

# Exposing the Deceit: Phishing Sites Impersonating Government Entities

[labs.k7computing.com/index.php/exposing-the-deceit-phishing-sites-impersonating-government-entities/](https://labs.k7computing.com/index.php/exposing-the-deceit-phishing-sites-impersonating-government-entities/)

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Threat actors impersonating a Government entity, and using their fake authority and trustworthiness to coerce the victims to divulge their personal or banking details through a Phishing page or an App or a direct voice call is a well-known trend. In India, “Digital Arrest” is the new fad in this trend, and our government is actively working to educate citizens on how to protect themselves.

A particularly alarming aspect of this is when the targets are employees of government institutions and agencies. There have been several instances of advanced persistent threats (APTs) and external parties targeting military personnel, research institutes, and even educational institutions. This targeting is sometimes long-drawn and reuses the tools, framework, and other infra. In this blog, we will present two recent examples of such attacks in which the threat actors masquerade as Government and Judicial entities. We recently came across a tweet, in which was mentioned a few fake Indian government sites.



Figure 1: The tweet

Let's take a look at the domain “**spcourt-in[.]com**.” This phishing site is designed to closely resemble the official website of the Supreme Court of India. This fake site collects PII (Personally Identifiable Information), bank account details, etc.

The major difference between the fake and the original site is the presence of those three logos at the bottom right, where the site harvests user data.



Figure 2: Phishing site posing as The Supreme Court of India website

On the bottom right part of the page, three clickable icons appear to represent official organizations, including the “Central Bureau of Investigation,” “Reserve Bank of India,” and “Supreme Court of India,” just to provide some ‘fake’ authenticity to their site.




Figure 3: The Original site

Clicking on the CBI logo (the first logo) takes the user to a page where they are prompted to enter details, such as their Aadhar number.

[Home](#) > [Case Number](#)

## Case Number



Dairy Number





Case Number

All fields marked with \* are required

Case Number \* --

Aadhaar Number \*

Please Enter the Captcha \*   




  
  


Figure 4: Collecting Aadhar

Clicking on the RBI logo (the second logo) leads the user to a page where they are asked to verify personal information. During this process, the site collects details such as date of birth, Aadhaar number, contact information, and bank account details (including passwords). At a later point in this blog, we will discuss what happens to the data that is being collected via these forms.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://spcourt-i...>. The page header includes the text 'भारत का सर्वोच्च न्यायालय' and 'SUPREME COURT OF INDIA', along with a 'SKIP TO MAIN CONTENT' link and a language selector set to 'English'. The main header features the Supreme Court of India logo, the motto 'योगो धर्मस्ततो जयः', and a 'GO TO OLD WEBSITE' link. The navigation menu includes links for Home, About Us, Judges, Collegium Resolutions, e-Services, Media, Advocates, Court Filings, Notices, and Publications.

The breadcrumb trail indicates the current location: Home > Verify Personal Information. The section title is 'Verify Personal Information'.

Below the title, there are two tabs: 'Dairy Number' (selected) and 'Case Number'. The form area contains the following fields:

- Suspect Name \***: Text input field with placeholder 'Suspect Name'.
- Aadhaar Number \***: Text input field with placeholder 'Aadhaar number'.
- Phone \***: Text input field with placeholder 'Contact Number'.
- Date Of Birth \***: Date selection field with placeholder 'Select Date'.
- Bank \***: A group of fields including 'Bank Name', 'Bank Account Number', 'User Name', and 'Password'.
- Card \***: Text input fields for 'Debit card number' and 'ATM Pin'.
- Captcha \***: A CAPTCHA image showing the number '869074' and a text input field for 'Enter Captcha code'.

On the right side of the form, there are three vertical logos: the Supreme Court of India emblem, the State Emblem of India, and the National Emblem of India. A note at the top right of the form states: 'All fields marked with \* are required'.

Figure 5: Collecting Personal & Bank Details

## Detailed Analysis on Spcourt-in[.]com

The IP address of the phishing site is "64.31.22.34" was registered on 27-01-2025 and has validity for a year. The website is hosted on servers provided by **Hosterpk[.]com**, a web hosting company based out of **Pakistan**. This information further suggests that the site is likely to be managed from outside India.




