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Ay MaMi

> Analyzing a New macOS DNS Hijacker: OSX/MaMi

01/11/2018

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2018 is barely two weeks old, and already it looks like we've got new piece of macOS malware! Hooray :)

Want to play along? I've shared both the malware's binary executable ('MaMi'), which can be downloaded <u>here</u> (password: infect3d).

Please don't infect yourself!

Background Earlier today (01/11), someone on MalwareBytes' forum <u>created a post</u> titled "DNS Hijacked":

Posted 16 hours ago	<\$
I am helping a fellow teacher. She accidentally installed something and her DNS now appears to be hacked.	
Malwarebytes found "MyCoupon" but that was all. I manually removed the offending DNS entries (82.163.143	3.135
82.163.142.137) but they keep coming back. I don't see any extensions, startup items, or other obvious signs	of v
is going wrong.	
I tried to generate a report, but there is no "Support" option under help on the version on her laptop.	
Thank you.	
Hank you,	
	I am helping a fellow teacher. She accidentally installed something and her DNS now appears to be hacked. Malwarebytes found "MyCoupon" but that was all. I manually removed the offending DNS entries (82.163.143 82.163.142.137) but they keep coming back. I don't see any extensions, startup items, or other obvious signs is going wrong.

As I hadn't seen an answer to MikeOfMaine', and as far as I'm aware there haven't been any recent macOS malware that hijacks DNS settings - so I was intrigued! So without further adieu, let's dive in to analyzing (what I'm calling) OSX/MaMi!

Analysis

Though currently I am unaware of the malware's infection vector, it is hosted on various sites such as http://regardens.info:

curl -L http://regardens.info/ > MaMi											
% To	tal	% Re	ceived	% Xferd	A١	verage	Speed	Time	Time	Time C	urrent
						Dload	Upload	Total	Spent	Left	Speed
100	178	0	178	Θ	0	381	Θ	::	:	:-:-	- 381
100	552k	100	552k	Θ	0	314k	Θ	0:00:01	0:00:01	:-:-	- 581k


MacBookPro:Downloads patrickw\$ file MaMi MaMi: Mach-O 64-bit executable x86_64

						🙍 Capturi	ng from Wi-	Fi: en0						
		۵ 🕑		۵ 🔇	♦	2	· 🛃		Ð	99	3 8			
h	ttp											×	Ex	pression
No.		Time	Source	D	estination			Protocol	Length	Info				
	6501	51.086427	2400:cb00:20	48:1:: 2	605:e000:d	544:2600:	4530:9d44	HTTP	79	HTTP/1.	1 301 Mo	ved Perman	ently	(text/html)
•	6510	51.281402	2605:e000:d5	44:260 2	400:cb00:2	048:1::68	1b:a51a	HTTP	158	GET /dc	data HTT	P/1.1		
+	7314	52.374275	2400:cb00:20	48:1:: 2	605:e000:d	544:2600:	4530:9d44	HTTP	1157	HTTP/1.	1 200 OK	(applica	tion/oc	tet-stream
	107	105.843644	192.168.0.7	2	39.255.255	.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARC	H * HTTP,	/1.1		
► ▼ I	(469 R Hypert HTTH	ission Contro eassembled TCI ext Transfer I P/1.1 200 OK\r	P Segments (50 Protocol `\n	66104 byte						•	•		519(122	0), #6521(
		e: Fri, 12 Jan tent—Type: app			r\n									
		tent-Length: 5												
		nection: keep-												
	Last	-Cookie:cfd t-Modified: Su q: "5a52131d-8	ın, 07 Jan 201			431f15157	745577; ex	pires=Sat	, 12-J	an-19 08:	26:17 GM	MT; path=/	; domain	n=.sincentr
		ept-Ranges: by												
		ver: cloudflar												

As shown by <u>WhatsYourSign</u>, nothing too special about the file; it's an unsigned Mach-O 64bit executable:

MaMi is not signed
Hani is not signed
MaMi
/Users/patrickw/Downloads/MaMi
Mach-0 64-bit executable x86_64
view hashes
none unsigned ('errSecCSUnsigned')
close

As is often the case with new malware, it's <u>currently marked as 'clean'</u> by all 59 engines on VirusTotal (this will hopefully change shortly as AV products start adding detections):



And speaking of 'new' if we load the malware's binary in a disassembler, we find an app version of 1.1.0, which (due to such low version number), may seem to indicate the malware likely hasn't been around for too long.

