

Fake recruiter campaign targets crypto developers with RAT

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Fake recruiter campaign targets crypto devs

A new branch of a fake job recruitment campaign, dubbed "graphalgo,"

is targeting developers with a RAT.

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The ReversingLabs research team has identified a new branch of a fake recruiter campaign conducted by the North Korean hacking team Lazarus Group. The campaign, which the team named *graphalgo*, based on the first package included in this campaign in the npm repository, has been active since the beginning of May 2025. It is a coordinated campaign targeting both Javascript and Python developers with cryptocurrency-related fake recruiter tasks.

Developers are approached via social platforms like LinkedIn and Facebook, or through job offerings on forums like Reddit. The campaign includes a well-orchestrated story around a company involved in blockchain and cryptocurrency exchanges. The malicious functionality is hidden using several layers of indirection across public services which include GitHub, npm and PyPI.

The campaign includes a malicious npm package, [bigmathutils](#), which collected more than 10K downloads since publishing the original, non-malicious version, and before the second version containing malicious payload was released.

See technical analysis: [Inside the fake crypto developer recruitment hack](#)

Graphalgo campaign overview

This whole campaign can be split into several partially independent activities conducted by the threat actor behind it. What's new in this campaign is its modularity makes it easier for the threat actor to keep the campaign active even if only some part of it becomes compromised.



Figure 1. Campaign overview

Part 1: Fake company

The central part of the campaign is a fake company, working on topics related to blockchain and crypto trading. In this case it was named “veltrix-capital,” but it is very likely that other organizations of the same profile exist as part of this campaign. The company’s domain, [www\[.\]veltrixcap\[.\]org](http://www.[.]veltrixcap[.]org), was created on April 4th 2025. A related GitHub organization named *veltrix-capital* was also created. It should be noted: several other companies with a similar name can be found by a quick Google search, but it is hard to tell if they are fake or legitimate entities.

The firm “Veltrix Capital” observed in this campaign had a basic looking website with information like the company vision and mission, but no concrete information about leadership or contact information. That said, it is not a hard task for a threat actor to create a fake company in case this one gets compromised. In fact, we think that was done in October 2025 when a new GitHub organization named *veltrixcapital* was created, pointing to a *veltrixcapital[.]ai* domain registered on September 21st 2025. No malicious activity related to this organization has been detected yet, but it is continuously getting new content published on its webpage and social media accounts. The content looks generic and AI generated and probably serves to create a sense of trustworthiness. It will very likely be used to publish malicious content in the future.

Part 2: Interview tasks

Several repositories were published under the *veltrix-capital* GitHub account and some of them were likely test tasks for job interviews. They include *test-url-monitoring*, *test-devops-monitoring*, *test-devops-orchestrator*, *test-devops-orchestrator-ts*. These repositories contained projects in both the Python and Javascript development languages. Examination of these repositories didn’t reveal any obvious malicious functionality. That is because the malicious functionality was not introduced directly via the job interview repositories, but indirectly — through dependencies hosted on the npm and PyPI open-source package repositories.



Malicious dependency in one of the job tasks



Figure 2. Malicious dependency in one of the job tasks

In Figure 2 you can see an example of a package.json file containing a dependency to a package named [graphnetworkx](#). This file is found in one of the repositories created by the targeted developers. In figure 3 you can see the repository landing page and a short description confirming it is a DevOps job candidate task.

 Landing page for one of the victim created repositories



Figure 3. Landing page for one of the victim created repositories

GitHub logs reveal that this repository was forked from one of the original *veltrix-capital* job task repositories, as visible in Figure 4.





Figure 4. GitHub fork event

As the repository description says, the developers' role is to “run, debug and improve...” Everything after “run” is not important, because at that moment, the malicious dependency is installed and executed on the victim's machine. It is easy to create such job task repositories. Threat actors simply need to take a legitimate bare-bone project and fix it up with a malicious dependency and it is ready to be served to targets. In case one of the “fake” job offering campaigns being exposed as fake.

