.sys
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\VBBoxVideo.sys
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxdisp.dll
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxhook.dll
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxmrxnp.dll
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxogl.dll
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxoglarrayspu.dll
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxoglcrutil.dll
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxoglerrorsspu.dll
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxoglfeedbackspu.dll
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxoglpackspu.dll
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxoglpassthroughspu.dll
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxservice.exe
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\vboxtray.exe
    C:\WINDOWS\system32\VBBoxControl.exe

```

```

C:\program_files\oracle\virtualbox_guest_additions
\\.\BoxMiniRdrDN
\\.\pipe\BoxMiniRdDN
\\.\BoxTrayIPC
\\.\pipe\BoxTrayIPC
Network Adapter checks:
  Check for Vmware MAC addresses
  Check for VirtualBox MAC addresses
  Check for VMware network adapter
Window Checks:
  VBoxTrayToolWndClass
  VBoxTrayToolWnd
Process Checks:
  vboxservice.exe
  vboxtray.exe
Loaded DLLs:
  vmcheck.dll

- option02: True -> check for sandbox artifacts:
  Verify spin loops aren't skipped
  Verify kernel32 doesn't contain export "wine_get_unix_file_name"
  Verify Numa api calls are not bypassed
  Loaded DLLs:
    SbieDll.dll
    api_log.dll
    dir_watch.dll
    dbghelp.dll
    wpespy.dll
  registry checks:
    SOFTWARE\Wine
  file checks:
    C:\sandbox\sandbox.exe
    C:\sandbox\sbfwe.dll
  username checks:
    SANDBOX
    VIRUS
    MALWARE
    SCHMIDTI
    CURRENTUSER
    ANDY
  current directory checks:
    VIRUS
    SANDBOX
    SAMPLE

- option03: True -> check for debugging artifacts:
  API calls:
    IsDebuggerPresent
    CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent
    NtQueryInformationProcess
    GetThreadContext
    OutputDebugString

- option04: Check if certain processes are running:
  0 -> ignored
  1 -> exit if specific processes are running
  2 -> exit if specific processes are not running
  parses option31_array_+0x200 for a list of ;; separated process names

- option05: Queries Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall keys
  exits if return value is != 0

- option06: Check for specific languages
  0 -> ignored
  1 -> exit if current language is found in list
  2 -> exit if current language is not found in list
  parses option31_array_+0x4b0 for a list of ;; separated languages

- option07: Check for specific usernames
  0 -> ignored
  1 -> exit if current username is found in list
  2 -> exit if current username is not found in list
  parses option31_array_+0x6b8 for a list of ;; separated usernames

