

Doppelgänger | Russia-Aligned Influence Operation Targets Germany

 sentinelone.com/labs/doppelganger-russia-aligned-influence-operation-targets-germany/

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Executive Summary

- SentinelLabs and ClearSky Cyber Security have been tracking the activities of a suspected Russia-aligned influence operation network named Doppelgänger.
- We observed Doppelgänger intensively targeting German audiences, coinciding with recent reports from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Der Spiegel.
- The network spreads propaganda and disinformation through news articles focused on current socio-economic and geopolitical topics relevant to the general population.
- Doppelgänger disseminates content criticizing the ruling government coalition and its support for Ukraine, likely aiming to influence public opinion before the upcoming elections in Germany.
- Doppelgänger leverages a substantial network of X accounts, actively participating in coordinated activities to enhance visibility and engage audiences.

Overview

SentinelLabs and ClearSky Cyber Security have been tracking a propaganda and disinformation campaign since late November 2023, highly likely orchestrated by Doppelgänger, a suspected Russia-aligned influence operation network known for its persistent and aggressive tactics. Initially focusing on disseminating anti-Ukraine content following the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Doppelgänger has since broadened its scope, targeting audiences in the US, Israel, Germany, and France.

We observed a significant emphasis by Doppelgänger on targeting German audiences. The network's activities are characterized by consistent efforts to disseminate propaganda and disinformation content, particularly by exploiting current topics of geopolitical and socio-economic significance among the population. The majority of the content seizes every opportunity to criticize the ruling government coalition and its support for Ukraine.

With Doppelgänger activities intensifying in times of frequent political shifts in Germany, we suspect that the network's goal is to erode support for the coalition in light of upcoming European Parliament, municipal, and federal state elections, culminating in federal government elections scheduled for 2025.

While we were documenting the Doppelgänger campaign, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the prominent German media outlet Der Spiegel reported on overlapping activities, highlighting a growing concern about election interference.

In this post, we supplement existing reporting by providing additional technical indicators and insights into Doppelgänger's tactics and disseminated content, with the ultimate goal of further heightening public awareness of this threat.

This report focuses on Doppelgänger activities targeting German audiences; a complementary report by Clearsky Cyber Security delves into the network's targeting of Israel, the United States, and Ukraine. The activities we observed closely resemble and partially overlap with those previously reported by Recorded Future and Meta, indicating the persistent nature of Doppelgänger.

We observed Doppelgänger orchestrating the operation of a large coordinated network of X (formerly known as Twitter) accounts. These accounts propagate content from third-party websites whose content aligns with Doppelgänger propaganda goals, as well as from sites that Doppelgänger itself has created.

The majority of the X accounts we discovered as part of our investigation had not been deactivated at the time of writing. In an effort to maximize visibility and audience engagement, these accounts participate in coordinated activities, such as regularly posting and reposting content from highly popular profiles, as well as engaging with posts from other suspected Doppelgänger-managed accounts.

The posts from these accounts contain links that redirect visitors through two stages to the destination articles intended for consumption. These stages implement obfuscation and tracking techniques. Coupled with the carefully constructed infrastructure management practices we observed Doppelgänger implementing, this underscores the network's determination to operate without interruptions while effectively tracking the performance of its influence operations.

Redirection Stages

The first-stage websites, which Doppelgänger distributes on X, use thumbnail images hosted at [telegra\[.\]ph](#) to obfuscate the website thumbnails and redirect to second-stage sites.

```

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
|   <title>Der Wertewesten kommt</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<meta name="twitter:card" content="summary_large_image">
<meta property="og:title" content="Der Wertewesten kommt"/>
<meta property="twitter:title" content="Der Wertewesten kommt"/>
<meta property="og:description" content="Go West: Life is Business here.
Die Ukraine lernt das gerade. [...]"/>
<meta property="twitter:description" content="Go West: Life is Business here.
Die Ukraine lernt das gerade. [...]"/>
<meta property="og:image" content="https://telegra.ph/file/0c502aca7a9f640a6d78e.png">
<meta property="twitter:image" content="https://telegra.ph/file/0c502aca7a9f640a6d78e.png">
<meta http-equiv='refresh' content='0; url=http://mt-secure-bnk.com/over6461365'>
</head>
<body>
| </body>
</html>

