

# Downeks and Quasar RAT Used in Recent Targeted Attacks Against Governments

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Palo Alto Networks [Traps Advanced Endpoint Protection](#) recently prevented recent attacks that we believe are part of a campaign linked to [DustySky](#). DustySky is a campaign which others have [attributed](#) to the Gaza Cybergang group, a group that targets [government interests](#) in the region.

This report shares our researchers' analysis of the attack and Remote Access Tool (RAT). We also discovered during our research that the RAT Server used by this attacker is itself vulnerable to remote attack, a double-edged sword for these attackers.

## Attack

The initial infection vector in this attack is not clear, but it results in installing the “Downeks” downloader, which in turn infects the victim computer with the “Quasar” RAT.

Downeks uses third party websites to determine the external IP of the victim machine, possibly to determine victim location with GeoIP. It also drops decoy documents in an attempt to camouflage the attack.

Quasar is a .NET Framework-based open-source RAT. The attackers invested significant effort in attempting to hide the tool by changing the source code of the RAT and the RAT server, and by using an obfuscator and packer.

## Detection

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Unit 42 researchers observed the Quasar RAT being prevented from executing on a Traps-protected client in September 2016. We observed these Quasar samples:

File Name: f-secure.exe

SHA256: 99a7cb43fb2898810956b6137d803c8f97651e23f9f13e91887f188749bd5e8f

Note: connects to hnoor.newphoneapp[.]com

File Name: HD\_Audio.exe

SHA256: 0c4aa50c95c990d5c5c55345626155b87625986881a2c066ce032af6871c426a

Note: connects to manual.newphoneapp[.]com

File Name: HD\_Audio.exe

SHA256: 86bd78b4c8c94c046d927fb29ae0b944bf2a8513a378b51b3977b77e59a52806

Note: crashes upon execution

File Name: sim.exe

SHA256: 723108103ccb4c166ad9cdf350de6a898489f1dac7eeab23c52cd48b9256a42

Note: connects to hnoor.newphoneapp[.]com

Further research found other Quasar examples, an attack earlier in the month 2016 on the same target:

SHA256: 1ac624aaf6bbc2e3b966182888411f92797bd30b6fcce9f8a97648e64f13506f

We found the same Quasar code in an additional attack on the same day, but upon a different target. A second Quasar sample was also observed attacking this new victim:

SHA256: 99a7cb43fb2898810956b6137d803c8f97651e23f9f13e91887f188749bd5e8f

We do not have detailed visibility into the specific host attacked, and have not been able to reproduce the second stage of the attack in our lab. However, based upon the timeframe of subsequent telemetry we observe, we understand the attack chain as follows:

1. The initial dropper (which varies across attacks) is delivered to the victim via email or web:

File Name: Joint Ministerial Council between the GCC and the EU Council.exe"

SHA256: 0d235478ae9cc87b7b907181ccd151b618d74955716ba2dbc40a74dc1cdfc4aa

1. The initial dropper, upon execution, extracts an embedded Downeks instance:

File Name: ati.exe

SHA256: f19bc664558177b7269f52edcec74ecdb38ed2ab9e706b68d9cbb3a53c243dec

1. Downeks makes a POST request to dw.downloadtesting[.]com, resulting in the installation of the Quasar RAT on the victim machine.
2. Additional Downeks downloaders connecting to the previously-observed server dw.downloadtesting[.]com were also found in this attack:

SHA256: 15abd32342e87455b73f1e2ecf9ab10331600eb4eae54e1dfc25ba2f9d8c2e8a

SHA256: 9a8d73cb7069832b9523c55224ae4153ea529ecc50392fef59da5b5d1db1c740

Further research identified dozens of Downeks and Quasar samples related to these attackers. All included decoy documents written in Arabic (all related to Middle Eastern politics) or Hebrew. Most of them use the same mutex structure, share the same fake icon and unique metadata details, file writes, registry operations, and fake common program metadata, as seen in DustySky samples.

The Downeks downloader and Quasar C2 infrastructures are each self-contained and independent of each other. However, we did find a single shared IP address demonstrably connecting the Downeks downloader and Quasar C2 infrastructures. The below chart (Figure 1) shows Quasar infrastructure (top), Downeks (bottom), and the shared IP link.





Figure 1- Quasar and Downeks

Charting the samples and infrastructure clearly shows the separate Downeks campaigns, and infrastructure links (Figure 2):



*Figure 2- Infrastructure Patterns and Connections*

In Figure 2, top-right (green) has the Quasar infrastructure (Figure 3), with a link to the Downeks infrastructure. Left (yellow) is DustySky infrastructure (Figure 4) and the links to this Downeks campaign. As well as similarities in the code, decoys and targets, we also identified C2 infrastructure links between DustySky and this campaign. The remainder is sub-campaigns of Downeks samples, their infrastructure, their links – and a favored ISP (center) (Figure 5).