- option08: Check for specific computernames
  0 -> ignored
  1 -> exit if current computernames is found in list
  2 -> exit if current computernames is not found in list
  parses option31_array_+0x8ac for a list of ;; separated computernames

```

- option09: Something with querying Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall keys  
exits if return value is < option09\_value
  - option10: integer value -> exits if there are fewer than this many processes running
  - option11-14: Check for system/drive info
    - 11==0x001 -> exit if number of processors <= option12
    - 11==0x010 -> exit if total physical memory <= option13
    - 11==0x100 -> exit if total harddisk space <= option14
  - option12/27/28: if True -> exploit dll hijack in cliconfg.exe (SQL Server Client Network Utility)  
dumps a number (option28) of bytes from an offset (option27) of this file into %temp%\ntwdblib.dll  
creates a Software\Claiomh registry key  
executes cliconfg.exe (which loads ntwdblib.dll)
  - option16: Set EnableLUA registry key  
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA to <option16>
  - option17: Create Persistence
    - 0 -> ignored
    - 1 -> Add registry key to Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run using a name from option31\_array\_+0x960
    - 2 -> Copy self into Startup folder
    - 3 -> Create an hourly Scheduled Task called "System Backup"
  - option18/23: Process Hollowing vs Drop/Execute
    - == 0 -> Do Process Hollowing
    - != 0 -> Dump payload to file and execute directly:
      - write to %temp%\RT5380.exe using own file offset (option27 + option28 + option22) and execute
      - write to %temp%\<option30> using own file offset (option27 + option28 + option22) and execute
      - check option23:
  - ==0 -> ignored
  - !=0 -> delete self and replace self with the dropped file
  - option19: Process to create/hollow/inject/execute
    - 0 -> self
    - 1 -> svchost.exe
    - 2 -> conhost.exe
    - 3 -> explorer.exe
    - 4 -> value of "http\shell\open\command" registry key
    - 5 -> <option33>
  - option20: Sleep timer  
Milliseconds to sleep before doing process hollowing
  - option21/26: Kill timer
    - 0 -> ignored
    - 1 -> if timestamp of module + <option26> >= currentTime -> remove persistence, delete self, exit process
  - option29/34/35: move file to desired location, delete old file, and execute from new location  
additional path is in option34  
new filename is in option35
    - 0 -> C:\
    - 1 -> %windir%
    - 2 -> %system%
    - 3 -> %programfiles%
    - 4 -> %programfiles%\Common Files\
    - 5 -> C:\ProgramData\
    - 6 -> %userprofile%
    - 7 -> %userprofile%\Documents\
    - 8 -> %temp%
    - 9 -> %userprofile%\Favorites\
    - 10 -> %appdata%\n
    - 11 -> %localappdata%
  - option36: char[40] - Unknown - Possibly adds a mutex to the hollowed process to enforce a single execution  
Uses argument to create a named mutex  
Injects additional code into the hollowed process (from offset 0x28c0)  
Injects <option36> into the hollowed process  
Creates another remote thread in the hollowed process pointing at offset 0x465a of the newly injected memory
- End Shellcode Options-----
- Screenshots

Opcode	Operation	Arguments	Description
0x03	SendVictimInfo		Returns the victim system info (format listed above)
0x05	ListDrives		Without an argument, this opcode returns a list of all used drive letters
0x05	DirectoryList	<path>	With an argument, this opcode returns a list of all files in the specified directory
0x07	RecvWriteFile	<filename>	Victim machine receives a file from the C2
0x09	ReadSendFile	<filename>	Sends a file from the victim machine to the C2
0x0b	CopyFile	<oldfilename>;<newfilename>	Copies a specified file to a new location
0x0d	MoveFile	<oldfilename>;<newfilename>	Moves a specified file to a new location
0x0f	RenameFile	<oldfilename>;<newfilename>	Renames a specified file
0x11	DeleteFile	<filename>	Deletes a specified file or directory
0x13	CreateDirectory	<dirname>	Creates a specified directory
0x15	Timestamp	<filename>	Changes the timestamp of the specified filename to the timestamp of kernel32.dll
0x17	ProcessList		Gets a list of processes
0x19	KillProcess	<pid>	Kills a specified process
0x1b	ServiceList		Lists all services
0x1d	StartService	<servicename>	Starts a specified service
0x1f	StopService	<servicename>	Stops a specified service
0x21	RunCmdPipe	<cmd>	Runs the specified command using cmd.exe. Uses a pipe to capture and return the results
0x23	LoadLibrary	<filename>	Loads the specified .dll into the current process
0x25	UnloadLibrary	<filename>	Frees the specified .dll from the current process
0x28	GetFileSize	<filename>	Returns the filesize of the specified file
0x2b	GetScreenshot		Takes a new screenshot into %temp%/crScr33nc4p.dat then sends and deletes it
0x2d	MicrophoneCapture	[start/stop/view]	Performs an audio capture of the microphone.
0x2f	KeyLogger	[start/stop/view]	Logs clipboard content and keystrokes, includes the title of the window the keys were typed into.
0x31	BrowserActivity	[cred]	Attempts to dump browser cookies/credentials
0x33	CachePasswd	[view]	Attempts to dump cached credentials
0x35	Disconnect		Disconnects from the implant
0x42	BrowserActivity		Attempts to dump browser cookies/credentials
0x50	GetLog		Reads and sends "err.log"
0x54	WebcamCapture		Possibly captures a snapshot from the webcam
0x58	Uninstall		Attempts to stop and remove the implant
0x59	ListOpenWindows		Lists all open windows

Figure 1: Implant Functionality -

618a67048d0a9217317c1d1790ad5f6b044eaa58a433bd46ec2fb9f9ff563dc6

Tags

dropperemotetkeyloggerspywaretrojan

Details

<b>Name</b>	0AE8A7B6B4D70C0884095629FC02C19C
<b>Name</b>	CAgent11.exe
<b>Size</b>	13498368 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	0ae8a7b6b4d70c0884095629fc02c19c
<b>SHA1</b>	9efa2d68932ff24cb18eb7e35aa5f91ce99596e8
<b>SHA256</b>	618a67048d0a9217317c1d1790ad5f6b044eaa58a433bd46ec2fb9f9ff563dc6
<b>SHA512</b>	08f724812cbef4020ac3fb07cafec5cde17f53f4644d554351cf4056907a6363d5b21ed3720976820307b43a543e81c6cc27c241f4449fd
<b>ssdeep</b>	196608:Klq/1ui17DaLU1i4O5dm/+f99FLOyomFHKnPG:GcvImLMg/299F
<b>Entropy</b>	5.658332

Antivirus

<b>Ahnlab</b>	Dropper/Win32.Keylogger
<b>Antiy</b>	Trojan[Spy]/Win32.Agent
<b>Avira</b>	HEUR/AGEN.1038092
<b>Cyren</b>	W32/Agent.RBBJ-4429
<b>ESET</b>	a variant of Win32/Spy.Agent.PUH trojan
<b>Ikarus</b>	Trojan-Spy.Agent
<b>K7</b>	Spyware ( 00555d821 )

<b>McAfee</b>	Trojan-Injector.d
<b>Microsoft Security Essentials</b>	Trojan:Win32/Emotet
<b>NANOAV</b>	Trojan.Win32.Graftor.ggzicq
<b>NetGate</b>	Trojan.Win32.Malware
<b>Sophos</b>	Troj/Agent-BCXS
<b>Symantec</b>	Trojan Horse
<b>Systweak</b>	malware.keylogger
<b>TACHYON</b>	Trojan/W32.Keylogger.13498368
<b>VirusBlokAda</b>	TrojanSpy.Agent
<b>Zillya!</b>	Trojan.Agent.Win32.1169060

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 2017-03-21 21:12:17-04:00

**Import Hash** c4406c66f7ca84ffb881d843c49acbd6

PE Sections

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
e7e02cd4a189cea5efaa8fb36509aa45	header	1024	3.530105
d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e	.textbss	0	0.000000
5db50cefbb12a73d10aad429548befe7	.text	7047680	5.565086
e9a63040b7f3e75b5746d8202d8594f5	.rdata	904704	4.415613
1e815bbe0c5cadf4953bbaac6259dcaa	.data	40448	4.299279
16342b710a408579ee34f3ccf9927331	.idata	28672	5.161732
c573bd7cea296a9c5d230ca6b5aee1a6	.tls	1024	0.011174
011d6c8672f924dc710a68acb6bc74f9	.00cfg	512	0.061163
867de3faa85f377519582ed29a83384c	.rsrc	5123072	4.951562
e74f13482e13eb316d544b69a046ff15	.reloc	351232	6.011950

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0

Description

See analysis for "04D70BB249206A006F83DB39BBE49FF6E520EA329E5FBB9C758D426B1C8DEC30".

Implants built with sample "04D70BB249206A006F83DB39BBE49FF6E520EA329E5FBB9C758D426B1C8DEC30" are not compatible with this c  
versa.

**b6811b42023524e691b517d19d0321f890f91f35ebbf1c12cbb92cda5b6de32**

Tags

backdooremotetrojan

Details

**Name** 26520499A3FC627D335E34586E99DE7A

**Name** ADManager.exe

<b>Size</b>	1120318 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	26520499a3fc627d335e34586e99de7a
<b>SHA1</b>	df10c097e42dbe7ea4478a984c5e2ab586147519
<b>SHA256</b>	b6811b42023524e691b517d19d0321f890f91f35ebbd1c12cbb92cda5b6de32
<b>SHA512</b>	898ab1a1cd5a731e94a7b4c0a274e81092fe6de2ea888b3db2d22cf4d0bacbbb36f486152ff10f61f054091aee421f00d89a8741fce0f371
<b>ssdeep</b>	24576:3gWPFTO4H59Z6PTvnh2gf2JfvoioZ74XKBpNCY+SOToKMcxGa52w:3gW3S4Z9ATcggox4wppwYq9Mcx3B
<b>Entropy</b>	7.953591

#### Antivirus

<b>Ahnlab</b>	Backdoor/Win32.Androm
<b>Antiy</b>	Trojan[Backdoor]/Win32.Androm
<b>Avira</b>	TR/Injector.cskrn
<b>BitDefender</b>	Trojan.GenericKD.41987802
<b>ClamAV</b>	Win.Trojan.Agent-7376533-0
<b>Cyren</b>	W32/Androm.DKHG-0510
<b>ESET</b>	a variant of Win32/Injector.DQTY trojan
<b>Emsisoft</b>	Trojan.GenericKD.41987802 (B)
<b>Ikarus</b>	Trojan.Win32.Injector
<b>K7</b>	Riskware ( 0040eff71 )
<b>McAfee</b>	Trojan-Injector.c
<b>Microsoft Security Essentials</b>	Trojan:Win32/Agentesla!MTB
<b>NANOAV</b>	Trojan.Win32.Androm.ggadbc
<b>Sophos</b>	Troj/Inject-ETF
<b>Symantec</b>	Trojan Horse
<b>Systweak</b>	trojan.injector
<b>TACHYON</b>	Backdoor/W32.Androm.1120318
<b>TrendMicro</b>	TROJ_FR.7170E263
<b>TrendMicro House Call</b>	TROJ_FR.7170E263
<b>VirusBlokAda</b>	Backdoor.Androm
<b>Zillya!</b>	Backdoor.Androm.Win32.44606

#### YARA Rules