For example, the story surrounding the *veltrix-capital* company, there is a good chance that only the “job” story will be detected — and that the malicious payload and infrastructure responsible for its delivery doesn't need to be changed. The threat actor only needs to prepare a new fake company and job offering. Such a modular approach shifts the burden of campaign support from expensive technical modifications to cheap social engineering activities.

Part 3: Recruiting

Several compromised developers were identified via repositories and contacted for more information about the incident. They confirmed they were approached by recruiters through various channels. Some of them came upon a job advertisement in forums like Reddit or dedicated Facebook Groups. Such examples are visible in Figures 5 and 6.

 Advertisement for a fake job position at Veltrix Capital posted on Reddit



Figure 5. Advertisement for a fake job position at Veltrix Capital posted on Reddit

 Advertisement for a fake job position at Veltrix Capital posted on Reddit



Figure 6. Advertisement for a fake job position targeting DevOps, posted in a Facebook group

Figure 7. Active recruiting through direct communication

It is not clear if these recruiters are fake, threat actor operated recruiter accounts, or real recruiters hired by the threat actor to make the offer look more trustworthy. Looking at recruiters that mentioned working for *veltrix-capital*, it appears as if these are real recruiters. RL contacted one of these recruiters and got a quick initial response, but after asking questions about the company, the conversation ended.

Part 4: Malicious dependencies

The parts of the campaign described so far could be called “frontend” and the malicious functionality is placed in the “backend” and uses public package repositories like npm and PyPI to host malicious downloaders. This approach is very convenient for threat actors, because it offers them a free, legitimate channel for hosting their malicious payloads. At the same time, it enables them to use the same payloads across different frontend campaigns.

Malicious packages attributed to this campaign can be split into two groups based on the packages they are impersonating:

- The first group are packages with “graph” in their name that started appearing on npm and PyPI in May 2025.
- The second group are packages with “big” in their name that started appearing on npm and PyPI in December 2025.

The “graph” packages were impersonations of legitimate packages — [graphlib](#) in npm and [networkx](#) in PyPI. Use of these packages was observed in *veltrix-capital* related tasks.

The “big” packages were not observed in any of *veltrix-capital* related tasks, so it is very likely that there is another, yet undiscovered, “frontend” operation in progress. As part of tracking this campaign, the package *bigmathutils* was identified. However, for a month since its publishing, it contained nothing malicious.

During that period it collected more than 10K downloads. Just before publication of this post on February 11, a new version, [1.1.0](#), of this package was published — and it contained the same payload observed in other packages from this campaign. This is an example of patience paying off for the threat actor, with the malicious version published after the initial user base was established. Shortly after publishing, the malicious version was removed from npm and the author issued a warning about the package being deprecated, so this action was very likely conducted by the threat actor to conceive the existence of the malicious version.

More technical details about malicious payloads from the graphalgo campaign can be found in a forthcoming technical analysis of this campaign.

Part 5: Final payloads

The second-stage payloads RL observed acted as downloaders for the final payload, a remote-access trojan (RAT) that periodically fetches and executes commands from the command and control server. The command listing can be seen in Figure 8. It supports typical commands like file download/upload, process listing and running of arbitrary commands.

Commands supported by the final RAT payload



Figure 8. Commands supported by the final RAT payload

One interesting detail is that the communication with the C2 server is token-protected. That means that the C2 server won't accept requests without a valid token issued from the server during agent registration or command request. This is something that was [previously observed](#) in campaigns attributed to North Korean state-sponsored actors.

Another notable functionality of the RAT is checking if the Metamask browser extension is installed. This is another typical characteristic of NK- sponsored activities — and a clear sign that the threat actor is interested in cryptocurrency funds.

Three versions of payload with identical functionality were identified, written in three different programming languages. JavaScript and Python versions were linked to npm and PyPI packages, but there is also a VBS version of the final RAT payload — identified by the SHA1 value `dbb4031e9bb8f8821a5758a6c308932b88599f18`, first seen on February 4, 2026. It is designed to communicate with the same C2 server `codepool[.]cloud` observed in “*graph*” named packages. This is another sign signaling existence of other “frontend” versions of the whole campaign.

