Analyzing COMmunication in Malware

Offset.net/reverse-engineering/analyzing-com-mechanisms-in-malware

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If you follow me on Twitter (<u>@overflow</u>), you may have noticed a while back that I was analyzing a sample of Ursnif/Gozi/ISFB (which I will refer to as ISFB) and was confused as to how it was able to communicate with its C2 servers through a separate process, without injected DLL's or process hollowing. I managed to locate a great article by Mandiant (<u>here</u>) from 2010 about how COM can be used to control a process, such as Internet Explorer, into performing certain actions.

In this post, I will be exploring the COM mechanisms that the latest versions of ISFB utilize in order to contact the command and control servers stealthily. I do have quite a long post going up (hopefully) in the next couple of weeks that goes into detail about this specific strain of ISFB, and the multiple unpacking stages it goes through before the final stage, so stay tuned for that!

What is exactly is COM?

According to Microsoft, "*The Microsoft Component Object Model (COM)* is a platformindependent, distributed, object-orientated system for creating binary software components." To sum it up, COM allows programs to interact with each other through COM objects. This interaction can occur

"within a single process, in other processes, and can even be on remote computers", and the language that the program was written in does not matter – as long as it is able to create structures of pointers and call functions through those pointers, it is COM Compatible – meaning languages like Visual Basic and Java can use COM. If you want to learn more about COM, you can check out Microsoft's own description and tutorials on it **here**.


As a result of the progression of technology, COM isn't used as frequently anymore, and therefore when an analyst comes across a piece of malware utilizing this unfamiliar communication method, it may be difficult to pinpoint what is happening, and how. Static analysis is even more complex, unless you know what you are looking for – which is what this article is about.

COM Mechanisms and its use in the ISFB Loader

Second Stage Loader MD5: 5019f31005dba2b410b21c4743ef4e98

I have uploaded the first stage and dumped second stage loader to **<u>VirusBay</u>**, so that you can follow the steps if you want to. I will be focusing on the second stage loader, as that is where the communication with the C2 occurs. I will be analyzing it statically using IDA, although you can do it dynamically as well.

The first giveaway that malware could be using COM functionality for communicating with it's C2 server is a call to **CoInitializeEx**. Calling this function will initialize the COM library so that the calling thread can utilize it's functionality. Taking a look at the flow of this sample, it is clear that if initializing the library fails, it will exit – hinting that it heavily relies on the COM library being loaded successfully.



Once we have discovered it is initializing the COM library, we can search for calls to **CoCreateInstance**, as this spawns an uninitialized object of the class associated with a specific CLSID, meaning you will notice a new process being spawned after you step over this call. Whilst there are many cross references to CoCreateInstance in this sample, we are able to determine which one calls Internet Explorer based on the CLSID pushed before the function call. IDA will show you the CLSID based on how it looks in memory, and as a result, we can find the corresponding object that is called. But how?

| push ebp mov ebp, esp push ecx push esi push OCh call Allocate_ | ; dw8ytes jeap | |
|--|--|--------------------------------|
| mov esi, eax test esi, esi | IDA View-D | |
| jz loc_2456F | .bss:0024C025 .bss:0024C026 | db 0D9h ; Ù db 1 |
| • | <pre>.bss:0024C027 .bss:0024C028 ; CLSID</pre> | db 19h |
| push esi ; ppv | • .bss:0024C028 IE_CLSID .bss:0024C028 | |
| <pre>push offset IE_riid ; riid push 4 ; dwClsContext</pre> | .bss:0024C028 | dw 0 ; Data2 dw 0 ; Data3 |
| push 0 ; pUnkOuter push offset IE CLSID ; rclsid | .bss:0024C028 | db 0C0h, 6 dup(0), 46h ; Data4 |
| call CoCreateInstance | .bss:0024C038 unk_24C0 .bss:0024C039 | db 0F4h ; ô |
| test eax, eax mov [ebp+var_4], eax | .bss:0024C03A .bss:0024C03B | db 50h ; P db 30h ; 0 |
| jl short loc_2456F4 | .bss:0024C03C .bss:0024C03D | db 085h ; μ db 98h ; $$ |

The CLSIDs of different objects are stored in the registry, and so whenever CoCreateInstance is called, the system checks the registry for the passed CLSID. From the image above, we can tell that the CLSID being utilized is {**0002DF01-0000-0000**-**C000-00000000046**}, which we can lookup in the registry. You can find a list of all the available CSLIDs at **HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID**. Once the CLSID has been located, it should reveal what process is being created, and in this case it is **Internet Explorer** (**Ver 1**). Moreover, the **IE_riid** that is being passed to the function informs us of the interface being used – in this case the **riid** being used is {**EAB22AC1-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0BE**}, which when looked up in the registry reveals that it is the **Microsoft Web Browser Version 1**. When we google this **riid**, it comes up with results for the **IWebBrowser** interface.

