


# Operation Parliament, who is doing what?

SL [securelist.com/operation-parliament-who-is-doing-what/85237/](https://securelist.com/operation-parliament-who-is-doing-what/85237/)



Authors



GREAT

## Summary

Kaspersky Lab has been tracking a series of attacks utilizing unknown malware since early 2017. The attacks appear to be geopolitically motivated and target high profile organizations. The objective of the attacks is clearly espionage – they involve gaining access to top legislative, executive and judicial bodies around the world.

1. The attackers have targeted a large number of organizations globally since early 2017, with the main focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), especially Palestine. High-profile organizations have also been targeted in other regions. The number of attacks has decreased since the beginning of 2018.
2. The attacks were initially discovered while investigating a phishing attack that targeted political figures in the MENA region. At first the attacks looked to be the work of the low-sophistication Gaza Cybergang (decoys, file names), but further analysis painted a very different picture.

3. Targets include high-profile entities such as parliaments, senates, top state offices and officials, political science scholars, military and intelligence agencies, ministries, media outlets, research centers, election commissions, Olympic organizations, large trading companies, and other unknown entities.
4. The malware basically provides a remote CMD/PowerShell terminal for the attackers, enabling them to execute any scripts/commands and receive the result via HTTP requests.
5. Kaspersky Lab users and Threat Management and Defense clients are protected from the attacks.

Cisco Talos recently [published a blogpost](#) describing targeted attacks in the Middle East region which we believe may be connected.

## Victimology and Statistics


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Based on our findings, we believe the attackers represent a previously unknown geopolitically motivated threat actor. The campaign started in 2017, with the attackers doing just enough to achieve their goals. They most likely have access to additional tools when needed and appear to have access to an elaborate database of contacts in sensitive organizations and personnel worldwide, especially of vulnerable and non-trained staff. The victim systems range from personal desktop or laptop systems to large servers with domain controller roles or similar. The nature of the targeted ministries varied, including those responsible for telecommunications, health, energy, justice, finance and so on.

Victims have been spotted in the Palestinian Territories, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Qatar, Lebanon, Chile, Somalia, Iraq, Morocco, Syria, India, Iran, Canada, the USA, the UK, Germany, Israel, Afghanistan, Serbia, Russia, Oman, Kuwait, South Korea and Denmark.

Victim organization type	Number of victim organizations
Unknown	91
Senates/Parliaments	7
Prime Ministerial Offices	3
Military/Intelligence Agencies	5
Other Gov./Ministerial/Diplomatic Offices	20
Financial/Banking Institutions	5
Media Outlets	2
Olympic/Sports Bodies	2

Research Centers/Scholars	2
Election Commissions	1
Distribution/Logistics	1



The number of victims/victim organizations probably doesn't represent the full scope of the attacks – only a portion.

## Attack description and attribution

Operation Parliament appears to be another symptom of escalating tensions in the Middle East region. The attackers have taken great care to stay under the radar, imitating another attack group in the region. They have been particularly careful to verify victim devices before proceeding with the infection, safeguarding their command and control servers. The targeting seems to have slowed down since the beginning of 2018, probably winding down when the desired data or access was obtained. The targeting of specific victims is unlike previously seen behavior in regional campaigns by Gaza Cybergang or Desert Falcons and points to an elaborate information-gathering exercise that was carried out before the attacks (physical and/or digital).

With deception and false flags increasingly being employed by threat actors, attribution is a hard and complicated task that requires solid evidence, especially in complex regions such as the Middle East.

See the following for more information and examples of false flags being used in cyberattacks:

[Wave your false flags! ...or the Nightmares and Nuances of a Self-Aware Attribution Space](#)

[OlympicDestroyer is here to trick the industry](#)

## Malware description

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The malware was first seen packed with VMProtect; when unpacked the sample didn't show any similarities with previously known malware. All the strings and settings were encrypted and obfuscated. Functionality was identified that enables HTTP communication with the C&C server and invokes "processcreate" based on parameters received as a response.