North Korean campaigns in OSS repositories

There is a long history of malicious activities conducted by North Korean threat actors in public package repositories like npm and PyPI. In August 2023, RL published two blog posts (see the [first](#) and [second](#)) describing malicious impersonations of legitimate PyPI packages downloading malware from attacker controlled infrastructure. Package trustworthiness was backed up with corresponding GitHub repositories. The campaign was dubbed VMConnect, and later attributed to Lazarus Group, the North Korean advanced persistent threat (APT) group that has been linked to a number of sophisticated campaigns.

A year later, RL researchers uncovered the [e continuation of the VMConnect campaign](#) — this time connected to a fake recruiter coding tests. Malicious PyPI packages were linked to GitHub repositories belonging to malicious actors. Looking at their content, all of them represented coding skills tests linked to job interviews. When the victim ran those packages while trying to do the interview, it would execute a downloader fetching the second-stage malware. Malicious actors posed as Capital One, a major US financial services company.

In 2023, [a Phylum research report](#) about a malware campaign targeting npm with malware distributed in package pairs, using a unique token mechanism to make malware detection harder. Later the same year [Unit42 described](#) methods North Korea state-sponsored threat actors use to spread malware. Since then, there has been a rise in malicious npm packages that can be easily attributed to the Lazarus Group. In 2024, [Veracode wrote](#) about npm packages downloading a second stage that would remove all proof of malicious code. Throughout 2025, [Socket researchers detailed](#) npm packages that were all part of a campaign connected with Lazarus.

In this campaign, attribution to Lazarus Group was based on the similarity with the techniques used in their previous campaigns. Those include:

- Fake interviews as the approach vector
- Malicious coding tasks as the initial infection vector
- Blockchain and cryptotrading related targets
- Multistaged malware with several encryption layers
- Patience in publishing malicious versions with weeks passing between publication of the initial version of a package and the first malicious version
- Token-protected command and control (C2) communication
- GMT+9 timestamps (North Korea's time zone) for git commits conducted by threat actors

A screenshot of a Git commit history or log, showing timestamps in GMT+9. The content is mostly blank, suggesting the image was not rendered correctly or the data is obscured.

Figure 9. Git commits with GMT+9 timezone timestamps

Sophistication is a mark of state-sponsored threat actors

Evidence suggests that this is a highly sophisticated campaign. Its modularity, long-lived nature, patience in building trust across different campaign elements, and the complexity of the multilayered and encrypted malware point to the work of a state-sponsored threat actor.

Fake interviews as the initial contact vector, as well as a cryptocurrency-focused story and malware, together with other techniques mentioned in this blog post, point to North Korea's Lazarus Group. This is likely the most prominent threat actor targeting popular open-source package repositories. Their footprint is continuously present in these ecosystems, and new malicious packages will certainly continue to appear for an extended period of time.

The modular approach in this campaign makes it easy for the threat actor to design frontend campaigns without the need to change backend services responsible for serving malicious payloads. A direct connection between “*graph*” named packages in npm and PyPI repositories, and the *veltrix-capital*/themed job offerings is clear.

At the same time, we still haven’t discovered the “frontend” campaign for “*big*” named packages nor for the freshly discovered VBS version of the final RAT payload. All these facts lead to a conclusion that this is an ongoing campaign and there are no signs of stopping.

See the [RL research team's deeper analysis of the graphalgo campaign](#) for technical details about malicious npm and PyPI packages related to this campaign — and ways to protect your organization from this and similar attacks.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) refer to forensic artifacts or evidence related to a security breach or unauthorized activity on a computer network or system. IoCs play a crucial role in cybersecurity investigations and cyber incident response efforts, helping analysts and cybersecurity professionals identify and detect potential security incidents.

The following IoCs were collected as part of RL's investigation of the *graphalgo* software supply chain campaign.