```

First-stage website

The second-stage websites contain text unrelated to the campaign and execute a JavaScript code obfuscated using Base64-encoding.

```

<html lang="en">
  <head>
  |   [...]
  </head>
  <body>
    <div class="header">
      <h1>Website Header</h1>
      <a href="page2.html">Page 2</a>
      <a href="page3.html">Page 3</a>
    </div>

    <div class="content">
      <p>However, currants have begun to rent grapes over the past few months,
      specifically for blackberries associated with their tigers?
      [...]</p>
    </div>

    <div class="footer">
      <p>Website Footer</p>
      <a href="contact.html">Contact</a>
      <a href="about.html">About Us</a>
    </div>
  </body>
  <script src="data:text/javascript;base64,CiAgICAgZnVuY3Rpb24oKSB7CiAgICB2YXlIgbmFtZS
  [...]</script>
</html>

```

Second-stage website

The JavaScript code samples we analyzed issue a request to `ggspace[.]space` (reported as part of previous Doppelgaenger campaigns) or `sdgqaef[.]site`. The request includes tracking information, which is likely a campaign identifier. These are in the format of `[country]-[day]-[month]_[domain]`, where `[domain]` refers to the domain hosting the destination article (`DE-02-01_deintelligenz` for an article hosted at `deintelligenz[.]com`). The IOC table at the end of this post lists some of the campaign identifiers we observed.

```
(function() {
var name = '_BhfrbTJC59dM86Nj';
if (!window._BhfrbTJC59dM86Nj) {
  window._BhfrbTJC59dM86Nj = {
    unique: false,
    ttl: 86400,
    R_PATH: 'https://ggspace.space/DE-21-11_overton-magazin',
  };
}
const _hQF4cQzgj76G5zv8 = localStorage.getItem('config');
if (typeof _hQF4cQzgj76G5zv8 !== 'undefined' && _hQF4cQzgj76G5zv8 !== null) {
  var _3GwcLC2Vdcb9WcH = JSON.parse(_hQF4cQzgj76G5zv8);
  var _Y3JLCzj2psrZJR8V = Math.round(+new Date()/1000);
  if (_3GwcLC2Vdcb9WcH.created_at + window._BhfrbTJC59dM86Nj.ttl < _Y3JLCzj2psrZJR8V) {
    localStorage.removeItem('subId');
    localStorage.removeItem('token');
    localStorage.removeItem('config');
  }
}
var _BWKQC7prhQDjCrTq = localStorage.getItem('subId');
var _kCyTD9J6T5F1NqBF = localStorage.getItem('token');
var _fMSn9yQVPxgdgpw3 = '?return=js.client';
_fMSn9yQVPxgdgpw3 += '&' + decodeURIComponent(window.location.search.replace('?', ''));
_fMSn9yQVPxgdgpw3 += '&se_referrer=' + encodeURIComponent(document.referrer);
[...]
```

```
var a = document.createElement('script');
a.type = 'application/javascript';
a.src = window._BhfrbTJC59dM86Nj.R_PATH + _fMSn9yQVPxgdgpw3;
var s = document.getElementsByTagName('script')[0];
s.parentNode.insertBefore(a, s)
})();
```

Second-stage website: Deobfuscated JavaScript code

In addition, the JavaScript code executed by second-stage websites dynamically loads another JavaScript code provided by `ggspace[.]space` or `sdgqaef[.]site`, which implements logic for generating web content that redirects to a destination article.

```

e.Client=c;
e.client=new c({
  subid:"je7kpt7eol",
  token:"",
  content:{"body":"","
  "headers":["Location: https:\\\\derglaube.com\\dialog-des-glaubens[...]",
  "status":302,
  "contentType":"","

e.default = function (t) {
  if (void 0 !== t.content) {
    if (200 === t.content.status && '' !== t.content.body)
      return document.open(), document.write
      ((o = t.content.body, decodeURIComponent(atob(o).split('').map(function (t) {
        return '%' + ('00' + t.charCodeAt(0).toString(16)).slice(-2);
      })).join(''))), void document.close();
    if (301 === t.content.status || 302 === t.content.status) {
      n = String.prototype.replace, String.prototype.replace = function (t, e) {
        return 'object' == typeof t &&
          t.source.includes('http\\-equiv=[\\\"\\\"']?refresh[\\\"\\\"']?) ? this : n.call(this, t, e);
      };
      var e = t.content.headers[0].replace(/Location:\s+/i, '');
      return document.open(), document.write('<html><head>'),
      document.write('<meta name="referrer" content="never" />'),
      document.write('<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=' + e + '" />'),
      document.write('</head></html>'), void document.close();
    }
  }
}

