blog.strikeready.com /blog/russia-nexus-actor-targets-ukraine/

# Russia-nexus actor targets Ukraine

: 7/24/2024

Recently an email was forwarded to Virustotal, appearing to show a ukr.net sender spoofing "Headquarters Police Department" (Головне управління поліції), targeting a government organization related to the Ukrainian economy.

Detection takeaways:

1. the zip attachment was only 341 bytes, and the underlying attachment was even smaller at 134 bytes

2. these very small sizes may bypass filters analysts or tools use to weed out junk files

```
Від кого: "Головне управління поліції" <viddkhpolice@ukr.net>
Кому: < @ukr.net>
Тема: Терміново!
Дата: 23 липня 2024, 12:17:44
Добове зведення ГУНП 23.07.2024
```

\_\_\_

## Дякую

Figure 1: email spoofing a Ukrainian police org

 Attachment
 sha256
 tran:

 терміново\_23\_07\_2024.zip
 c16926a74f8d30b4086057241edc46e88bb0cf675ff5b5ced93ea654ea2b4e26 (urgently \_23\_0

 терміново\_info\_23\_07\_2024.html
 9e49db0eb920e130c0393a87c96434b9f0257025584cf546f623c1cb0b074333 (urgently \_info\_2

Figure 2: attachments to email

The initial HTML was very small, 134 bytes, and was simply a redirect to an external site.

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<meta http-equiv="refresh"content="0;url=http://uasystdoc.com/login/doc.html">
<body>
</body>
</html>
```

Figure 3: simple redirect, perhaps to prevent anti-spam detection

The page content is the below, and one can notice that it's a phishing page for ukr.net, a Ukrainian webmail service. This service is a frequent target for Russia-nexus threat actors.



Figure 4: UKR credential phishing

The doc.html page contains a numerous amount of sig-able artifacts to find similar phishing pages. Signatures need not be written on malicious content to be effective. In the below example, the <head lang="uk"> is unusual. lang= is typically inside a <html> tag instead of <head>, but when you can combine this with other indicators, two weak signals can become a strong signature.

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html class="js desktop">
<head lang="uk">
  <title>Система єлектронного </title>
  <meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  <meta content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" name="viewport">
  <link rel="stylesheet" href="css/bundle.css">
  <link rel="icon" href="images/favicon.ico">
  <script src="js/bundle.js"></script>
</head>
```

Figure 5: snippet of doc.html

## landing pages

landing pages	sha256
doc.html	efd 54 e 566767 de 3 e 35597 da e 60 d 317 b 388460 ff c 2 b 3231 b d 4897 b 254863835 c c
index.html	5d93ee6f0f4e88d06f384a84ec4401100ec6b1d01062af23acebd3f314379be0
file1.html	5b694114129846328da15d79e2bc6a4b19f887e86ae8f0abc6d9572a8b88e4316bc6d9572a8b66d9572a8b66d9572a8b66d9572a8b66d9572a8b66d9572a8b66d9572a8b66d95728bc6d95728bc6d95728bc6d95728bc6d95728bc6d95728bc6d95728bc6d95728bc6d95728bc6d95728bc6d957288b66d95728bc6d95758bc6d95758bc6d9578bc6d9578bc6d95758bc6d9578bc6d9576005728bc6d9575560000000000000000000000000000000000

Figure 6: associated landing pages

Examining the landing pages, we can notice the credentials will be POST'd to a PHP script and then redirected.

```
Courses of the advertise of the state of the
          data-expanded-class="dynalist__title_expanded">Завантажити файл</button>
<div class="cm96uGWL">
                               <form class="_27e9pAZr" method="POST" action="php/dl8.php">
                                         <div class="XC54guCS">
                                                    <label for="id-text-field-0">Імя скриньки</label>
                                                               <div class="E50lnyie">
```

Figure 7: Analysts raise an eyebrow at "dl8"

After the credentials are sent, the PHP script redirects us to a decoy that might be interesting to a Ukrainian target. When analysts see "dl8.php", they typically wonder what may live at "dl1.php", "dl2.php", etc.