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Figure 3- Quasar



Figure 4- DustySky




Figure 5- Favorite ISP

The timing of the attacks is commensurate with the Middle-Eastern working week (Figure 6):





Figure 6- Attacks by day-of-the-week

The sample build days-of-the-week follow an almost identical pattern (Figure 7):



*Figure 7- Builds by day-of-the-week*

We saw five samples built on the same date in December 2015, and six on the same date in January, further solidifying the link between each sample.

## Quasar

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We analyzed a Quasar sample we found that was communicating with an active C2 server at the time of analysis:

SHA256: 4393ff391396cdfd229517dd98aa7faecad04da479fe8ca322f035ceee363273

Quasar is a publicly-available commodity RAT, an evolution of his earlier xRAT, by German developer “MaxXor”. This sample is a modified version of Quasar, most likely forked from open source version 1.2.0.0 on [GitHub](#). The client was likely built using the Quasar server client builder. We observed the following customizations:

C2 server:

app.progsupdate[.]com, which resolved to 185.141.25[.]68), over port 4664.

Quasar mutex name:

VMFvdCsC7RFqerZinfV0sxJFo

Keylogger log location:

Users\hJTQwqwwSCkZU\AppData\Roaming\GoogleDesktop\<date>

The malware uses fake version information to appear as a Microsoft update program, as well as Google Desktop once unpacked.

Property	Value
FileDescription	update microsoft programe
FileVersion	3.10.2.0
InternalName	micr data
LegalCopyright	microsoft C 2011
OriginalFilename	micr data
ProductVersion	3.22.1.20
Assembly Version	3.22.1.20
CompanyName	microsoft
ProductName	microsoft data

## Packer

This sample is packed by “Netz”, a simple .NET Framework packer which stores the original executable compressed (zlib) as a resource. At runtime, the packer decompresses the resource and uses Reflection to load the assembly, find its Entry point, and Invoke it. Extracting the payload is straight forward – we simply dump the resource and decompress it. After decompilation, the packer looks like this:

```
1 public static int Main(string[] args) {
2     try {
3         NetzStarter.InitXR();
4         AppDomain.CurrentDomain.AssemblyResolve += new
5         ResolveEventHandler(NetzStarter.NetzResolveEventHandler);
        return NetzStarter.StartApp(args);
    }
}
```

Find the resource and call InvokeApp:

```
1 public static int StartApp(string[] args) {
2     byte[] resource = NetzStarter.GetResource("A6C24BF5-3690-4982-887E-
3     11E1B159B249");
4     return NetzStarter.InvokeApp(NetzStarter.GetAssembly(resource), args);
}
```

Get the assembly object by decompressing the resource and loading it with Reflection:

```

1 private static Assembly GetAssembly(byte[] data) {
2     MemoryStream memoryStream = (MemoryStream) null;
3     memoryStream = NetzStarter.UnZip(data);
4     memoryStream.Seek(0L, SeekOrigin.Begin);
5     return Assembly.Load(memoryStream.ToArray());
6 }

```

And finally, find the entry point and invoke it:

```

1 private static int InvokeApp(Assembly assembly, string[] args) {
2     MethodInfo entryPoint = assembly.EntryPoint;
3     ParameterInfo[] parameters1 = entryPoint.GetParameters();
4     object[] parameters2 = (object[]) null;
5     if (parameters1 != null && parameters1.Length > 0)
6         parameters2 = new object[1]{ (object) args };
7     object obj = entryPoint.Invoke((object) null, parameters2);

```

Extracting produces:

SHA256: c931de65d9655a772d23e4227a627a1140d8d3c4912ca71c324421b13efa1a02

Property	Value
Comments	
CompanyName	Google
FileDescription	Google Desktop was a computer program with desktop search ...
FileVersion	5.0.0.0
InternalName	Google Desktop
LegalCopyright	©2016 Google
LegalTrademarks	©2016 Google
OriginalFilename	Google Desktop
ProductName	Google Desktop
ProductVersion	5.9.1005.12335

This layer uses obfuscation in an attempt to avoid detection/analysis.

## Obfuscation

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We discovered that the sample was obfuscated using .NET reactor. It is possible to decompile the deobfuscated sample and retrieve most of the original source code but not enough to compile it easily.

After deobfuscation we extracted:

SHA256: d773b12894d4a0ffb0df328e7e1aa4a7112455e88945a10471650e503eecdb3d

Property	Value
Comments	
CompanyName	Google
FileDescription	Google Desktop was a computer program with desktop search ...
FileVersion	5.0.0.0
InternalName	Google Desktop
LegalCopyright	©2016 Google
LegalTrademarks	©2016 Google
OriginalFilename	Google Desktop
ProductName	Google Desktop
ProductVersion	5.9.1005.12335

## Quasar Code

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After decompiling the sample, we were able to document the modifications from the open-source Quasar.