000000010003818f	db	"AppVersion:	%@\nAppBuild:	%@",	0
00000001000381ab	db	" 1.1.0 ", 0			
00000001000381b1	db	"0", 0			

Before we dig further into the disassembly, let's dump the Objective-C class names and methods, as often this can allow us to quickly gain insight the malware's (likely) capabilities or at least guide our analysis.

I use J. Levin's invaluable jtool utility to dump such info:

```
$ ./jtool -d objc -v MaMi
```

```
@interface AppDelegate
. . .
/* 2 - 0x100001e0b */ - setupCert;
. . .
/* 7 - 0x1000027bc */ - setupDNS;
. . .
/* 9 - 0x100002a97 */ - takeScreenshotAt:;
. . .
/* 22 - 0x1000049d8 */ - mouseClick:;
/* 24 - 0x100004ac5 */ - runAppleScript:;
@interface SBMaMiSettings :
/* 2 - 0x10000518b */ - initMaMiSettings;
. . .
/* 9 - 0x100005385 */ - programArguments;
. . .
/* 11 - 0x1000053a7 */ - runAtLoad;
/* 25 - 0x10000548f */ - launchOnlyOnce;
@interface SBNetwork :
. . .
/* 0 - 0x10000d2e5 */ + downloadFile:atPath:;
/* 1 - 0x10000d4a8 */ + sendAsyncRequestWithUrls:andMethod:andBody:;
@interface SBFileSystem : ?
/* 0 - 0x10002407e */ + writeString:toPath:;
. . .
/* 8 - 0x1000247fb */ + runCmd:andPipeToCmd:withParams:andParams2:;
/* 9 - 0x100024b07 */ + runCmd:withParams:;
/* 10 - 0x100024b23 */ + runCmd:withParams:andUser:;
@interface SBCryptoSystem : ?
/* 0 - 0x100026731 */ + isAdmin; // Protocol 129824ad7
/* 1 - 0x100026745 */ + elevatePrivilegesWithParams:; // Protocol 1298247ca
/* 2 - 0x1000267aa */ + relaunchWithPrivilegesAndParams:;
```

Some very interesting methods! Of course we'll continue our analysis to confirm, but seems this malware is indeed a 'dns hijacker' (method: setupDNS), with a host of other abilities such as:

- taking screenshots
- · generating simulated mouse events

- perhaps persists as a launch item (programArguments, runAtLoad)
- downloading & uploading files
- executing commands
- ...and more!

Jumping back to the disassemIby, within the application's main entrypoint (-[AppDelegate applicationDidFinishLaunching:]), we see a massive encrypted string that is passes to a setDefaultConfiguration: method:

```
[SBConfigManager
setDefaultConfiguration:@"uZmgulcipekSbayT09ByamTUu_zVtsflazc2Nsuqgq0dXko
OzKMJMNTULoLpd-QV9qQy6VRluzRXqW0GscgheRvikLkPRzs1pJbey2QdaUSXUZCX-
UNERrosul22NsW2vYpS7HQ04
```

VG5l8qic3rSH_fAhxsBXpEe557eHIr245LUYcEIpemnvSPTZ_lNp2Xwy0JjzcJWirKbKwtc3Q61pDwTzKvE0..