Figure 8: decoy content after credentials are entered

After looping through dl[0-9].php, we can harvest a number of other interesting decoy files as well as IOCs.

dl.php 82.221.139[.]200/login/php/1308\_8711629.html dl2.php 82.221.139[.]200/login/php/zrazok.pdf

dl3.php 82.221.139[.]200/login/php/organizations\_kharkiv\_2021\_12\_03-1.xlsx dl4.php 82.221.139[.]200/login/php/47.pdf dl5.php 82.221.139[.]200/login/php/tsu-sbu-vid-13042023-131-site.doc dl6.php ukainua[.]com/login/php/d534990-20240427.pdf dl7.php ukainua[.]com/login/php/Dod\_Zvit\_pro\_kons\_III\_kvartal\_2021\_.pdf dl8.php uasystdoc[.]com/login/php/Dod\_Zvit\_pro\_kons\_III\_kvartal\_2021\_.pdf

Figure 9: credential gathering and decoy redirecting scripts

A sampling of the decoy content is show below.



Figure 10: three of the decoy files from the table above, showing Ukrainian themes

A quick pivot to passivedns through our community account at silentpush shows many likely related domains, shared in our github.

© 	•	Hurrayl I found something to share with you: 0307PM			ask silentpush what domains are resolving to 82.221.139.200 $_{\rm O3.07PH}$	۵
۵,		DOMAIN	FIRST SEEN	LAST SEEN		
8		⊖ ukenlog.com	2024-06-19 13:44:42	2024-07-03 06:03:18		
		e ukrsett.com	2024-06-19 13:44:43	2024-07-22 19:10:15		
		e ukrsets.com	2024-06-11 13:45:10	2024-07-22 23:30:22		
		le uasetukr.com	2024-07-02 13:42:25	2024-07-23 04:14:13		
		uasystnet.com	2024-06-19 17:57:37	2024-07-23 13:42:30		
		() uasystdoc.com	2024-07-20 13:43:16	2024-07-23 13:42:31		
			ltems per page:	10 - 1-10 of 31 < >		
		Type or ask me something			۵.	] 🖊

Figure 11: passive dns for 82.221.139[.]200

Lastly, pivots on the layout of the phishing page, combined with negating legitimate infrastructure, will lead to similar phishing campaign.

IOCs			
105733			
)			

### Phish

## 💁 ukr.net

Добрий день! Відправляємо Вам попередження про безпеку поштової скриньки. З Вашого облікового запису помічена підозріла 3 Вашиото облікового заляку помічена підорліла активність. У нас виникли підстави вважати, що з цісі поштової скриньки здійснювалася розсилка листія з порушенням умов Угоди про використания електронної пошти. У віз'яху зци вівша поштови скринька через 3 доби буде заблокована. Підтвердіть доступ до акарити ціби вь бухи заблокования аккаунту, щоб не бути заблоко З повагою, адміністрація ukr.net

853f21ba9a8a362a9bafc98204eb70b8c23ba845359e694984711ec1485d0c2f

**IOCs** 

Figure 13: Попередження.pdf

# 🚱 ukr.net

Добрий день! Відправляємо Вам попередження про безпеку поштової скриньки. З Вашого облікового запису помічена підозріла актанисть и воссото сама (1) состояти сама (1) активність

accounts.kv-ukr[.]net/login/

#### Vendor

### Threat Actor name

Google Cloud Security (neé Mandiant) UNC3707 You? Get in touch for blog pre-releases!

Figure 14: Other validated vendor names for this actor

Our github provides a download to the raw samples mentioned in the blog, as well as the indicators.

# Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the reviewers, as well as peer vendors, for their comments and corrections. Please get in touch at research@strikeready.com if you have corrections, or would like to collaborate on research.