| e Edit View Favorites Help | | | | | |
|---|---|-----------|--------|----------------------------|--|
| {00021400-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | * | Name | Туре | Data | |
| {00021401-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | (Default) | REG SZ | Internet Explorer(Ver 1.0) | |
| {00022601-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | - | | |
| {00022602-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {00022603-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {00024500-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {00024502-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {00024505-0016-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002DF01-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E005-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E006-0000-0000-C000-0000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E101-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E119-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E132-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E169-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E170-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E174-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E178-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E17C-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E185-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |
| {0002E187-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | - | | | | |
| L {0002E187-0000-0000-C000-00000000046} | | | | | |

Now that we know for sure what instance is being created, we can look at what functions are being called. IDA Pro has a plugin called COM helper which will detect CLSIDs and alter the names to resemble what they point to, however this isn't possible in the free version, so you would have to look it up in the registry. When looking at calls to COM functions in IDA, all you would see is **call dword ptr [ecx+2Ch]**, which doesn't tell you much unless you know the functions inside out. That is why we have to create a structure in IDA that allows us to assign understandable functions to these pointers. Simply click on the **Structures** tab and press the INSERT Key to add a new structure. Then click **Add Standard Structure**. In this case, we know Internet Explorer is being called, and a quick google search for "*Controlling Internet Explorer using COM C*" will show code on several pages referring to **IWebBrowser2**, and so the Standard Structure we want to create is called **IWebBrowser2Vtbl**, which is possible to create using the free version of IDA Pro. Furthermore, we know that **IWebBrowser** was being used as well, so we should also create a Standard Struct for that as well.

One way you can determine other interfaces that are being utilized is to simply look for calls to **QueryInterface**, as this retrieves pointers to all calls available in that Interface. This will allow you to create the correct standard structures, and resolve the calls to these functions.

| mp Searc <u>h V</u> iew Deb <u>ugg</u> er <u>O</u> ptions | E Please choose a structure | | |
|---|-----------------------------|---|-----------------|
| 🛍 🛍 🖀 🚳 🔍 🕺 | Type name | Declaration | Type library |
| | 1WCWizardCallback | struct {struct IWCWizardCallbackVtbl *lpVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| | IWCWizardCallbackVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall "QueryInterface)(IWCWizardCallback "This, const | Visual C++ v6 |
| jon 🗖 Regular function 📕 Instruction 📃 Da | IWEExtendContextMenu | struct {struct IWEExtendContextMenuVtbl */pVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| Treate structure/union | IWEExtendContextMenuVtbl | struct (HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IWEExtendContextMenu *This, c | Visual C++ v6 |
| | IWEExtendPropertySheet | struct {struct IWEExtendPropertySheetVtbl *lpVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| Structure name struc_1 | IWEExtendPropertySheetVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall "QueryInterface)(IWEExtendPropertySheet "This, | Visual C++ v6 |
| | IWEExtendWizard | struct {struct IWEExtendWizardVtbl */pVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| | IWEExtendWizardVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IWEExtendWizard *This, const II | Visual C++ v6 |
| Create before current structure | IWEInvokeCommand | struct {struct IWEInvokeCommandVtbl *lpVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| Don't include in the list | IWEInvokeCommandVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall "QueryInterface)(IWEInvokeCommand "This, cons | Visual C++ v6 |
| | IWPObj | struct {struct IWPObjVtbl */pVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| Create union | IWPObjVtbl | struct (HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IWPObj *This, const IID *const r | Visual C++ v6 |
| | 1WaitMultiple | struct {struct IWaitMultipleVtbl *lpVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| Add standard structure | IWaitMultipleVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IWaitMultiple *This, const IID *c | Visual C++ v6 |
| Add standard structure | IWebBrowser | struct {struct IWebBrowserVtbl * pVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| OK Cancel | IWebBrowser2 | struct {struct IWebBrowser2Vtbl * pVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| | 😫 IWebBrowser2Vtbl | struct (HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IWebBrowser2 *This, const IID * | . Visual C++ v6 |
| 0000000 | IWebBrowserApp | struct {struct IWebBrowserAppVtbl */pVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
|)f_String 00000000 | IWebBrowserAppVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall "QueryInterface)(IWebBrowserApp "This, const II | Visual C++ v6 |
| ntion ~ 0000000 | 1WebBrowserVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IWebBrowser *This, const IID *c | Visual C++ v6 |
| 0000000 (| 🗄 IWinInetHttpInfo | struct {struct IWinInetHttpInfoVtbl *ipVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| 00000000 | IWinInetHttpInfoVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IWinInetHttpInfo *This, const II | Visual C++ v6 |
| w 🗆 🗗 🛪 0000000 | IWinInetInfo | <pre>struct {struct IWinInetInfoVtbl *lpVtbl;}</pre> | Visual C++ v6 |
| 00000000 | IWinInetInfoVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IWinInetInfo *This, const IID *c | Visual C++ v6 |
| 00000000 | 🔃 IWindowForBindingUI | struct {struct IWindowForBindingUIVtbl *fpVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| 00000000 00000000 | 🗄 IWindowForBindingUIVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IWindowForBindingUI *This, con | Visual C++ v6 |
| 80000000 | IWriteCookie | struct {struct IWriteCookieVtbl *lpVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| 00000000 | 1WriteCookieVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IWriteCookie *This, const IID *c | Visual C++ v6 |
| 1. IShellFol | 1XAConfig | struct {struct IXAConfigVtbl * pVtbl;} | Visual C++ v6 |
| 8 | 1XAConfigVtbl | struct {HRESULT (stdcall *QueryInterface)(IXAConfig *This, const IID *cons | Visual C++ v6 |
| w | TXAObtainRMInfo | struct {struct IXAObtainRMInfoVtbl *InVtbl:} | Visual C++ v6 |
| fers, please waitok | | OK Cancel Search Help | |
| | Line 5479 of 10677 | | |
| | | | |