```
rule CryptographyFunction
{
  meta:
    author = "CISA trusted 3rd party"
    incident = "10271944.r1.v1"
    date = "2019-12-25"
    category = "Hidden_Cobra"
    family = "HOTCROISSANT"
  strings:
    $ALGO_crypto_1 = { 8A [1-5] 32 [1-4] 32 [1-4] 32 [1-4] 88 [1-5] 8A [1-4] 32 [1-4] 22 [1-4] 8B [1-5] 8D [3-7] 33 [1-4] 81 [3-7] C1 [1-5] C1 [
33 [1-4] 22 [1-4] C1 [1-5] 33 [1-4] 32 [1-4] 8B [1-4] 83 [1-5] C1 [1-5] 33 [1-4] C1 [1-5] C1 }
    condition:
      uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and any of them
}
```

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.



PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 2017-03-26 09:21:10-04:00

**Import Hash** 68d3c5fd0c41042f190fa12a4eebfe1b

PE Sections

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
a507172c7e89d3f88c70c4fd6827a522	header	1024	2.476553
0cc984b88cda683bad52d886fbadf22d	.text	77824	6.585222
d7200a9095f81e46d89eb2175a7d16ba	.rdata	21504	4.940483
56eae295cdc645a889cc51643c19ca1c	.data	5632	3.200450
58dbdc33cb7f42b5e3a9f0fcc94d6b1f	.rsrc	1024	4.796047
c7a9818fe1b1f64be18f67db25dbed6d	.reloc	7680	4.982554

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.

Relationships

b6811b4202... Connected\_To 159.100.250.231

b6811b4202... Contains 133820ebac6e005737d5bb97a5db549490a9f210f4e95098bc9b0a7748f52d1f

Description

See analysis for file "1ea6b3e99bbb67719c56ad07f5a12501855068a4a866f92db8dcdefaffa48a39" for additional details.

**738ba44188a93de6b5ca7e0bf0a77f66f677a0dda2b2e9ef4b91b1c8257da790**

Tags

trojan

Details

<b>Name</b>	C51416635E529183CA5337FADE82758A
<b>Name</b>	server.exe
<b>Size</b>	947200 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	c51416635e529183ca5337fade82758a
<b>SHA1</b>	830368d88b661d09c084e484713effb8d230d328
<b>SHA256</b>	738ba44188a93de6b5ca7e0bf0a77f66f677a0dda2b2e9ef4b91b1c8257da790
<b>SHA512</b>	244b67e0b9e9ab2fa6ccceeb4ad71207f1d8371af9c69af93bcc15cc8b592aca54e9c241d439b94ed28923d4622050fccdc38b326a8d1f
<b>ssdeep</b>	24576:9oV9SPwODditnxk93QKTrCEgqAGYOEgJZ+0Mn:9o2l2du23QxErv7ESZ+7n
<b>Entropy</b>	6.703705

Antivirus

<b>Ahnlab</b>	Malware/Win32.Generic
<b>Antiy</b>	Trojan/Win32.AGeneric
<b>Avira</b>	HEUR/AGEN.1038092
<b>BitDefender</b>	Trojan.GenericKD.32683846
<b>ClamAV</b>	Win.Trojan.Agent-7376468-0
<b>Cyren</b>	W32/Agent.KUBI-8127

<b>ESET</b>	a variant of Win32/Agent.SSC trojan
<b>Emsisoft</b>	Trojan.GenericKD.32683846 (B)
<b>Ikarus</b>	Trojan.Win32.Agent
<b>K7</b>	Trojan ( 0027657e1 )
<b>McAfee</b>	Generic Trojan.sh
<b>NANOAV</b>	Trojan.Win32.TrjGen.ghyubn
<b>Sophos</b>	Troj/Agent-BCXS
<b>Symantec</b>	Trojan Horse
<b>Systweak</b>	malware.passwordstealer
<b>TrendMicro</b>	TROJ_FR.7170E263
<b>TrendMicro House Call</b>	TROJ_FR.7170E263
<b>VirusBlokAda</b>	BScope.TrojanSpy.Agent
<b>Zillya!</b>	Trojan.Agent.Win32.1168332

#### YARA Rules

No matches found.

#### ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

#### PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 2017-04-13 23:44:03-04:00

**Import Hash** d31e404296b957729148721e11f3bc88

#### PE Sections

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
1db5d7f5d8e2fa35f4077d3c28b60ae7	header	1024	3.229935
6f6469c660281de2c72fa3685d55a8ec	.text	710656	6.655052
0847400b5430782ad644a30cd8240c73	.rdata	167424	5.776485
77ab2f92d6177b9e39430447aa595073	.data	37376	5.315603
1f354d76203061bfd5a53dae48d5435	.tls	512	0.020393
1704ffd93e9d463dc42784bc03bbfd5d	.guids	512	2.779799
850aa99c8c1a85dc7545811d66bb0c17	.rsrc	512	4.717679
48da542e50cc8e12bdb9cab38a8ce0cb	.reloc	29184	6.576636

#### Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.

#### Relationships

738ba44188... Connected\_To 159.100.250.231

#### Description

This sample is a full-featured RAT executable.

See analysis for file "1ea6b3e99bbb67719c56ad07f5a12501855068a4a866f92db8dcdefaffa48a39" for additional details. This sample varies slightly.

Victim\_info for this version contains Unicode strings. The RAT is controllable by an unknown variant of CAgent.exe.

**04d70bb249206a006f83db39bbe49ff6e520ea329e5fbb9c758d426b1c8dec30**

#### Tags

dropperemotetkeyloggerspywaretrojan

#### Details

<b>Name</b>	96071956D4890AEBEA14ECD8015617CC
<b>Name</b>	CAgent11.exe
<b>Size</b>	7014400 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	96071956d4890aeb14ecd8015617cc
<b>SHA1</b>	49e16180795034a4888fff776968e29871f79340
<b>SHA256</b>	04d70bb249206a006f83db39bbe49ff6e520ea329e5fbb9c758d426b1c8dec30
<b>SHA512</b>	29abd5fa0c24e42916631f830b6860027dcefd320978bee389e55f4f04278668ec4cfb67e5b1c8b7133338cc0fb09ffae28c5cf6d5226d
<b>ssdeep</b>	98304:SC6l4uHxEcIYwS2BsszjfsjJiBg1pDCImMFLOAkGkzdnEVomFHKnP:P44uHi0mFi+1p+FLOyomFHKnP
<b>Entropy</b>	5.907837

#### Antivirus

<b>Ahnlab</b>	Dropper/Win32.Keylogger
<b>Avira</b>	HEUR/AGEN.1038092
<b>BitDefender</b>	Trojan.GenericKD.32683845
<b>Cyren</b>	W32/Trojan.KVTC-7019
<b>ESET</b>	a variant of Win32/Spy.Agent.PUH trojan
<b>Emsisoft</b>	Trojan.GenericKD.32683845 (B)
<b>Ikarus</b>	Trojan-Spy.Agent
<b>K7</b>	Spyware ( 00555d821 )
<b>McAfee</b>	Trojan-Injector.d
<b>Microsoft Security Essentials</b>	Trojan:Win32/Emotet
<b>NANOAV</b>	Trojan.Win32.TrjGen.ghyuap
<b>Sophos</b>	Troj/Agent-BCXS
<b>Symantec</b>	Trojan Horse
<b>Systweak</b>	malware.keylogger
<b>TACHYON</b>	Trojan/W32.Keylogger.7014400
<b>TrendMicro</b>	TROJ_FR.7170E263
<b>TrendMicro House Call</b>	TROJ_FR.7170E263
<b>VirusBlokAda</b>	TrojanSpy.Agent
<b>Zillya!</b>	Trojan.Agent.Win32.1168788

#### YARA Rules

No matches found.

#### ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

#### PE Metadata

<b>Compile Date</b>	2017-03-26 00:28:24-04:00
<b>Import Hash</b>	0937a296014c778f116e3990f06e314b

#### PE Sections

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
a9fb26d3d4f4a80f2c2f7aeb1201325a	header	1024	3.391911
c788578d4f02ac011ffabd20db4506f3	.text	1619456	6.522579
7a1b03c4f7501d6f82d34a01fe9cf6b7	.rdata	348160	5.245418
50c4f4eab880975227b9b4d454941979	.data	24064	4.732755
b9af73df5ec7fb7a68b1c00d83e6b404	.gids	111104	4.230152
52f93ebec3bc0c9da8e85ddf5ad812f4	.giats	512	0.155178
1f354d76203061bfd5a53dae48d5435	.tls	512	0.020393
e0376d74c0a0f746949b4647d35ef424	.rsrc	4774400	5.470347
9011be24e5ab8066360bd7d0af07cea6	.reloc	135168	6.491093

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?..?

Description

This sample is a GUI implant controller titled "Cyber Agent v11.0". It is capable of dynamically building new bot payloads with the following options

-----Begin Payload Options-----

Callback IP  
 Callback Port  
 Beacon Interval  
 Output Path

-----End Payload Options-----

victim\_info (see analysis for "43193c4efa8689ff6de3fb18e30607bb941b43abb21e8cee0cfd664c6f4ad97c") is displayed for each implant beacon i can establish Remote Desktop viewer, drive enumeration, file upload/download, list processes and services, reverse shell, microphone capture ar keylogger, browser activity, cached passwords, and DLL loading and unloading. The controller has the ability to provide implants with an Update l option to uninstall all bots.