## Settings

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The configuration of Quasar is stored in the Settings object, which is encrypted with a password which is itself stored unencrypted.

```
1 public static class Settings {
2 public static string VERSION;
3 public static string HOSTS;
4 public static int RECONNECTDELAY;
5 public static string PASSWORD; // password for encryption of communication
6 public static Environment.SpecialFolder SPECIALFOLDER;
7 public static string DIR;
8 public static string SUBFOLDER;
9 public static string INSTALLNAME;
10 public static bool INSTALL;
11 public static bool STARTUP;
12 public static string MUTEX;
13 public static string STARTUPKEY;
14 public static bool HIDEFILE;
15 public static bool ENABLELOGGER;
16 public static string ENCRYPTIONKEY; // Encryption password of the settings
17 public static string TAG;
18 public static string LOGDIRECTORYNAME;
19 public static bool HIDELOGDIRECTORY;
20 public static bool ISCHECKIP;
21 public static int INSTARTUPFOLDER;
```

Modifications:

The ISCHECKIP and INSTARTUPFOLDER are not found in open source Quasar samples.

## Cryptography

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The sample we analyzed is using RijndaelManaged with ECB mode and PKCS7 padding. The key is the SHA256 hash of the hard-coded password. The password of the sample we analyzed is:

“6y7u^Y&U6y7u^Y&U6y7u^Y&U”

Although at first glance this appears somewhat complex, it is in fact a rather simple, repeated keyboard sequence. We observe similar keyboard patterns in other samples: “567%^&”, “zxc!@#ASD”.

```

1 public static void SetDefaultKey(string key) {
2     byte[] bytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(key);
3     AES._defaultKey = SHA256.Create().ComputeHash(bytes);
4
5     private static void EncDec(Stream src, Stream ds, bool encDec, byte[] key) {
6         RijndaelManaged rijndaelManaged = new RijndaelManaged();
7         rijndaelManaged.Key = key;
8         rijndaelManaged.Mode = CipherMode.ECB;
9         rijndaelManaged.Padding = PaddingMode.PKCS7;
10        rijndaelManaged.BlockSize = AES.BlockSize * 8;
11        if (encDec) {
12            ICryptoTransform encryptor = rijndaelManaged.CreateEncryptor();
13            CryptoStream cryptoStream = new CryptoStream(ds, encryptor,
14                CryptoStreamMode.Write);
15            long position = src.Position;
16            AES.CopyTo(src, (Stream) cryptoStream, 8192);
17            cryptoStream.FlushFinalBlock();
18        } else {
19            ICryptoTransform decryptor = rijndaelManaged.CreateDecryptor();
20            AES.CopyTo(new CryptoStream(src, decryptor, CryptoStreamMode.Read), ds, 8192);
21        }
22    }
23 }

```

Modifications:

- Uses SHA256 instead of MD5 to create the key.
- Uses RijndaelManaged instead of AES for encryption. (with ECB mode, which is considered weak).

## Serialization

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Quasar contains the NetSerializer library that handles serialization of high level IPacket objects that the client and server use to communicate. The serialization assigns unique IDs for serializable objects types. The open source and several other samples we found give a dynamically-assigned 1 byte ID at compile time. The sample we analyzed changed that behavior and hard-coded DWORD for each object type. This is a better implementation, as it allows servers and clients from different versions to communicate with each other to some extent.

```

1 private static void initTypeMap() {
2     Exts.dict_0.Add(typeof (object), -737641570);
3     Exts.dict_0.Add(typeof (GetPasswordsResponse), -692037318);
4     Exts.dict_0.Add(typeof (List<string>), 1046249082);
5     Exts.dict_0.Add(typeof (int), -118636331);
6     Exts.dict_0.Add(typeof (string[]), -2103720204);
7     Exts.dict_0.Add(typeof (string), 1236129805);

```

## Version

---

The sample we analyzed is most likely forked from open source quasar 1.2.0.0. We find multiple file/object names hinting at the version, but most compelling:

- Quasar version 1.1.0.0 names the encryption module name space "Encryption", while subsequent Quasar versions use "Cryptography" – which we observe in this sample.
- Quasar version 1.3.0.0 changed the encryption key generation, and stopped saving the password in the sample. There are more indications as well, such as names of objects, files etc.

Other samples we analyzed had different combinations of modification to cryptography and serialization.

## The C2 server

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Our decompilation of the serialization library was not complete enough to allow simple recompilation. Instead, we downloaded and compiled the 1.2.0.0 server of the open-source Quasar RAT, having determined that this seemed likely the most similar version. The out-of-the-box server could not communicate with the client sample owing to the previously documented modifications that we had observed. We incorporated those changes into our build, discovering that this worked for most sample versions with almost no further modification.

Both the client and the server use the same code to serialize and encrypt the communications. Instead of compiling a different server for each client, our server uses the code from within the client to communicate with it. Using Reflection, the server can load the assembly of the client to find the relevant functions and passwords.

### Load the client assembly:

---

```
1 private static System.Reflection.Assembly assembly =  
2 System.Reflection.Assembly.LoadFile(@"C:\Users\user1\Desktop\Quasar\ServerVersionLo  
3 adClient\resource.bin.open.exe");
```

### Encryption:

---

Rather straight forward, as the server version uses the same API as the sample client.