The configuration and strings are encrypted using 3DES and Base64 encoding. Data sent to the C&C server is also encrypted using 3DES and Base64. Different keys are used for local and network encryption.

The malware starts communicating with the C&C server by sending basic information about the infected machine. The C&C server then replies with the encrypted serialized configuration.

The malware basically provides a remote CMD/PowerShell terminal for the attackers, enabling them to execute scripts/commands and receive the results via HTTP requests.

```
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  "Alaya": 662009,  
    "Immanuel": "cx30FE4LA4jjMMoXoefx1A==",  
    "Olive": true, "Graeme": false,  
    "Jadiel": false,  
    "Jovani": "z1lxJXy4S1bW5TvgX9NBDeq3WPiU8LjW" },  
  {  
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```

*Sample of the C&C response with encrypted commands and configurations*

## Examples of attack decoys

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File	Home	Insert	Page Layout	References	Mailings	Review	View	Design	Layout
Spelling & Grammar	Research	Translate Language	Language	New Comment	Comments	Track Changes	Tracking	Accept	Reject
Final: Show Markup	Show Markup	Reviewing Pane	Previous	Next	Compare	Block Authors	Restrict Editing	Protect	

moaz	so.com		رانيو النجاح	معلا الشريدي
ikwan	mail.com	59	رانيو ظم العليل	حافظ تاحمه
alqu	s.net,		جريدة القدس	جريدة القدس
isam	so.com		جريدة القدس	مصام الكرد
mat	so.com		جريدة الحياة	محمود ابو الهيجا
sa	n.tv		وطن لثنايه	ساميه وطن
office.mar	@gmail.com			غادة الزحبي
gmo	il.com		دنيا الوطن	غازي مرتجي
orab	l.com,		تلفزيون وطن	معمر عراي
lmoasher88	mail.com	59	رانيو المؤتمر	كريم احمد
hisham	mail.com		رانيو الكوفيه	هشام زياده
ope	et.co.il		باتيت	يسام جبر
bas	et.co.il		باتور اما باتيت	يسام جبر 2
Qu	.com,			راسم صيات
amal2	ail.com,		الحياة اللدنيه	امان تحاده
Adel ZA	afafo.com	59	مراسل وكالة الانباء الفرنسيه	عادل الزحنون

Page: 1 of 2    Words: 324    100%


Translation: Contacts list of media personnel

documentss.pdf - Adobe Reader

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
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الإمارات العربية المتحدة  
وزارة الخارجية

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
**العلاقات بين دولة الإمارات والأردن وتأثيرها في عدم مقاطعة قطر**

مراسلة خاصة

3:05 AM  
8/6/2017

Translation: Relations between UAE and Jordan, and the impact caused by the non-boycott of Qatar






Translation: Military retirement statement 2017 June



Translation: The new Hamas structure for Gaza strip 2017



*Translation: Clarification report (on Gaza employee salaries)*

## What should high-profile organizations do?

High-profile organizations should have elevated levels of cybersecurity. Attacks against them are inevitable and are unlikely to ever cease. These organizations need to pay particular attention to their security, implementing additional measures to ensure they are well protected. Anti-targeted attack solutions, threat intelligence capabilities and data flows, default-deny application lockdown, endpoint detection and response, data leak and insider threat prevention, and even isolated/air-gapped networks should form the basis of any strategy for protecting organizations in the current threat landscape.

The victims of Operation Parliament need to re-evaluate their approach to cybersecurity.

## Additional information

For more information about the attacks and the indicators of compromise, please contact: [intelreports@kaspersky.com](mailto:intelreports@kaspersky.com)

Alternatively, please visit: <https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/apt-intelligence-reporting>

To find more information about cybersecurity awareness training for enterprise or government staff, go to [Kaspersky Security Awareness](#).



[Watch Video At:](#)

<https://youtu.be/eNpu4ku8tg4>

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