**159.100.250.231**

Ports

- 80 TCP
- 8080 TCP

Whois

% IANA WHOIS server  
 % for more information on IANA, visit <http://www.iana.org>  
 % This query returned 1 object

refer: whois.arin.net

inetnum: 159.0.0.0 - 159.255.255.255  
 organisation: Administered by ARIN  
 status: LEGACY

whois: whois.arin.net

changed: 1993-05  
 source: IANA

# whois.arin.net

NetRange: 159.100.0.0 - 159.101.255.255  
 CIDR: 159.100.0.0/15  
 NetName: RIPE-ERX-159-100-0-0  
 NetHandle: NET-159-100-0-0-1  
 Parent: NET159 (NET-159-0-0-0-0)  
 NetType: Early Registrations, Transferred to RIPE NCC  
 OriginAS:  
 Organization: RIPE Network Coordination Centre (RIPE)  
 RegDate: 2003-10-29  
 Updated: 2003-10-29  
 Comment: These addresses have been further assigned to users in  
 Comment: the RIPE NCC region. Contact information can be found in  
 Comment: the RIPE database at <http://www.ripe.net/whois>  
 Ref: <https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/159.100.0.0>

ResourceLink: <https://apps.db.ripe.net/search/query.html>  
ResourceLink: [whois.ripe.net](https://apps.db.ripe.net/whois/ripe.net)

OrgName: RIPE Network Coordination Centre  
OrgId: RIPE  
Address: P.O. Box 10096  
City: Amsterdam  
StateProv:  
PostalCode: 1001EB  
Country: NL  
RegDate:  
Updated: 2013-07-29  
Ref: <https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/RIPE>

ReferralServer: [whois://whois.ripe.net](https://apps.db.ripe.net/whois/ripe.net)  
ResourceLink: <https://apps.db.ripe.net/search/query.html>

OrgTechHandle: RNO29-ARIN  
OrgTechName: RIPE NCC Operations  
OrgTechPhone: +31 20 535 4444  
OrgTechEmail: [hostmaster@ripe.net](mailto:hostmaster@ripe.net)  
OrgTechRef: <https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/RNO29-ARIN>

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE3850-ARIN  
OrgAbuseName: Abuse Contact  
OrgAbusePhone: +31205354444  
OrgAbuseEmail: [abuse@ripe.net](mailto:abuse@ripe.net)  
OrgAbuseRef: <https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/ABUSE3850-ARIN>

# whois.ripe.net

inetnum: 159.100.245.0 - 159.100.255.255  
netname: Akenes  
descr: Exoscale Open Cloud DK2  
descr: Exoscale cloud hosting <https://www.exoscale.ch>  
descr: \*\*\*\*\*  
descr: \* These IPs are customer assigned STATIC IPs.  
descr: \* In case of abuse, please do NOT block entire  
descr: \* network as IPs of this block are assigned as /32  
descr: \* to individual customers.  
descr: \*\*\*\*\*  
descr: \* For abuse-complaints please use  
descr: \* only [abuse@exoscale.ch](mailto:abuse@exoscale.ch).  
descr: \*\*\*\*\*  
country: CH  
admin-c: AC22866-RIPE  
tech-c: LLL1007-RIPE  
status: LEGACY  
mnt-by: Exoscale-MNT  
created: 2017-11-20T10:37:49Z  
last-modified: 2017-11-20T10:37:49Z  
source: RIPE

person: Antoine COETSIER  
address: Boulevard de Grancy 19A  
address: 1006 Lausanne  
address: SWITZERLAND  
phone: +41 58 255 00 66  
nic-hdl: AC22866-RIPE  
mnt-by: Exoscale-MNT  
created: 2013-02-08T14:10:06Z  
last-modified: 2019-04-11T05:30:08Z  
source: RIPE # Filtered

person: Loic Lambiel  
address: Boulevard de Grancy 19A  
address: 1006 Lausanne  
address: Switzerland  
phone: +41 58 255 00 66  
nic-hdl: LLL1007-RIPE  
mnt-by: Exoscale-MNT  
created: 2013-02-15T10:16:52Z  
last-modified: 2019-04-11T05:31:04Z  
source: RIPE # Filtered

% Information related to '159.100.248.0/21AS61098'

route: 159.100.248.0/21  
origin: AS61098  
mnt-by: Exoscale-MNT  
created: 2016-12-14T10:12:52Z  
last-modified: 2016-12-14T10:12:52Z  
source: RIPE

% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.95.1 (WAGYU)  
Relationships

159.100.250.231	Connected_From	1ea6b3e99bbb67719c56ad07f5a12501855068a4a866f92db8dcdefaffa48a39
159.100.250.231	Connected_From	b6811b42023524e691b517d19d0321f890f91f35ebddf1c12cbb92cda5b6de32
159.100.250.231	Connected_From	738ba44188a93de6b5ca7e0bf0a77f66f677a0dda2b2e9ef4b91b1c8257da790
159.100.250.231	Connected_From	43193c4efa8689ff6de3fb18e30607bb941b43abb21e8cee0cfd664c6f4ad97c

#### Description

Hard-coded C2 address used by these RATs.

**43193c4efa8689ff6de3fb18e30607bb941b43abb21e8cee0cfd664c6f4ad97c**

#### Tags

keyloggerspywaretrojan

#### Details

<b>Name</b>	83833f8dbdd6ecf3a1212f5d1fc3d9dd
<b>Size</b>	905216 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	83833f8dbdd6ecf3a1212f5d1fc3d9dd
<b>SHA1</b>	77a2272633eb64e4c16f8ea4466dba59ecc92292
<b>SHA256</b>	43193c4efa8689ff6de3fb18e30607bb941b43abb21e8cee0cfd664c6f4ad97c
<b>SHA512</b>	cda12a75b1d6524fe8856d6ef359ab58785e2c56ca4fec613b851a6730d24b8141dfdd00fba62f2865b8cc4606e85b258c02d71ccd45fca
<b>ssdeep</b>	24576:AECw5N98knVurfj9gbYX91XdKo1ldrtD9:AECwz9fqfj59NwuldrF
<b>Entropy</b>	6.710436

#### Antivirus

<b>Ahnlab</b>	Trojan/Win32.KeyLogger
<b>Antiy</b>	Trojan/Win32.AGeneric
<b>Avira</b>	HEUR/AGEN.1038092
<b>BitDefender</b>	Gen:Variant.Graftor.679285
<b>ClamAV</b>	Win.Trojan.Agent-7376468-0
<b>ESET</b>	a variant of Win32/Spy.Agent.PUH trojan
<b>Emsisoft</b>	Gen:Variant.Graftor.679285 (B)
<b>Ikarus</b>	Trojan-Spy.Agent
<b>K7</b>	Spyware ( 00555d821 )
<b>NANOAV</b>	Trojan.Win32.Graftor.ggzicq
<b>Sophos</b>	Troj/Agent-BCXS
<b>Symantec</b>	Heur.AdvML.B
<b>VirusBlokAda</b>	BScope.TrojanSpy.Agent
<b>Zillya!</b>	Trojan.Agent.Win32.1170395

#### YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

**Compile Date** 2008-01-17 10:34:19-05:00

**Import Hash** 3b7df90688bca84764a888c49f25e8b9

PE Sections

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
064a795c4019629fd03c3d47c823cd49	header	1024	3.330520
ec60b9f4b78b0f79ea9d15910baf3d8d	.text	672768	6.660080
3dd902a53e33d4f6b014f6a677620252	.rdata	164864	5.832569
0c88a9a99d1c3cb1b61009a6acb2539e	.data	37376	5.304517
1f354d76203061bfd5a53dae48d5435	.tls	512	0.020393
d5ea2a2452a9733e2cc63487e98b387d	.gfids	512	2.821174
f42c4819230ff4b40b0e52850c134b08	.rsrc	512	4.708237
a1862d52a23162d56421552f09f1ca85	.reloc	27648	6.587842

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ?.

Relationships

43193c4efa... Contained\_Within 1ea6b3e99bbb67719c56ad07f5a12501855068a4a866f92db8dcdefaffa48a39

43193c4efa... Connected\_To 159.100.250.231

Description

This sample is a full-featured RAT executable contained within "1EA6B3E99BBB67719C56AD07F5A12501855068A4A866F92DB8DCDEFAFFA-

See Figure 1 for full list of commands a hardcoded C2 address of 159.100.250.231 on port 8080 is contained within the sample. The RAT is contr variant "618A67048D0A9217317C1D1790AD5F6B044EAA58A433BD46EC2FB9F9FF563DC6".

The Imports are obfuscated by prepending "CARAT\_" to the API names.

Packets are formatted in the following format:

```
-----Begin Packet Formatting-----  
[OPCODE] [4 Bytes length of data] [data]  
-----Begin Packet Formatting-----
```

Packets are encoded by performing an XOR on the data after the header with the XOR key 0x07. The implant initiates callback to C2, then immer victim\_info.

-----Begin Victim\_Info-----

- Language
- Country
- Victim\_ID
- Computer\_Name
- User\_Name
- Implant\_Version = "11.0"
- Victim\_IP
- System\_Architecture
- Drive\_Letters
- OS\_Version

-----End Victim\_Info-----

**133820ebac6e005737d5bb97a5db549490a9f210f4e95098bc9b0a7748f52d1f**

Tags

trojan

Details

**Name** a21171923ec09b9569f2baad496c9e16

<b>Size</b>	922624 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	a21171923ec09b9569f2baad496c9e16
<b>SHA1</b>	35ba8e39e6c8234ad55baf27130bb696179b7681
<b>SHA256</b>	133820ebac6e005737d5bb97a5db549490a9f210f4e95098bc9b0a7748f52d1f
<b>SHA512</b>	c1775b68b6b083323780150f6da654c6bc313b298fd243047402a0d0ec5631f8c90ed7ccc28ff4c1eaf2666e671b9c0f6bc068ca9e065
<b>ssdeep</b>	12288:KsukuhRC+VmUmEViUUwsaXpx3U09S5j4J6dxLqm1JaSjyQiEyDIZk7SxTmgaA6i:pukuhRC+Vr24v3qhdDaSuQCBZk7SUAB
<b>Entropy</b>	6.678910

#### Antivirus

<b>Ahnlab</b>	Malware/Win32.Generic
<b>Antiy</b>	Trojan/Win32.AGeneric
<b>Avira</b>	HEUR/AGEN.1038092
<b>ClamAV</b>	Win.Trojan.Agent-7376468-0
<b>ESET</b>	a variant of Win32/Agent.SSC trojan
<b>Symantec</b>	Heur.AdvML.B

#### YARA Rules

No matches found.

#### ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

#### PE Metadata

<b>Compile Date</b>	2017-03-26 09:21:10-04:00
<b>Import Hash</b>	80e9b5b96cb30be08b9f46dcd40ca0b6

#### PE Sections

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
480ee7622ef011b56ad9be1f520b53bb	header	1024	3.124211
e0689d923085269b1433eb46c62b9aad	.text	698880	6.634137
e1d4d47c07cb01481a7f937c1a399c5	.rdata	154112	5.641674
5b25e16d6a60901096dd38e8d609656f	.data	38912	5.185811
1f354d76203061bfd5a53dae48d5435	.tls	512	0.020393
4dd9e4bd9bce353817d7013e17254399	.rsrc	512	4.717679
6c01df76342b581365053b6550340347	.reloc	28672	6.610094

#### Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Microsoft Visual C++ ??.?

#### Relationships

133820ebac... Contained\_Within b6811b42023524e691b517d19d0321f890f91f35ebddf1c12cbb92cda5b6de32

#### Description

This sample is a full-featured RAT executable contained within "B6811B42023524E691B517D19D0321F890F91F35EBBDF1C12CBB92CDA5B6

See analysis for file "1ea6b3e99bbb67719c56ad07f5a12501855068a4a866f92db8dcdefaffa48a39" for additional details. This sample varies slightly.