### Get the AES class:

---

```
1 private static Type tAES = assembly.GetType("_Cr.Crp.AES");
```

### Getting the setDefKey, encrypt and decrypt methods:

---

```
1 private static System.Reflection.MethodInfo[] mi = tAES.GetMethods();
2 private static System.Reflection.MethodInfo setDefKey = mi[1]; // this one is used
3 to set the current encryption key (IE sha256 of the password stored in Settings)
4 //tAES.GetMethod("Encrypt"); doesn't work, because its ambiguous as it is overridden,
5 so I choose the right ones directly
6 private static System.Reflection.MethodInfo encMIBuf = mi[4];
  private static System.Reflection.MethodInfo decMIBuf = mi[6];
```

### **Replace the server functions:**

---

```
1 public static void SetDefaultKey(string key)
```

with

```
1 public static void setDefKey.Invoke(null, new object[] { key });
```

```
1 public static byte[] Encrypt(byte[] input)
```

with

```
1 public static byte[] encdata = (byte[])encMIBuf.Invoke(null, new object[] { input
2 });
```

```
1 public static byte[] Decrypt(byte[] input)
```

with

```
1 public static byte[] data = (byte[])decMIBuf.Invoke(null, new object[] { input });
```

### **Serialization:**

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This was more complex. Both the client and server uses the same API, but the client serializer cannot serialize server objects, because they are not the same as their "mirrored" objects inside the client. In some cases these objects are completely different, for example the server commands to get the file system.

Our solution is to:

1. Translate on the fly the objects the server send to mirrored matching client objects (will not work if client doesn't have this object, or renamed it).
2. Copy the content from the server object into the new client object (will not work if client implementation is different).
3. Serialize the client object (which will be later encrypted and sent).
4. Deserialize the decrypted response into another client response object.

5. Translate the client response object into the server version of the client response object.
6. Copy the contents from the client response object into the translated server object.
7. Return the translated object.

```

1  public static void SerializeWrapper(Stream stream, object data)
2  {
3  System.Reflection.Assembly assembly =
4  System.Reflection.Assembly.LoadFile(@"C:\Users\user1\Desktop\Quasar\ServerVersionL
5  oadClient\resource.bin.open.exe");
6  Type serializerType = assembly.GetType("_Cr.NetSerializer.Serializer");
7  System.Reflection.PropertyInfo serInstanceProp = serializerType.GetProperty("Instance");
8  object serInstance = serInstanceProp.GetValue(null, new object[] { });
9  System.Reflection.MethodInfo serializeMet = serializerType.GetMethod("Serialize");
10 Type typeOfData = data.GetType(); string typeOfDataFullName = typeOfData.FullName;
11 string typeOfDataFullNameNew = typeOfDataFullName.Replace("xServer.Core", "_Cr");
12 Type packType = assembly.GetType(typeOfDataFullNameNew);
13 object packTypeInstance = packType.GetConstructor(new Type[] { }).Invoke(new object[] {
14 });
15 // now try to copy data into the instance
16 foreach (FieldInfo fieldOfClient in packType.GetFields())
17 {
18 string fieldName = fieldOfClient.Name;
19 FieldInfo fieldOfServer = typeOfData.GetField(fieldName);
20 PropertyInfo PropOfServer = typeOfData.GetProperty(fieldName);
21 object serverValue = null;
22 if (fieldOfServer != null) {
23 serverValue = fieldOfServer.GetValue(data);
24 } else if (PropOfServer != null) {
25 serverValue = PropOfServer.GetValue(data, null);
26 } fieldOfClient.SetValue(packTypeInstance, serverValue);
27 }
28 foreach (PropertyInfo fieldOfClient in packType.GetProperties())
29 {
30 string fieldName = fieldOfClient.Name;
31 FieldInfo fieldOfServer = typeOfData.GetField(fieldName);
32 PropertyInfo PropOfServer = typeOfData.GetProperty(fieldName);
33 object serverValue = null;
34 if (PropOfServer != null) {
35 serverValue = PropOfServer.GetValue(data, null);
36 }
37 else if (fieldOfServer != null) {
38 serverValue = fieldOfServer.GetValue(data);
39 }
40 fieldOfClient.SetValue(packTypeInstance, serverValue, null);
41 }
42 serializeMet.Invoke(serInstance, new object[] { stream, packTypeInstance });
43 }
44
45 public static object DeserializeWrapper(Stream stream) {
46 System.Reflection.Assembly assembly =
47 System.Reflection.Assembly.LoadFile(@"C:\Users\user1\Desktop\Quasar\ServerVersionL