```

JavaScript code from *sdgqaef[.]site*

sdgqaef[.]site and *ggspace[.]space* host at the */admin* URL path a login page, which has been assessed to be of the Keitaro Tracking System. Doppelgaenger possibly uses Keitaro to track the effectiveness of its campaigns.

The image shows a login page with a light gray border. At the top, it says "Welcome!". Below that are two input fields: the first is labeled "Username" with a person icon, and the second is labeled "Password" with a lock icon. At the bottom, there is a large green button with the text "Sign in" in white.

Login page hosted at *sdgqaef[.]site*

Social Media Activities

Probably in an attempt to increase their visibility, some of the suspected Doppelgänger-managed X accounts we identified regularly post content, which does not necessarily contain first-stage websites, whereas others remain idle for relatively long time periods.

The screenshot shows three tweets from the account 'chareatercost1975' (@chareaterc59681). Each tweet has a profile picture of a green landscape with a path. The first tweet, posted 10 hours ago, says 'おはようございます😊' and has 1 view. The second tweet, posted on Feb 5, says 'おはようございます😊' and has 1 view. The third tweet, posted on Feb 4, says 'おはよ♪' and has 1 view. Below the tweets are navigation tabs for 'Posts', 'Replies', 'Media', and 'Likes', with 'Posts' being the active tab.

The screenshot shows a tweet from the account 'Joseph' (@Joseph673224507) dated Dec 26, 2023. The tweet text is 'Il est clair que Petraeus a négligé certains détails cruciaux.' followed by a blue link 'ssv476.jualpulsapress.xyz/xz7xty'. The account has a profile picture of a person's face.

An active and idle suspected Doppelgänger account

We observed accounts posting content linking to first-stage sites in multiple languages of the targeted audiences. Further, the Doppelgänger’s account network is probably attempting to increase the engagement metrics of posts that link to first-stage websites in a targeted manner through reposts and views. This becomes evident when these metrics are compared with the metrics of posts by the same accounts that do not link to first-stage websites.



Tim @Tim298432442090 · Dec 26, 2023



Meduza ne sera pas là une fois que l'UE et Poutine auront résolu leurs différends. ze5aqy.gamewin31.click/japn2l



1



797



6.2K



Tim @Tim298432442090 · Dec 23, 2023



Es ist beunruhigend, wie viel Geld in einen Konflikt fließt, der längst hätte gelöst sein können. a8zcf5.orange-mpuc.online/r5zflz



947



1



2.9K



Multi-language posts tailored to the targeted audiences



Engagement metric discrepancies

We identified multiple clusters of suspected Doppelgänger-managed accounts which have joined the X platform within the same month. We observed a significant level of coordination in the activities of the accounts within the same cluster, suggesting centralized control. This includes reposting of the same content at almost the same time, typically that of highly popular profiles. In addition, engagement metrics of posts that link to first-stage sites by suspected Doppelgänger accounts within the same cluster often have very similar engagement metrics.



Coordinated activities

 **Marc** @Marc182057 · Dec 26, 2023 ...

Il est vraiment regrettable que l'Occident ne puisse pas dire la même chose. wayzsa.bonus-menarik.xyz/2fillrg



  753   5K  

 **Rounak** @Rounak1685212 · Dec 26, 2023 ...

Pourquoi les pays de l'Est voient-ils dans la Russie un ami, tandis que nous la considérons comme un adversaire? t25nn2.bonus-menarik.xyz/b0r6y2



  787   5.2K  

Engagement metric similarities

Our analysis of the engagement metrics for almost all the accounts we identified revealed a range of reposts between 700 and 2000, with a median value of 883, and a range of views between 613 and 14000, with a median value of 5000.