Network indicators:

codepool[.]cloud

aurevian[.]cloud

Final RAT payloads:

File type	SHA1
Python	052c278f727292d779e9cf2465c9065a55b49546
JavaScript	e5af589fcd2bfb7093dd10274161a3c0de42057f
VBS	dbb4031e9bb8f8821a5758a6c308932b88599f18

Package indicators:

package_name	version	sha1	repository
graphalgo	2.2.5-pre	a9c1d537ae937580a51293008d78dd507355ee0c	npm
graphalgo	2.2.6	492c45688dc1e568d01693c724d3ef562a95680a	npm
graphalgo	2.2.7	43d2a634a90e168ccadac47f50769a2a6a98416e	npm
graphalgo	2.2.8	2283aefe0d59b37af0ce86465b0e770d0ffc364b	npm
graphalgo	2.2.9	ff388fd9a3e85af541949f2087bf09e276a3d75f	npm
graphalgo	2.2.10	8b425247a84d9e506952e2c913393c9ecdab399f	npm
graphalgo	2.2.11	b55921f502ec6839b08545a582a4291eaf3d902c	npm
graphorithm	2.2.6	784b3cda328a49bc6ba5d20be03d7bd76db41917	npm
graphorithm	2.2.7	5f71af195874a7a582c523fe020c0ed183d9b083	npm
graphorithm	2.2.8	b1d6b677917221673dc7e419c535600c129931fb	npm
graphorithm	2.2.9	70db64caa7070b5a2abaf842fa663586525de644	npm
graphstruct	2.2.6	3e14c0ca61c51b399c6a3426c77a3376c33afc69	npm
graphstruct	2.2.7	c7141b43dd62c712cc625cd5e9f27ea6fd34955d	npm
graphstruct	2.2.8	ed4e8c98a71e9763d23d0275f17ad2712c327944	npm
graphlibcore	2.2.6	254ef870c2e48a15ffc577a6bc9a3de7c68099ce	npm
graphlibcore	2.2.7	9b9ec71e1aae94a29487e9936985f71ce18010f9	npm

graphlibcore	2.2.8	2dcd9901fa0743f8dc35597c2d027a5ef6804c2f	npm
graphlibcore	2.2.9	e1cb6f690371fa76f3d062a80054e18d6b02461e	npm
graphlibcore	2.2.10	29f31fac84020d647af1961547638b6be51651aa	npm
graphlibcore	2.2.11	89b41008256e7684ba798e0edb27619e7c35c4d7	npm
netstruct	2.1.6	78a2db508108506ad453a2298117237702df10a8	npm
netstruct	2.1.8	20eaf2e2913ba6017446e16df1f3f1b9ea69e721	npm
graphnetworkx	2.1.6	033555f315d1ce6e63eda1e6e6821d481d163865	npm
graphnetworkx	2.1.7	1d3d040f3cc2bd4de04f906d4f84d891c4125913	npm
graphnetworkx	2.1.8	e4551317d305111fa15081ddbbf5ab6aa744d84c	npm
graphnetworkx	2.1.9	96080e0159c455e3de443526b880a774e9cabbb2	npm
graphnetworkx	2.1.10	834cbb4671d038261c609f2de3312025f773bd4d	npm
graphnetworkx	2.1.11	5af8efdd7a95161e6e5996d95778cf79064fb069	npm
terminalcolor256	2.0.2	a574ae8b6904cc1c9cafb26e1ccf5e87e6261ad6	npm
terminalcolor256	2.0.3	be2d5cf002a3e0d3414081c5c6b1840962ab9a10	npm
terminalcolor256	2.0.4	6caaa280c6280843fd14f63b4b2bc6fc5fa900f3	npm
terminalcolor256	2.0.5	12198337384feec6a71260fddde961b5f30e64a2	npm
terminalcolor256	2.0.6	44cd449ab5d35668ac6f5bb71f9f90d6469e976f	npm
terminalcolor256	2.0.7	10b958180dc3f9e3cce02a8fab86cb5099746ce4	npm