This standard structure will contain a list of functions exported by **IWebBrowser2**, and so we can simply resolve any pointers to those functions, such as **dword ptr [ecx+2Ch]**, which can be resolved to **IWebBrowser2Vtbl.Navigate()**. Dynamic analysis becomes quite important here, as you can then start matching up functions correctly, rather than assuming a pointer is pointing to a function in that struct.

| Windows Help | A Choose a structure for offset | _ 0 🔀 |
|--|--|----------------|
| 😔 🗟 📾 🕼 😴 🛪 🖆 🗙 | Operand representation | Structure size |
| • | A IShellFolderViewDualVtbl.get_FocusedItem | 0040 |
| | IShellWindowsVtbl.RegisterPending | 0048 |
| Unexplored External symbol | IShellBrowserVtbl.BrowseObject | 0048 |
| -A 🔟 🛛 Hex View-2 🗵 🛛 💽 Pse | IShellViewVtbl.GetCurrentInfo | 0040 |
| mov dword ptr [ebp- | IHTMLElementVtbl.get_className | 0178 |
| | IWebBrowserAppVtbl.Navigate | 00D0 |
| | IWebBrowserVtbl.Navigate | 0080 |
| 🗾 🗹 🖼 | IHTMLDocument2Vtbl.get_images | 01D0 |
| | IWebBrowser2Vtbl.Navigate | 011C |
| loc_24552A: | IDispatchVtbl.GetTypeInfo+1Ch | 001C |
| mov eax, [ebx] | OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES.SecurityQualityOfService+18h | 0018 |
| mov ecx, [eax] | | 003C |
| lea edx, [ebp+Headers] push edx : Head | WIN32_FIND_DATAA.cFileName | 0140 |
| push edx ; Head lea edx, [ebp+PostData] | CLIENT_ID.UniqueThread+28h | 0008 |
| push edx ; Post | SCOPETABLE_ENTRY.HandlerFunc+24h | 000C |
| lea edx, [ebp+TargetFrame] | CPPEH_RECORD.registration.ExceptionHandler+20h | 0018 |
| push edx ; Targ | | 0010 |
| <pre>lea edx, [ebp+Flags]</pre> | SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES.bInheritHandle+24h | 000C |
| push edx ; Flag | | 0008 |
| push [ebp+URL] ; URL | A LARGE_INTEGER.anonymous_0.HighPart+28h | 0008 |
| <pre>push eax ; This call dword ptr [ecx+2Ch];</pre> | A LARGE_INTEGER.u.HighPart+28h | 0008 |
| call dword ptr [ecx+ <mark>2Ch</mark>]; mov edi, eax | A LARGE_INTEGER+2Ch | 0008 |
| test edi, edi | CLSID.Data4+24h | 0010 |
| il loc 245629 | A IID.Data4+24h | 0010 |

If you were debugging this program, these functions would show up as

ObjectStublessClient, and sometimes you will have to rely on the pushed values to determine what the function was doing. Once we have fully resolved most of the calls, we can get an idea of what is happening:

- Instance of Internet Explorer is created using CoCreateInstance
- IWebBrowser2->Navigate() is called, passing the C2 URL and gathered data as arguments. This will cause IE to navigate to that URL
- IWebBrowser2->get_ReadyState() is called, comparing the return value with 4 (**READYSTATE_COMPLETE**) if it is 4, the function will continue, otherwise it will sleep for 500 milliseconds and retry the call.
- IWebBrowser2->get_Document() is called, which physically loads in the page that has been navigated to.
- IUnknown->QueryInterface() is called, passing the CLSID for IHTMLDocument2 to it.
- IUnknown->QueryInterface() is called, passing the CLSID for IHTMLElement to it.
- IHTMLDocument2->get_Body() is called, which returns a pointer to the website body.
- IHTMLElement->get_OuterText() is called, which returns the raw data from the C2 server
- The data is then decrypted and parsed by the malware

COM usage currently seems quite popular among malware authors, possibly due to the fact that it is often undetected by several anti malware programs, as well as being able to remain under the radar from unsuspecting researchers, such as myself – such as **this** post by Nocturnus Research Team, which details how the banking trojan Ramnit utilizes COM API to create scheduled tasks, in an attempt to remain persistent.

So that brings an end to this brief post – but make sure to stay tuned for a much longer post on reversing ISFB, sometime this month!

4 Comments

Comments are closed.