```
-----Begin Packet Formatting-----
[OPCODE][4 Bytes data length][4 Bytes unused][AUTH CODE 72 50 BF 9E][Data]
-----End Packet Formatting-----
```

The implant initiates callback to C2, then waits for tasking (DOES NOT immediately send its victim\_info) and the Victim\_info for this version contains additionally adds UserGeoID to victim\_info.

The sample attempts to connect to 159.100.250.231:8080 4 times, with 1 minute between attempts. If does not succeed, then attempts to connect 4 times, with 1 minute between attempts. This loop continues until a connection is made.

### Relationship Summary

1ea6b3e99b...	Connected_To	159.100.250.231
1ea6b3e99b...	Contains	43193c4efa8689ff6de3fb18e30607bb941b43abb21e8cee0cfd664c6f4ad97c
b6811b4202...	Connected_To	159.100.250.231
b6811b4202...	Contains	133820ebac6e005737d5bb97a5db549490a9f210f4e95098bc9b0a7748f52d1f
738ba44188...	Connected_To	159.100.250.231
159.100.250.231	Connected_From	1ea6b3e99bbb67719c56ad07f5a12501855068a4a866f92db8dcdefaffa48a39
159.100.250.231	Connected_From	b6811b42023524e691b517d19d0321f890f91f35ebddf1c12cbb92cda5b6de32
159.100.250.231	Connected_From	738ba44188a93de6b5ca7e0bf0a77f66f77a0dda2b2e9ef4b91b1c8257da790
159.100.250.231	Connected_From	43193c4efa8689ff6de3fb18e30607bb941b43abb21e8cee0cfd664c6f4ad97c
43193c4efa...	Contained_Within	1ea6b3e99bbb67719c56ad07f5a12501855068a4a866f92db8dcdefaffa48a39
43193c4efa...	Connected_To	159.100.250.231
133820ebac...	Contained_Within	b6811b42023524e691b517d19d0321f890f91f35ebddf1c12cbb92cda5b6de32

### Mitigation

Displayed below is a Python3 script used to decrypt and extract the embedded files:

```
--Begin Decryption and Extraction Python3 Script--
import argparse
import struct

def truncate_nullterm_str(data):
    null_index = data.find(b'\x00')
    truncated_str = data[:null_index].decode('utf-8')
    return truncated_str

def decode(offset,buffer,length,key1,key2):
    dec = b''
    k3 = key1
    key1 = key1 >> 1
    while length > 0:
        k1 = key1
        k2 = key2
        dec += bytes([(buffer[offset] ^ k1 ^ k2 ^ k3) & 0xff])
        key1 = (key1 >> 8 | ((key1 * 8 ^ key1) & 0x7f8) << 0x14) & 0xffffffff
        k3 = (k3 & k2 ^ (k2 ^ k3) & k1)
        key2 = (key2 >> 8 | (((key2 * 2 ^ key2) << 4 ^ key2) & 0xfffff80 ^ key2 << 7) << 0x11) & 0xfffffff
        offset += 1
        length -= 1
    return dec

offset = 0
def parse_options(buffer):
    options = list(struct.unpack('!'*30, buffer[0:120]))
    options.append(buffer[120:320])
    options.append(buffer[320:2820])
    options.append(buffer[2820:3020])
    options.append(buffer[3020:3120])
    options.append(buffer[3120:3220])
    options.append(buffer[3220:3320])
    options.append(buffer[3320:3360])

    enabled_options = ''
    disabled_options = ''
```

```

if options[0] == 0:
    global offset
    offset = options[27] + options[28] + options[22]
    enabled_options += "Embedded payload at offset: %d\n" % offset
    disabled_options += "Download payload\n"
else:
    enabled_options += "Download payload from: %s\n" % truncate_nullterm_str(options[30])
    disabled_options += "Embedded payload\n"

str = "VM Detect\n"
if options[1] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "Sandbox Detect\n"
if options[2] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "Debugger Detect\n"
if options[3] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "Active Processes Check\n"
if options[4] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "Installed programs Check\n"
if options[5] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "Language Check\n"
if options[6] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "Username Check\n"
if options[7] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "Computer name Check\n"
if options[8] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "Installed number of programs Check\n"
if options[9] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "Number running processes Check\n"
if options[10] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += "Number running processes Check: %d\n" % options[10]

str = "System processors/memory/diskspace Check\n"
if options[11] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    if options[11] & 0x001:
        enabled_options += "Processor count check: %d\n" % options[12]
    if options[11] & 0x010:
        enabled_options += "Physical memory check: %d\n" % options[13]
    if options[11] & 0x000:
        enabled_options += "Disk space check: %d\n" % options[14]

```