terminalcolor256	2.0.8	ea0b470b55f57dd8d2359894ad9143093a46e3e4	npm
terminalcolor256	2.0.9	8435d36e2e410a003b6d5568b192c0e153f06ea9	npm
terminalcolor256	2.1.0	60100d8d7f7dd0cf53088d38a08b2772a5d6e9e7	npm
terminalcolor256	2.1.1	ca29de9683e093e2930bf1b3138b9fbace8862e5	npm
terminalcolor256	2.1.2	d9648b415ddb8f45fad1f129a64960f49aa6e42b	npm
terminalcolor256	2.1.3	6bb7e15c199604907d561382ef193421db09e7e8	npm
terminalcolor256	2.1.4	45ca547179f02b6c5c9e2d4bc08add1bead67cf5	npm
terminalcolor256	2.1.5	2a9bf45acbcead76a54dd2f655949ea67dd09f7f	npm
terminalcolor256	2.2.0	664af994c85d23468f6efd891026f69e27def1fa	npm
terminalcolor256	2.2.1	8a6c7cbff4f66b61862c66c6c1394dc550c54f95	npm
terminalcolor256	2.2.2	9622181de887925f692bf51ba69bc6b6694ecc6f	npm
terminalcolor256	2.2.3	249ad4622d3046892f819cd0094c056694dcef57	npm
terminalcolor256	2.2.4	7d0a69b61b590c4615ab9096e2e4f48478a68312	npm
terminalcolor256	2.2.5	1f4f73d8b599a6e4176149b69500b30b3396b201	npm
terminalcolor256	2.2.6	b125f586dae2c664147c4499d7d5c3d43c2678c8	npm
graphkitx	2.0.0	86dc6c1cc0c33086d5749883a17bed24e9fa0010	npm
graphkitx	2.1.0	f40725fc376828fa099414166a097f179e6cb62b	npm
graphchain	0.0.1	5cb58fe4a9053d8ecdd90a254344b0cc73f6a778	npm

graphflux	0.0.1	0bb0148df7c183be5322ed0529182a06a2ca5cf3	npm
graphflux	0.0.1-beta	167b9822840628479524a35424ec2429ba3595cb	npm
graphflux	0.0.2	269ec49a563433993cd216ef5ddddd0f923de97b7	npm
graphflux	0.0.3	6216e9a70d00d33f1dfc437a51d98dba1f012801	npm
graphflux	0.0.4	83021cfead0849a738ea557588647be634039b01	npm
graphflux	0.0.5	29ce03eb28cc848e15e5ad9919ce4c263a2cbfd0	npm
graphflux	0.0.6	be756aaaf4135c7ec500d14c45a284cb6e8765c9	npm
graphflux	0.0.7	03609909b138f75bec5b52732eb512118cc68cda	npm
graphflux	0.0.8	6ebf66318f9fdcd4be42fc73218674128e69df58	npm
graphflux	0.0.9	dac7f0061abde4d0e517d044d3360d4e6dde2418	npm
graphorbit	0.0.1	7fe51338c41c875bf7bb7d96dfa6e8443314a9b7	npm
graphorbit	0.0.2	a8dfbdb54252af72d8c3898656d49f542bbf4407	npm
graphnet	0.0.1	0be039e3391b2904d6d015b4974939d32c109605	npm
graphnet	0.0.2	73e4903608da9e3f730ee35ffd07d561d0ca35cb	npm
graphnet	0.0.3	426a964a533de9fe7b9d033582770e167961f5bc	npm
graphnet	0.0.4	6abff4b4fe8701bd7e0013fcb12fea373ca8b0b9	npm
graphnet	0.0.5	bdf9b400e2935947c30fc1e5b79352129969dbf7	npm
graphnet	0.0.6	f0e406f821ffccb0eb56d7c6a9b62267eb9c21f6	npm