Propaganda and Disinformation Content

Doppelgänger has been very active in creating websites that host articles for consumption by targeted audiences through the previously described multi-stage approach. Among these sites, there are domains and websites impersonating third-party news outlets, which includes mimicking their design, structure, and domain names, such as [welt\[.\]pm](#) (inauthentic) vs. [welt\[.\]de](#) (authentic) and [faz\[.\]ltd](#) (inauthentic) vs. [faz\[.\]net](#) (authentic). We assess that the rest of the websites we observed have been created by Doppelgänger with original design and structure and no indications of impersonating established news platforms.

In most cases, we observed consistent and regular publishing of new content, with only occasional idle periods lasting a few days at most. Some of the content consists of a blend of materials sourced from other websites and translated into the languages of the targeted audiences.

A closer look at the custom-built websites indicates that Doppelgänger has been making a fast-paced effort to bring its websites online and start distributing content. For example, some sites include template text or exhibit errors in search functionalities. Furthermore, nearly all of these websites lack social media presence. They display icons of social media platforms that link to the domains of these platforms rather than specific profiles.



Template text (emphasis added)

Many of the custom-built websites have been built and are managed using the [WordPress](#) content management system. We observed that some websites display status messages in Russian when users perform content searches and the activity fails with an error, indicating the use of Russian-language WordPress components.



Поиск по запросу: << test >>

There has been a critical error on this website.

[Learn more about troubleshooting WordPress.](#)

WordPress status message translates to “Search for”

The majority of the articles Doppelgänger distributes have a strong anti-government narrative, especially in regard to the government’s support of Ukraine. The article snippets we present below are machine-translated from German into English.

An article at [arbeitspause\[.\]org](#) discusses a recent series of strikes by workers in the German public transport demanding better wages and better working conditions. The challenges relating to the state of workers in this sector, such as rising living costs due to inflation and shortage of workers, are a pressing concern in Germany that captures the attention of the broader population.

Yesterday a plane was unable to take off in Hamburg, Berlin, Hanover, Leipzig/Halle and Stuttgart. According to estimates by the airport association ADV, a total of around 1,100 flights at 11 airports were canceled or delayed by 14 hours. According to estimates, more than 200,000 passengers were affected.

So at the end of this week it can be said that all transport in Germany - trains, planes and now buses - was on strike. This is no longer just a subtle hint, but literally a cry to the government that it is time to take action. But neither Scholz nor his government is rushing to pay attention to the logistics workers. Perhaps they will only react when the company cars can no longer drive out of the Bundestag.

Article snippet from [arbeitspause\[.\]org](#), referencing Scholz, the German chancellor (emphasis added)

On a similar note, another article at [arbeitspause\[.\]org](#) focuses on the recent strikes by German farmers, which involved the blockade of major roads and were motivated by rising living costs and the government's plan to phase out agricultural subsidies. Overlapping at times with the strikes in the public transport sectors, the farmers' strikes have been disrupting mobility and therefore garnered the attention of the population and mass media. Doppelgänger has attempted to capitalize on the momentum by criticizing the government's plan regarding agricultural subsidies, drawing a connection to the government's support for Ukraine.

Politicians should reconsider their spending on the state apparatus and support for Ukraine instead of withdrawing social funds. Otherwise, they will face a massive backlash from citizens and a shortage of supplies in stores.

Article snippet from *arbeitspause[.]org*

An article at [derglaube\[.\]com](#) focuses on the German immigration policy, which, according to some polls, ranks among the top issues for voters in Germany. In addition, the media frequently covers topics relating to the government's allocation of funds for immigration-related programs and services. Consistent with typical Doppelgänger practices, the influence operation network uses this opportunity to cast the government in a negative light and introduce its support for Ukraine into the narrative.

Germany's migration policy is viewed by critics as an economic catastrophe. The **government seems overwhelmed** and seems to be drowning in the chaos of the problems it has created.