Applying some classified decryption methods I learned as an intern working in NSA's Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services (CES) group - it was trivial to decrypt this configuration data. I'm totally kidding - not about the internship - but about how to decrypt. Just step over that method in a debugger (IIdb) and the data is sitting decrypted in memory:

```
# lldb MaMi
(lldb) target create "MaMi"
Current executable set to 'MaMi' (x86_64).
. . .
(lldb) po $rax
{
    defaults =
                   {
        affiliate = "";
        build = 0;
        "compilation_id" = 0;
        "confirmation_end_time" = 0;
        "confirmation_start_time" = 0;
        "download_complete_time" = 0;
        "download_location" = "";
        "download_retry_count" = 0;
        "download_start_time" = 0;
        "download_url" = "";
        "exception_id" = 0;
        "execute_location" = "";
        "execution_end_time" = 0;
        "execution_start_time" = 0;
        "exit_code" = 0;
        "external_id" = 0;
        "file_crc" = 0;
        "hardware_id" = 0;
        "hosts_active" = "";
        "installer_id" = 0;
        "is_admin" = false;
        "old_secondary_dns" = "";
        "os_build" = 0;
        "os_id" = 0;
        "product_id" = 0;
        "product_name" = "";
        "publisher_id" = 0;
        "register_date" = 0;
        "register_dsrc" = 0;
        "report_id" = 0;
        "run_args" = "";
        "screen_x" = 0;
        "screen_y" = 0;
        "secondary_dns" = "";
        "service_pack" = 0;
        "session_id" = 0;
        status = 0;
        "step_id" = 0;
        tag = "";
        tracker = "";
        "user_time" = 0;
        "validate_end_time" = 0;
        "validate_start_time" = 0;
        version = 0;
    };
    dnsChanger =
                   {
```

```
affiliate = "";
        "blacklist_dns" =
                                   (
        );
        encrypt = true;
        "external_id" = 0;
        "product_name" = dnsChanger;
        "publisher_id" = 0;
        raw = true;
        reports =
                          {
            "dnsChanger_activity" =
                                                 {
                async = false;
                body = "r={dnsChanger->reports->dnsChanger_activity->template}&rc=
{dnsChanger}";
                "connection_timeout" = 5;
                domains =
                                           (
                    "honouncil.info",
                    "gorensin.info"
                );
                "http_headers" =
                                                  (
                                         {
                        name = "Content-Type";
                        value = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded";
                    },
                                         {
                        name = "User-Agent";
                        value = "";
                    }
                );
                "query_string" = "r={dnsChanger->reports->dnsChanger_activity-
>template}&rc={dnsChanger}";
                "request_method" = 1;
                "request_timeout" = 5;
                "retry_count" = 2;
                "send_port" = 80;
                "send_protocol" = http;
                template =
                                            {
                    affiliate = "%affiliate%";
                    build = "%build%";
                    "compilation_id" = "%compilation_id%";
                    dns =
                                               {
                        "hosts_active" = "%hosts_active%";
                        "hosts_config" = "[templates->secondary_dns]";
                    };
                    encrypt = true;
                    "exception_id" = "%exception_id%";
                    expand = true;
                    "external_id" = "%external_id%";
                    "hardware_id" = "%hardware_id%";
                    "is_admin" = "%is_admin%";
                    "old_dns" =
                                                     {
                        "hosts_active" = "%hosts_active%";
                        "hosts_config" = "[templates->old_secondary_dns]";
                    };
                    "os_build" = "%os_build%";
                    "os_id" = "%os_id%";
```

```
"product_name" = "%product_name%";
                    "publisher_id" = "%publisher_id%";
                    "register_date" = "%register_date%";
                    "register_dsrc" = "%register_dsrc%";
                    "report_id" = "%report_id%";
                    "report_name" = "dnsChanger_activity";
                    "report_type" = 8;
                    "screen_x" = "%screen_x%";
                    "screen_y" = "%screen_y%";
                    "service_pack" = "%service_pack%";
                    "session_id" = "%session_id%";
                    status = "%status%";
                    tag = "%tag%";
                    tracker = "%tracker%";
                    "user_time" = "%user_time%";
                    version = "%version%";
                };
                "url_path" = "";
            };
            "time_report" =
                                         {
                async = false;
                body = "r={dnsChanger->reports->time_report->template}&rc=
{dnsChanger}";
                "connection_timeout" = 5;
                domains =
                                           (
                    "squartera.info"
                );
                "http_headers" =
                                                  (
                                         {
                        name = "Content-Type";
                        value = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded";
                    },
                        name = "User-Agent";
                        value = "";