Figure 6: IP-details-I

```

Domain Name: SPCOURT-IN.COM
Registry Domain ID: 2954178573_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.matbao.net
Registrar URL: http://www.matbao.net
Updated Date: 2025-01-27T15:55:30Z
Creation Date: 2025-01-27T15:55:30Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2026-01-27T15:55:30Z
Registrar: MAT BAO CORPORATION
Registrar IANA ID: 1586
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@matbao.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +84-36229999 - 8899
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Name Server: DNS1.HOSTERPK.COM
Name Server: DNS2.HOSTERPK.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
  
```

Figure 7: IP-details-II

## TLS details

The certificate is issued by the organization “**Let’s Encrypt**”. While Let’s Encrypt is known for providing free SSL certificates to secure websites, its use here indicates that the attacker is attempting to give the phishing site a legitimate and secure appearance, which could give a false sense of security to users into trusting this site with their PII.




Figure 8: Certificate Details

The below image shows a list of PHP scripts used for processing the collected data.



https://spcourt-in.com/backend/api/

## Index of /backend/api/

Filter Name

Name	Last Modified	Size
Parent Directory		
delete_user_case.php	2024-06-03 13:56	2k
error_log	2025-01-21 04:50	1k
get_all_personal_information.php	2024-06-01 14:18	2k
get_all_user_case.php	2024-06-03 10:58	2k
get_personal_information.php	2024-06-01 14:18	2k
get_user_case.php	2024-06-02 10:32	2k
insert_user_case.php	2024-06-03 06:51	2k
login.php	2024-06-01 14:22	2k
update_user_case.php	2024-06-03 11:15	3k
verify_personal_information.php	2024-06-02 10:33	2k

Figure 9: backend/api found on the Phishing site

The forms on the site collecting the personal data and bank details are processed through the “get\_all\_Personal\_information.php” and the data submitted are stored in JSON format.

https://spcourt-in.com/backend/api/get\_all\_personal\_information.php

Pretty-print

```
[{"personal_information":{"id":"2","suspect_name":"test","id_card_number":"test","phone":"test","dob":"2025-01-20"},"bank_details":{"id":"2","personal_information_id":"2","bank_name":"test","account_number":"test","username":"test","password":"test"},"card_details":{"id":"2","personal_information_id":"2","card_number":"test","pin":"test"}}, {"personal_information":{"id":"3","suspect_name":"uyrter","id_card_number":"874532145214","phone":"8796541236","dob":"1996-04-18"},"bank_details":{"id":"3","personal_information_id":"3","bank_name":"IDFC","account_number":"632541789","username":"mohan","password":"utrerter"},"card_details":{"id":"3","personal_information_id":"3","card_number":"8745214536987451","pin":"9614"}}, {"personal_information":{"id":"4","suspect_name":"uyrter","id_card_number":"784521654785","phone":"8796541236","dob":"1996-04-18"},"bank_details":{"id":"4","personal_information_id":"4","bank_name":"IDFC","account_number":"874512541","username":"mohan","password":"uterter"},"card_details":{"id":"4","personal_information_id":"4","card_number":"8745214536987451","pin":"9614"}}, {"personal_information":{"id":"5","suspect_name":"uyrter","id_card_number":"784521654785","phone":"8796541236","dob":"1996-04-18"},"bank_details":{"id":"5","personal_information_id":"5","bank_name":"IDFC","account_number":"745125412","username":"mohan","password":"uterter"},"card_details":{"id":"5","personal_information_id":"5","card_number":"8745214536987451","pin":"9614"}}, {"personal_information":{"id":"6","suspect_name":"222","id_card_number":"333","phone":"666","dob":"2025-02-05"},"bank_details":{"id":"6","personal_information_id":"6","bank_name":"sdf","account_number":"sdf","username":"sdf","password":"sdf"},"card_details":{"id":"6","personal_information_id":"6","card_number":"222","pin":"111"}}, {"personal_information":{"id":"7","suspect_name":"asda","id_card_number":"asdas","phone":"3333","dob":"2025-02-11"},"bank_details":{"id":"7","personal_information_id":"7","bank_name":"asd","account_number":"asd","username":"asd","password":"asd"},"card_details":{"id":"7","personal_information_id":"7","card_number":"asd","pin":"asd"}}]
```

Figure 10: Data we entered in the forms stored in PHP

This domain hosts several JavaScripts as shown below.