Europe is facing an unprecedented wave of refugees, which planned reforms are intended to contain, but the challenges for the coming year remain immense. Germany remains the focus and the implementation of the agreed measures will be crucial.

Article snippet from *derglaube[.]com* (original emphasis)

As Germany faces an internal budget crisis, Chancellor Olaf Scholz is causing a stir by reaffirming his promise to continue supporting Ukraine financially and militarily. This determination raises questions not only about effectiveness but also about the prioritization of national interests.

Article snippet from *derglaube[.]com* (emphasis added)

In an attempt to blend political-oriented propaganda or disinformation among other topics, some websites host articles covering broader subjects such as health, sports, and culture. We observed attempts to introduce propaganda even in such articles. For example, an article hosted at [miastagebuch\[.\]com](#) initially discusses headaches from a medical perspective only to later indicate the German government as one of the major causes of headaches.

But let's look at the causes of headaches. One of the most common triggers for headaches is stress. Emotional stress, professional challenges or personal problems can lead to increased pressure and tension, which in turn can cause headaches.



No wonder: Germans' dissatisfaction with their government and their level of prosperity is growing. Compared to the average European, Germans today are financially worse off. There are even rumors that Germany could become the

Anti-government statements in a health-themed article (emphasis added)

We emphasize that Doppelgänger also targets Germany through articles published by third-party outlets, such as [telepolis\[.\]de](#), [freiewelt\[.\]net](#), [overton-magazin\[.\]de](#), and [deutschlandkurier\[.\]de](#).

The articles from these outlets that Doppelgänger disseminates focus on both domestic and international topics, some with a strong anti-Western narrative. For instance, an article from [overton-magazin\[.\]de](#) portrays the West as profiteering from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, while depicting Ukraine as a *plaything of Western global players* (cit.).

Arrived in the West

Whether Ukraine becomes a NATO or EU member seems to make no difference. The country already belongs to the West and its locusts. Slowly but surely it is becoming apparent that the United States is positioning itself economically to reap the rewards for supporting Ukraine. Not even the death to which this country was subjected is in vain.

Ukraine wanted to orient itself towards the West under President Zelensky, who was still in office. Now it gets to know the West. The place of longing for the Western world, as people in Ukraine will soon realize, does not fulfill all of the wishes that were dreamed of. Maybe not even the modest ones. Now the income and profits are being internationalized; Ukraine has allowed itself to be made a plaything of Western global players in order to secure its sovereignty. This is exactly what it is losing at the moment: to the other side – to the USA and its zone of influence.

Article snippet from *overton-magazin[.]de* (emphasis added)

Additionally, an article from *osthessen-news[.]de* highlights factors such as the Ukraine war and inflation as contributors to economic challenges in Germany, prompting medium-sized companies to consider restructuring due to escalating costs. Issues concerning small- and mid-sized companies are particularly relevant to the broader German audience, given their significant contribution to the country's overall economy.

11/14/23 - Corona, Ukraine war, energy crisis, inflation - the German economy has been in crisis mode for years. Many companies have to adapt - and the state also sees a challenge.

In view of the ongoing crises of recent years, more and more medium-sized companies in Germany are being forced to make fundamental adjustments in their own companies. More than a third of a good 1,000 companies (36 percent) that DZ Bank surveyed now consider restructuring to be relevant in the short term. During the energy crisis a year ago it was a quarter. Companies are struggling with increased costs for energy and raw materials as well as the general economic weakness.

Article snippet from *osthessen-news[.]de*

Infrastructure

The Doppelgänger infrastructure can be structured into four parts subject to different infrastructure management and control practices, with each part designated to hosting the different entities involved in disseminating content for consumption by targeted audiences: the first-stage and second-stage redirection websites, the servers likely used for monitoring campaign performance (*ggspace[.]space* and *sdgqaef[.]site*), and the destination websites.

The first-stage and second-stage websites often shift between a variety of hosting providers, such as Hostinger, Global Internet Solutions, and Digital Ocean. The domains of these websites typically have short lifespans, lasting only several days at a time and recurring multiple times over a few years. We observe that Doppelgänger activates the domains for brief periods during its campaigns before deactivating them again.