                    }
                );
                "query_string" = "";
                "request_method" = 2;
                "request_timeout" = 5;
                "retry_count" = 2;
                "send_port" = 80;
                "send_protocol" = http;
                template =
                    affiliate = "%affiliate%";
                    build = "%build%";
                    "compilation_id" = "%compilation_id%";
                    dns =
                                               {
                        "hosts_active" = "%hosts_active%";
                        "hosts_config" = "[templates->secondary_dns]";
                    };
                    encrypt = true;
                    "exception_id" = "%exception_id%";
                    expand = true;
                    "external_id" = "%external_id%";
```

```
"hardware_id" = "%hardware_id%";
                "is_admin" = "%is_admin%";
                "os_build" = "%os_build%";
                "os_id" = "%os_id%";
                "product_name" = "%product_name%";
                "publisher_id" = "%publisher_id%";
                "report_id" = "%report_id%";
                "report_name" = "time_request";
                "screen_x" = "%screen_x%";
                "screen_y" = "%screen_y%";
                "service_pack" = "%service_pack%";
                "session_id" = "%session_id%";
                status = "%status%";
                tag = "%tag%";
                tracker = "%tracker%";
                "user_time" = "%user_time%";
                "verification_id" = "%verification_id%";
                version = "%version%";
            };
            "url_path" = "";
        };
    };
    "setup_dns" =
                          (
        "82.163.143.135",
        "82.163.142.137"
    );
    "shared_storage" = "/Users/%USER_NAME%/Library/Application Support";
    "storage_timeout" = 120;
    tag = "";
    "timeout_dns" =
                            {
        "high_timeout" = 1;
        "low_timeout" = "0.3";
        "medium_timeout" = "0.5";
    };
    tracker = "";
};
"installer_id" = 1359747970602718687;
"report_templates" =
                         {
    "report_config" =
                              {
        async = false;
        body = "";
        "connection_timeout" = 5;
        domains =
                               (
            "domain1.com",
            "domain2.com"
        );
        "http_headers" =
                                      (
                            {
                name = "Content-Type";
                value = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded";
            },
                            {
                name = "User-Agent";
```

```
value = "";
        }
    );
    "query_string" = "";
    "request_method" = 2;
    "request_timeout" = 5;
    "retry_count" = 2;
    "send_port" = 80;
    "send_protocol" = http;
};
"report_config2" =
                            {
    async = true;
    body = "";
    "connection_timeout" = 5;
    domains =
                           (
        "domain1.com",
        "domain2.com"
    );
    "http_headers" =
                                  (
                         {
            name = "Content-Type";
            value = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded";
        },
                         {
            name = "User-Agent";
            value = "";
        }
    );
    "query_string" = "";
    "request_method" = 2;
    "request_timeout" = 5;
    "retry_count" = 2;
    "send_port" = 80;
    "send_protocol" = http;
    "url_path" = "";
};
"report_template1" =
    affiliate = "%affiliate%";
    build = "%build%";
    "compilation_id" = "%compilation_id%";
    dns =
                      {
        "hosts_active" = "%hosts_active%";
        "hosts_config" = "[templates->secondary_dns]";
    };
    "exception_id" = "%exception_id%";
    "external_id" = "%external_id%";
    "hardware_id" = "%hardware_id%";
    "is_admin" = "%is_admin%";
    "os_build" = "%os_build%";
    "os_id" = "%os_id%";
    "product_name" = "%product_name%";
    "publisher_id" = "%publisher_id%";
    "report_id" = "%report_id%";
    "screen_x" = "%screen_x%";
    "screen_y" = "%screen_y%";
```

```
"service_pack" = "%service_pack%";
        "session_id" = "%session_id%";
        status = "%status%";
        tag = "%tag%";
        tracker = "%tracker%";
        "user_time" = "%user_time%";
        version = "%version%";
    };
    "report_template2" =
                                 {
        affiliate = "%affiliate%";
        build = "%build%";
        "compilation_id" = "%compilation_id%";
        dns =
                         {
            "hosts_active" = "%hosts_active%";
            "hosts_config" = "[templates->secondary_dns]";
        };
        "exception_id" = "%exception_id%";
        "external_id" = "%external_id%";
        "hardware_id" = "%hardware_id%";
        "is_admin" = "%is_admin%";
        "os_build" = "%os_build%";
        "os_id" = "%os_id%";
        "product_name" = "%product_name%";
        "publisher_id" = "%publisher_id%";
        "register_date" = "%register_date%";
        "register_dsrc" = "%register_dsrc%";
        "report_id" = "%report_id%";
        "screen_x" = "%screen_x%";
        "screen_y" = "%screen_y%";
        "service_pack" = "%service_pack%";
        "session_id" = "%session_id%";
        status = "%status%";
        tag = "%tag%";
        tracker = "%tracker%";
        "user_time" = "%user_time%";
        version = "%version%";
    };
};
templates =
                {
    "old_secondary_dns" =
                                  {
        "fill_template" = "%old_secondary_dns%";
        "fill_type" = string;
    };
    "secondary_dns" =
                              {
        "fill_template" = "%secondary_dns%";
        "fill_type" = string;
   };
};
version = 1;
```