## Index of /assets/

js

Name	Last Modified	Size
Parent Directory		
DailyMotion-0wvppTZZ.js	2025-01-29 06:22	3k
DailyMotion-C0_-RkA5.js	2025-01-29 06:22	3k
DailyMotion-NcPZFI7f.js	2025-01-29 06:22	3k
Facebook-CofMc-fR.js	2025-01-29 06:22	4k
Facebook-DDPJdQ24.js	2025-01-29 06:22	4k
Facebook-zoVbFxtR.js	2025-01-29 06:22	4k
FilePlayer-B1y-UmMT.js	2025-01-29 06:22	9k
FilePlayer-BIXK9qPu.js	2025-01-29 06:22	9k
FilePlayer-C4hbqEHo.js	2025-01-29 06:22	9k
html2canvas.esm-CBrSDip1.js	2025-01-29 06:22	198k
index-B6uxDcEV.js	2025-01-29 06:22	750k
index-BtwgnbmO.js	2025-01-29 06:22	1102k
index-lyfvuEvc.js	2025-01-29 06:22	1067k

Figure 11: JavaScripts present in the site

We also checked for signs of any IP abuse and discovered that the IP address associated with the Phishing site had been involved in a **WordPress brute force attack**.

### IP Abuse Reports for 64.31.22.34:

This IP address has been reported a total of **121** times from 55 distinct sources. 64.31.22.34 was first reported on September 28th 2023, and the most recent report was **2 days ago**.



**Recent Reports:** We have received reports of abusive activity from this IP address within the last week. It is potentially still actively engaged in abusive activities.

Reporter	IoA Timestamp in UTC	Comment	Categories
✓ <a href="#">maxxsense</a>	2025-02-07 13:59:25 (3 days ago)	(wordpress) Failed wordpress login from 64.31.22.34 (US/United States/s21.hosterpk.com)	<a href="#">Brute-Force</a>
✓ <a href="#">LRob.fr</a>	2025-02-07 10:45:28 (3 days ago)	WordPress login brute-force detected by Fail2Ban in pl esk-wordpress jail	<a href="#">Brute-Force</a> <a href="#">Web App Attack</a>
✓ <a href="#">MAGIC</a>	2025-02-07 10:09:58 (3 days ago)	VM1 Bad user agents ignoring web crawling rules. Draining bandwidth	<a href="#">DDoS Attack</a> <a href="#">Bad Web Bot</a>
✓ <a href="#">LRob.fr</a>	2025-02-05 22:00:15 (4 days ago)	WordPress login brute-force detected by Fail2Ban in pl esk-wordpress jail	<a href="#">Brute-Force</a> <a href="#">Web App Attack</a>
✓ <a href="#">LRob.fr</a>	2025-02-04 16:45:07 (5 days ago)	WordPress login brute-force detected by Fail2Ban in pl esk-wordpress jail	<a href="#">Brute-Force</a> <a href="#">Web App Attack</a>
✓ <a href="#">Joey_B</a>	2025-02-04 13:26:00 (6 days ago)	wp-login attack	<a href="#">Web App Attack</a>
✓ Anonymous	2025-02-04 08:50:25 (6 days ago)	Trawling for Open Source CMS installs	<a href="#">Hacking</a> <a href="#">Brute-Force</a>

Figure 12: Abuse Reports from the IP

There is also a history of **Lumma Stealer** being hosted on this site at an earlier point in time.