```

str = "DLL Hijack cliconfg.exe\n"
if options[12] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "EnableLUA\n"
if options[16] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += str

str = "Create Persistence\n"
if options[17] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
elif options[17] == 1:
    enabled_options += "Create Persistence using Run key: %s\n" % truncate_nullterm_str(options[31][0x960:])
elif options[17] == 2:
    enabled_options += "Create Persistence in Startup folder\n"
elif options[17] == 3:
    enabled_options += "Create Persistence using \"System Backup\" hourly Scheduled Task\n"

if options[18] == 0:
    disabled_options += "Direct Execution\n"
else:
    disabled_options += "Process Hollowing\n"

if options[19] == 0:
    enabled_options += "Process Hollowing: self\n"
elif options[19] == 1:
    enabled_options += "Process Hollowing: svchost.exe\n"
elif options[19] == 2:
    enabled_options += "Process Hollowing: conhost.exe\n"
elif options[19] == 3:
    enabled_options += "Process Hollowing: explorer.exe\n"
elif options[19] == 4:
    enabled_options += "Process Hollowing: \"httpshell\open\command\" registry key value\n"
elif options[19] == 5:
    enabled_options += "Process Hollowing: %s\n" % truncate_nullterm_str(options[33])

str = "Sleep Timer\n"
if options[20] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += "Sleep Timer: %d\n" % options[20]

str = "Kill Timer\n"
if options[21] == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += "Kill Timer: %d\n" % options[26]

if options[29] == 0:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: C:\\"
elif options[29] == 1:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: %windir%\\"
elif options[29] == 2:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: %system%\\"
elif options[29] == 3:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: %programfiles%\\"
elif options[29] == 4:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: %programfiles%\Common Files\"
elif options[29] == 5:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: C:\ProgramData\"
elif options[29] == 6:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: %userprofile%\\"
elif options[29] == 7:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: %userprofile%\Documents\"
elif options[29] == 8:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: %temp%\\"
elif options[29] == 9:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: %userprofile%\Favorites\"
elif options[29] == 10:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: %appdata%\\"
elif options[29] == 11:
    enabled_options += "Relocate to: %localappdata%\\"
if len(truncate_nullterm_str(options[34])) > 0:
    enabled_options += "%s\n" % truncate_nullterm_str(options[34])
enabled_options += "%s\n" % truncate_nullterm_str(options[35])

```

```

str = "Mutex\n"
if len(truncate_nullterm_str(options[36])) == 0:
    disabled_options += str
else:
    enabled_options += "Mutex: %s\n" % truncate_nullterm_str(options[36])

print("\nDisabled Options:")
print(disabled_options)

print("\nEnabled Options:")
print(enabled_options)

def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument('filename')
    args = parser.parse_args()

    with open(args.filename, 'rb') as f:
        exe = f.read()
        PE_header_pos = struct.unpack('<i', exe[0x3c:0x3c+4])[0]
        PE_header_len = struct.unpack('<i', exe[PE_header_pos+0x54:PE_header_pos+0x54+4])[0]
        PE_header_length = struct.unpack('<h', exe[PE_header_pos+0x14:PE_header_pos+0x14+2])[0]
        section_headers_pos = PE_header_pos + PE_header_length + 0x18
        num_headers = struct.unpack('<h', exe[PE_header_pos+0x6:PE_header_pos+0x6+2])[0]
        curr_header_pos = section_headers_pos
        bitmap_pos = PE_header_len
        for i in range(num_headers):
            header_len = struct.unpack('<i', exe[curr_header_pos+0x10:curr_header_pos+0x10+4])[0]
            bitmap_pos += header_len
            curr_header_pos += 0x28
        key1 = struct.unpack('<l', exe[bitmap_pos+0x3a:bitmap_pos+0x3a+4])[0]
        bitmap_len = len(exe) - bitmap_pos
        bitmap_header_len = struct.unpack('<H', exe[bitmap_pos+0x3e:bitmap_pos+0x3e+2])[0]
        key2 = struct.unpack('<l', exe[bitmap_pos+0x36:bitmap_pos+0x36+4])[0]
        bitmap_len -= bitmap_header_len
        bitmap_len -= 0x036
        print("[ ] Decoding %d Bytes with:" % bitmap_len)
        print("   Key1: %s" % hex(key1))
        print("   Key2: %s" % hex(key2))
        dec = decode(0,exe[bitmap_pos+bitmap_header_len+0x36:],bitmap_len,key1,key2)
        print("[+] Decoding Complete!")
        parse_options(dec[0:0xd56-0x36])
        payload_pos = 0xd56-0x36+offset
        print("[ ] Found embedded payload, extracting..")
        with open(args.filename + "_payload.exe", 'wb') as out:
            out.write(dec[payload_pos:])
        print("[+] Wrote %d Bytes to %s" % (len(dec[payload_pos:]), args.filename + "_payload.exe"))

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()
--End Decryption and Extraction Python3 Script--

```

## Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization. Configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

- Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
- Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
- Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
- Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless necessary.
- Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
- Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
- Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
- Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
- Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file type).
- Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
- Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
- Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
- Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-151, **"Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops"**.

## Contact Information

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**What is a MIFR?** A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most cases, we will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the desired analysis.

**What is a MAR?** A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual analysis. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

**Can I edit this document?** This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or [soc@us-cert.gov](mailto:soc@us-cert.gov).

**Can I submit malware to CISA?** Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

- Web: <https://malware.us-cert.gov>
- E-Mail: [submit@malware.us-cert.gov](mailto:submit@malware.us-cert.gov)
- FTP: [ftp.malware.us-cert.gov](ftp://malware.us-cert.gov) (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at [www.us-cert.gov](http://www.us-cert.gov).

## Revisions

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February 14, 2020: Initial Version

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