```

```

48 oadClient\resource.bin.open.exe");
49 Type serializerType = assembly.GetType("_Cr.NetSerializer.Serializer");
50 System.Reflection.PropertyInfo serInstanceProp = serializerType.GetProperty("Instance");
51 object serInstance = serInstanceProp.GetValue(serInstanceProp, null);
52 System.Reflection.MethodInfo DeserializeMet = serializerType.GetMethod("Deserialize");
53 object ob = DeserializeMet.Invoke(serInstance, new object[] { stream });
54 Type typeOfPacket = ob.GetType(); string typeOfPacketFullName =
55 typeOfPacket.FullName;
56 string typeOfPacketFullNameNew = typeOfPacketFullName.Replace("_Cr",
57 "xServer.Core");
58 System.Reflection.Assembly currentAssembly = Assembly.GetExecutingAssembly();
59 Type packTypeServ = currentAssembly.GetType(typeOfPacketFullNameNew);
60 object pacTypeInstance = packTypeServ.GetConstructor(new Type[] { }).Invoke(new
61 object[] { });
62
63 // now try to copy data into the instance
64 foreach (FieldInfo fi in typeOfPacket.GetFields()) {
65     string fieldName = fi.Name;
66     FieldInfo fiServ = packTypeServ.GetField(fieldName);
67     if (fiServ != null) {
68         object clientSentValue = fi.GetValue(ob);
69         fiServ.SetValue(pacTypeInstance, clientSentValue);
70     }
71 }
72 foreach (PropertyInfo fi in typeOfPacket.GetProperties()) {
73     string fieldName = fi.Name;
74     PropertyInfo fiServ = packTypeServ.GetProperty(fieldName);
75     if (fiServ != null) {
76         object clientSentValue = fi.GetValue(ob, null);
77         fiServ.SetValue(pacTypeInstance, clientSentValue, null);
78     }
79 }
80 return pacTypeInstance;
81 }

```

## Communication


---

Our sample communicates with `app.progsupdate[.]com`, which resolved to `185.141.25[.]68`, over TCP port 4664.

## Architecture

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This is the communication architecture between quasar client and server (Figure 8):



*Figure 8- Communication Architecture*

1. The server sends a command. for example, “Get System Information”.
2. The command is translated to an IPacket of type GetSystemInfo.
3. The packet is serialized into a stream of bytes.
4. The stream of bytes is encrypted (in some versions there is also optional compression step).
5. The stream of bytes is sent over TCP to the client.
6. The client receives and decrypts the packet.
7. The client deserializes the packet into IPacket GetSystemInfo.
8. The relevant handler of the client is called, collects the system information and sends it back inside IPacket of GetSystemInfoResponse.

Each of these layers seems to be different to some extent in the various samples we found. The IPacket, Serialization and Encryption framework code is shared between the client and the server, therefore we can use it with Reflection. However the Server handlers and command function are not, so we cannot create a completely perfect simulation.

## **Initial handshake**

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After the TCP handshake completes, the server starts another handshake with the client by sending packets in the following order (Figure 9):






Figure 9- Initial Handshake

The client returns data to the server about the victim computer, which is displayed in the server GUI (Figure 10):

IP Address	Tag	User@PC	Version	Status	User Status	Country	Operating System	Account Type
2.2.2.2	31/10/...	user1@WIN-LR8119VPR37	1.5.0.0	Showed ...	Active	Unknown [-]	Windows 7 Ultimate 64 Bit	User

Figure 10- Quasar RAT Server GUI

The server and client then enter into a keep-alive mode, where the attacker can send commands to the client and receive further responses.

## RAT commands

The attacker can issue commands (not all commands appear in different samples) through the Quasar server GUI for each client:

- Get system information
- Get file system

- Upload / download / execute files
- Startup manager
- Open task manager
- Kill / start processes
- Edit registry
- Reverse Proxy
- Shutdown / restart the computer
- Open remote desktop connection
- Observe the desktop and actions of active user
- Issue remote mouse clicks and keyboard strokes
- Password stealing
- Retrieve Keylogger logs
- Visit website
- Display a message box

Our server build was able to successfully execute most of the commands.

The file system commands underlying handlers and IPacket were modified to support more features, so these commands don't work out of the box and required manual implementation from us.

## **A Double-Edged Sword...**

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With further analysis of the Quasar RAT C2 Server, we uncovered vulnerabilities in the server code, which would allow remote code execution. This might allow a second attacker to install code of their choice – for example, their own Quasar RAT – on the original attacker's server. We refer to this (somewhat ironic) technique as a "Double Edged Sword Attack". We did not apply this to any live C2 servers – we only tested this with our own servers in our lab.

In the lab, we changed our Quasar RAT source code to use the known encryption key, and to send fake victim IP address, City, Country code, Flag, and Username. The Quasar server does not verify the RAT data, and displays this data in the RAT Server GUI when the RAT is executed and connects to the server. We found this could be used to supply compelling "victim data" to convince the attacker to connect to this "victim" via the GUI.

Quasar server includes a File Manager window, allowing the attacker to select victim files, and trigger file operations – for example, uploading a file from victim machine to server. Uploaded files are written to the server sub directory "clients\user\_name@machine\_name\_ipaddress".

Quasar server does not verify that the size, filename, extension, or header of the uploaded file is the same as requested. Therefore, if we convince the attacker to request the file "secret\_info.doc (20KB)", we can instead return to the server any file of our choice, of any size or type.