graphnet	0.0.7	901c3a0b449322c030d8a6efc6c1332036a414c9	npm
graphnet	0.0.8	e131392b3897ef6ccfb54770fd2e47811681610a	npm
graphhub	0.0.1	3fce78c9a7ba3e113404b2b9ae32c36eda5001e3	npm
graphhub	0.0.2	e00defa7cbdd9d79ccb6e33caa9f9b0c704a0dbd	npm
terminal-kleur	1.0.0	4d7e20f1b1421db366ae9b95d678e474e3d2238a	npm
terminal-kleur	1.5.0	20a7e464276f4e1a5338230522a446ca7ffba486	npm
terminal-kleur	1.6.0	70f1aaf238548a666423458f225d98dff74386da	npm
graphrix	0.0.1	f1668ee99e6f7a5a7aa4577c9298f8efb154653e	npm
bignumx	1.0.0	c2f1f955059e30313f0738e98845d039ca3d7937	npm
bignumberx	1.0.0	1c11118bbbe0944c99c6130154aae7a49183ab96	npm
bignumex	1.0.0	759e78b8b7392686021881951d9329144d7da998	npm
bignumex	1.0.1	ff683cdbbcdfdbd18f4d8f99e62c202add282e216	npm
bigmathex	1.0.0	d1ad29b721ee4ed29ce2bf7fe0be84d32d57924	npm
bigmathex	1.0.1	b5f43299a66f6f8c8200bbde1b690a1ab8a5ef75	npm
bigmathex	1.0.2	f33dc1bfbece7ada203e00477ca029baaaa6f61d	npm
bigmathlib	1.0.0	d228a43e5b158532b5ffd2f526b34b2ee6024de8	npm
bigmathlib	1.0.1	5200922519c6813561653d363483eb4384579d16	npm
bigmathlib	1.0.2	b21a4affb019afd4eb05bcb5428798ea623bb75c	npm

bigmathutils	1.0.0	1c3fdc5fe2ca46db9d27b4aa25e3a7684af5bfc0	npm
bigmathutils	1.1.0	296461bd731f418b8df36f109c30de0bd4aed573	npm
graphlink	2.2.7	e9740a495371fae13f997786089ab941cd5633dd	npm
bigmathix	1.0.0	0b30a1b7f0a2d23eac10e844ef489e7e1117a867	npm
bigmathix	1.0.1	96447faded23c699025d03406063ac2f425a1bc2	npm
bigmathix	1.0.2	f1bb514e2ef6bc4a1d11637cb92c08161520183f	npm
bigmathix	1.0.3	c3c225bd5e5d0d53bdc403f8da183c63e7a16b7e	npm
bigmathix	1.0.4	ec7a06d3184c5c0265cf2e9c2f2a7d3eaa91fffe	npm
bigmathix	1.0.5	0365f525ea5618d9564c30671b18e9bf3b917e1c	npm
bigmathix	1.0.6	47cc6b384cab1c0499ff525a8c4fcf9113beecf0	npm
bigmathix	1.0.7	00c3c60aea42bc85ab4166caf00a9da9dfcd31ad	npm
bigmathix	1.0.8	915131dccbc1234c6560952385185f07de1b3929	npm
bigmathix	1.0.9	2e06ddc88ef4a3583df2e30078b4f05723e23f51	npm
bigmathix	1.1.0	ce41fc66abc67957cbe8828b439f31c1f1227b35	npm
graphflowx	1.0.0	18f60badb67c98b4ef70f07aff2b3d579cf1e68f	npm
graphflowx	1.0.1	7ee57e51d157c9aabe1afc59855e90401fd0e2a7	npm
graphflowx	1.0.2	20c4e927e172a60799c47f71cfaf6b5e82faba64	npm
graphflowx	1.0.3	c379c40dedb6a54437786572284c249031690249	npm