Firstseen (UTC)	IP address	Hostname	SBL	ASN	Country	Active?
2024-01-25 09:01:12	64.31.22.34	s21.hosterpk.com	Not listed	<a href="#">AS46475</a> LIMESTONENETWORKS	US	yes

## Malware URLs

🔗 URLs

⚙️ Payloads

The table below shows all malware URLs that are associated with this particular host.


Dateadded (UTC)	URL	Status	Tags	Reporter
2024-01-25 09:01:12	<a href="http://ftsolutions.com.pk/v1220-55000.exe">http://ftsolutions.com.pk/v1220-55000.exe</a>	Offline	dropped-by-SmokeLoader LummaStealer	 Casperinious

Figure 13: Malware history for the IP

While performing a reverse IP lookup for the address **64.31.22.34**, we discovered that another domain, **supremecourt-india[.]com**, was also hosted on the same server. This further suggests that multiple phishing sites may be operating from the same infrastructure, potentially targeting users by impersonating government entities in an attempt to harvest user data.

<a href="https://viewdns.info/reverseip/?host=64.31.22.34&amp;t=1">https://viewdns.info/reverseip/?host=64.31.22.34&amp;t=1</a>		
reliancehealthcareind.com	2024-11-13	
supremecourt-india.com	2025-01-15	
spcourt-in.com	2025-02-05	

Figure 14: Reverse IP Results

By searching with the filter for the website title “**The Supreme Court of India | India**” and specifying that the hosting country is not India, we obtained several results showing fake sites, some of which were already on the block list as shown in Fig 16. From these findings, it’s clear that these Phishing sites have been active for quite some time, indicating a prolonged campaign. However, the exact **modus operandi** of the attacker remains unclear. Specifically, it is unknown how the attacker plans to approach users and convince them to divulge their PII on these fraudulent sites.

No	Host/Fid	IP	Country/Region	Lastupdate time
1	47.76.72.16	47.76.72.16	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2025-02-06
2			United States of America / Washington / Seattle	2025-02-05
3			United States of America / Washington / Seattle	2025-02-05
4	scigo.in	104.21.2.142	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2025-01-20
5	https://scigo.in	172.67.129.75	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2025-01-20
6	lx-yindu.top	172.67.128.179	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2024-12-22
7	scigov.cn	47.76.72.16	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-12-21
8	judicialsearch.in	104.21.66.49	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2024-12-21
9	https://judicialsearchi...	104.21.66.49	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2024-12-21
10	https://lx-yindu.top	172.67.128.179	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2024-12-21
11	https://scicbi.com	172.67.144.33	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2024-11-20
12	scicbi.com	104.21.55.23	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2024-11-20
13	https://www.scigov.cn	163.181.228.188	Singapore / Singapore / Singapore	2024-09-23
14	www.scigov.cn	163.181.228.188	Singapore / Singapore / Singapore	2024-09-23
15	https://laoy-ajab.top	104.21.39.49	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2024-09-17
16	laoy-ajab.top	172.67.143.56	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2024-09-17
17	https://www.incourtsci...	45.115.39.69	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-09-14
18	www.incourtsci.com	45.115.39.69	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-09-14
19	www1.scigov.cn	47.76.72.16	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-09-13
20	scigov.online	47.76.72.16	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-09-12
21	www1.scigov.online	47.76.72.16	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-09-08
22	https://incourtgov.com	43.228.125.28	Singapore / Singapore / Singapore	2024-09-01
23	www.incourtgov.com	43.228.125.28	Singapore / Singapore / Singapore	2024-09-01
24	https://www.incourtg...	43.228.125.28	Singapore / Singapore / Singapore	2024-09-01
25	incourtgov.com	43.228.125.28	Singapore / Singapore / Singapore	2024-09-01

Figure 15: FOFA result for the website title




Figure 16: Screenshots of Supreme Court impersonating sites

Now let's examine the second site mentioned in the tweet, which is **"email[.]gov[.]in[.]defenceindia[.]link"**. This also is a phishing domain impersonating an official Indian government site.





Figure 17: Phishing site




Figure 18: Original Site

Of late, many impersonators of “email.gov.in” have been seen in the wild, searching on **Malware Bazaar**, we can see tags like Malware and RATs associated with them, all linked to **SideCopy**, a well-known APT operating out of Pakistan.