When the Quasar server retrieves the name of the uploaded file from the victim, it does not verify that it is a valid file path. Therefore sending the file path "..\..\secret\_info.doc " will result in writing our file instead to the same directory as the Quasar server code.

Quasar server does not even verify that a file was requested from the victim. Immediately when the File Manager window is opened by the attacker, the Quasar server sends two commands to the RAT: GetDrives and listDirectory (to populate the list of the victim's files in the RAT Server GUI). We can respond to those commands by instead sending two files of our choice to the Quasar server. Again, we control the content of the file, the size and the path and filename.

Quasar is a .NET Framework assembly, loading multiple DLLs upon launch, for example "dnsapi.dll". Quasar server is vulnerable to a simple DLL hijacking attack, by using this technique to replace server DLLs.

When the attacker restarts the Quasar application, our uploaded "dnsapi.dll" will instead be loaded. Through this vector, we could drop our own Quasar client on the attacker's server and execute it. Our Quasar RAT will connect to our own (secured, of course) Quasar server, allowing us to control that attacker's server with his own RAT. We can also replace "shfolder.dll" (and add a DLL export proxy to avoid a crash), which is loaded whenever the attacker clicks the builder tab – allowing us to infect the server while it runs, without the need to wait for application restart.

## **Downeks**

---

Although Downeks has been publicly examined to some extent, our analysis found several features not previously described.

Earlier Downeks samples were all written in native code. However, among our Downeks samples, we found new versions apparently written in .NET. We observe many behavioral similarities and unique strings across both the native-Downeks versions, and the new .NET Downeks versions. Almost all of the strings and behaviors we describe in this analysis of a .NET version are also present in the native version.

We observed these samples deployed only against Hebrew-speaking targets.

### **Downeks.NET – "SharpDownloader"**

---

Downeks .NET internal name is "SharpDownloader", "Sharp" may be a reference to the language it was written in – C#.

As seen in previous Downeks versions, it uses masquerades with icons, filenames and metadata imitating popular legitimate applications such as VMware workstation (Figure 1) and CCleaner, or common file formats such as DOC and PDF.




Figure 11 - Application metadata masquerading as VMWare Workstation

All 3 samples were compiled with the same timestamp. Downeks.NET is obfuscated using “Yano” and can be easily de-obfuscated using the [de4dot](#) utility.

SHA256: 4dcf5bd2c7a5822831d9f22f46bd2369c4c9df17cc99eb29975b5e8ae7e88606

SHA256: 905f6a62749ca6f0fd33345d6a8b1831d87e9fd1f81a59cd3add82643b367693

SHA256: c885f09b10feb88d7d176fe1a01ed8b480deb42324d2bb825e96fe1408e2a35f

## Communication

---

Downeks is a backdoor with only very basic capabilities. It communicates with the C2 server using HTTP POST requests.

It runs in an infinite loop, in each iteration it requests a command from the C2, and then it sleeps for a time period it receives in the C2 response (defaulting to 1 second if no sleep-time sent).

The data that is sent in the POST is serialized with json, which is then is encrypted, and finally encoded in base64. The json format is typically {"mth": "some\_method", "data": "some\_encrypted\_data"}. The C2 server responds using the same format and serialization/encryption/encoding.

## Download and Execute

---

As described in earlier analyses, Downeks' main purpose is as a downloader. Unfortunately, we were unable to get any C2 servers to issue download commands to any samples that we tested in our lab.

The download is initiated upon receiving json with a "download" command, which includes the URL of the file to be downloaded. Downeks can also be instructed to execute binaries that already exist on the victim machine. After successful execution, Downeks returns the results to the C2 server.

Downeks also has a self-update capability, if instructed by the C2.

## Screen Capture

---

Downeks can be instructed with the "img" command to capture the victim screen and transmit it back to the C2. The parameters "wth" and "qlt" specify "width" and "quality".

## Appdata

---

Downeks .NET creates a file in the "Appdata" directory, based on certain properties of the machine. During our analysis, Downeks created a file in "Appdata\Roaming" containing only "SD{new line}0" ("SD" possibly for "SharpDownloader").

Although this file itself is not particularly interesting, the older (native) Downeks versions also creates a file in Appdata\Roaming, with identical data.

The filenames across the two variants bear striking similarities. The .NET variant creates "1FABFBFF0000065132F71D94", while the native version creates "000206511FABFBFF". We observed the string "1FABFBFF0000065132F71D94" in memory during debugging of the native variant (Figure 12). This is a pseudo-unique ID for each machine, based on install date taken from the registry, volume serial number, OS version and service pack, Processor architecture, and computer name.



```
04011324 $!0+ RETURN from aaa.0400F740 to aaa.04011324
03471A20 +G+ Arg1 = ASCII "000206511FABFBFF32F71D94"
03471378 x!G+ Arg2 = ASCII "Hc4eamPVbrICJEtv9xp2"
00000014 7... Arg3 = 14
00131000 -..
```

Figure 12 - Machine ID in memory

## Installed Antivirus check

---

Downeks enumerates any antivirus products installed on the victim machine and transmits the list to the C2. It constructs this list using the WMI query:

"SELECT displayName FROM AntivirusProduct"

## Persistence

---

Downeks achieves host persistence through either the registry “run” key or with a shortcut in the start-up folder.