graphalgo	3.5.1rc0.dev0	a98c0377f80f04a3a7cf044d5abe515654520183	PyPI
graphalgo	3.5.1rc0.dev0	6230fc3006ecda4899bb9621ef2cf95b78f54a0a	PyPI
graphalgo	3.5.2	a8df8cb07bac3c2f6434a21beb58e45f73ab66b2	PyPI
graphalgo	3.5.2	142268facd71d20feabea97f8867cb505306e26d	PyPI
graphalgo	3.5.3	cd332731273e93769cc28dde5a02814c027e1b77	PyPI
graphalgo	3.5.3	091de0f6c0a7d4713c83819a538a553ad2e3bb73	PyPI
graphalgo	3.5.5	3fbea692a0c549dc711e9ad2aa016fad6fea68e5	PyPI
graphalgo	3.5.5	756a14ca3baf5ccfc18b2316d52d7fe98e31dfef	PyPI
graphalgo	3.5.6	4dab7e9201a431495b3babb165b0e5362287b178	PyPI
graphalgo	3.5.6	d15ea1735d6b057884faaa90afa46c8ee0be5927	PyPI
graphex	3.5.7	763907bf89983b36d2161153d91c7f313822bec8	PyPI
graphex	3.5.7	ab827c68d4be6002385b9008fc89eef4e04c6912	PyPI
graphex	3.5.8	99fa440b658412b5c2685c6df90cb0d3c4eb84a8	PyPI
graphex	3.5.8	3fe294dafca9a86961d2f426b76f327521e55c40	PyPI
graphex	3.5.9	3337794382593be3a8f324621406df073b85a170	PyPI
graphex	3.5.9	134dfb95bd64b371b66b34b8f30ad2181938244d	PyPI
graphex	3.5.10	06b9793ebe4805807f05b2f49a4b2f8161047f97	PyPI
graphex	3.5.10	73951e3d352491ef40473df055b5c8b9cc2b1820	PyPI

graphlibx	3.5.10	b899f364e788501bb4286ff379d5d155599fb35d	PyPI
graphlibx	3.5.10	cd4884dc181a011c75405940172a994b7923daba	PyPI
graphlibx	3.5.11	4afc0cf7b41b40f4bf228b49d3ad5638146b3743	PyPI
graphlibx	3.5.11	46cbc3e9426f83bcc6a6e5d1c86839fe8436150c	PyPI
graphlibx	3.5.12	d3ff122a9cf8e34d29dc2859ead08d3db62b5687	PyPI
graphlibx	3.5.12	c118c35a8a5a1160ca1cb1b16a7f62da5c32b8c8	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.0	b32c00c384160bbc18b8dde2299005639a48c18d	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.0	742d5f027889b9686614b0e24e9eb60ef4cd5f78	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.2	6e31ceb63acb46902deb20009a8bb6142de882cf	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.2	ca9196dd69b93c07126654024c19da991302ed71	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.6	8dd57b1364d3364cf17c5219a759a2f1787f666c	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.6	28f34f5b52b0c307c30a6721bb137eced2e167e9	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.8	6dd72228c3f29ec28c030f739c2ffd822ea99388	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.8	3c0e265ac38c2d75d75f41a3334148d486234063	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.10	bb4e1cea60199c26620715103f4019030fea3792	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.10	efefa0438f2a01121fb6fab0b04978f6631ed87f	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.11	c25bebd17ed164dd39e0d47dd5228dff6c9c3ff9	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.11	e44b02e1bcad6493a925181cb5ccc9f3a64ebc31	PyPI

graphdict	3.4.12	75b4f29b7b797841dd1132611f248d826ae7bf56	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.12	7acf1e9d52630a89b38133be149f95af8a8b810b	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.13	a64961f4d1394cad5f2a3c0ccdb7d46f9bc6142c	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.13	b384f23953f4f621e3e9bd1d742edd6ddf9cf4c1	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.14	2478ecadb46d4d18706c68b1a4a6a493d8eff51c	PyPI
graphdict	3.4.14	e58a77ecfaa1e0a481581ec6831874d655976203	PyPI
graphflux	3.4.1	4342a8d6fcb01534d7b9fc653535772effab03b7	PyPI
graphflux	3.4.1	8baaf0694234a06cce73ccc0910f63dd513329e4	PyPI
graphflux	3.4.2	b31f2162e886683b65b017e1d1a841bd4f10cc11	PyPI
graphflux	3.4.2	6dfc750fb1c30cbbcbd935bb140ac44982d3961b	PyPI
graphnode	1.0.0	86c55cc76b918dec25dcb0db4746a3cc58ca8f5a	PyPI
graphnode	1.0.0	66abee65f46121b5551fcf103961a8828d2f4395	PyPI
graphnode	1.0.1	5c01ed7a8d4686603db797b817ee949d871138cd	PyPI
graphnode	1.0.1	16aa31d991b25a5e498d7101ef9891b211ecafbf	PyPI
graphnode	1.1.0	a4c824afbb4584e4640d0f03fa9d2370f84cfe66	PyPI
graphnode	1.1.0	53f8e29944bf36be007061380e3f4ddb1f2e379b	PyPI
graphsyc	1.1.0	ef332b55ed0083373097bd0862b487f384d88d17	PyPI
graphsyc	1.1.0	557b02cc261ad4655cc7cd9efccb180340dd287e	PyPI