The domains of the first-stage websites have a diverse range of top-level domains (TLDs), including generic TLDs such as `.buzz`, `.art`, `.store`, `.site`, and `.online`, as well as country code TLDs like `.co.uk` and `.br`. The domains' format suggests an automated generation approach involving the creation of subdomains and numerical suffixes, for example, `pcrrjx.kredit-money-fun169[.]buzz` and `yzrhk.kredit-money-fun202[.]buzz`.

This strategy, combined with the frequent rotation between hosting providers and the cyclical nature of the domains, indicates an effort by Doppelgänger to evade detection and tracking of its first-stage infrastructure, which is exposed on social media platforms and therefore more likely to be subjected to scrutiny. Doppelgänger does not apply the same domain naming convention to second-stage websites, which are not directly exposed on social media platforms.

Playing a central role in Doppelgänger's campaigns, `ggspace[.]space` and `sdgqaef[.]site` are responsible for both redirection and presumably monitoring campaign performance. They are hosted behind a Cloud-based reverse proxy infrastructure, likely implemented as a security measure to obfuscate their true hosting locations. In contrast to the first-stage and second-stage domains, the active periods of these domains typically span several months during Doppelgänger's campaigns.

Many of the servers hosting the destination websites are managed using cPanel, and some implement geofencing, which restricts traffic to IP addresses from targeted countries. This practice is likely intended to minimize exposure of their infrastructure and content to scrutiny and monitoring by researchers or authorities outside those regions, reducing the likelihood of detection and investigation into Doppelgänger's activities.

The domains of the majority of these websites were first registered in the first quarter of 2023 and some as early as mid-2022, remaining active as of the time of writing. A smaller subset of domains, such as `derglaube[.]com`, which we assess with high confidence as being managed by Doppelgänger at this time, have been active for nearly 10 years, with intermittent periods of inactivity lasting a few years at most.

Conclusions

Doppelgänger represents an active instrument of information warfare, characterized by strategic use of propaganda and disinformation to influence public opinion. The campaign targeting Germany we discussed in this post serves as a compelling example of the persistent and continually evolving nature of Russia-aligned influence operations, which exploit social media and current topics of geopolitical and socio-economic significance to shape perceptions.

We anticipate that Doppelgänger’s activities, targeting not only Germany but also other Western countries, will persist and evolve, particularly in light of the major elections scheduled across the EU and the USA in the coming years. We expect Doppelgänger to continue innovating its infrastructure and obfuscation tactics to make its activities more difficult to detect and disrupt.

We emphasize that countering influence operations requires a comprehensive and collaborative approach, involving enhancing public awareness and media literacy to identify and resist manipulation, alongside prompt and effective actions by social media platforms and infrastructure operators to limit the spread of propaganda and disinformation online.

SentinelLabs continues to monitor Doppelgänger activities and remains committed to timely reporting on its operations to improve public awareness of this threat and mitigate its impact.

Indicators of Compromise

Due to the extensive volume of observed indicators, we present here only a selection, including indicators from parallel campaigns targeting France alongside those targeting German audiences.

Domains

Value	Note
09474w.reyt-cre-ad34[.]buzz	First-stage website
1wfsq.c-majac-ann4[.]buzz	First-stage website
3wk8wa.kariz-good-ad10[.]buzz	First-stage website
62ogyy[.]internetbusinesslondon[.]co[.]uk	First-stage website
6fmb3r[.]great-cred195[.]buzz	First-stage website
allons-y[.]social	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
antiwar[.]com	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
arbeitspause[.]org	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
arizztar[.]com	Second-stage website
bfmtv[.]com	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
bluetoffee-books[.]com	Second-stage website