Ok, that's a lot of configuration data! The most interesting part is probably the 'setup_dns' array:

}

```
"setup_dns" = (
"82.163.143.135",
"82.163.142.137"
);
```

...we'll see those DNS addresses used shortly!

In IIdb we can set a breakpoints on methods of interest such as setupCert and setupDNS methods;

```
# 11db MaMi
(11db) b -[AppDelegate setupCert]
Breakpoint 1: where = dcdata`-[AppDelegate setupCert], address = 0x0000000100001e0b
(11db) b -[AppDelegate setupDNS]
Breakpoint 2: where = dcdata`-[AppDelegate setupDNS], address = 0x00000001000027bc
```

Once these breakpoints are hit, we can step thru the each instruction, or as I had fired up ProcInfo, the open-source process monitor I recently wrote (on github: <u>ProcInfo</u>) just let the malware run to see what it does. I'm voting for the latter as it's almost midnight.

```
# ./procInfo
starting process monitor
process monitor enabled...
pid: 1294
path: /usr/bin/security
args: (
    "/usr/bin/security",
    "add-trusted-cert",
    "-d",
    "-r",
    trustRoot,
    "-k",
    "/Library/Keychains/System.keychain",
    "/Users/user/Desktop/dcdata.bin"
)
```

First we see the malware invoking the security tool to install a new certificate (dcdata.bin) it's downloaded from the internet. Let's take a peak at this cert:

```
$ openssl x509 -inform der -in dcdata.bin -out dcdata.pem
$ openssl x509 -in dcdata.pem -text
Certificate:
   Data:
       Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number: b6:e1:ab:f3:8b:9a:b4:1a
        Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=IL, ST=Gush Dan, L=Hertzilia, O=GreenTeam Internet, Ltd.,
               OU=Web, CN=cloudguard.me
        Validity
            Not Before: Jul 23 17:25:15 2014 GMT
           Not After : Jul 15 17:25:15 2044 GMT
        Subject: C=IL, ST=Gush Dan, L=Hertzilia, O=GreenTeam Internet, Ltd.,
                 OU=Web, CN=cloudguard.me
        . . .
$ openssl x509 -in dcdata.pem -fingerprint -noout
SHA1 Fingerprint=26:D9:E6:07:FF:F0:C5:8C:78:44:B4:7F:F8:B6:E0:79:E5:A2:22:0E
```

We can also view the (now installed) certificate via the 'Keychain Access' app. It's in the System keychain as a root certificate authority....MitM anybody?!