Date (UTC)	IOC	Malware	Tags	Reporter
2025-02-10 18:01:00	<a href="#">b5a2949defda9a282aa307580118f9...</a>	Unknown malware	APT SideCopy	abuse_ch
2025-02-10 18:01:00	<a href="#">cc90bf946b495aec9133f6c970dc873...</a>	Unknown malware	APT SideCopy	abuse_ch
2025-01-23 19:45:46	<a href="#">drjagrutichavan.com</a>	Unknown malware	APT SideCopy	abuse_ch
2025-01-21 19:46:50	<a href="#">https://www.email.gov.in/ministryofd...</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:50	<a href="#">https://www.email.gov.in/indiandefe...</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:50	<a href="#">https://www.email.gov.in/indiandefe...</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:50	<a href="#">https://www.email.gov.in/indiagov.ws</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:50	<a href="#">https://webmail.putir.shop</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:49	<a href="#">https://email.gov.in/ministryofdefenc...</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:49	<a href="#">https://email.gov.in/indiagov.ws</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:49	<a href="#">https://email.gov.in/indianarmy.ml</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:49	<a href="#">https://email.gov.in/indiandefence.link</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:49	<a href="#">https://email.gov.in/indiandefence.nl</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:49	<a href="#">https://email.gov.in/mailindia.one</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:49	<a href="#">https://mail.putir.shop</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:48	<a href="#">https://email.gov.in/briefreport.nl</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:48	<a href="#">https://b.putir.shop</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:48	<a href="#">https://a.putir.shop</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:21	<a href="#">indiandefence.link</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:21	<a href="#">putir.shop</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:21	<a href="#">indiandefence.nl</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:21	<a href="#">indianarmy.ml</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:21	<a href="#">indiagov.ws</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:21	<a href="#">govs.info</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:21	<a href="#">briefreport.nl</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-21 19:46:21	<a href="#">ail-govs.icu</a>	Unknown malware	SideCopy	juroots
2025-01-13 11:58:27	<a href="#">email.gov.in/ministryofdefenceindia.l...</a>	Crimson RAT	SideCopy	fibonacci3
2024-12-13 09:23:29	<a href="#">email.gov.in/mailindia.one</a>	Unknown malware	APT SideCopy	abuse_ch
2024-12-13 09:23:29	<a href="#">mailindia.one</a>	Unknown malware	APT SideCopy	abuse_ch

Figure 19: SideCopy IoCs

The data shown in the image below was obtained by applying the filter for the website title “Email Web Client Sign In” with the hosting country, not India.