## External IP

---

In another similarity between both variants, Downeks assesses the victim’s external IP using an HTTP request to <http://www.myexternalip.com/raw>.

## Other commands

---

Downeks can be instructed by the C2 to perform a few other commands:

- Check if the computer name and user name, or external IP address, is in a provided list and if so, display a message box with a message as defined by the C2.
- Kill any running process and attempt to delete the associated executable.
- “Setup” command – sends various info about the machine with each iteration of the C2 communications loop.

## Encryption keys

---

Downeks has static encryption keys hardcoded in the code. These keys are initialized in the “Defaults” class constructor, suggesting that the author of this malware has great affection for stackoverflow:

```
1 static Defaults()
2 {
3     ResEncKey = Strings.Get(0x1524);    // resolves to "$t2ck0v3rFI0w"
4     RarPass = Strings.Get(0x1539);    // resolves to "123456"
5     ServerTransKey = Strings.Get(0x1542); // resolves to "P@$sw0rD$nd"
6     DataEncKey = Strings.Get(0x1553);  // resolves to "$t@k0v2rF10w"
7     ConnRequestKey = Strings.Get(0x1564); // resolves to "1q@W3e$RQ!w2E#r4"
8 }
```

## Typos

---

We observed some typos in the code, such as “responce” ( “response”) and “GroubID” (“GroupID”) in this version.

## Coverage & IoCs

---

Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from Downeks and Quasar used in this attack:

- WildFire properly classifies these Downeks and Quasar samples as malicious.
- Traps detects and blocks malicious behavior exhibited by new, unknown Quasar samples.

- C2 servers associated with this activity are blocked through Threat Prevention DNS signatures.
- AutoFocus customers can monitor this activity using the [Downeks](#) and [QuasarRAT](#) tags.

A list of Indicators of Compromise can be found in Appendix C - IoCs.

## Appendix A - IoCs

---

### C2 Domains

---

downloadtesting.com  
gameoolines.com  
onlinesoft.space  
newphoneapp.com  
gamestoplay.bid  
smartsftp.pw  
galaxysupdates.com  
galaxy-s.com  
datasamsung.com  
progsupdate.com  
topgamse.com  
bandtester.com  
speedbind.com  
ukgames.tech  
wallanews.publicvm.com  
wallanews.sytes.net  
noredirecto.redirectme.net  
dynamicipaddress.linkpc.net  
downloadlog.linkpc.net  
havan.qhigh.com  
kolabdown.sytes.net  
rotter2.publicvm.com  
ftpserverit.otzo.com  
webfile.myq-see.com  
downloadmyhost.zapto.org  
help2014.linkpc.net  
safara.sytes.net  
exportball.servegame.org  
viewnet.better-than.tv  
down.downloadoneyoutube.co.vu  
netstreamag.publicvm.com  
hostgatero.ddns.net  
subsidiaryohio.linkpc.net  
helpyoume.linkpc.net