Keychains login Local Items System System Roots	Certificate Root certificate Expires: Friday,		
	• This certifica	authority July 15, 2044 at 7:25:15 AM Hawaii-Aleutian Standard Time ate has custom trust settings	
	Name		
	Cloudguard.me		
		cloudguard.me	
	Subject Name		
	Country	IL .	-
	State/Province		
Category	Locality	Hertzilia GreenTeam Internet, Ltd.	
All Items	Organizational Unit		
An Passwords	Common Name		
Secure Notes My Certificates Keys Certificates	Organizational Unit Common Name	Gush Dan Hertzilia GreenTeam Internet, Ltd. Web	

Back to process monitoring:

```
# ./procInfo
process start:
pid: 1177
path: /bin/cp
args: (
    "/bin/cp",
    "/Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/preferences.plist",
    "/Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/preferences.plist.old"
)
```

Interesting! It's mucking with the SystemConfiguration/preferences.plist file. What's in there? If you guessed DNS settings - you're right!

And remember the two DNS addresses from the decrypted config data? 82.163.143.135 and 82.163.142.137, they've been added to the plist file:

\$ grep -B 4 -A 2 82. /Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/preferences.plist DNS

ServerAddresses

82.163.143.135 82.163.142.137

If you're more inclined to use the UI, you can see these changes via the System Preference app (Network pane):

$\bullet \bullet \bullet \checkmark \rightarrow \blacksquare$	Network	k Q Search
Loc	ation: Automatic	\$
• Ethernet Connected	Status:	Connected
Bluetooth PAN Not Connected		Ethernet is currently active and has the IP address 192.168.0.10.
	Configure IPv4:	Using DHCP 🗘
	IP Address:	192.168.0.10
	Subnet Mask:	255.255.255.0
	Router:	192.168.0.1
	DNS Server:	82.163.143.135, 82.163.142.137
	Search Domains:	
	IPv6 Address:	2605:e000:d544:23:1ca1:128f:8b4c
+ - &-		Advanced ?
		Assist Me Revert Apply

So, the DNS settings on the infected host have been hijacked as well.

What about the other interesting methods? (e.g. takeScreenshotAt, mouseClick, runAppleScript). We in my brief reversing/analysis/debugging session I didn't see them being executed. Moreover, though the malware has an embedded launch item plist it didn't attempt to persist (though as it's altered system settings, it really doesn't need to hang around - in

fact it does self-delete). When I coerced the malware to execute the method that modifed the launch item plist, initMaMiSettings, the value it configured in the ProgramArguments key - which tells the OS what to persistently execute - was simply: Is -la && sleep 28 && Is:

```
# lldb MaMi
(lldb) po $rax
{
    AbandonProcessGroup = "<key>AbandonProcessGroup</key><true/>";
    FooterStage = "</dict></plist>";
    HeaderStage = "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC</pre>
\"-
    //Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN\" \"http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd\">
    <plist version=\"1.0\"><dict>";
    KeepAlive = "<key>KeepAlive</key><true/>";
    LabelStage = "<key>Label</key><string>%Label%</string>";
    ProgramArguments = "<key>ProgramArguments</key><array><string>/bin/sh</string>
    <string>-c</string><string>%ProgramArguments%</string></array>";
    RunAtLoad = "<key>RunAtLoad</key><true/>";
    . . .
}
(lldb) po %$rsi
ls -la && sleep 28 && ls
```

Perhaps in order for the methods to be executed or for the malware to be persisted, requires some attack-supplied input, or other preconditions that just weren't met in my VM. I'll keep digging!


(Windows) Relatives

After chatting with <u>@noarfromspace</u>, about this malware, he dug up an interesting article from 2015. Titled, <u>"The mystery of 82.163.143.172 and 82.163.142.174"</u>, the article dicusses a piece of Windows malware named DNSUnlocker that also hijacked DNS settings on Windows systems. This DNSUnlocker malware seems closely related to OSX/MaMi for a few reasons:

 DNS servers: DNSUnlocker, hijacks Windows victim's DNS servers to: 82.163.143.172 and 82.163.142.174 OSX/MaMi, hijacks Mac victim's DNS servers to: 82.163.143.135 and 82.163.142.137

Certificate:

The certifcate installed by both malware specimens is the same:



Clearly DNSUnlocker, while older (circa 2015) and Windows only, is closely related to OSX/MaMi. If I had to guess, I'd say it's likely OSX/MaMi is a (fully re-written?) macOS version of DNSUnlocker, with a lot of extra macOS-specific evilness.