No	Host/Fid	IP	Country/Region	Lastupdate time
1	▶ <a href="https://93.157.106.225">https://93.157.106.225</a> <span>T09...</span>	93.157.106.225	United States of America / Florida / Jacksonville	2025-02-12
2	▶ <a href="mailto:email-govs.icu">email-govs.icu</a> <span>mXF...</span>	172.67.130.208	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2025-02-08
3	▶ <a href="https://email-govs.icu">https://email-govs.icu</a> <span>mXF...</span>	172.67.130.208	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2025-02-08
4	▶ <a href="https://80.225.193.92">https://80.225.193.92</a> <span>xfcs...</span>	80.225.193.92	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2025-02-07
5	▶ <a href="https://80.225.193.92:8443">https://80.225.193.92:8443</a> <span>xfcs...</span>	80.225.193.92	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2025-02-05
6	▶ <a href="https://176.65.139.63">https://176.65.139.63</a> <span>T09...</span>	176.65.139.63	Germany / Rheinland-Pfalz / Erlenbach	2025-01-31
7	▶ <a href="https://www.email.gov.in.ministryofdefenceindia.link">https://www.email.gov.in.ministryofdefenceindia.link</a> <span>T09...</span>	45.202.35.172	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2025-01-14
8	▶ <a href="https://email.gov.in.ministryofdefenceindia.link">https://email.gov.in.ministryofdefenceindia.link</a> <span>T09...</span>	45.202.35.172	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2025-01-13
9	▶ <a href="https://ail-govs.icu">https://ail-govs.icu</a> <span>mXF...</span>	172.67.190.34	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2025-01-11
10	▶ <a href="https://ail-govs.icu">ail-govs.icu</a> <span>mXF...</span>	104.21.10.120	United States of America / California / San Francisco	2025-01-11
11	▶ <a href="https://email.gov.in.indiandefence.nl">https://email.gov.in.indiandefence.nl</a> <span>T09...</span>	45.202.35.172	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2025-01-11
12	▶ <a href="https://www.email.gov.in.indiandefence.nl">https://www.email.gov.in.indiandefence.nl</a> <span>T09...</span>	45.202.35.172	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2025-01-08
13	▶ <a href="https://www.email.gov.in.indiandefence.link">https://www.email.gov.in.indiandefence.link</a> <span>T09...</span>	45.202.35.172	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-12-25
14	▶ <a href="https://email.gov.in.indiandefence.link">https://email.gov.in.indiandefence.link</a> <span>T09...</span>	45.202.35.172	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-12-25
15	▶ <a href="https://45.202.35.172">https://45.202.35.172</a> <span>T09...</span>	45.202.35.172	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-12-24
16	▶ <a href="https://putir.shop">https://putir.shop</a> <span>T09...</span>	93.157.106.19	United States of America / Florida / Jacksonville	2024-12-21
17	▶ <a href="https://email.gov.in.indianarmy.mil">https://email.gov.in.indianarmy.mil</a> <span>T09...</span>	93.157.106.19	United States of America / Florida / Jacksonville	2024-12-21
18	▶ <a href="https://mail.putir.shop">https://mail.putir.shop</a> <span>T09...</span>	93.157.106.19	United States of America / Florida / Jacksonville	2024-12-21
19	▶ <a href="https://email.gov.in.mallindia.one">https://email.gov.in.mallindia.one</a> <span>T09...</span>	93.157.106.19	United States of America / Florida / Jacksonville	2024-12-21
20	▶ <a href="https://webmail.putir.shop">https://webmail.putir.shop</a> <span>T09...</span>	93.157.106.19	United States of America / Florida / Jacksonville	2024-12-21
21	▶ <a href="https://a.putir.shop">https://a.putir.shop</a> <span>T09...</span>	93.157.106.19	United States of America / Florida / Jacksonville	2024-12-15
22	▶ <a href="https://b.putir.shop">https://b.putir.shop</a> <span>T09...</span>	93.157.106.19	United States of America / Florida / Jacksonville	2024-12-15
23	▶ <a href="https://93.157.106.19">https://93.157.106.19</a> <span>T09...</span>	93.157.106.19	United States of America / Florida / Jacksonville	2024-12-10
24	▶ <a href="https://email.gov.in.indiagov.ws">https://email.gov.in.indiagov.ws</a> <span>T09...</span>	45.202.35.172	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-11-20
25	▶ <a href="https://www.email.gov.in.indiagov.ws">https://www.email.gov.in.indiagov.ws</a> <span>T09...</span>	45.202.35.172	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region / ...	2024-11-20

Figure 20: FOFA results for the title client sign-in






Figure 21: Screenshots of sites impersonating email.gov.in

Phishing-based traps have become more and more sophisticated of late, making it difficult for users to discern. Netizens should be cautious of the links they are clicking and do some basic checks to make sure they are being redirected to the right channel. They should also be cautious of the data that they are revealing and should discern if such information is definitely needed for their query to be solved. Cybersecurity awareness and having a reputed malicious website blocker such as “**K7 Total Security**” can help users stay protected from such online scams.

## References

- <https://x.com/500mk500/status/1887282887331901851>
- <https://x.com/Cyberteam008/status/1881174353376874861>
- [https://github.com/stamparm/maltrail/blob/master/trails/static/malware/apt\\_transparenttribe.txt](https://github.com/stamparm/maltrail/blob/master/trails/static/malware/apt_transparenttribe.txt)

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