## Quasar & Downeks SHA256s

---

3053e1e8df7e525ef98a77190cefce258aea365e2998425ecc8e139230680156  
f19bc664558177b7269f52edcec74ecdb38ed2ab9e706b68d9cbb3a53c243dec  
0d235478ae9cc87b7b907181ccd151b618d74955716ba2dbc40a74dc1cdfc4aa  
96c1346351a53c865afef5e087a8cbcf8e28d652fbc083a93399a8b94328d456  
15abd32342e87455b73f1e2ecf9ab10331600eb4eae54e1dfc25ba2f9d8c2e8a  
b66e5af52fd4d802f64788692b3eafe6b5ff61cea09c06a237a96b6cdb90b41a  
55a7ca1e5ed2d74c7eb6ab6a985c1d369157a91275f575967aefb7ddb3388e0c  
9a8d73cb7069832b9523c55224ae4153ea529ecc50392fef59da5b5d1db1c740  
39bdeaded0f919caa6697ae1ae4953de1c7afa79905939dbbd8c647a84f6cd07  
0e41c3611da6e3a2b0dd0d43b9ce0b3f3405472efa5760767719cc82692afb7b  
bc7c3f687d0589a4db53475bc65056a628b52aa27f84c1d76b9fe686d495df27  
0d1aa670df8ae1379d6997c9dc8b40c893ee395c3d45b84c2ad1732e86973143  
8ac7138215b2500d0737b483b9194419c0e0248014147e84f43b1e2b409184cf  
8ca99455d244fab2701beb5127f94745154e03ac1231a58f8bd2cd01732a341b  
a149340f920888256902e28e4c5d8587fed3037682e875ed1fdf6a3213c50e92  
78aaed20914d3895708985aee089a464b31e11eb3b3e90b530dcebbe10e915ec  
704b19e0460a0fa7d952ba6feb5eadb9054895d1d753df72faf6f470446a0519  
118d0bd8ec35b925167c67217d2fe06ac021ce253f72d17f1093423b8f9b4a2b  
68ec3588735341566e9736b897aac06affb4a4808b05ceffb72384e77ea04b2c  
d3c710eaaf849598fa486823da42bdce03ea3c9421c3936e3330e98b34e4ef47  
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75336b05443b94474434982fc53778d5e6e9e7fabaddae596af42a15fceb04e9  
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b8a3096a396c28462c0d168d97e28573e0e6d272bbc1dd2432e7effe098bd979  
905f6a62749ca6f0fd33345d6a8b1831d87e9fd1f81a59cd3add82643b367693  
c885f09b10feb88d7d176fe1a01ed8b480deb42324d2bb825e96fe1408e2a35f  
0c4aa50c95c990d5c5c55345626155b87625986881a2c066ce032af6871c426a  
1ac624aaf6bbc2e3b966182888411f92797bd30b6fccc9f8a97648e64f13506f  
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723108103ccb4c166ad9cdf350de6a898489f1dac7eeab23c52cd48b9256a42  
99a7cb43fb2898810956b6137d803c8f97651e23f9f13e91887f188749bd5e8f  
86bd78b4c8c94c046d927fb29ae0b944bf2a8513a378b51b3977b77e59a52806  
3243292E46A198BD83E0DCE58258312852C99217187E6D5399066189FEB2677B  
9b8d8780454708b950459d43161097ac72f62ff349bc8f379b5b2216bc9ae935  
3619b12b11cda6e87644d3316355d99ee5fa5407aa8a8f107aa1058e33b19bf6  
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4393ff391396cdfd229517dd98aa7faecad04da479fe8ca322f035ceee363273  
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f5413c785770400215c3191ea887517b4380ec81be4e5bdc5aea12bf82f9105d  
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182c82100069834ad4a8dadee6874cfb612f0b9bab7cd3ee5d69f16440ad6d7  
f772463bafef5f45f675658eee43b6f56911a4f449afb0cc68ac068002a2f875  
b30e3dc47848666e71c1f13050a6502b2c2a7a542ee867d152ffb2dd186d7114  
e5e4895d2195e14a3a105f3ed73fd49493e9dbdd7dfc6f6616023473fa8f86c6  
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695821451be582d85cd8e42ce4446f131bd474e6c715bdf13fe8bac6de34b2e3  
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d735c19fc9223e1bc4e625c1f47801d758426fbae89e5086bc56a8d6b1df2011  
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f1b682808f1819f0e3d030fce1fd6b1ca95ad052b069e028cd9ed4afd81cd4d6  
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Aacf24e288388431b30f8da765b4696975adc9cc0303d285abb05077eda21da2  
02bd710d3055076f86116d28427322c9cb623291c6c5a66c1932181fc6558586  
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7eeeeae1f2fc62653593c7ce254e9cf855905035c2e8f8c0588887cb8e99dd770

d2d08bb2707b635617e5bab0fcd033b6f68a753dd2b3897adca1c627758e686b  
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7c578dcdcefe78fb1dd51ac611f6450d9eb5be6c5f1e3363f460321a46be4a39  
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5668470c92408f4b9f3a659005c2acca9da8df750cc491bffc88ef640474fa4a  
d735c19fc9223e1bc4e625c1f47801d758426fbae89e5086bc56a8d6b1df2011  
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f53fd5389b09c6ad289736720e72392dd5f30a1f7822dbc8c7c2e2b655b4dad9  
2c2ae3f482d9db2541de0d855b5b12cd18028a94887f0c28acf1e2d6a4f3d4ac  
a35e2b21f7f770debcffc79eb4834ec8881465df06cee41af705b6ea5d899978  
a7aeeee233fcdfe1c7475db982497a82d8ae745ec1c58bd87215e8869c3f9e4  
f0e3562d0438695c7f3af0c280968cfc7134b484010d9ba2aceab944b441b127  
f5413c785770400215c3191ea887517b4380ec81be4e5bdc5aea12bf82f9105d  
29049e2c7671a7c4fc953cb76e539150cc7c80e1b83c19d0894dfa446ce5276e  
2eb7aa306551d693691d14558c5dc4f6d80ef8f69cf466149fbaa23953c08f7f  
dbdc72a7cfbf03599b95d8f1c47e157da34ea5d2f951cf5f49715e8caab58cd4  
de3e25a69ba43b9f236e544ece7f2da82a4fafb4489ad2e263754d9b9d88bc5c  
bc846caa05939b085837057bc4b9303357602ece83dc1380191bddd1402d4a2b  
44b99603dde822b6b86577e64622e9a2f5b76b6d8bd23a3fe1b4d91b73d0230a  
bb24105295588d14c4509ec7374fbe6f7a4821cf4e9d9282754dd666ad7a7ea1

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