graphsyc	1.1.1	1988d1afd33f98d9a0a87c082fde2c59083f3759	PyPI
graphsyc	1.1.1	40ba273eb7495f97ba813ea903834495a47a91d6	PyPI
bigpyx	0.0.1	c450613503334e4f21bd5ca374c86031ab3ff79b	PyPI
bigpyx	0.0.1	63100569f6bb327c5785cdb8d9e6d8b2de992fb3	PyPI
bigpyx	0.0.2	d4e162311ad2adbc67045598bf0731473d44105b	PyPI
bigpyx	0.0.2	4b6be3b4a2747be35eb065ef4dc6f57c60180a01	PyPI
bignum	0.1.0	d5656ca2ab4a7c0d5f367c2d35a3e680c48d7c95	PyPI
bignum	0.1.0	86f1839df0be17d4d156f69df16eaf5944a29da4	PyPI
bignum	0.1.1	928b2144dc1d485338fc748ab280a5deee9dcf21	PyPI
bignum	0.1.1	2becc8dfd662ac79994c1cac59914f2c00be7a30	PyPI
bignum	0.1.2	b3a5f72296ec2bf18b29699544f4234d6113941c	PyPI
bignum	0.1.2	8ff23154805c304a9863cffc61b1453ddf9ee721	PyPI
bignum	0.1.3	43fb82b3881dd0fef4b89e55cf6f0a43e1939ac5	PyPI
bignum	0.1.3	3211392eb14e624fbc11a3b6e42da99950a1f78e	PyPI
bigmathex	0.0.1	cf8a3a18a719512d833c33973c1862eda56aa2b8	PyPI
bigmathex	0.0.1	2b2d02bdb2f5a5f36452de13f0880b213f53e0c9	PyPI
bigmathex	0.0.2	8e2ca8ce68cdcc15463a6a96c83da6e394492141	PyPI
bigmathex	0.0.2	3fa294c4314d25cd341a600ac24f5d6f708c4a38	PyPI

bigmathex	0.0.3	61fcf59a6650f7a2a273cc0457a8ce6786f83ea2	PyPI
bigmathex	0.0.3	cffcb81564f598b9cb55bb8430399497ea366da1	PyPI
bigmathix	0.0.1	65cde10d69ce708919fa68e03b6dccc9e583dbe6	PyPI
bigmathix	0.0.1	b5d8bb1d4a14c85b9996f05b602c36ef2c508a3b	PyPI
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bigmathix	1.0.1	1beb37c7d100e5a8fede590a2aeb08cda237b3e2	PyPI
bigmathix	1.0.1	09ff80412f707fecc242b18ac232b18e93dbab27	PyPI
bigmathutils	0.0.1	29d7e8ec66426b7e63f83ce301092bd01944738b	PyPI
bigmathutils	0.0.1	6cdd085286b941f8e2bfda641b3be527e18360c0	PyPI
bigmathutils	0.0.2	3c3ab1b60e37ec60fc620b14e8a16bd2f8b457b0	PyPI
bigmathutils	0.0.2	68ba7ef842fa586cea851b0c5c8acbeaaec5a871	PyPI
bigmathutils	0.0.3	7067522a2c34d2e91c7ffb8dc59def269b24c1dd	PyPI
bigmathutils	0.0.3	26ab088510f0e3fad1280d2d4d6934268a7dd4d1	PyPI

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