Conclusions

Ok, that's a wrap. OSX/MaMi isn't particular advanced - but does alter infected systems in rather nasty and persistent ways. By installing a new root certifcate and hijacking the DNS servers, the attackers can perform a variety of nefarious actions such as man-in-the-middle'ing traffic (perhaps to steal credentials, or inject ads).

Let's end with some Q&A!

Q: How do I get infected?

A: At this time, this is unknown. However, it's likely the attacker are using (rather lame) methods such as malicious email, web-based fake security alerts/popups, or social-engineering type attacks to target mac users

Q: How do I know if I'm infected?

A: Check your DNS settings, looking to see if they've been set to 82.163.143.135 and 82.163.142.137. You can check via the terminal (e.g. networksetup -getdnsservers Wi-Fi), or via the System Preferences app (Network pane). Also check for malicious cloudguard.me certifcate, which if installed, will appear in the System Keychain:

$\bullet \bullet \bullet$

cloudguard.me

▶ Trust						
Details						
Subject Name						
Country	IL					
State/Province	Gush Dan					
Locality	Hertzilia					
Organization	GreenTeam Internet, Ltd.					
Organizational Unit	Web					
Common Name	cloudguard.me					
Issuer Name						
Country State (Bravings						
State/Province						
	Hertzilia					
	GreenTeam Internet, Ltd.					
Organizational Unit						
Common Name	cloudguard.me					
Serial Number	00 B6 E1 AB E3 8B 9A B4 1A					

Q: How do I disinfect myself?

A: Often malware can install other malware, or allow an remote attacker to do what ever they want. Thus if you were/are infected it's suggested you fully <u>re-install macOS</u>. However, you can probably get away with simply resetting the DNS servers and deleting the malicious certifcate.

• Remove DNS Servers:

Open the System Preferences Application, click the 'Network' Icon, then the 'Advanced' button, and finally the 'DNS' button. If infected, you'll see the malicous DNS servers (82.163.143.135 and 82.163.142.137):

< ··	> Ethernet								
		TCP/IP	DNS	WINS	802.1X	Proxies	Hardware		
	DNS Servers:				Searc	h Domains	:		
	82.163.143.1	35							
	82.163.142.1	37							
	+ - IPv4 d	or IPv6 add	resses		+ -	-			
?							Can	cel	ОК

Selected each server, then click the '-' button to delete.

• Remove Certificate:

Open the Keychain Access Application, click on 'System' in the Keychains (top left). If infected you'll see the malicious certificate (cloudguard.me). Right click on the certifitcate and select 'Delete' to remove it:

Keychains login Local Items System System Roots	Certificate Root ce Expires	guard.me ertificate authority s: Friday, July 15, 2044 at 7:25:15 AM Ha certificate has custom trust settings	awaii-Aleutian Standard
	Name	^ Kind	Date Modified
	cloudguard.me	certificate	
	com.apple.keri	New Certificate Preference	
	@ com.apple.keri		
	com.apple.keri	Copy "cloudguard.me"	
	🖂 com.apple.sys	Delete "cloudguard.me"	
	com.apple.sys	Get Info	
Category	@ com.apple.sys	Evaluate "cloudguard.me"	
\Lambda All Items		Evaluate bloadgaara.me	
2. Passwords			

Q: Will my AV product protect me?

A: Evenutally. But for now, it does not appear that any will. I'd recomment a 3rd-party tool such as firewall that can detect & block outgoing traffic. I'm currently working on a free open-source firewall named <u>'LuLu'</u> that will detect OSX/MaMi's network traffic:



Q: Did I discover this malware?

A: No, a good friend brought it to my attention. I just happen to blog about things such as macOS malware!

Q: Why the name, OSX/MaMi

A: Since there are already several (IMHO unrelated) malware specimens that perform DNS hijackering (that are named 'DNSChanger', etc), I decided to call is OSX/MaMi due to a core class the malware named:

'SBMaMiSettings'

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