brennendefrage[.]com	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
buegym.ranking-kariz108[.]buzz	First-stage website
contre-attaque[.]net	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
d6egyr.borafazerfestaoficial[.]online	First-stage website
deintelligenz[.]com	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
derbayerischelowe[.]info	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
derglaube[.]com	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
derrattenfanger[.]net	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
deutschlandkurier[.]de	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
faridmehdipour[.]com	Second-stage website
faz[.]ltd	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
freebooktemplates[.]com	Second-stage website
freiewelt[.]net	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
ggspace[.]space	Server likely used for monitoring campaign performance
grunehummel[.]com	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
histoireetsociete[.]com	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
hungarianconservative[.]com	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
jungefreiheit[.]de	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
kaputteampel[.]com	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
ledialogue[.]fr	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
legrandsoir[.]info	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
leparisien[.]re	Doppelgänger-managed destination website

lildoxi[.]com	Second-stage website
miastagebuch[.]com	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
mt-secure-bnk[.]com	Second-stage website
nice-credits-list266[.]buzz	First-stage website
nw3m7o.samaritana.com[.]br	First-stage website
o21obd.reyt-credbest-mx29[.]buzz	First-stage website
osthessen-news[.]de	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
overton-magazin[.]de	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
pcrrjx.kredit-money-fun169[.]buzz	First-stage website
profesionalvirtual[.]com	Second-stage website
realpeoplesreviews[.]com	Second-stage website
referendud[.]com	Second-stage website
restuapp[.]com	Second-stage website
sbl63p.kredit-money-fun274[.]buzz	First-stage website
sdgqaef[.]site	Server likely used for monitoring campaign performance
sueddeutsche[.]ltd	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
telepolis[.]de	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
uncut-news[.]ch	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
v5yoaq.chilling[.]lol	First-stage website
voltairenet[.]org	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates
wanderfalke[.]net	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
welt[.]pm	Doppelgänger-managed destination website
www.nachdenkseiten[.]de	Third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminates

Campaign Identifiers

DE-02-01_deintelligenz
DE-09-01_derrattenfanger
DE-13-01_nachdenkseiten_-2
DE-13-01_telepolis_-2
DE-15-11_deutschlandkurier
DE-17-11_jungefreiheit
DE-21-11_freiewelt
DE-23-12-2_arbeitspause
DE-23-12-2_arbeitspause
DE-24-11_grunehummel
DE-25-01_brennendefrage
DE-25-01_derglaube
DE-25-01_welt
DE-27-12_faz
DE-27-12_miastagebuch_-2
DE-27-12_sueddeutsche
DE-29-01_derbayerischelowe
FR-03-02_candidat
FR-03-02_lexomnium_-2
FR-04-02_allons-y
FR-13-01_original
FR-19-01_bfmtv_s
FR-23-12-2_franceeteu
FR-23-12-2_leparisien
FR-25-01_la-sante
FR-26-12_hungarianconservative
FR-26-12_lepoint_-2
FR-26-12_voltairenet
FR-27-12_ledialogue
FR-27-12_lesfrontieres

Suspected Doppelgänger-managed X/Twitter Accounts

Ayniyemcca18343
Brent8332812692
ButzlaffF6068
chareaterc59681
Chris423806

Dan2082135
elasagev1981744
Equinoxevt4
Eric69112331297
Eric81026324555
izaguine65954
jacksanbac66126
Jermaine1384705
Jermaine1384705
Jim388251815042
Joseph673224507
Joseph673224507
Kevin1135109
Kristin1039811
Marc182057
Marc1826509
Mark5768674550
MeadowOf43589
MehetabelW87922
MGlasscock91268
Mike3614071710
MingoGerri92116
MissyVoorh3954
MitchamNis5726
MKarg84246
ModestiaH56404
ModestineF72279
MonteroTer52325
MontesRodi62373
moore_tess5916
MorelockSo28285
MorganMcqu33699
MunroHelen78796
MurdockTip96177
myrta53009
NancyOrona49857
NannySpeer51042
NatalaWelb47593
Natasha90680770
NaylorVida41053
NCraighead92692
NFridley71438

Nikki9265841534
NikoliaE39574
NJean52219
NKuehner28951
OClodfelte8787
of_navy23563
of_novelis81275
OlguinElsy987
Oliver1325592
Omar37785134192
Pam807954589169
PauliHarry9140
PegeenD80598
Pete1192428369
Rayshaw78069964
Rounak1685212
Tim298432442090